Why did Imperial Russia succumb to Revolution in 1917?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Darshan Sanghrajka

Matriculation number: 010000962

24th October 2002.

Imperial Russia had thus far survived the evolving forces of political change but in this very observation is the implicit and incorrect perception of uncontested autocratic strength; Indeed Imperial Russia was actually“… a powder keg waiting to explode”, and the essay will illustrate this by initially explaining the immediate catalysing military, political and economical effects caused by the war and then addressing some underlying issues which pre-date the War, back to the grievances of the Emancipation of Serfs in 1861.

The argument is that there was a striking contradiction in the way the country was run; The Tsarist Empire was on one hand, implementing rapid industrialisation whilst simultaneously, attempting to sustain total autocracy. Problematically, both in absolute terms are mutually exclusive. However, had the Tsar compromised by conceding some of his power, the political, economic and social issues fuelled by the pressures of an elongated war, would not have led to the Revolution in 1917. Such contradictions shall be discussed further in this essay.

War was militarily disastrous for Russia, with its inferior industry making her inadequately prepared for war. Defeats occurred even in early 1914, exemplified by Tannenberg. The Tsar’s decision to take over as Commander-in-Chief in August 1915 was disastrous, implementing inadequate military strategies contrary to the experienced advice, for example, the halting of General Brusilov’s offensive in summer 1916. A total of 3.8 million casualties had increased to 9.8 million by 1917, inevitably leading to disillusionment and mass army desertion. Revisionists however, would argue that Nicholas justifiably took command; he wanted to replace the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, because he had become a symbol of Duma criticism. Ironically he became just that. The loss of sympathy from the soldiers would prove critical in February, with the mutiny at the Petrograd Garrison. The high command began to see Nicholas as a liability that could be easily sacrificed for the benefit of war success by 1917, especially since his departure from the capital had such huge political repercussions.

Indeed, leaving Alexandra to administer the country was a vital mistake, drawing public criticism at the nemka (German woman) and Rasputin. The latter’s influencing of the Tsarina’s ministerial appointments, led to further inadequacy. He dismissed a total of 21 ministers and replaced them with completely incompetent ones, for example, appointing Iran Goremykin as Prime Minister, even though he was merely an unsuitable reactionary.

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Consequently, in response to the Government’s critical war campaign, the Centre party members formed the “The Progressive Bloc” in summer 1915. They called for ‘a government of confidence’, a cabinet of ministers who were accountable to the elected Duma and not only to the Tsar. The Tsar however, refused to concede to the Bloc and by the winter of 1916, most believed that Russia’s interests were disadvantaged by Nicholas and Alexandra. Hostility developed with Russia’s backward economy buckling under the pressure of an unpredictably long war.

In addition to the political hostility, the costs of war and over-heated growth had resulted in inflation rising by around 700% between 1914 and 1917. The wartime expenditure rose from 1,500m Roubles in 1914 to 14,500m in 1916. Inversely proportional to government income, the deficit could only be funded through heavy foreign loans and the printing of extra money, hence causing further inflation. Naval blockades cut Russia off from most foreign trade and occupied Russian territory, resulted in the loss of raw material resources and loss of tax levies from an enemy occupied population. The mismanagement of the government is exemplified here with the mistimed prohibition of alcohol sales, resulting in loss of much needed alcohol duties.

Additionally, with around 80% of raw materials channelled towards the war effort, and around 37% (15 million) of the male population conscripted to the army by 1917, there was declining agriculture and industrial productivity in consumer goods such as bread. The inadequate rail network was used to transport conscripts, munitions and food to troop, whilst food for urban consumers simply rotted on railway platforms. Peasants sold a smaller proportion of crops on the market, under the premise, that they were receiving money which was fast depreciating in value and at the same time, with not many consumer goods being produced, they had nothing to purchase. Consequently, renewed industrial strikes caused even more havoc.

Illustrated above, the War, had undermined the Tsarist State and also highlighted existing grievances; these shall now be discussed. Russian Tsarism was a serious issue. Nicholas II had stated “I shall maintain the principle of autocracy just as firmly and unflinchingly as ….by my unforgettable dead father”. As argued, the insistence of this impossibility could only lead to a provocation to revolt. The modernisation stage undermined the autocracy by not only creating a new middle class through industrialisation but also by the economic cost of rapid growth.

