As has become clear, housing was the biggest concern for the electorate in 1945. It is estimated that about two million homes had been destroyed in the Blitz. The destruction that the British people faced during the Second World War was unprecedented. The reaction of the Conservatives and the Labour Party to this problem was vital in the election campaign. It was Labour’s ‘firm and direct’ promise that every family will have ‘a good standard of accommodation’ which was most attractive to the electorate. However unrealistic this aim, the Labour Party’s pledge was exactly in tune with the public mood. The Conservatives did ‘not intend to make promises’ that they were not able to fulfil, and their target in the first two years was 220,000. Indeed even if the Conservatives were pragmatic in their approach to housing, their modest targets were primarily a consequence of party division over nationalisation. The electorate, for reasons which will be examined, was not as fearful of nationalisation as the Conservative Party. A poll taken in 1945 asked which party could best handle post-war housing, 42 per cent favoured a Labour government and only 25 per cent thought the Conservatives were the better choice. The Conservatives failed to convince the public on the most important issue of the election.
There was a great hope for good post-war employment prospects among the electorate; How the respective parties addressed this was very important. Labour wished to direct British resources, boost demand, increase investment and nationalise the Bank of England to ensure full employment. This indicates that Labour was committed to a vast programme of reform in both promoting and protecting jobs. The end of war would mean the winding down of various industries and that jobs would be more difficult to come by because of returning soldiers. British workers wanted immediate personal protection from the potential of economic slump and the Labour Party offered this. The Conservatives, on the other hand, were less clear in the security they would provide. The manifesto reads ‘To find plenty of work with individual liberty to choose one’s job, free enterprise must be given the chance and the encouragement to plan ahead.’ The Conservatives focused on ‘mutual co-operation between industry and the State, rather than control by the State.’. Labour were sensitive to both what the electorate wanted and also to how the Tories would deal with it. They attacked Conservative policy on employment:
Our opponents would be ready to use State action to do the best they can to bolster private industry whenever it plunges the nation into heavy unemployment…our opponents are not ready to draw the conclusion that the sphere of public action must be extended.
This perfectly illustrates intelligent Labour campaigning; strengthening their hold on post-war economic policy. They could disassemble Conservative proposals according to popular opinion which fell in their favour. This favour came from both pre-election issues and the increased integrity Labour policies gained after the Second World War.
Foreign policy after war in Europe was not an important election issue. The manner in which it was dealt with in the respective manifestoes provides a good insight into how receptive each party was to the inclination of the electorate. Foreign policy featured last in Let Us Face the Future for good reason. The voters were not concerned with the war in Japan, they were anxious about immediate domestic issues which would solve post-war problems. Churchill classed decisions made about Japan as of the ‘utmost gravity’. The first two sections on Mr Churchill’s Declaration of Policy to the Electors were ‘Britain and the World’ and ‘The British Empire and Commonwealth’. The Conservative emphasis on this is most probably due to Churchill himself writing the manifesto. The Conservative Party were engrossed in sustaining the British Empire and Churchill’s personality accentuated this. It was not the only time he was to hinder Conservative chances.
Radio and newspapers were the principal channels for popular politics in the election campaigns. There were ten radio broadcasts given by Labour and the Conservatives respectively. The effect of these broadcasts is relatively unclear. The broadcasts, for the most part, reiterated the election manifestoes. The main debate between the parties continued to be the choice of either free enterprise or greater state involvement. The electorate did not learn much more in terms of policy from the broadcasts. They did, however, discover more about who they were voting for.
Winston Churchill’s first radio broadcast is a notorious example of his insensitivity to popular attitudes in post-war Britain. His claim that Labour’s vision of socialism would require ‘some form of Gestapo’ was particularly tasteless, given that the public were first learning about the atrocities committed in the Second World War. Steven Fielding places much emphasis on the comment, ‘by miscalculating public mood Churchill was literally overnight transformed from a national figurehead into a squalid party hack.’ Fielding cites the Gallup poll conducted shortly after the event which found that 69 per cent of those asked thought the Gestapo speech was unsavoury. Mass-Observation also found the speech had caused disenchantment among the electorate about both Churchill’s attitude and British politics in general. Attlee and the Labour Party took advantage of Churchill’s blunder, focusing on how it was Lord Beaverbrook’s dangerous influence over Churchill which was responsible for the ‘politics of the gutter’ which Bevin condemned. Mud-slinging was not popular with the public and was widely criticised, even by The Times, noted for its neutrality on the election.
