With reference to any major uprising against political authority, assess the relative importance of the reasons why it was either successful or unsuccessful.

There had been no parliament in Russia until 1906, and even then it held but a few powers; in the years to come they were reduced.  A significant number of Russians, predominantly within the middle class, wanted a democracy with an elected government.  However a democratic government could be attained in two ways, with a constitutional monarchy or as a republic.  This split the middle classes into those who wanted a constitutional monarchy, following the KDs, and those who were against Tsarism as a whole, dividing into other parties such as the Mensheviks or the SRs.  It is worth noting that no major party overtly planned to seize Russia in an undemocratic dictatorship and most were ‘committed to the [Constituent] Assembly’.  The KDs appeared to benefit from the 1905 revolution as a Duma was created, and although its power was limited many believed it would progressively gain further sovereignty.  However in 1917 the Duma had fewer powers than in 1905, which led many to believe that Nicholas II had used the Duma as a token gesture to appease the 1905 uprising and that he was soon going to withdraw.  However the KDs were generally moderates and ‘did not intend open revolution’.  The few that joined the strikes would not have shared the ambition of others to overthrow the Tsar but rather wanted to voice their concerns over the Duma’s lack of power or, at their most radical, force an abdication.  The fact that the February revolution resulted in the end of Tsardom was the key factor for the revolution being unsuccessful for the KDs and their supporters.  

The Bolsheviks’ coup in October had given them unofficial control of Russia.  Lenin believed in the Constituent Assembly and called an election in 1918, however the results (see appendix A) left them with approximately a quarter of the seats.  Lenin’s belief in the Assembly should not mean he is confused with being a democrat as he did not believe in ‘one man, one vote’, as the social revolutionaries did.  He regarded this as ‘bourgeois democracy’.  His idea of democracy was to have the Bolshevik party ruling the country as the voice of the revolutionary masses.  The Bolsheviks’ hold on power was in grave danger if the Assembly stood as the electorate wished.  In January 1918 the Bolsheviks ‘forcibly prevented it [the Constituent Assembly] from re-assembling’.  The revolution was completely unsuccessful for the KDs as there was no democracy in Russia following 1918 and many historians believed the Bolsheviks simply turned into Red Tsars. Although the January 1918 events completely finished any hopes of democracy for Russia in the near future the more important factor in this aim being crushed was the overthrow of the Tsar, as the provisional government was meant only as that and was not strong enough to fight off any potential coup.

The result of the revolutions was unsuccessful for the peasants.  The provisional government attempted to negotiate a withdrawal from the War, however when this failed they went on a catastrophic offensive. For peace to be acquired the peasants had to wait until 1918 and the treaty of Brest Litovsk, orchestrated by the ruling party, the Bolsheviks.  However peacetime was short, later that year Russia becoming caught up in civil war. This finished after the First World War, meaning Russia was at war longer than its European counterparts.  More people were killed in purges and prison camps under the Bolsheviks than in the First World War, and the Bolsheviks, under Stalin, took Russia into the Second World War at the cost of nearly 30 million Russian lives.  Although the Bolsheviks promised peace, it was not attained.  Robert Conquest would argue there was no peace under the Bolsheviks not only due to the purges, but the cold war, which many believed lasted throughout their time in government.  

The issue of Bread was never met as the peasants were forced to give up their crops, which were exported to generate hard currency and feed the industrial workers.  Under Stalin this was pushed so hard that it led to a man-made famine between 1932-33.  Although it was not just the peasants who were starving, ‘the failure of collectivisation … meant the country was always short of food’.  In theory, the Bolsheviks’ Land Decree of November 8th 1917 would have benefited the majority of the peasants (see appendix D).  However the validity and intention behind this must be questioned, as it is possible it was created simply for propaganda purposes.  Peasants were guaranteed land as their property free from private interference, and were also ensured a safety net of state pension or communal support in case of disability.  Kulaks however were displeased, as it removed their status of ‘richer peasants’ and they lost all benefits of their private dealings, and many of them were killed or imprisoned.  As all excess food was seized from them, the peasants had little incentive to work harder to produce more as the Bolsheviks only left them barely enough to survive on as it was.  This also contributed to Russia’s food shortages.  The February revolution was unsuccessful for the peasants as it allowed a party who did not represent their views into government although the Constituent Assembly election gave a majority of votes and seats to a party who did - the Social Revolutionaries. The peasants had always believed in the Tsar and religion to solve their problems.  Although Marxist historians would regard this a false hope others would argue that it was better than the no hope that they had under the Bolsheviks, who exploited them more than the Tsar did. The fact they did not gain ‘peace, bread and land’ is they key factor in the revolution being unsuccessful as although they gained literacy, free education and amenities for those living near cities, this was not as important to their lives as those three fundamentals.

