When considering the military achievements of napoleon it is important to asses his motivation, whether moral or merely due to megalomania. In the Memoirs of Napoleon written on ST Helena, Napoleon claims not only to be a great military mind, but also that he was doing it for the greater cause of European unification and liberation as “the defender of nationalities” and he claims “there would have been a single European people”. Historians however, disagree with this claim; Robert Gildea writes “the satellite states were no more than vehicles for making foreigners pay for and fight napoleons wars”. There is an ambiguity in the myth of Napoleon on whether he was on the one hand ruthless and territory-hungry or on the other hand he was civilizing and liberating countries. Perhaps this ambiguity acted as an advantage for Napoleon because some people admired him for his political aspirations and moral justification for his foreign policy (perhaps the educated, enlightened) while others (perhaps the farmers and military leaders) admired him for the ruthlessness, which he used.
It is important to consider why and to what extent people admired Napoleon for his ruthlessness and cruelty. Franklin L. Ford when considering Napoloeon’s cruelty, said he “was indifferent to the suffering of individuals or of entire armies”. During the time of Napoleon it was much more likely for people to admire a cruel leader. Many leaders at the time were known for ruthlessness used in order to gain more territory or keep things in order, and it was considered an asset to the state. According to the Hobbsian account, natural hierarchy is only successful under an absolute ruler who has the rights to be cruel when necessary to keep order. This philosophy represents the thinking at the time in many countries and perhaps in the post-revolutionary disorder, the French were even more inclined to lean towards this type of leadership.
Frank Mclyyn offers an interesting but contradictory assessment of the cruelty attributed to Napoleon. He describes the “crocodile tears” that Napoleon shead on the death of his favourites. This would appear to show that napoleon was a ruthless, cruel man who couldn’t find real tears on the death of a friend. However, Mclynn also illustrates that Leaders such as Hitler or Stalin were a lot more ruthless with peasants and Jews respectively. This illustrates that when considered in context, Napoleon wasn’t as cruel as the myths assured. Mclyyn also claims that Napoleon’s wife said he was not cruel to her, which does indicate his character. Perhaps a degree of myth surrounding his ruthlessness had developed and it caused admiration since it was “fashionable” at the time for a leader to appeal ruthless. If this were the case, it was once again prove that another justification for admiration of Napoleon was more myth that reality.
I shall now assess the role of economic conditions, which lead to admiration towards Napoleon. Economically, France was doing very badly at the time when Napoleon became emperor. England was a superior economy due to the fast industrialisation (as capital gains from her colonial territories such as India), whilst the majority of the French remained farmers. Gordon Wright stresses the impact of Napoleons economic policies as a main reason for why many people admired him. The introduction of the Bank of France and the economic stability it bought benefited both bourgeoisie (better environment for business) and workers (stable wages).
This economic instability was also what most historians say largely contributed to the primary admiration of Adolph Hitler. Many say he would not have become leader were it not for the weak economy and high unemployment. Mao Tse-Tung is another example of how an economic crisis can be a perfect time for a charismatic leader to jump in and grab the admiration of the population through promises of prosperity. This shows us that when people are desperate for food and are promised economic stability, they will admire almost anyone who can promise it and appear to provide it. For example even when Mao’s policies were obviously disastrous, many people wanted to continue admiring him and believing he was the only hope. The rapid advance to popularity of Boulanger during the 1880’s is another example of the French choosing an a leader who wanted a strong executive and more powers, during a time of economic weakness. This illustrates the important role of a weak economy, in bringing a leader to popularity that might not otherwise be so admired, and then once the person is found and the myth is created, people are so hope to believe in it whilst many faults are over looked. Although praised by the French at the time, the actual benefits for the French of the continental system that Napoleon introduced have been put under question. This same human tendency is shown in people’s ability to forgive military blunders because they had already made the decision that he was worthy of admiring unquestionably.
When comparing the attraction to Napoleon with the attraction to these leaders, it becomes more obvious that admiration for Napoleon was less about his personal qualities, but more about the instability and chaos that brought him to the top. In history, we can see that humans have a tendency to be afraid of instability, it is during this time that powerful leaders emerge. This pattern shows us it less about the strengths of the individual leaders and more about the weakness and desperation of human’s nature in times of crisis. Humans put all admiration into a leader such as Mao, Napoleon or Hitler and then when things collapse it is also a face to which they can throw all blame.
How much stability did Napoleon actually bring to France at a time when it was severely needed? The administrative system he introduced, consisting of departments and deputies who ran them, supposedly created order after the chaotic period when adoption from the ancien regime was proving difficult. Almost all historians emphasise this is an important factor that contributed to admiration for Napoleon, both among the French and foreigners. Evidence of this is that even after the Vienna Treaty (1815) where all of France’s developments and European Expansion were almost completely back to the state before the revolution, except the administrative system that napoleon had introduced. However, one could still ask to what extent centralisation is all due to Napoleon or whether it had actually begun to be introduced soon after the revolution. Even if he was the genius behind the system, whether or not he brought order to France is questionable. The period of continual warfare could be considered unfavourable for all social classes. Also, some criticize the centralised system for not taking into consideration local problems, which can then escalate. This criticism of the system would suggest that if Napoleon really wanted to bring order and stability, he would have created a better system of deputies who were more adapt to dealing with local problems rather than being a corrupt political force.