It is easy to exaggerate the effect of Churchill’s blunder, Paul Addison and Kenneth O. Morgan have provided a more realistic approach to the infamous broadcast. The Gallup poll on 28 May, the day of the broadcast, showed a Labour lead of 16 per cent, this decreased to 9 per cent on 18 June and fell further to 6 per cent on 4 July. Opinion polls had also been against Churchill since 1943, the swing to the Conservatives in June 1945 can only be attributed to his involvement. Much has been made of Churchill’s comments but in reality, their effect on public opinion towards him was not great. The comments highlighted the division in the Conservative Party, and increased speculation that Lord Beaverbrook was somewhat too involved with Conservative public relations. The election thus did not hinge on this mistake, as many commentators suggested in 1945.
Another point of conflict between the two parties was an incident concerning Harold Laski, chairman of the Labour Party. This episode was not the view of the Conservative Party as a whole, but the tactics of Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook. The relationship between the National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Labour Party had always been vague and this was the line the Conservatives were to take in their campaign. Laski claimed that Attlee could not bind the party to any post-war foreign policy commitments and Churchill asked if Labour MPs were dictated to by members of the NEC. Churchill had in fact stumbled across an important problem in the constitution of the Labour Party. Whether this had an effect on the outcome of the election is questionable. The ‘red scare’ was similar to that of the Zinoviev letter in 1924, but in reality it was simply another example of ‘gutter politics’ from the Conservatives. It actually highlighted the ‘defensiveness and lack of serious content in the Conservative programme.’ Like the ‘Gestapo’ incident it emphasised Lord Beaverbrook’s influence to the detriment of the Conservative Party, but it did not influence the outcome of the election.
Although these two individual events cannot be seen as solely responsible for the Conservative defeat, the overall style of the campaigns was important. Churchill’s association with Beaverbrook isolated him from the Conservative Party, and this did not serve to rectify a problem which had been prevalent since the 1930s. Winston Churchill and the Conservative Party were seen by the public as entirely different entities. The Conservative Party was remembered for appeasement and the Great Depression, whilst Churchill was remembered for winning the Second World War. In this sense the campaign was not important in showing Churchill’s ineptitude at gauging popular public opinion, but more his ineptitude in selling the widely unpopular Conservative Party to the electorate. Attlee was extremely different in his approach to the electorate, especially in terms of meeting them. He travelled the country alone with his wife, in contrast to Churchill’s lavish tours with a vast entourage. Not bridging the gap between Churchill and the Conservative Party during the campaign was their biggest failure in 1945. The opinion polls suggest that although Churchill’s methods were unpopular, it was not enough to hinder his personal popularity; however, the longstanding feeling of distrust towards the Conservatives never waned throughout the campaign. The Conservative manifesto, election broadcasts, propaganda and speeches did not solve a problem with roots which lay well before the outbreak of the Second World War.
THE SHIFT TO THE LEFT IN WARTIME BRITAIN
Evacuation during the war was an enormous social upheaval. By 1945 four million people had been evacuated from urban areas to the countryside. It also caused an unprecedented blending of different social classes. The urban poor were evacuated to the affluent countryside, and the vast chasm in social inequality became apparent. Socialists like Margaret Cole saw evacuation as important,
The countryside and the comfortable classes suddenly became painfully aware, in their own persons, of the deep and shameful poverty which exists to-day in the rich cities of England.
Richard Titmuss agreed with Cole’s thought, he argued that evacuation was primarily responsible for the introduction of welfare reform like the 1944 Education Act. It is undeniable that there was widespread concern of the ‘condition of England’ as a direct result of evacuation. Even Neville Chamberlain admitted his surprise at conditions, ‘I never knew that such conditions existed, and I feel ashamed of having been so ignorant’. The mixing of town and countryside was a shocking revelation for the rural middle class. They were astonished at the ill-mannered and unhealthy children that were brought to them.
