on what these rebellious groups in order to be able stand a higher chance of countering these groups
effectively. Smith points out that the downfall of the Bush administration was its readiness to
categorize everyone that opposed them as a ‘terrorist” rather than taking the time to differentiate
between terrorist and insurgents. For example, the Taliban was quickly deemed as a terrorist
organization though it is first and foremost an insurgent organization that commits terrorist acts to
propel their cause.
In modern cases today, counter-insurgency is a symbol of political upheaval and revolutionary change
to the insurgent’s society. Often these insurgents engage in irregular warfare methods to resist
counter-insurgents from invading their space. This is currently evident in the Middle East today where
many insurgent groups are fighting against western invasion in order to defend their traditional culture
and repel 21st century western ideals being imposed on them. Thus, insurgency centers on ideological
pursuits whether they be political, economic or religious. Advocates of insurgency have primarily a
strong sense of ressentiment. Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche sums up the ideological backbone
beliefs of insurgents, stating “The miserable, the poor, the powerless alone are the good. You the
noble and the powerful are the evil, the cruel, the godless.” Nietzsche alleges that the ressentiment
produces a different kind of rebellion and reversal of values. This is where the idea that everything is
explained once the oppressor is located, arises. The construction of the ressentiment narrative relies on
the idea that the virtuous have a right to use violence against the evil oppressor and so their cause is
morally justified in their eyes. One must be moral and unambiguous to gather the kind of support that
one needs for a large scale insurgency conflict. The propaganda that insurgency churns out, thrives off
the moral high ground. Indeed it is in great peril of losing validity, if anyone spots that the insurgents
are not in occupation of the moral high ground. In order for insurgents to triumphantly overthrow its
oppressors, the backing and support of civilians is one of the ultimate deciding factors that will secure
its victory. Chinese communist and political theorist Mao Tse-tung predicates the premise where
insurgency will fail without the ideals of the operation synchronizing with the will of the majority.
As such Captain D.F Robinson of the Intelligence Corps argues that the same can be said for counter-
insurgency. It is important for counter-insurgents to recognize their primary target is to win the
“hearts and minds” of the people. Without the allegiance of civilians, insurgents are fighting a losing
battle. Successfulness of counter-insurgency relies on the support of the civilian population as well
and so counter-insurgents have to prioritise the protection of the civilian population. Collateral
damage in battling insurgency has a tendency to lose the support of the civilians. Roman governor
Julius Agricola presents a fundamental underlying principle that must govern counter-insurgency. He
proposes that “Conquest can never be secure while it loads the vanquished with injury and
oppression.” Counter-insurgents have to maintain the moral high ground by acting lawfully in order
to garner support for their cause.
Modern era also presents another facet that counter-insurgency struggles with. Kilcullen spotlights the
predicament of “weaning insurgents away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting
modernisation is increasingly difficult considering the entirely new elements arising from the effects
of globalisation and technology.”
Invention of new technology, it can be argued, has steadily allowed more and more people to
simultaneously interact and to share the same ideologies concerning the world beyond boundaries of
physical proximity. An important and effective tool of technology is mass media. Joshua Barker and
Sharon Kelly in “Technology and Nationalism” argue that the mass media’s capacity “to reach large
numbers of people within a given national territory makes it a popular means by which to spread
nationalist ideas in hopes of creating a unified public.” Communicational technology was now
available to be used for the purposes of unifying a nation, creating and influencing the identity of that
nation by putting forth ideas and messages that work towards mobilizing a community.” Barker and
Kelly further expand that by stating that “A public that was united could be mobilized for political,
social or religious causes. This unification was essential in the nationalist cause, once people could
imagine their fellows as sharing a public culture; it became possible to imagine that this public ought
to share certain fundamental rights and freedoms.” This platform has emerged to be highly
beneficial for insurgents. Now available to them is the widespread of their ideological, be it political
or religious, cause. It has become increasingly easier for them to garner attention and support, both
moral and financially.
