Why, and with what consequences did Charles I fail to defeat the Covenanters in 1639-1640?

by lhughes94 (student)

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

In 1637 King Charles I's introduction of the Book of Common Prayer to Scotland sparked widespread social unrest and rioting in Edinburgh. This led to the formation of the National Covenanters which was an Scottish Presbyterian alliance who opposed Charles's religious reforms in Scotland. This resulted in two conflicts in 1649 and in 1640 fought between Charles and the National Covenanters, collectively known as the Bishops' wars. There has been much debate between historians such as Adamson and Gentles over the reasons and consequences of Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters. The most significant reasons why Charles failed to defeat the Scots between 1639 and 1640 was a combination of lack of support from the Short Parliament, a chronic lack of funds and the superior quality of the Covenanters' Army. The significant consequences of Charles's defeat include destabilisation within Charles's three Kingdoms, rebellion in Ireland and the onset of the Long Parliament. This essay will be organised into two parts, the first section will examine the specific reasons why Charles failed to defeat the Covenanters while the second section will focus on the consequences of Charles's failure.

Firstly it is important to assess Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters in the First Bishops' War of 1639. David Scott states that 'the Scot's military preparations were more than matched by the King's own – at least on paper'. This is true to an extent as Charles and his advisers drew up an extensive war plan for the campaign against the Covenanters. The marquess of Hamilton was to launch an amphibious assault on Scotland's eastern coast, the Earl of Strafford was to raise ten thousand men in Ireland and Charles himself was to march an English Army to the Scottish border. However in reality these plans were too ambitious, as Strafford failed to raise enough men and Hamilton's naval plans failed to come to fruition. It is also fair to say that Charles underestimated the resolve of the Covenanters. Scott states that 'Charles seems to have believed that merely by marching an army to the border he would intimidate the Covenanters into submission'. This view was not just shared by the King but also by the Earl of Clarendon who wrote 'the glory of such a visible appearance of the whole nobility would at once terrify the Scots'. However this was a naive view. The Scots led by Alexander Leslie were highly religiously motivated and refused to back down, as they saw their religious principles and ideals under threat. The Covenanters Army was highly organised, extremely determined and was made up of a large amount of experienced veterans who had fought for the protestant cause on the continent. The Scots also called upon the services of veteran Mercenaries from Northern Europe. In contrast Ackroyd states that Charles's English Army was 'ill organised and largely apathetic'. It is fair to say that Charles's Army lacked the same intense motivation as the Scots did and many English Protestants actually sympathised with the Covenanters cause. It is clear that Charles's Army was inexperienced, under trained and inferior to the one put together by the Covenanters. Hamilton wrote to the King stating 'you will find it work of great difficulty and of vast expense to curb them by force, their power being greater, their combination being stronger than can be imagined'. Furthermore Charles's campaign was compounded by lack of funds, only two hundred thousand pounds was allocated for the whole campaign. By May 1649 the Lord Treasurer had announced that the revenue had been exhausted and Sir Edmund Verney wrote to his son 'our men are very raw, our arms of all sorts naught, our victuals scarce, and provision for horses worse' this quote emphasis the lack of funds and provisions the King's forces suffered. The King clearly did not have the required funds necessary to fight a long campaign against the Covenanters. By June 1649 the First Bishops' Wars was over with barely any direct conflict between the two sides. In June 1649 the King agreed to the Treaty of Berwick which was seen as a clear victory for the Covenanters. Overall it is clear to see that a combination of the King's naivety, lack of funds and the inferior quality of Charles's Army contributed to Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters in the First Bishops' War. It is now important to assess the reasons why Charles failed to defeat the Covenanters in the Second Bishops' War.

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In 1640 Charles again was at war with the Covenanters. The King's leading advisor by this time was Strafford, who had successfully suppressed opposition in Ireland and believed he could do the same in Scotland. Strafford advised the King to 'go on with an vigorous war, loose and absolved from all rules of government; being reduced to extreme necessity'. This was an expensive approach and to raise the necessary funds a new Parliament was to be called, thus in April 1640 the Short Parliament was summoned and Charles's eleven years of Personal Rule was over. Fissel states that 'the Short Parliament made Charles's predicament in 1640 much worse than in 1639 as elections raised political consciousness throughout the Kingdom'. This is true to a large extent. Rather than voting to provide subsidies for the King's campaign against the Covenanters, the members of the Short Parliament had more pressing grievances to address such as the levying of Ship Money. It is clear that leading members of the Commons such as John Pym symphasised with the Covenanters cause, and there may have been some collusion between Scots and members of the House of Commons. John Adamson has argued that Charles's defeat in 1640 owed as much to the activities of an English fifth column as to anything the Scots did. The refusal to grant subsidies and challenges to Charles's domestic and religious policies by the members of the Commons led to the dissolution of the Short Parliament in May 1640 after just three weeks. This left Charles with no fresh funds for the campaign against the Covenanters and led to what Kishlansky and Morrill have described as 'the single great miscalculation of his career. He decided to invade Scotland without the necessary money'. Again like the First Bishops' War in 1639, the King's Army was crippled by lack of funds. The King's troops were under trained, impoverished and lacked the same level of motivation when compared to the army put together by Leslie. This can clearly be linked back to the 1639 conflict. In addition the leaders of the English Army did not inspire confidence. Gentles states that 'Strafford was a novice, Northumberland was ill; Conway was indecisive and showed poor judgement in his choice of ground'. In contrast Leslie was an efficient and effective leader. The Covenanters invaded Northern England and defeated the English Army at the Battle of Newburn in August 1640, which allowed the Scots to seize control of Newcastle. This forced the King to sign the Treaty of Ripon in October 1640 which left Newcastle in control of the Covenanters. This was another humiliation for Charles and a clear victory again for the Covenanters. Overall it is clear to see that the most significant reason why Charles failed to defeat the Covenanters in the Second Bishops' War was a lack of support from the members of the House of Commons during the Short Parliament, who's refusal to grant the King fresh subsidies had the knock on effect of a poorly funded campaign and an inferior army.