Serge Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance’s imposition of heavy taxes had, upset the peasantry who felt that their agrarian interests were being ignored for industry. The Emancipation Act of 1861, gave the peasants freedom but on average, they received 13% less land than they previously cultivated, whilst the nobles kept their disproportionately large estates causing a widening social gulf. Stolypin described his agrarian reforms as a “wager on the sturdy and the strong”. The abolition of peasant communes in 1906, exemplifies this best. Under his reform, peasants in each village community could claim their land as private property, hence encouraging capitalism. However, this did nothing to help the majority of the poorer peasants, who merely wanted the expropriation of land from the nobility. This lead to widespread peasant disturbances which were only controlled through violent suppression.

Essentially, controlling population became more of a problem after 1905, when the limitations of state power were exposed. Such disparagement needed strong control, but there was a serious lack of central control; hence, it was difficult for autocracy to survive when it had to rule thousands of villages run by zemstvo. A feudal country with over a hundred nationalities and over ninety million people could only either be autocratic or anarchic. Russia was overripe for revolution because autocracy was not viable.

The development of the new urban proletariat caused problems, as will be discussed further. Organised political opposition to Tsarism was also developing with members of the Intelligentsia, who had been influenced by their exposure to the Western ideas of liberalism and socialism and were prompted to seek a radical transformation. The two main groups were the liberals and the underground revolutionary parties. This form of opposition was rising and played a significant part in consolidating the movement in February.

This was fuelled by worker’s grievances. Pressure to keep costs low, meant low wages and the consequent discontent manifested itself in the form of strikes, increasing from 2,032 in 1912 to over 3,000 in 1914. “The poverty of most workers and peasants remained. Its persistence was a Damoclean sword dangled over Imperial politics”.

Constitutional issues were also important in bringing about the Revolution. Imperial Russia’s experimentation with, as Alan Wood argues, quasi-constitutional”, politics between 1905-1917, led to the formation of the State Duma and the State Council. Both were designed to install a semblance of democracy to decision making, however, the Duma was controlled entirely by the Tsar. This is highlighted by the Tsar’s dissolution of the first two Dumas by only June 1907. The October Manifesto, served only to appease rather than to reform. Evidently, there was no change to the Tsar’s absolute autocratic power, and no improvements to the Russian system were made; an instrument of positive change in Russia was wasted. Indeed, the Fundamental law of April 1906, stated that the Tsar was the, “Supreme autocratic power.

Additionally, Stolypin, violating the Fundamental Laws, narrowed the franchise to favour the landed nobility and the rich urban classes. Hence, the final two Dumas became increasingly conservative, with a larger number of Octobrists, whilst the Social Democrats and the Trudoviki¸ were marginalised. The Russian masses had no constitutional forum to express themselves in this increasingly conservative State. Indeed, Wood’s summation is rather apt - “…an uncontrolled steamhead of pressure building up inside an inflexible container with no room for expansion, no structural elasticity and no in-built safety valves will inevitably explode and shatter the vessel.” Imperial Russia was merely prolonging an inevitable revolution, with an unbridgeable gulf between the State and society.

Historians agree that war intensified discontent against the Tsarist Government, but beyond that, liberal and Soviet historians disagree about the fundamental link between war and the Revolution. The Liberal historians argue that war reversed the stability that was ensuing before the war. However, this cannot be argued convincingly because the problems that led to the Revolution - the peasants’ demands for land, the workers demands for better working conditions, the inadequate Tsarist government, all pre-dated the War. The stability that the Liberals mention, was merely an illusion.

Soviet historians such as P.V. Volobuev, argue that it was inevitable because the Tsarist state only served the autocracy, thus resulting in cultural backwardness which the masses resented. However, they also state the importance of the Bolsheviks. This is debatable, because although the party did have 24,000 members by 1917, the revolution was led by a discontented proletariat, many of whom were previous revolutionaries from 1905. Both interpretations fail to consider the whole picture and the Revisionist historians such as Richard Pearson formulate a more rounded argument.

In conclusion, the Tsar refused to concede even with the impact of War, which Trotsky later stated - “sharpened all the contradictions, tore the backward masses out of their immobility, and thus prepared the grandiose scale of the catastrophe”. However, as mentioned before, the dual aims of maintaining autocracy and accelerated industrial growth could never be natural bed partners and hence Imperial Russia, succumbed to Revolution in February 1917 and subsequently, in October.