Why did Tsar Nicholas II Abdicate in 1917?

Two principal liberal parties came to prominence in the period pre-1914 period - The Octobrists and the Kadets.

The Kadets were Constitutional Democrats and while they supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy for the most part the shared a common dislike of Tsar Nicholas II.  They wanted Russia to develop as a constitutional monarchy, in which the power of the Tsar “would be restricted by a democratically elected constituent (national) assembly.” Its most prominent leader was Pavel Milyukov.  The Octobrists were a conservative constitutional party, which according to the traditional view, supported the Monarchy fully, and for the most part supported the Tsar. As M. Lynch mentioned the Octobrists “voiced serious criticism of the … incompetence of the Tsarist government”

 The Rightists were a coalition of all the right wing conservative parties and thus they were both in favor of Monarchy and of the Tsar.

The Progressists was a party block created in 1914, it comprised of and represented fractions of the Kadets, the Octobrists, the Nationalists and the Party of Progressive Industrialists. They stressed the immediate need for “a Ministry of National Confidence”. However, as the tsar and his government continued to show themselves incapable of dealing with the situations at hand, “the Block became the focal point of the political resistance” as it constantly had demands in the direction of the Tsar.

Various groups blamed virtually all of the key figures of the fourth Duma, each group assigning different degrees of fault, for causing the collapse of the Russian Monarchy. Many of the blamed were in fact directly involved in the process of Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication.  This has lead many people to blame Duma members such as: Guchkov and Shulgin (who accepted the abdication) as well as Rodzianko. Although their roles varied they all received huge criticism not only in Russia but also amongst the White emigration after the Civil War (1918-1920).

 Many émigrés had various reasons for blaming Duma members for the fall of Tsarism, and expressed disgust at the actions of virtually all involved. In return to the sharp criticism from the white (pro-monarchist) émigrés Rodzianko was quoted: “Very well, maybe for you I was the author of the revolution… But allow me to ask: where were you and your supporters, when the revolution erupted?... You, gentlemen… did worse. Not only did you evade fighting, but you even hid behind the red ribbons on your chests and continued, in your cushy seats, serving your provisional government which you hated so much.” This quote shows the actions, attitude and position of the majority of the nobility at the time. Very few people understood the weakness of the Russian political institutions. Even Lenin, who had one of the best understandings of the revolutionary situation in Russia, stated seven weeks before the Tsar Abdicated that not he or any of his contemporary revolutionaries would live to see the revolution in Russia.

Since the time of Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication the blame has often fallen on the members of the Duma, and in particular on the Chairman. The Chairman of the Duma was M. V. Rodzianko; he was in the Octobrists party, a monarchist and a supporter of Nicholas II. While many émigrés blamed him for the revolution there are many arguments, which show that in fact his intentions were to save the monarchy, up until March 2 1917, the day before the Tsar abdicated, Rodzianko refused to accept the Tsar’s decision to abdicate. Throughout the period in which Rodzianko was chairman of the Duma he made many attempts at stabilizing the situation in Russia. One such example being his frequent telegrams to the Tsar in which he warned him of the escalation of the revolutionary situation and attempted to save Russia through solutions which he presented to the Tsar, such as: “[Your Majesty must take to] the formation of a government that all people can trust.”  The Tsar brushed off the majority of such telegrams received from Rodzianko as he considered them not to be accurate or immediate. Rodzianko often found possible actions, which could have been ways around the revolution, but never managed or was allowed to achieve or change anything in time. An example of this is Rodzianko’s attempt to organize the Ministry of National Confidence, however by the time the approval came several days later the Soviets were already in place and there was nothing but the abdication of the Tsar that could possibly save the situation. If Rodzianko did not have to deal with the complex bureaucratic system surrounding the Tsar things may have turned out very different.

 Many people at the time of the revolution were monarchists and did not intend to topple the entire system by requesting the abdication of the Tsar. Shulgin and Guchkov are examples of Duma members who were supporters of a Constitutional Monarchy. In the days before the Tsar’s abdication these members of the Duma came to the belief that the only way to save the regime was to remove, who they believed to be, the much disliked Tsar. Many Duma members involved in the abdication process considered that there was no alternative way to save Russia. This belief sprouted from the fact that it was too late for the creation of a Government of National Confidence, and many believed it was simply too late for Tsarism to grasp the situation and deal with it.

