The economic trouble that the arms race caused the USSR and its subsequent incapability to keep up with the USA is a major factor in the USA becoming a hegemon, and the ending of the Cold War. The USSR’s centralised, command economy was geared on producing military equipment, paid for by the sale of oil. This led to long standing systemic problems in the economy that had been covered by the sale of large quantities of oil for hard currency. The problem was that “a disproportionate share of the wealth went to non-productive military budgets, or disappeared in the floundering economies...” (LaFeber, 1991: 293). Competing with the ‘supply side’ Reaganomics which saw the USA spending up to 5% of its GDP on weapons, meant the USSR had to spend 50% of its GDP on weapon to keep up in the arms race (LaFeber, 1991: 295). This was not possible and the economy collapsed. The economy was growing at only 0.8% in 1979 (LaFeber, 1991: 293). A major problem was the lack of technology in areas such as farming that led to the USSR, with the largest tillable land, being unable to feed its people. It could be argued when comparing the USSR to a human living standard index it would show it as being a third world country.
The breakaway of some satellite states form the USSR was a substantial factor in ending the Cold War. It led to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the USSR. The breakup came from various satellite sates toppling communist parties in free elections during 1989 such as Hungary in March and Poland in June. These revolutions were possible as a result of a change in Moscow’s policy on protests in Soviet bloc countries from the harsh and brutal Brezhnev Doctrine to the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ which prohibited the use of coercion on Soviet bloc countries, allowing them to do it their way (LaFeber, 1991: 328). The Helsinki conference signed by the USSR in return for economic assistance, stated that “the participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief...”, which made it impossible for the USSR to use force and keep the economic benefits it received by complying with the accords. However, the USSR wasn’t eager to keep a hold of the Soviet bloc both as it was a huge financial drain on the USSR’s economy and there was no need for the ‘buffer zone’ between the USSR and Western Europe as relations between the two had greatly improved. The collapse of the Berlin wall in November 1989 saw the beginning of the re-unification of Germany and another blow to soviet influence in the near east. The fact that no soviet troops were sent to stop the wall being torn down was an overt consequence of perestroika and the Helsinki Accords, along with the end of the Cold War (Crockatt, 2006: 120).
Ronald Reagan was very anticommunist, which doesn’t appear to be a good start for an important factor in ending the Cold War. However, his aggressive stance to the USSR did help to bring the Cold War to an end. For example, his massive spending ($1.6 trillion from 1982-1986 ( Downey, 1983: A17)) on the US military, during the Strategic Defence Initiative crippled the USSR’s economy, and the huge build up of nuclear weapons led to various treaties limiting arms which the USA benefitted more than the USSR from (Bell, 2001: 386).
The suddenness of the collapse of communism defied the predictions of experts. Neo-realism failed to predict the end of the Cold War because it focused on ‘high economies’ and ignored economic and social reasons which were key in why the Cold War ended. This led to Constructivism becoming a main school of thought in International Relations (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2000-2001: 5.53)
In judgement, it was a mixture of American pressure, Soviet economic ruin, the breakup of the satellite states and the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev that led to the end of the Cold War. However, Gorbachev’s radical reforms were the most crucial as they all made it easier to attack the Soviet machine and bring it down by those who resented it, such as Lech Walsea in Poland. The pressure put on the USSR’s economy by the USA with its massive military build-up, and its subsequent collapse made it impossible for the USSR to keep up with the USA and along with Gorbachev’s signing of the various arms treaties, secured the US as a hegemon, ending the bipolar world of the Cold War, along with the Cold War itself.
Bibliography
Books:
John Baylis & Steve Smith. The Globalization of World Politics; An introduction to international relations. 3rd ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Cox. 2006. From the cold war to the war on terror. John Baylis & Steve Smith. The Globalization of World Politics; An introduction to international relations. 3rd ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Crockatt. 2006. The end of the cold war. John Baylis & Steve Smith. The Globalization of World Politics; An introduction to international relations. 3rd ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Walter LeFeber. 1991. America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990. 6th ed. USA. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company.
Electronic journal articles:
Steven G. Brooks &William C. Wohlforth. 2000. Power Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Re-evaluating a Card Mark Case for Ideas, 2000-01. International Security [Online], 25(3), pp. 5-53. Available from JSTOR [accessed 3rd December 2007].
R. Lebow & J. Mueller. 1995. Realism and the End of the Cold War, 1994-95. International Security [Online] 20(2), pp. 185-187. Available from JSTOR [Accessed: 3rd December 2007].
Newspaper articles:
Downey. 1983. We Never Dropped Out of the Arms Race. Washington Post Nov 29 1983. p. A17
Documents:
1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act Helsinki. Available at:
R. Lebow & J. Mueller. 1995. Realism and the End of the Cold War, 1994-95. International Security [Online] 20(2), pp. 185-187. Available from JSTOR [Accessed: 3rd December 2007].
