Bismarck was extremely cunning in how he solved this problem. He did so by finding a common cause. Both Prussia under the Kaiser and Bismarck as well as the national-liberals wanted a unified Germany that would be effective. The common cause Bismarck used to manipulate his relationship with the National-liberal party was the Kulturkampf policy.
The catholic based Center party or Zentrum under Ludwig Windhorst, had opposed Bismarck’s kleindeutsch unification since 1859. The center party identified itself with polish representation drawing wide electoral support and able to be officially recognized as the second largest political party in the Reichstag. There was a strong belief by Bismarck that Windhorst and his Zentrum were a political force to be reckoned with because of the accreditation given to Windhorst as a practical and effective parliamentarian. Support for this political group was very strong and remained so throughout Bismarck’s period. Between 1870 and 1914 the support for the CP (center party) was constant at around 25%.
Bismarck declared war on this party in 1970 however the war between them had been present since 1859 and Bismarck had only just recognized this. This point is picked up by Simon who explains this idea “…Bismarck declared war on the party…Bismarck initiated everything that happened around him…Bismarck became active only at a time when the conflict was already relatively far advanced” It would be a fair assessment to make that Bismarck had inadvertently created his own problems by wanting to satisfy both his Junker ancestral allies and his new found friends the National-liberals. His inabilities to balance this problem effectively lead to another problem regarding religion in the form of the Kulturkampf situation.
This problem Bismarck faced politically inadvertently lead to another with the Vatican. Pope Pius IX was anti-modern and anti-progressive and he wanted to synchronise the new unified Germany with religion and that the church should be the foundation for control. The CP believed that such freedoms born from the 1848 revolution would lead ultimately to freedom of thinking, creed and will lead people to commit sins.
Bismarck was skeptical about the ‘old catholic’ ideology and was an issue raised in the Reichstag in March 1871. Bismarck began to become disillusioned with the attitude of the center party and consequently identified to the rest of the political parties in the Reichstag that they had become hostile to the state (reichsfeindlich) and a gap had opened up between them. Bismarck’s main problem with them lay in a conflict of best interests regarding the German integration of a constitution.
The center party wanted the bill of rights set out by the Prussian constitution incorporated into the imperial constitution. However the liberal nationals preferred to include the fundamental rights drawn up in Frankfurt in 1848, which were not as pro-catholic in origin. Simon’s comments that “This was the sort of issue Bismarck feared, that might not only cement the alliance between the center and the poles but also attract some progressives to the catholic cause” There evidence that Bismarck was caught in two minds because he couldn’t satisfy the national-liberals or the growing CP party.
Bismarck’s personality can be attributed to the solving of this problem in my opinion. Bruce Waller makes a comment about Bismarck by saying that “… [He] was larger than life in every meaning of the word” Bismarck’s physical appearance was enormous at nineteen stone possessing a good strong physical character too. It is this stature that I believe goes partially to accounting to his ability to stamp his authority in the Reichstag and over his growing peers in the form of the CP.
The suggestion about extending the Prussian constitution into the imperial constitution was seen by Bismarck as an attack on democracy and everything the French revolution of 1848 stood for. Socialism was presented as a sin by the CP and the RCC (Roman Catholic Church). The institutional structure of German society was questioned such as civil marriages, divorce and temporal powers believed by the CP to be separate from any democratic form of government.
By the March of 1872 the Prussian parliament the Landtag had passed a law placing the supervision of all schools in the hands of the state. By June 1872 Albert Falk employed a vigorous anti-catholic decree, stopping all members of religious orders teaching in schools. By the following year Falk had successfully under the ‘May Laws’ subordinated all church life to state regulation. However RCC was not the only religious group to be targeted by Bismarck and Falk. In July 1872 the Reichstag had created a popular petition banning Jesuits from Reich territory and became known as the Jesuitengesetz.
However the passing of the May Laws did not stop the Roman Catholic religion from taking route and if anything Bismarck and Falk had only encouraged them. The Prussian state reacted by imprisoning priests and bishops. Further state pressures were applied through the Prussian Landtag law of March 1874 which introduced civil marriages and the Prussian Klostergesetz to dissolve all monastic orders within Prussia.
I believe a fair assessment of Bismarck should consider the fact that he was consequently caught up in two minds over whom to side with and instead appeased both the liberal-nationals and the Junkers in the Reichstag parliament. Bismarck can be seen as successfully resolving the problems he faced at home. He had influence stature and the ability to orchestrate a solution whereby the status quo of Germany was preserved.
Bismarck had internally made Germany a success with rapid economic development and introduction and implementation of the gold standard. But his downfall came with him segregating the RC society and its influence on the South and Western German states which would lead to his failure and resignation as the first chancellor of the unified German states under Germany.
The Kulturkampf failed to achieve its goals and, if anything, convinced the Catholic majority that the fear of persecution was real to them. The death of Pope Pius IX in 1878 bought Bismarck to relax his growing personal relented feelings to the campaign. But he still had resentment for the leader of the CP Ludwig Windhorst.
By 1878 Bismarck became more bothered about the events happening in Europe regarding the economic depression it was going through. Tariffs were introduced on iron and major grains to stop cheap imports effecting Germanys thriving economy. The rise of social democracy under Bismarck saw the Junkers (German landowners) become the main opposition to political reform.
Bismarck’s disillusionment continued and he saw the Socialists and Anarchists as his main threat in parliament. Although only two socialists were ever elected into the Reichstag, during Bismarck’s reign in 1871, they were blamed for the two assassination attempts on the Kaiser and dubbed by Bismarck as “…this country’s rats that should be exterminated”. By the end of Bismarck’s rein as chancellor in 1890 the socialist’s controlled 35 seats in the Reichstag.
Bismarck’s strategy to destroy social democracy was the introduction of social legislation to prevent workers becoming involved with radical ideas held by the socialists. Accident and old age insurance as well as medicine were used as a tool to appease these growing feelings. However Bismarck was unsuccessful in this two way approach. He couldn’t strategically win workers and conservatives with conflicting ideas and so support for social democrats increased. By the time of the 1890 election Bismarck found enemies in the form of the CP, SD and the progressives and so was inevitably doomed to fail. He resigned at sixty-five years old and fearing a bloodbath coup d’ e’tat by the state a new younger emperor was announce William II.
Bibliography:
K.A. Lerma – Bismarck, Longman, 2004
G. Layton - From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890-1933, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995
E.J. Passant – A short history of Germany, Cambridge University press, 1979
W.M. Simon – Germany in the age of Bismarck, George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1968
B. Waller – Bismarck, Blackwell publishers, 1997
D.G Williamson – Bismarck and Germany, Longman, 1998
W.M. Simon – Germany in the age of Bismarck (George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1968) page 39
E.J Passant – A Short history of Germany 1815-1945 (Cambridge University press, 1979) page 85
W.M. Simon – Germany in the age of Bismarck (George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1968) page 48
B. Waller – Bismarck (Blackwell publishers, 1997) page 103