Furthermore, modern forms of technology tend to demand an instant and forceful response. Thus it
can be argued that because of this, it lessens contemplation and the time to think on the parts of
counter-insurgents. The dominant state reacts quickly and though it seems to be defending itself from
an uprising that seems to threaten its way of life, stability and cohesion of the community, quick and
rash decisions made can help win more support for the insurgents. Hence it is necessary for counter-
insurgency to act wisely, sympathetic and appropriately. Technology is a platform that goes both
ways. Though classical-insurgency methods have very little to say about modern technology, the same
principles can be applied. To counter insurgents on this front, counter-insurgents still need a campaign
of moral high ground that can be circulated through the same means of technology to counter
insurgent’s efforts on this ground.
Colin S. Gray in “Peace and International Relations” denotes that it is also important for counter-
insurgents to have an appealing and alluring political cause to draw in citizens. He points out that
though the French Army in Algeria were experts in counter-insurgency, France ultimately lost the war
because she lacked the political incentives to propose to Muslim citizens. There was no binding tie
both culturally and politically between the French and Muslims. Thus an enticing political narrative is
crucial in garnering attention and support of the people in order for counter-insurgency to conquer.
The next following step in a successful venture of counter-insurgency is its recognition that the course
of action taken must be in light of the type of war it faces. Counter-actions must be individualised and
customised. Charles Callwell's in 'Small Wars' highlights the necessity to consider the characteristics
of small wars. A big failure of counter-insurgent efforts has been partly due to trying to suppress
these wars with regular warfare tactics. Haviland Smith adduces that America’s second mistake in
wars of counter-insurgency is its inappropriate military response. He criticises America’s heavy
reliance on military might on being the answer to solve all fronts. It is important for the civilian
authorities to be primarily in charge instead of military authorities calling all the shots. Insurgency is
an intricate type of battle, one that must be handled politically. There has to be a strong co-ordination
amongst civilian and military authorities in order to maintain a front of unity.
In other instances where insurgencies have been successful, the military has been guilty of using “big
war methods”. This can be seen in the way American and French militaries have responded to
insurgency in Vietnam. General William Westmoore rounded his troops and indoctrinated them to
fight Vietnamese insurgents akin to regular war methods. In these cases, these counter-insurgents
fought a battle in which they had little to no experience in. Instead they relied on the vast experience
they had in regular war conflict and used tactics derived from there to deal with insurgency and as a
result suffered a humiliating defeat.
Another aspect that has to be greatly utilized by counter-insurgents in order to be advantageous is
usage of intelligence. Intelligence, in history, has long been an efficacious tool that acts like a sword,
often giving the upper hand to the side that employs it more cogently. At the time of World War II,
Britain and the Soviet Union, along with many others, had clandestine operations, in which many
master spies have emanated from. These countries recognized the sheer significance of the role that
intelligence plays in wars. Rightly so, as the outcome of World War II could have been arguably
altered without the presence of these intelligence groups. Intelligence is just as crucial in irregular
warfare as it is in regular warfare. For example, it was through the work of intelligence that a
prominent insurgent leader was finally nabbed. In 2004, American intelligence working along with
the U.S military force was able to annihilate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a notorious and brutal Iraqi
leader of insurgency. Having previously evaded Coalition forces, he was finally nabbed through the
efforts of American intelligence. This effort of intelligence resulted in throwing Al-Qaeda off balance
and amplified the efforts of the U.S military.
The last principle of the doctrine of counter-insurgency involves cutting off the enemy’s from external
support and places of sanctuaries is an essential strategic tactic. Irregular warfare is a protracted
conflict and by isolating these belligerents, it greatly impedes their ability to influence the minds of
the civilians. The Malayan Emergency has been considered to be the textbook case for successful
execution of counter-insurgency and especially so in this principle. In 1948, the British were faced
with the guerrilla movements of Malayan communists. General Sir Harold Briggs’s sweeping
response strategy to the emergency has formed the basis of many counter-insurgency actions. The
Briggs Plan as it has been referred to have four primary goals. The first plan of action involved the
areas which were smaller in size. By seizing control of these areas, the British were able to create a
sense of security and over the course of the protracted conflict, they were able to build and elevate the
“flow of information”. The second course taken was to target and demolish any communist operations
in these small occupied areas. Thirdly, these belligerents were cut off from all their operational
supplies, inclusive of food. Lastly, the definitive striking measure was to force these belligerents into
attacking the military, engaging in a highly advantageous regular warfare.
