This analysis would indicate that all wars should conform to this broad model, to enable them to be classed as total or otherwise. However for certain wars this model is applicable for only one side only. For example The Vietnam War was destructive and devastating for the Vietnamese people; mobilised their disadvantaged people (poor villages used as hideouts for the Vietcong); and had a psychological effect on its people; (namely the victory of the communist north over the American backed south). Meanwhile ordinary Americans were only effected when called up, when a son died, or when confronted by war protests. Therefore the Vietnam War can be classed as limited as the USA was only affected by two of the four principles of the Marwick model. Similarly the Arab-Israeli six-day war of 1967 cannot be classed as a total war, as it too only encompassed two of the four points of Marwick’s model, namely strain on social and political structures, and also left a psychological impact on the Palestinian state and society.
The psychological aspect of ‘Total War’ is also seen in propaganda wars which are initiated by the elite to keep control of the common man who is usually at the forefront of any armed conflict, whether civilian or soldier. During World War Two, it was assumed that the Allied press, government and military were of the same class and therefore have the same goals to achieve. Similarly, President Bush’s propaganda campaign to disarm Iraq either by political or military force whilst leaving the majority of Western nations fully armed can be seen both as elitist White Western Male Supremacy politics and as the psychological preparation for war.
In addition to the Vietnam example, there are other types of warfare, which may come under the aegis of total war. For example, although the First World War has been described as the beginning of the age of Total War, the Thirty Years War (1618-48) could also be classed as a total war. This is according to Chickering’s “indices”, those being the extent of destruction and motivating force of ideological animosity allied with the ‘war aims’ of each of the nations. This began as a war of religion in Bohemia, and spread to include several belligerent nations across Europe, and led to the inclusion and casualties of German civilians, namely 300,000 killed in battle, and many deaths resulting from malnutrition and disease, and also civilian persecution by ill-disciplined soldiers. The Thirty Years War, however, did not involve weapons of mass killing, and whilst considered major in history, is relatively minor in terms of death toll. Similarly, the current ‘War on Terror’ being carried out by the United Nations may not classed as a Total War for those nations, despite the fact that it fulfils the criteria of ideological animosity. For Al-Quaeda however, a socio-religious organisation, the war of terror is a spiritual war against all non-Islamic culture; ergo for them this is a total war because it involves the spiritual dimension, and for its members Jihad is a total and lifelong war. The interesting aspect of Al-Quaeda’s war is that whilst it does involve a national cause, i.e. the protection of holy Arabia from non-Muslim presence, it does not have one particular nationality fighting for this; nor is Saudi Arabia as a nation mobilised for this purpose. Hans-Peter Gasser argues, in an article about the treatment of Al-Quaeda prisoners, that this war should not be allowed to degenerate into a “total war”. However for the Al-Quaeda organisation this is already a total war, and therein lies the difficulty in the definition of the term. Thus ‘Total War’ may be asymmetrical as the geographical or geopolitical location of the War will dictate the lifestyle of the local population, socio-religious or socio-political organisation involved.
Thusly, the two great Total Wars of the 20th century had marked differences; World War One was fought mainly in France, but is can be classed as total by the number of belligerent nations, and the participation of civilians in war work. World War Two was characterised with the same basic principles, but was spread from the war of the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Pacific war in the east; truly war on a global scale. World War Two also had the added danger of the mass involvement of civilians, either through bombing, in the hope that this would affect morale, as well as disrupting war production, and also deportations to Nazi death camps for Jewish civilians in occupied Europe. In addition to this, World War Two saw the dawning of the age of the ultimate weapon of mass destruction, the Atomic Bomb.
The advent of Total War can be traced to the mechanisation of industry, and to the complete overhaul of European armed forces, with the general mobilisation of economies and civilians for war work. This phenomenon can be traced to the American Civil War and is an argument taken up by Chickering, and also John Roberts. Indeed when David Lloyd-George took office as British Prime Minister, he explained the Liberal party’s shift in war policy thus; that in time of war “A democratic government in time of war [had] the right to commandeer every resource, every power, life, limb, wealth, and everything else for the interest of the state”. This full civilian mobilisation for war work, as well as the advent of war economies is crucial to the development of total war. However parallel to this was the invention and development of the aeroplane and airship and these would enable belligerent powers to attack targets within enemy boundaries, thus spreading war away from the battlefield, resulting in the mass bomber raids of World War Two. But as Peter Calvocoressi argues, the use of mass bombing is the most modern way of frightening of the enemy in war. The bombing of Britain during the First World War resulted in 1,400 deaths, but lent viability to the strategic possibilities of the tactic. Consequently air power tactics were developed during the inter-war years, although air force sizes did not increase significantly until the advent and growth of the Luftwaffe as a fighting force in 1935. Guilio Douhet had advocated the new tactic of mass terror bombing, as a means to break civilian enemy morale. This was fully tested during the first ever carpet bombing raid to terrorise civilians, undertaken during the Spanish Civil War at Guernica on the 26th April 1937, and repeated at Warsaw and Rotterdam during World War Two. However in certain quarters this form of attack was seen as immoral, and was ineffective to British civilian morale when employed as a tactic during the 1940-41 blitz. With all factories being turned over to war production during World War Two, mass bomber raids became a regular occurrence in Britain between 1940-43 and in Germany from 1940-45. In the absence of efficient precision bombing methods on both sides it was inevitable that civilians would bear the brunt of these assaults, and for Germany would result in the fire-bombings of Hamburg in 1942 (circa 50,000 killed), and Dresden in 1945 (circa 70,000 killed). These figures though, were dwarfed once the Americans came within air range of Japan in 1945, and all major Japanese cities were subjected to firebombing raids. In Tokyo alone between 70 and 140,000 people were killed. Finally the ultimate Total War weapon was used against civilians, the Atomic Bomb, which was dropped on Hiroshima on 6th August 1945, and Nagasaki on the 9th August 1945.
To conclude, the one-sided nature of warfare in contemporary times makes Marwick’s Total War Model evermore difficult to put wars into the “Total” category. Therefore this essay has discussed that the definition of Total War depends on the person fighting it, and can be a de-nationalised or non-nationalised phenomenon, for example Al-Quaeda. Furthermore as Buckley argues air power and mass mobilisation seen on the scale of World War One and World War Two is precluded by technological, economic and political advances. Consequently, even though technological, economic and political advances made Total War possible, the more powerful nations of this world are attempting to ensure asymmetricality in the conflicts they engage with; for example Saddam Hussein must give up his countries weapons of mass destruction, whilst the western powers keep theirs. Nonetheless, a personal interpretation of Total War is thus; the participation of a nation in a war, and the mobilisation of that nation’s entire resources for the prosecution of that war.
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