The aims of the elites were not met by the revolutions, however the results were not completely unsuccessful, as they were not affected as negatively as many would assume.  Many of the bureaucrats and civil servants of the Tsars were kept on as the Bolsheviks could see the benefit of using people with expertise, and in return they were given the advantages that came with holding high positions in government.  Although neither group’s views on society matched ‘there were advantages for both sides in retaining a working relationship’.  The aristocracy were enemies of the principles of the Bolsheviks.  Some fled following the revolutions and the defeat in the civil war, however around ‘100,000 … were resident in the countryside … the amount of land they were allowed to keep … was often rather generous’.  Although some were imprisoned, killed or exiled, many of the elites remained in Russia with benefits and privileges over the rest of Russian society, although less than pre 1917.  The elites had a key role in the toppling of the Tsar, as the major difference between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions was that in 1905 the elites supported Nicholas II and he survived, in 1917 they did not and he fell.  Although the outcome of the revolutions were not as catastrophic as many would have thought, their aim of retaining the Tsar and with him, their positions, did not happen.  For the minority who did flee Russia this led to a worse life post 1917 than beforehand.  This results in an unsuccessful result of the revolutions for the elites.

 

Russia was teetering at the point of industrialisation; steps had been taken in this direction, with increasing amounts of people moving into the cities to work in the new factories, becoming the industrial classes.  Production levels were increasing steeply (see appendix sources C and D) therefore there was more money being generated implying the workers should reap some benefit.  However their dire conditions did not improve.  They lived in crowded, basic rooms and there was rarely enough to eat.  Their poor conditions were largely due to the ‘absence of effective trade unions … and adequate legal protection’.  This meant all power was with the employers.  Worker discontent soon became directed above the employers towards the Tsar who had failed to take any action due to being at the front attempting to raise the army’s morale.  The industrial classes’ significant political influence was due to their crucial role in Russian society.  It was hard to replace these workers, as it would require at least a basic level of training, and their numbers needed to be increasing rather than decreasing to keep up with the demands of industry.  Their necessity was further exacerbated by the First World War, which required huge amounts of production and manufacturing of weapons to supply the Russian army.  This meant that when the workers revolted in 1917 it caused a larger impact than the predominantly peasant uprisings in 1905.  The importance of the industrial classes, their displeasure with the current political climate, and Russia’s involvement in the War, were key reasons for the success of the revolutions, as was their determination to get their aims met.  The industrial classes were also more politically active than the peasants, probably due to their central location at the hub of government where they could see past the propaganda and realise the conditions of Russia, which increased discontent. This created problems for the Tsar: it was easy to keep the peasants in ignorance as they were many miles away from the major cities and political activity and the Tsars could rely on religion to enforce their position promising a better afterlife for the great hardships of the present, Marx’s interpretation of religion being the ‘opiate of the people’ could have been made from viewing Tsarist Russia.  Workers could remain in the city between strikes, unlike the peasants in 1905, meaning the problem of uprisings would and could never go away for the Tsar, an important factor in the success of the revolution.  The revolution was successful for the industrial classes as they achieved their aim of toppling the Tsar, and by 1918 the Bolsheviks, who focused their beliefs and polices on improving conditions for the industrial classes, had consolidated power, which was the beginning of Russia becoming a fully industrial and socialist state. This in principle would be to the benefit of the industrial classes.  However many historians would dispute that the revolutions were successful.  ‘The Non-Bolshevik Socialist Point of View … the Bolsheviks … hijacked this [revolution] democratic development’.  This view would suggest the Bolsheviks were not as they maintained, ‘representing the people’ but rather taking away what the people wanted.  A further interpretation was the ‘Optimist’ view, ‘imperial Russia was steadily transforming itself into a modern, democratic, industrial society until weakened by the 1914-1917 war and subverted by the Bolsheviks’.  This would imply that revolution was unnecessary and the majority of the Russian people’s aims would have been met if the Tsars had been given more time.