The astonishment at this revelation however should be scrutinised in terms of what it meant for the shift in public opinion. There is no real evidence to suggest that evacuation was a precursor to the growth of left-wing sentiment. The discovery of such poor living conditions of the urban poor by the rural middle class merely reinforced conclusions that had been drawn well before the war. In their view, ignorance did not lie with the middle class, but in fact with the urban poor. Arthur Marwick for example, takes a more realistic approach to evacuation. He argues that whilst there was increased unease about urban living standards, evacuation did not tear down middle class prejudices of the working class. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo share the view that evacuation did not stop most in the reception areas concluding that working class problems were due to a ‘needlessly unwholesome life-style.’ The effect of evacuation must not be seen as having created a left-wing consensus which swept Labour to victory in 1945.
The destruction caused by German bombers in the first years of the war was immense. The effect this had on the likelihood of voters choosing the Labour Party is disputable. Most major British cities were bombed from September 1940 to May 1941. It was London which was to feel the majority of the force, 60 per cent of the bombs landed on London. The predominantly working-class East End took the full force of the Blitz. It was in London that public shelters like tube stations were used frequently.
The Blitz is often seen as responsible for uniting certain areas of Britain, and in turn, moving towards more left-wing ideas. Angus Calder’s The Myth of the Blitz is the best known rejection of this idea. This view was primarily an expression of local reaction by commentators in the early 1940s, rather than an accurate interpretation of the Blitz as a whole. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo are also sceptical of the actual effect of German bombing on popular attitudes in Britain. They see the Blitz as mostly ‘a private, familial experience’ and it was only London and Liverpool which used communal shelter regularly. The experience was more an exercise in personal safety, rather than communal spirit. In terms of the 1945 election the Blitz may have had a more direct effect on voting patterns. It may not have had a particularly strong impact on left-wing sentiment, but the destruction of housing deeply affected people in wartime Britain. Most of the urban population if not affected themselves, would know someone who had their house damaged or destroyed. The Blitz catalysed the issue of housing and primarily as a result of Conservative dominance of the coalition, the public found government reaction inadequate. For many voters, this would not be forgotten by the election of 1945, and thus the public looked elsewhere for good housing prospects.
The Blitz served to exaggerate the fear of inadequate accommodation in post-war Britain. How politicians reacted to reconstruction and social reform as a whole was also very important. During the Second World War politicians were identified with their stance on reconstruction and social reform because the public were deeply concerned with post-war issues. Social reform was popular in wartime Britain and it was the Beveridge Report of 1942 which garnered the most attention. In total 635,000 copies of the report were sold, it was a best seller, a rarity for a parliamentary report. The focus of the report was three key aspects of poverty; ill health, large families and unemployment. It also outlined potential policies to rectify the situation; a National Health Service, family allowances and policies intent on maintaining full employment. The report rested upon the concept of universalism, the idea that everyone should have access to assistance and that no one could be blamed for their poor economic circumstances.
The reaction of the political parties to the Beveridge Report was important to the 1945 election for several reasons. Firstly, a poll conducted by BIPO found that 88 per cent of those asked thought that the report in full should be implemented as policy. It was also the first time the middle-class had been relatively enthusiastic about the prospect of social reform. The report gained wide publicity for being the largest revolt in parliament against the government during the Second World War. Finally, the Conservatives were still associated with the problem inter-war poverty, and thus their reaction to welfare reform was particularly important.
The House of Commons debated Beveridge in February 1943, but there was significant dissent among Conservative politicians over the ideas put forward. Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir John Anderson, Lord President ‘brought a profound sense of disillusion’ and convinced many that the government was ‘not sincere in its aims for post-war change.’ Once again the Conservative Party were insensitive to the public concern of post-war reconstruction. Immediately after the debate in the Commons, public belief in the implementation of the proposals fell dramatically; only 35 per cent of those asked thought it would become law. The Beveridge Report set out social proposals which were feasible, the public belief of this was at odds with many Conservative sceptics. Churchill himself described Beveridge as an ‘awful windbag and a dreamer’. The radio broadcast he was persuaded to give on the issue reinforced his public aversion to the report.
