Why was there a Scramble for Africa in the late 19th Century? (68/100)

Expeditions were financed by state leaders in Britain to bring civilisation through commerce and Christianity like those of Livingstone. At the time of this speech Livingstone was at the commission of Lord Palmerston and said “I go back to Africa to try to make an open path for commerce and Christianity”. The difference between the earlier expeditions and those embarked upon by Stanley Morton and Pierre de Brazza, financed by Belgian and French governments respectively in the late 19th century, are evident of the fundamental change in policy and objective made by European states at that time. No longer was the goal humanitarian and the infrastructure “the precursor for commerce, education, civilisation and Christianity” as the Reverent Hughes had written, and it was not the humanitarians that initiated the scramble. The drivers of the scramble were the Great European states in competitive colonisation, but what caused this synchronised change in policy?

Flint's understanding is that “The catalyst which transformed British policy from one of consolidation and economy in the 1870s into coastal partition in the 1880s and the interior expansion in the 1890s was the challenge of French imperialism”. The British fear was that the French would take territory and impose restrictions, taxations and tariffs on British trade in that region, all facets of mercantilism; a trade doctrine Britain had moved decidedly away from and towards Adam Smith's free market in the 18th century. This can certainly be seen as the spark that ignited the scramble as it was the first definitive challenge to what had otherwise been British commercial domination in Africa, but on what basis? The immediate economic implications of French colonisation on free trade prove Wilhelm Mommsen's diagnosis of Imperialism as a “purely political conception” and a “phenomenon of power politics” to be overstated and this is ratified by the necessity for the Berlin Congress of 1885. The General Act of the Berlin Congress 1885 specified that “The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom – In all regions forming the basin of the Congo and its outlets”, an implication that imperial nations had been adopting mercantile policies abroad to benefit the economy of their home nation, as was feared by the British.

Mommsen notes in Theories of Imperialism that both the Liberals that drove capitalism and the Marxists that opposed it recognised that the possibilities for growth were limited and it was therefore important to extend the system to virgin territories. This was most certainly applicable to Britain at the time, as is observed by Thomas August that whilst the British export industries remained substantial until the outbreak of World War I, economic growth was disappointing relative to that of other industrial nations. The prospect of subjugating a new territory in which there resided a vast, inexpensive work force in a continent rich in mineral resources must have seemed attractive to businessmen and financiers alike. Whilst these interests wielded quite considerable power in British parliament ultimately there was still a “marked reluctance to go to the trouble and particularly the expense of taking on any more overseas responsibilities, however much missionaries and merchants urged [governments] to do so”.

Whilst urging merchants to go to Africa to trade and spread commerce the cost of administering dependent territories and of the steadily increasing armaments made necessary by the growing rivalry among the powers was out of all proportion to the economic value of the newly acquired colonies. Because of this it seems unlikely that the potential for financial gain was the motive for the scramble, when considering the distinct lack of it.

Although this could make it seem that the British administration only colonised territories that were necessary and economically justifiable pursuits, the crisis at Fashoda in 1898 suggests otherwise. Fashoda, described by Winston Churchill as “a miserable swamp of no particular value”, was the region that in 1898 Britain threatened the French with war in a bid to force them to remove their soldiers and garrisons from. Whilst the region held little or no economic potential whatsoever the reason for such aggressive diplomacy soon became clear in the reactions of French and British citizens to the incident. In France at the time “emotions and verbal bellicosity were easily aroused by talk of national honour and the flag” whilst in Britain there was celebration at having bettered their colonial rivals.

Reactions like these were not uncommon amongst the populations of the Great powers and the desire for and pursuit of national prestige was all pervasive. According to Mommsen British statesmen were well aware of what poor investments colonies were but “a nationalist public opinion compelled them again and again to imperialist action, even at the risk of military complications”. Indeed the popularity of the governance and thus the unity of the nation could be swayed considerably by imperialist action, policy looked upon generally favourably by the electors of Europe. The German Chancellor Bismarck in newly unified Germany who had “steadfastly opposed the popular demand for them [colonies]” inaugurated a colonial policy in the hope of “stimulating national sentiment and by this means securing a working majority in the insubordinate Reichstag”. Cecil Rhodes famously remarked on British national unity that “If you want to avoid civil war then you must become imperialists” and Langer went as far as to say that both the French and Russian colonial movements were essentially “artificial”, resting upon considerations of national prestige.

Although Langer's statement, similar to Mommsen's “purely political phenomenon”, is overstated and nescient to alternate motives, the ubiquitous nature of a nationalist desire for expansion grants this cause more credibility and applicability than economic causes even if it was sparked by the fear of French imperialism and mercantilism.

The change in objective notable in British colonial policy is evident of the position Britain held in Africa and how that changed towards the end of the 19th century. Whilst Britain maintained dominance of commerce in Africa there was little state interference and when Africa raised enough attention in the House of Commons action was taken on humanitarian and scientific grounds, often with the laying of infrastructure beneficial to Africans and to those bringing civilisation through commerce and Christianity. Once this position was contested by other European nations there was a marked shift towards mercantilism, the possession of territory becoming a necessity to protect trade from rival nations. Whilst advances in technology and medicine were undoubtedly prerequisites to possessive expansion in Africa they were always either incidental, as was the case with quinine, or came about when the demand for these advancements arose. It was this demand that initiated the development of the armed steam-boat just as it was this demand that began the “Scramble” for Africa. States justified this expansion on a variety of grounds, but the foremost cause of the scramble was the pursuit for national prestige. Whilst humanitarian, scientific and technological advancements continued on an individual basis, only these powerful European states wielded the power to subjugate African territories and when the balance of power in Europe appeared so conclusive after a century of warfare, Africa became the new field on which to compete.

Bibliography:

G. August, The Selling of Empire, (Connecticut, 1985)

W. Aydlotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, (Connecticut, 1970)

D. Bates, The Fashoda Incident of 1898, (Oxford, 1984)

R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 2nd Edition, (London, 1968)

J. Flint, Perspectives of Empire, (London, 1973)

J. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of Africa, (London, 1963)

B. Harlow, M. Carter, Archives of Empire Volume II: The Scramble for Africa, (Durham, 2003)

W. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, Volume II, (Connecticut, 1935)

W. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, (London, 1981)

B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, (New York, 2004)

Word Count: 1832.

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