The Bolsheviks aimed to become the government; they had seized power through the Kornilov affair, where they had been armed and supported by the provisional government to defend them from General Kornilov who had believed the country was in danger of falling into anarchy and intended to overthrow the Provisional Government and establish military rule.  He and his troops never made it to Petrograd; this event exposed the weakness of the Provisional Government, allowing the Bolsheviks to seize power in the October Revolution.  The Bolsheviks aimed to consolidate their position through elections and when they were not elected they took power forcibly.  They were a well-organised, small group with clear aims and plans for how to achieve them.  The 1917 revolutions were successful for them, the overthrow of Tsardom allowed a weaker power to assume leadership of Russia, which could be easily overthrown, in the October Revolution.  Although ‘No one seriously believes the overthrow of the Tsar was directly organised and led by Lenin’, Lenin’s ‘April Theses’ (see appendix E) declared Lenin’s intention of Russia becoming a fully socialist state, presumably run by the Bolsheviks and supported by the Soviets rather than parliament. Their aim was more important than their means as they did not fulfil their aim of being elected, yet they still took power.  This is the crucial factor in the success of the revolution for them: they were prepared to bypass or reject their principles to take control of Russia, no other political party was prepared to do this which is a key reason why they were all unsuccessful.  The Bolsheviks benefited more than any other group from the revolution.  If they were to be believed then all of Russia would have benefited from them being in government through a utopian communist state.  However due to their corruptness not even their main target group, the industrial class, fully benefited as although they and other Russians received free university places, opera, adult literacy classes, these were dwarfed in comparison by mass purges and terrible living conditions, their lives did not improve under the Bolsheviks.  

The 1917 revolutions were not successful for Russia as a whole.  The majority of people did not want Tsardom to end, and although there was much promise of Russia becoming a fully democratic state with civil liberties, this never happened.  If the final, great aim of the Bolsheviks, communism, was reached, the revolution would have been hailed as a great success but this never happened, the only group to fully benefit from the revolutions being the Bolsheviks themselves.

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Appendix

A

B

C

        D

‘(1) Private ownership of land shall be abolished forever … All land … shall become the property of the whole people, and pass into the use of those who cultivate it.

Persons who suffer by this property revolution shall be deemed to be entitled to public support only for the period necessary for adaptation to the new conditions of life …

(6)The right to use the land shall be accorded to all citizens of the Russian State (without distinction of sex) desiring to cultivate it by their own labour, with the help of their families, or in partnership, but only as long as they are able to cultivate it.  The employment of hired labour is not permitted.

In the event of the temporary physical disability of any member of a village commune for a period of up to two years, the village commune shall be obliged to assist him for this period by collectively cultivating his land until he is able to work.

Peasants who, owning to old age or ill health, are permanently disabled and unable to cultivate the land personally, shall lose their rights to the use of it but, in return, shall revive a pension from the State.

(7) Land tenure shall be on an equality basis … There shall be absolutely no restriction on the forms of land tenure-household, farm, communal or co-operative, as shall be decided in each individual village and settlement.’

        

Sourced from, John Daborn, Russia, Revolution and counter-revolution, p106,107 (1991)

E

 ‘The peculiarity of the current moment in Russia consist in the transition from the first stage of the Revolution, which gave power the bourgeoisie as a result of insufficient consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, to its second stage which should give the power into the hands of the proletariat.  The present parliamentary-bourgeoisie republic restricts in the independent political life of the masses, hinds their direct participation in the democratic upbuilding of the state from the bottom to the top.  The Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies does just the reverse.  What is needed is not a parliamentary republic – a return to that from the Soviet of Worker’ Deputies would be a step backwards – but a republic of Soviets throughout the country, growing from below upwards.’

Sourced from, Michael Lynch, Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924, p83 and 84

Bibliography

John Daborn, Russia, Revolution and counter-revolution (1991)

Michael Lynch, Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924

Martin McCauley, Russia 1917-1941

Robert Wolfson, Years of Change European History 1890-1945, (1978)

Steve Phillips, Lenin and the Russian Revolution, (2000)

Anthony Wood, The Russian Revolution, p11 (1976)

Edward Hallett Carr, The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin 1917-1929, p7 (1979)

John Laver, The Modernisation of Russia 1856-1985 (2002)

Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917, (1993)

Stephen J. Lee, Lenin and Revolutionary Russia, (2003)

David R. Marples, Lenin’s Revolution Russia, 1917-1921, (2000)

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