The Conservative Party did not react intelligently to Beveridge and his proposals. Churchill was insistent that no reform would take place until after the war, and frequently rejected the idea that it would. He rejected proposals of the War Cabinet’s Committee on War Aims and forbade R.A. Butler to proceed with an education bill, for example. This period of rejection of social reform is widely seen as the beginning of the Conservative downfall. The opinion polls found a considerable Labour lead over the Conservatives since 1943. This shift in opinion can be seen as a direct result of the Beveridge Report and political reaction to it. Fielding confirms this assumption; ‘It can be said, with not much exaggeration, that the 1945 general election had been decided two years before it took place.’ Pelling considers the securing of credit for standing behind the proposals as a great help to the Labour Party. The Conservative Party did make concessions to the Labour Party and the reformers for the sake of unity within the coalition, but from 1943 they were firmly established as a party of stagnation.
The Army Bureau of Current Affairs was set up in the Second World War to maintain morale and improve education among the armed forces. Much of the discussion and the pamphlets distributed were about nationalisation, post-war reconstruction and the reform like the Beveridge Report. The Economist described the meetings as providing ‘opportunities for soldiers to discuss the problems in which they as citizens of a democratic country will have an important stake when the war is over.’ Along with party organisation, Conservatives and political commentators immediately blamed the effect of the servicemen’s vote as responsible for Labour’s victory, notably former education minister R.A. Butler argued that the ABCA had a left-wing bias. Undoubtedly, the ABCA would have driven soldiers to more left-wing ideas. Most soldiers recognised Britain as recovering from the depression in the 1930s, and even more so the policy of appeasement which may have made their plight in conflict worse.
It is true that the majority of soldiers would have voted for Labour in the election. The effect of the servicemen’s vote however, has been exaggerated. In fact, only 60 per cent of servicemen voted, accounting for 1,701,000 of a 25,000,000 strong electorate. This clearly does not reflect a 12 per cent swing in Labour’s favour. The ABCA is more accurately described as an opportunity for ‘a smoke and a sleep’ rather than having any serious importance. Whether or not servicemen voted for the Labour Party is irrelevant, the voting figures show that they were only contributors to a wider left-wing swing.
The success of the Red Army on the eastern front is a better example of popular opinion shifting leftward. The Soviet Union was very popular with the British public during the Second World War. Their achievements were well documented by the British press. The Times covered the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army at the Albert Hall. The coverage is firmly appreciative of the Red Army’s triumph in the Battle of Stalingrad;
To-morrow’s anniversary is a reminder that victories so epoch-making as this do not come by chance and cannot be extemporized, but crown the patient and arduous labours of a whole people over many years of constant purpose.
This idea was particularly common in wartime Britain. The Soviet Union and the Red Army were immensely popular throughout the war. A Gallup poll conducted in 1942 suggested that 62 per cent of American soldiers thought Russia was more popular with the British than the United States. The naïve conclusion that the British public were to make as a result of press coverage of the war was that socialism must be efficient. The public were fed stories of Soviet triumphs throughout the war, and the admiration of the Red Army certainly caused many to consider a socialist alternative in Britain. The Red Army’s achievements were juxtaposed to the often negative press garnered by the British war effort in Europe. The Conservative Party were no longer able to use ‘red-scare’ tactics to quell the popularity of the Soviet Union. The Red Army justified socialism through its victories and this certainly increased the swing to the left in the 1945 election.
LABOUR’S ADVANTAGE?
The Labour Party election victory has often been attributed to their natural advantage during the Second World War. Churchill himself blamed party organisation for his loss in 1945; ‘They all did work on the home front which no one else could have done, and at the same time they maintained…their party affiliations.’ Henry Pelling is a proponent of the idea that organisation in the Labour Party was firmly geared for an election. According to Pelling, the NEC was dynamic during the war in improving the electoral machinery of the Labour Party. Trade Union officers were encouraged to contribute to an election fund which would eventually lead to the ability to employ full-time agents. This party organisation was important, the Labour Party were more ready for the 1945 election than they had been for any other. The NEC, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the trade unions were united in their effort to win the election. Labour were able to ride the wave of left-wing sentiment by focusing it towards them through organisational improvements.