The two main sources used in this section are reliable in the information used for several reasons. While Rodzianko’s memoirs may have been writing in a manner to portray himself as attempting to save Tsarism in return to the criticism he received from the white emigration, his position is supported by G. Z. Yoffe. G. Z. Yoffe was a Soviet historian who wrote at the beginning of the Perestroika in the USSR. Thus, while he had access to new unknown sources he to some extent could retain the orthodox soviet view on the matter. These two people who held opposite political views hold the same perspective on the matter of Rodzianko’s actions before the Tsars abdication, Seeing how he supports the idea that Rodzianko was in fact attempting to save the monarchy, Rodzianko’s claim that he attempted to save monarchy can be viewed not as an act of self protection against criticism, but as an objective view of his goals during the period in which he was the chairman of the Duma. In fact, there is a possibility that many émigrés blamed Rodzianko in an attempt to lift some of the blame off of themselves, and seeing how M. V. Rodzianko died in 1924 and thus was not able to protect himself against such claims. It is possible that it was for this reason the false rumors appeared that the abdication and disintegration of the Russian empire were to a large degree the fault of Rodzianko arose.

World War I and the Army Elite’s Effect on the Situation

As visible there are many unclear aspects to Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication. A factor that played a considerable role in his decision to abdicate was the role of the army. The General who was the Chief of the Staff of the Russian army at the time, General M. V. Alekseev, was against the absolute rule of Nicholas II. To the Tsar he reported that when he looked into, and asked the army elite’s attitude towards Nicolas and his political ruling the majority believed that the only way that Russia would ever triumph in the war was if the Tsar and Tsarism were removed. A major cause for his low popularity was the fact that he named himself Commander-in-Chief in 1915, which caused many people to blame him for all the defeats on the Eastern Front (Baltic territories, Poland, and major parts of Byelorussia and Ukraine were lost, these were the most industrially developed regions in Russia).

According to many sources this was very grave news for Tsar Nicolas II. In fact Tsar Nicholas was described as extremely patriotic and very proud, Tsar Nicholas was caught in a disposition in which he could possibly have saved the situation by creating a separate peace with the Germans and the Austrians, this would have returned the loyalty of the soldiers and created millions of able bodied troops available for putting down the constant strikes and rebellions across Russia; however, this would have greatly lowered not only his personal prestige but also that of his country. Another possible consequence is that such a move would have given Germany the possibility to defeat France and the Allies. Due to this fact it is clear what an important role and what a massive impact the army had. Seeing how Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had no desire to continue this war, there was much dissent amongst the troops; the Russian front was described as “…no longer a war zone but a collection of debate groups attempting to solve Russia’s political problems and backwardness.” As visible from contemporaries of that time the soldiers did not want to fight and due to the unexpectedly long continuity of the war, discord amongst the troops continued to grow, obviously leading towards crisis.

Tsar Nicholas decision on his abdication came soon after his realization that he was in a political vacuum in which he had no supporters. Alekseev’s role in this matter is quite important as he participated in gathering the opinions of the army elite, and informing the Tsar of the situation. In telling the Tsar that he had no support from the army the Tsar was given the impression that he was ruling a country in which he had no supporters. This was a major contributing factor to the Tsar Nicholas II’s decision to abdicate.

Contributing Factors to Nicholas II’s Decrease in Popularity

While many various figures involved in government, politics, revolutionary movements, and the army at the time of the Russian revolution can be blamed for the Tsars abdication, the decision came from Tsar himself. If events are considered from this aspect then much of the mysticism of the other versions disappears. While becoming slightly more logical, the act of Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication remains nonetheless shrouded in mystery.

At a time when the Russian people were very superstitious and extremely religious and sensitive towards outsiders there were two figures out of which enemies of the people were established. These were the Tsarina, who was German, and the priest Gregory Rasputin, a shady character who supposedly had a very strong influence on the royal family and their affairs.