It is also important to examine the consequences of Charles's failure to defeat the Scottish Covenanters between 1639 and 1640. It is clear that the consequences of the King's defeat in the Bishops' Wars had a significant impact on the rest of Charles's Kingdoms rather than just on Scotland itself. The Bishops' Wars sparked the beginning of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. Scott states that 'the consequences of the King's defeat in this war contributed to the Irish Rising of 1641'. This is a fair point as while there were long term causes of the outbreak of the Irish rebellion such as religious grievances held by Irish Catholics, it is fair to say that the destabilisation caused by Charles's defeat against the Covenanters acted as a trigger for a Catholic rebellion in Ireland. As Gentles states the English and Scots were 'preoccupied with their own troubles which presented the Gaelic Irish with an opportunity to rebel'. The King's resources were stretched due to the demands of the Bishops' Wars which provided the context for an Irish rising. Furthermore the absence of Strafford who had now returned to England due to the war with the Covenanters created further opportunity for the Irish Catholics to rebel. Thus in October 1641 the Irish Rebellion had broken out and reports of the massacre of Protestants started to reach London. Overall it is clear to see that Charles's failure to defeat the Scottish Covenanters between 1639 and 1640 had a destabilising effect on the rest of his Kingdoms and provided the right context for the Gaelic Irish to launch a rebellion.

A further significant consequence of Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters was the onset of the Long Parliament. Charles was forced to call a new Parliament in November 1640 as the Bishops' Wars had completely exhausted the King's revenue and the Treaty of Ripon demanded that Charles had to pay the Scots eight hundred and fifty pounds a day during their occupation of Newcastle. Worden states that the calling of the Long Parliament had various negative consequences on Charles as the members of the Commons such as Pym attacked aspects of Charles's Personal Rule and the King's closest advisors such as Strafford and Archbishop Laud. This is true as Parliament forced the King to sign away his right to dissolve the current Parliament, in 1641 Parliament passed the Triennial Act which meant that a new Parliament had to be called every three years and also the Commons impeached Strafford which led to Strafford's execution in which Charles was forced to sign the death warrant. It is also worth noting that within two years of the summoning of the Long Parliament the King and Parliament would be at Civil War. There has been much debate between historians as to when the outbreak of Civil War became inevitable. John Adamson has challenged the view of Conrad Russell and other revisionist historians that England itself lacked sufficient combustible material in 1642 to ignite Civil War yet in 1640. According to this argument only Scottish intervention and the divisions it created injected enough into English society to make it explode. Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters did not make the English Civil War inevitable as Charles still held considerable support within Parliament. Finally it should be noted that the Covenanters would go onto play a key role in the English Civil War and provided support to the Parliamentarians which was a significant factor in the King's defeat. Therefore significant consequences of the King's failure to defeat the Covenanters is the summoning of the Long Parliament which brought about various negative consequences to Charles and the fact that the Covenanters provided support to Parliament during the war which would not have happened if Charles had defeated the Covenanters earlier in 1640.

In conclusion it is clear to see that Charles failed to defeat the Covenanters in the Bishops' Wars of 1639 to 1640 due to a combination of significant factors. Charles failed to gain the support of the Short Parliament as members of Parliament sympathised with the Covenanters and had their own grievances over the policies of Charles's Personal Rule. This lack of support from Parliament resulted in a lack of the necessary subsidies to fund the campaign against the Covenanters, leaving Charles's army underfunded. While the army put together by the Covenanters was highly religiously motivated, included many experienced veterans and an all around stronger force than the one mustered by Charles. These three main factors of lack of support from Parliament, a chronic lack of funds and the superior strength of the Covenanters' Army combined and interlinked to give the Covenanters victory over Charles in the Bishops' Wars of 1639 and 1640. The three most significant consequences of Charles's defeat was firstly the destabilisation it caused which stretched beyond Scotland's borders and was the beginning of the Wars of Three Kingdoms. Charles's failure was a significant factor in the timing of the Irish rebellion in 1641. The Bishops' War left the English preoccupied and Charles's resources fully stretched which gave the Gaelic Irish the opportunity to rebel. A further significant consequence of Charles's defeat was the exhaustion of his finances which forced the King to recall the Long Parliament which raised many new problems for Charles such as the impeachment and execution of Strafford. The onset of the Long Parliament while did not make Civil War inevitable it was still a clear stepping stone towards Civil War in 1642. Finally the third significant consequence of Charles's failure to defeat the Covenanters was it allowed the Covenanters to support Parliament during the English Civil War which gave Parliament a significant advantage over Charles and led to Charles's surrender to the Covenanters in 1647.

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