There is a problem with the idea that good party organisation contributed to Labour’s victory. Other than recognition of a need to improve, there is little evidence that shows organisation was significantly better than at the start of the war. The local Conservative constituency organisations were closed down for the entirety of the war. The Conservative Party were particularly intent on upholding the electoral truce which was established with the creation of the coalition. In terms of readiness for the election itself, the Conservatives also had more full and part-time agents than the Labour Party. There is little coherence in the idea that wartime organisation or electoral organisation had any real effect on either party’s chances. Both parties were not ideally placed for an election, and thus there is little worth in considering wartime party machinery as an explanation of Labour’s victory.
The effect of mobilisation may provide a better interpretation of Labour’s advantage in the election. State intervention was necessary to both maximise production and produce munitions throughout the war. It is worth noting that a BIPO poll in July 1945 asked if the election result meant the British public wanted sweeping changes like nationalisation or for the Labour Party to govern along existing lines, 56 per cent of those asked declared ‘sweeping changes’. This illustrates the idea that Britain did wish for real change in post-war Britain. The best way to assess the relationship between state and industry is to consider the amount of strike action. Industrial disputes were not significant in wartime Britain. There were days lost a result of differences between state and industry, however, rarely did this last more than a week and it usually remained a local occurrence. Not only did the relationship between state and industry appear to be cordial, it was Labour ministers who oversaw production the home front. Ernest Bevin was Minister for Labour, Hugh Dalton was Minister for Economic Warfare and President of the Board of Trade, and Sir Stafford Cripps was for a time in charge of aircraft production. As a consequence, Labour ministers were able to prove their ability on the home front and were mainly associated with peaceful industrial relations.
It is easy to misinterpret strike action during the war. Striking was illegal during the war, and this would have had a great effect on the figures. It is wrong to assume that because it seemed that state and industry found harmony during the war, it would affect voting patterns afterwards. Stephen Brooke argues that state intervention was unpopular and the public were against ‘the dragooning regimentation and loss of liberty through bureaucratic control.’ He also highlights the fact that some 35 per cent of the population in 1945 thought private enterprise was the only way to provide jobs. Ralph Miliband disagrees with Brooke, he asserts that state intervention was vital for victory, and that millions were better fed as a result. Miliband’s argument is true, but the fact that people were better fed does not explain a 12 per cent shift in the vote to Labour in the general election of 1945. Censorship would also have spread the idea that unions were behaving well and given the impression that state and industry could find an effective peace. The British people recognised that industrial relations could be better as a consequence of the Second World War, but it did not have a major effect on the fortunes of the Labour Party.
Labour’s advantage can be more accurately traced from a distrust of the Conservative Party, which was prevalent from well before the Second World War. This distrust had its origins in both inter-war economic problems and the policy of appeasement. Voters in 1945 faced a very similar situation as they did in 1918. In short, the question was which party was best suited to dealing with the problem of post-war unemployment and housing shortages. Henry Pelling sees the inter-war period as very important to shaping Labour’s advantage in 1945. He argues that although Labour were in office for a very short period their housing record was better than the Conservatives’. The Wheatley Housing Act 1924 was far more effective than Churchill’s ‘housing squads’ for example.
The prospect of unemployment was also worrying for the electorate in 1945. The Conservative-dominated National Government formed in 1931 was widely recognised as not doing enough to soften the blow of the Great Depression. Foreign policy on the whole did not garner much interest in 1945. The Conservative Party were seen as the ‘guilty men’; however it was not responsible for their electoral defeat. The distrust of the Conservative Party did indeed have its roots in the inter-war period; however, it was not until the latter years of the war that this actually fell in Labour’s favour. It is wrong to assume that distrust of the Conservatives manifested itself in the form of Labour support. The only evidence there is of direct support for the Labour Party is from the opinion polls of 1943 onwards.