Thus it is astounding how these principles of doctrine and lessons learnt from the Malayan emergency
were not applied to the counter-insurgency efforts in Cyprus. Instead Field Marshall Harding chose a
path that would lead him to a dead end. He dealt with the insurgency with his police that was
infamous for being plagued with corruption and ruthlessness. This in effect contributed to the cause of
EOKA insurgents, garnering them civilian support effortlessly. Field Marshall Harding’s poor choice
in dealing with the insurgency has led EOKA insurgent leader Colonel Grivas to proclaim that
Harding has “done more than anyone else to keep alive the spirit of Hellenistic resistance in
Cyprus". Harding had failed to learn that an impartial, restrained and disciplined police force was
fundamentally key in establishing effective counter-insurgency in Malaya.
The British counter-insurgency efforts in Northern Ireland in 1969 is another cautionary tale of what
happens when lessons are not heeded from the past. Contrary to the counter-insurgency doctrine, the
British were in support of a highly fanatical and prejudiced police force. The Irish were subjected to
internment without trial and search operations executed were based very loosely on intelligence and in
turn led to the direct colossal failure of British counter-insurgency efforts.
It therefore seemingly appears baffling how the doctrine and lessons of counter-insurgency continues
to be ignored. History is essentially the consciousness of the past. It is through it that attaining a
purposeful direction becomes possible. Why are these lessons then falling on deaf ears? John Kiszely
identifies this continuous failure to learn from the past to be blamed on the military’s anti-
intellectualism attitudes and adversity to criticism. Sir Michael Howard concurs with the prospect
of the military being anti-intellectual, citing that the history has proved over and over that the British
in particular are predisposed to learning things the “hard way”. Kiszely moreover argues that
perhaps its cultural challenges that are a barrier to the military’s ability to learn. The greatest barrier
that remains to be overcome is the perception that irregular warfare is a type of regular warfare. Along
with the belief that counter-insurgency can be won solely based on military battles. Kiszely points out
that this difficulty stems from the notion that “in the eyes of the warrior, counter-insurgency calls for
some decidedly un-warrior-like qualities, such as emotional intelligence, empathy, subtlety,
sophistication, nuance and political adroitness.” These qualities are still considered to be
unprecedented and the ultimate challenge lies in moulding the perceptions of the military in order to
win.
One has to travel in time to examine the whole spectrum of counter-insurgencies over the last few
centuries to arrive at any acceptable conclusion. Counter-insurgency movements throughout history
have displayed a patchy track record.. The communist march against the nationalist in China and the
subsequent attempts by the nationalist government to counter failed miserably because the communist
were able to win the minds and hearts of the people. The Taliban continue to survive in Afghanistan
despite the massive presence of the US and Nato forces because the terrain are the Taliban’s’ best
ally. The government of the day and its western allies are not able to defeat the Taliban whose hit-
and-run to the mountains strategy is highly effective. In the Middle East, especially Iraq and Palestine,
the suicide bombing tactics are impossible to wipe-out. The Al Qaeda operatives mingle with the
people and are difficult to spot, and suddenly a suicide bomb goes off to devastating effect. .The
Indian government efforts in Kashmir against the Muslim insurgents are difficult to defeat because
they are deeply sheltered in the jungles of Pakistan, sometimes under the Pakistan’s military auspices..
Whilst history has thrown out successes such as the Malayan counter-insurgency of the 1950s, the Sri-
Lankan government’s blow out of the Tamil Tigers, not all the counter-insurgencies have been a
raging success. There are many struggles. One is tempted to draw a religious denominator to the
current struggles of counter-insurgencies in the world. In India, the Middle East, and Tibet, the
religious fervour, albeit among the minority, has gripped these insurgents and made any success
limited and contained for counter-insurgents, who are inevitably governments of the day. The past
insurgencies were politically or ideologically oriented – communism versus democracy. In the
medieval years, it was the church versus the people and landowners versus the poor farmers. The
shape and form of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies may change through the years but the
principles remain constant. It is consistency, decisiveness and learning lessons from the past that often
leads to political victories. If these all-encompassing important aspects of counter-insurgency can be
hammered into the psyche of civilian and military authorities alike, counter-insurgency undoubtedly
stands a chance of overcoming insurgency.
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Kiszely, Op cit., RUSI Journal 151 (6)
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