Both were disliked greatly not only amongst the lower classes but even amongst the aristocracy. In fact the Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna, a cousin to the Tsar, in a conversation with M. V. Rodzianko said, “Some attempt must be made… The Duma must do something. …She [the Empress] must be annihilated...” She believed that she posed a threat not only to the Royal family but to all of Russia. The use of such strong words clearly shows the general attitude towards the Tsarina. Public opinion was set against the Tsarina in wartime, she was named the cause of the failure in the First World War and accused of selling military secrets to her homeland. The Tsar, Tsarina and Rasputin are tied together quite closely and this immensely hurt their popularity. The Tsar was very much in love with his wife the Tsarina and when he was given the chance either to lose the Empress or lose the throne he abdicated. Rasputin who had been murdered several months prior to Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication in December 1916, had been the theme of many political satires as a dark demon type figure who controlled the Tsar and Tsarina as if they were puppets and he were a puppet master. Although this view was very much exaggerated in the political satire cartoons of the times in order to spark public discontent and anger which lead to more radical views in the direction of the Tsar,  to some degree this influence stands true. While, the contemporaries of Tsar Nicholas II may have over exaggerated Rasputin’s role in government, modern historians view him as an easy scapegoat for revolutionaries with little political interest whatsoever. The Tsar was considered holy throughout Russia and even though living conditions were not very good, there were very few people who demanded the Tsars abdication. This view that there was a devil figure influencing the Tsar is something which would have been much easier for the Russian people to accept, the Tsar’s holiness and innocence remained intact and a need for change could be discussed.

The largest contributing factor to Rasputin’s massive detestation was his rapid rise in confidence amongst the Imperial Couple. In order to understand this envy it is important to be aware of he managed to achieve such heights. Rasputin became a prominent figure in the royal family after he proved his ability to heal the sickly Prince Alexei who suffered from Hemophilia, a disorder of the blood in which it does not clot. The entire royal family was very worried about the young prince as each day was another trial in which he suffered immense pain from a small bang or scratch. In the desperate state that the Tsar and Tsarina were in they turned to any possible means of healing their sickly heir. Where no modern or traditional medicine had any effect, Rasputin managed to relieve the Prince of his suffering. This ability caused him to quickly become a favorite of the royal family as they considered him a blessing from God. On the other hand, to many other people it was known of Rasputin’s unorthodox and unchristian lifestyle, which left many questioning whether this priest’s powers were given by God or by the devil. Whether Rasputin influenced the Tsar and his wife or not is unclear and may never be known; however, the majority of the contemporaries believed that he did. Thus the blame for the Tsar’s incompetent ruling was blamed on Rasputin, finally after his death it is possible that people began to understand that the Tsar’s inept ruling was not due to Rasputin. This could have caused the people to begin revolting in full throttle against the Tsar.

The Tsar was not extremely popular amongst the intelligentsia and even amongst a number of members of the aristocratic class. The Tsar believed very strongly in his God given position as Tsar of the Russian people, for this reason refused to give political freedom and rights to his people. It seems strange that the Tsar would have an all or nothing point of view on the matter. In fact the Tsar refused to abdicate while he felt that in his country he had people who put their absolute confidence in him. The sole reason for his abdication was his understanding that he had no true supporters, in fact he abdicated with the phrase: “There is pure cowardice and deceit surrounding me.”

While many Soviet historians often claim that the Tsar’s abdication had been apparent for some time to come, many western historians do not support this view.  The common Soviet view on the Tsars abdication and revolution is that no matter which Tsar had been in power the revolution would have happened. While many western historians claim that the Tsar was a weak political figure and for this reason he abdicated with out putting up any fight, a new view emerged during the perestroika in which historians claim that the Tsar did in fact do everything within his powers to fight the situation. This theory has a slight Soviet tinge to it in the sense that it hints that the fall of Tsarism did not depend on the Tsar’s personal character but was caused purely by the circumstances.