CONCLUSION
The Labour Party’s victory in 1945 was a surprise to most. Only the opinion polls suggested that Attlee would defeat Churchill in the election and little attention was paid to these fledgling surveys. The spectrum of opinion on the reasons for the Conservative defeat is vast. The essential difference between historians is whether or not the increase in left-wing opinion meant people would vote for the Labour Party, and how the left-wing opinion came about. The reason why historiographical debate over the election is so heated is precisely because public opinion is difficult to assess. An assessment of a democratic election is essentially an exercise of scrutinising public attitudes in the run up to it. The only way to truly understand the outcome of the election result would be to ask the 12 per cent of swing voters what changed their mind during the Second World War. Unfortunately this information does not exist; however, if there was more research into the specifics of the swing vote, we may be able to obtain a more accurate picture of the election.
As a result of this problem, historians are forced to assume what caused the 12 per cent swing towards the Labour Party. In short, the general election result was a combination of poor Conservative campaigning, a distrust of the Conservative Party and a general rise in left-wing sentiment during the Second World War. The idea of a socialist revolution or a radical swing towards the Labour Party is misguided. Socialist ideas became more popular and more acceptable during the Second World War, especially with the middle class which was where Labour gained considerably, but this did not ultimately mean that the Labour Party was guaranteed victory. Both parties went to the polls promising reconstruction and social reform in 1945. It was not Labour’s promise of a ‘Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain’ which caused the swing vote in 1945. The Labour Party’s success was less to do with specific left-wing policies than many historians assert. Housing and social security, for example were very important to the electorate, and whilst they were aware of the Conservative Party’s history of failure in the field, they had no real proof that a Labour government would do any better.
It is more accurate to describe the election result as an example of general disenchantment with the Conservative Party. Winston Churchill, for all his imperfections, was immensely popular, and it was not he, but the Conservative Party itself that lost the election in 1945. They were unable to tame the distrust which had grown from the inter-war years and into wartime Britain. It was from 1940-1945 that the Conservative Party was to justify scepticisms which had existed, albeit on a smaller scale, before the war. The Conservatives were tactless in dealing with the Beveridge Report, and this, as indicated in the opinion polls from 1943 onwards, was the trigger cause of their downfall. Their election campaign was particularly insensitive to the build up of disenchantment among the electorate, and together with the increased credibility of the Labour Party and its policies caused a 12 per cent swing which caused Winston Churchill and the Conservative Party to fall from grace.
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, accessed 25 February 2010
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See for example The Economist, (9 Jan 1945)
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For separation of the Conservative Party and Winston Churchill see, Manchester Guardian, 27 July 1945
Kenneth Harris, Attlee, (London, 1982) pp.255-261
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Quoted in Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson & Nick Tiratsoo, ‘England Arise!’ The Labour Party and popular politics in 1940s Britain, (Manchester, 1995) p.21
Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, (London, 1950) pp.507-517
Quoted in Addison, The Road to 1945, p.72
Arthur Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1974) pp.156-158
Fielding, Thompson & Tiratsoo, ‘England Arise!’, p.22
Fielding, Thompson & Tiratsoo, ‘England Arise!’, p.23
Fielding, Thomspon & Tiratsoo, ‘England Arise!’ , pp 25-26
Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War, (Manchester, 2002) p.231
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Mass Observation File Report 1782-3 ‘Social Security and Parliament’, (May, 1943) p.7
For rigorous explanation and support of the Beveridge Report see The Economist, 5 December 1942
Clive Ponting, Churchill, (London, 1994) pp.707-708
Paul Addison, ‘Churchill and Social Reform’, in Robert Blake & Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), Churchill, (Oxford, 1993) p.72
See Addison, The Road to 1945, p.248
Fielding, ‘What Did “The People” Want?’, p.633
Pelling, ‘The 1945 General Election Reconsidered’, p.411
The Economist, 26 December 1942
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Fielding, ‘What did “The People” Want?’, p.628
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Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Vol.6 Triumph and Tragedy, (London, 1954) p.509
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Richard Sibley, ‘The Swing to Labour During the Second World War: When and Why?’ , Labour History Review, Vol.55 No.1 (1990) p.28
See for exact figures, Fielding, Thompson & Tiratsoo, “England Arise! ”, p.31
Stephen Brooke, ‘The Labour Party and the 1945 general election’, Contemporary British History, 9, 1 (1995) p.10
Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, p.273
Pelling, The Labour Governments, p.32
The Labour Party, Let us Face the Future, (1945)