When assessing the role of order and stability, there is no doubt that Napoleon’s absolute rule solved the issues of political unrest, which existed among the heated revolutionary groups. A Radio4 program emphasises the extent to which the French desperately needed ideological structure at the time he came to power. Napoleon “domesticated” the revolution whilst maintaining many of the values that it had worked towards. The Napoleonic code 1804, gives the impression that Napoleon wanted to up hold the revolutionary values, so this can explain why the working classes admired him. However the new authoritarian and hierarchical system (albeit based on merit instead of birth) created respect among the military and bourgeois.
It could be argued that this “domesticating” of the revolution was inevitable and Napoleon was just there when it happened. Often after a revolution there is a natural moderation that follows it. Often (especially in France) a lot of “heat” and rioting is needed to create change in a system, but then it cools down and a compromise can be reached. The revolution of 1848 was quickly followed by a compromise of the Napoleon III, and the radical ideas of the 1870 communards were quickly “domesticated” by the moderate by the moderate liberal leaders of the Third Republic. So, looking through history it becomes obvious that the political compromise that Napoleon found, in order to combine liberalism with stability appears to be a natural fusion, rather than the political originality that people admire him for. Perhaps people projected their own conflicting hopes onto Napoleon; they wanted to have equality and hold onto the values they fought for, but they were also not willing to living political chaos that revolutions can attract. This shows once again that the admiration of napoleon was more to do with the political hopes that the people wanted to project onto any leader, than his actual political competence.
In conclusion, it appears that most of the qualities that people have traditionally admired Napoleon for were either exaggerated and more myth than reality, such as his superb military competence and ruthlessness. Any particularly admirable political aspirations such as the dream for a unified Europe appear to be realised in retrospect by Napoleon and he carefully wrote expanded on his myths on St Helena, and are either lies or were “at least self-deceiving” Mclyyn. Those who would justify the admiration for Napoleon to be because of his administrative system could be refuted because the administrative system was actually beginning to fall into place before napoleon, and it wasn’t effective for reaching all of the needs of the people. Finally, it seems the order and political compromise (between revolutionary values and stability) that he is acclaimed to have introduced, are a natural occurrence, which any leader would have reached.
This theme of people needing a leader and projecting their hopes onto any person available is recurrent in history. This economic situation leading up to the strong, powerful, admired authoritarian leader of China, Germany, Russia and France is another proof that although Napoleon had many strong qualities, history shows us that the key to his success was actually his luck in situation which emerged around him. Human nature is inclined to choose a strong leader in times of difficulty. Gordon Wright wrote, [my italics] “ What the nation wanted was security and peace and it was beginning to think that only a general could achieve them”. This shows that the French would have given as much admiration to any general that happened to show leader ship skills and have the military authority needed to drag their country out of the economic and political instability it was in.
There have been a number of occasions when the French have chosen a strong leader to rescue them from instability. This is evident in the way the French chose Napoleon III in 1851 when he offered strong government and stability. Boulanger, was another charismatic leader that the French were drawn towards owing to his offers of strong executive government during a time of political and economic instability. This shows us the tendency of the French to admire someone, not because of their own qualities, but because of the situation of France in general, around the time they become popular. The French put pressure onto an authoritarian person to help them.
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This follows a trend in history throughout history in societies everywhere, which shows humans are naturally inclined towards admiration, submissiveness to a leader and idolism, especially in times of difficulty. This is occurs within social structures, both on a local level for example tribal chiefs, “elders”, or even a charismatic person taking the lead in a team game, on a national level (leading to authoritarian rule) or even on a supranational level such as powerful religious leaders. The cause of admiration has more to do with human needs for idolism and leadership (someone to put hopes onto or blame when things go wrong) than it does with the qualities of the actual leaders.
Frank Mclynn, Napoleon: A Biography 1997 (p.665)
Gordon Wright: France in Modern Times, 5th edition
Napoleon: Mémorial de Sainte-hélene (in Las Cases, op. cit, ed.Garnier, vol. I, p.306
Robert Gildea: Borders and Barricades, Europe 1800- 1914, 3rd edition (p.57)
Franklin. L. Ford. Europe 1780-1830
Frank Mclynn, Napoleon: A Biography 1997 (p.664)
Eric Hobesbawn: Age of Extremes
Boney’s revenge: October 2005- Battle of Trafalger series (Radio4 online)
Frank Mclynn, Napoleon: A Biography, 1997
Gordon Wright: France in Modern Times, 5th edition