A considerable large causing factor in Nicholas II’s poor popularity, which led to his abdication, was the fact that he was very badly informed of the events in Russia and Petrograd. While he officially was the only political figure with the right to make decisions his judgment on matters was often slurred and to those in Petrograd, especially in the days of the February revolution, his decisions did not always seem coherent and adequate to the situations at hand. This is something many political officials and activists understood and could have used in order to decrease the popularity of the Tsar. Also many revolutionaries used this as evidence of his indifference towards the people. While this was not the case, the Tsar attempted to return to Petrograd and was literally barred from entering the city during the February revolution just prior to his abdication. This was a vital time in which he could have possibly rid the revolutionary situation. However, on the other hand a numerable amount of the troops meant to protect Petrograd had joined the revolutionary movement and there was considerable danger involved in Tsar Nicolas’s appearance in the capital. While it may seem that the city was in fact dangerous the risk could have saved Tsar Nicolas II the throne.

M. V. Rodzianko’s memoirs, which only cover the time he was in the Duma, are extremely anti-Rasputin. While on one hand this shows the attitude of a contemporary; however, at the same this could be his personal bias. Interestingly enough the role of Rasputin is extremely minimized and hardly mentioned in the writings of more modern historians such as Yoffe, Pipes and Oxley. Although there are many things this could be caused by, it is likely that it means one of the following: either Rasputin was merely portrayed as a major contributor to the downfall of the Tsarist regime after and during the revolution but in truth was a mere scapegoat and modern historians have proven that, or that Soviet historians replaced the role of Rasputin with the inevitability of the revolution and after the fall of communism that view has transferred worldwide and become the revisionist view on the matter. The amount of criticism directed at Rasputin is visible in the title alone of Rodzianko’s memoirs of the time in which he was in the government.

The huge fall in the Tsar’s personal prestige caused many people to question his rule and thus he lost massive support. Such questionable figures surrounding the Tsar such as the devil depicted Rasputin and the German Tsarina,  at a time when Russia was warring with Germany, immensely in a negative way affected his popularity and the amount of trust the people confided in him.

Conclusion

As apparent, it is foolish to seek a single reason or find a single scapegoat on which to blame the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. This event is shrouded in such mystery because no one foresaw this rapid degradation of the political system. While many believed the roots of Russia’s problems were in Nicholas II his removal seemed to be the logical way to save and reestablish Russia. His disappearance in the political system created a void, causing the system to crumble, which the communist party took advantage of. While the depth and degree of participation and roles of various figures is questionable, the fact remains that the massive misunderstandings, poor organization in and lack of power given to the Duma, poor moral and loyalty of the troops and the mysterious and suspicious figures surrounding the Tsar, all contributed greatly to the fall of not only Tsar Nicholas II but the entire Russian Empire.

Word Count - 3990

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Bibliography

1.         Daborn, John. Russia Revolution and Counter-Revolution 1917-1924. 1991. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK.

2.         Evans, David and Jenkins, Jane. Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991. 2001. Hodder and Stoughton. UK

3.         Lynch, Michael. Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924. 1998. Hodder and Stoughton. London, UK.

4.         Morris, T A. European History 1848-1945. 1995. HarperCollins Publishers. London, UK.

5.         Oxley, Peter. Russia 1855-1991 From Tsars to Commissars. 2001. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK.

6.         Pipes, Richard. Three Whys of the Russian Revolution.1998. Pimlico Publishers. London, UK.

7.         Radzinsky, Edward. The Last Czar The Life and Death of Nicholas II. 1992. Doubleday. New York, USA.

8.         Rodzianko, M. V. The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire’s Collapse. 1927. A. M. Philpot Ltd. London, UK.

9.         Service, Robert. The Russian Revolution 1900-1927. 1991. Macmillan Press Ltd. London, UK.

10.         Yoffe, G. Z. Great October and the Epilogue of Tsarism. 1987. Nayka. Moscow.

11.         TV Documentary: Mysteries of the Centuries. 1 Kanal. Russia. October 2002.

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Appendix I

The compositions of Imperial Russia’s four Dumas

Taken from: Lynch, Michael. Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924. 1998. Hodder and Stoughton. London, UK. Pg 50.

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Appendix II

Taken from: Rodzianko, M. V. The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire’s Collapse. 1927. A. M. Philpot Ltd. London, UK. Appendix II, pg 269.

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Appendix III

Taken from: Lynch, Michael. Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924. 1998. Hodder and Stoughton. London, UK. Pg 68.

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