Perestroika meant the reconstructuring of the economy and at that time this seemed possible. The aim was to set the economy on a path to catch up with Western economies and with Japan, and encourage the introduction of new technologies, all vital for the maintenance of the Soviet Union as a world power. Gorbachev suggested, however, that radical reform was necessary, thus indicating that the measures were to go further than anything previously attempted.
The policy of glasnost, of encouraging a greater openness of discussion was prompted by the belief that the airing of opinions was vital for new ideas to come forward, and that the existing of conflicting views was a normal phenomenon in a modern civilised society. This can be advisable, but maybe at that time it can be seen as not possible as Gorbachev wanted a one party state to remain. He did not want competing parties to enter. As soon as Gorbachev introduced glasnost, this formed the way for factions within the party, which led to internal opposition, and this shows his reforms of glasnost were not ready and possible at that time.
At the 19th Party Conference in July 1988 Gorbachev proposed reforms of the Soviet or the government structures, which had the consequence of undermining the party’s leading role. This tore apart the Perestroika package and put on the agenda, the possibility of a democratic future for the Soviet Union. Gorbachev introduced a Congress of People’s Deputies in which two thirds of the seat should be open to competition on the basis of universal suffrage. The Congress was to elect a Constitutional Court, with the authority to oversee the legality of any constitutional amendments. There was to be a combination of the party’s institutional power and authority with a new basis of legitimacy: electoral accountability. This shows it should not have been advisable because if the party was to retain its power and authority, it was difficult to see what the purpose of the legislature was.
Gorbachev’s policies of reform, especially glasnost created problems as I have mentioned. It was reflected again when in March 1989, elections for the CPD were held. In Moscow, Boris Yeltsin stood. His calls for an end to the special privileges and his attacks upon the party apparatus, his ability to establish a rapport with a crowd made him the people’s hero in Russia. The party apparatus did not know how to fight an election campaign as it never had to before and this tells us that Gorbachev’s reforms at the time were not possible and certainly not advisable.
One could say the establishment of the CPD was not advisable as political authority began to slip away from the leading party bodies to the CPD. The Communist Party still controlled most of the newspapers, and publishing houses, but the provinces received the television programmes, which revealed a party leadership squabbling and unable to compete, which made them, look weak. By the winter of 1989 the party was losing a battle to retain its place as the political authority in the system.
Gorbachev’s inability to convert the CPSU into a genuine instrument of reform was one of the reasons for the failure of perestroika. After Gorbachev experienced Yeltsin’s coup in August 1991, Gorbachev had expected to carry on as before. One could say this was not possible and not advisable to any extent, as he looked out of touch with current realities, reiterating his commitment to the renewal of the Communist Party and to the notions of renewed socialism. Gorbachev had lost the support of the Party’s Liberal wing while not regaining the trust of the Conservatives by 1991. Perestroika was the third major attempt at reform of the Soviet system, following the NEP of the 1920s and Khrushchev’s reforms in the 1950s.
Gorbachev wanted to reform the Communist Party apparatus and he did this by adopting semi-presidentialism. The goal was to create a more dignified and powerful constitutional office distinct from the legislature. Semi-presidentialism had numerous advantages for Gorbachev as separating the posts of head of state (President), and head of government (Prime Minister) elevated the president above the unpleasant business of managing a vast and inefficient bureaucracy, so we can say this was advisable.
Glasnost and the elections had resulted in its losing control of two main resources, which was authority, and undisputed control of the media. The phase of Perestroika was a transitional period. It was characterised by conflicts over economic policy, national issues and political strategies and up to this extent one could say that the Soviet system was not ready for reforms. The very forces Gorbachev hoped to use to implement his reforms, the Party and the Ministerial bureaucracy, resisted his policies. Gorbachev realised the extent of the tasks he was undertaking, but he did not realise the complexity and overestimated the extent to which he had control over events. He introduced democratisation that freed him from the apparat but he created an opposition that constrained him in introducing more reforms. By introducing perestroika and glasnost, he accelerated the system. To conduct the reforms which he intended to, most would argue that an authoritarian system is ideal so Gorbachev did well in introducing perestroika but he should not have introduced glasnost as it brought down authority as it gave people to express dissatisfaction. But having said that, the reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union was not just due to Gorbachev’s reforms, but also because there was a decline in productivity which was depressing the economy and reducing living standards. The size of the Soviet economy masked major distortions, above all the distribution between defence and consumer goods, raw materials and energy extraction, so in this way reforms were advisable as reform of the economy and the political system was essential if the Soviet Union was to meet the challenge of technological and social modernisation.
