I understand the depth and sincerity of his thoughts which motivated

even if he did believe that he had a lawful excuse under

s. 5(2) (b), the court must objectively assess whether, on the facts

believed by the defendants, the action taken by him was

capable of protecting the property or had, in fact, protected the

property. It had been ruled out that Blake did not have

a defence available however genuine his beliefs were because he had not

passed the objective test; the alleged crime would

not be resolved by the force of his action. It can be argued that if in

this particular case the defendant was let off then

this would open a floodgate into cases where people commit crimes but

then say that God had directed them to do it. An example

can be that if this defence was allowed then it can be argued that

there is a different approach taken into practicing law

differently for different religions as in the Islamic religion honour

killing is illegal, even though Muslims argue that it

is God’s teaching.

In the case of Blake, a genuine belief may have not amounted to a

defence however there are cases that where genuine beliefs

can be held as lawful excuses. In the case of Chamberlain v. Lindon

(1998), the respondent broke down a wall which was obstructing

his way. The defence under s 5(2) (b) was available for him because he

‘’honestly believed that his right or interest was

in immediate need of protection’’.It was held that even if the

defendant hadn’t done it, there was ‘a present need to remove

it’ . The authorities were going to take this action as they saw that

it was in immediate need of action. However, in circumstances

such as in Blake’s case, Parliament was not the source that by damaging

would help resolve the dispute as legally they were

doing nothing wrong. The Lordships have held in situations where the

defendant thinks that there is wrong done, the property

cannot be in immediate need of protection where the authorities choose

to carry out the action the defendant sees as wrong.

In the case of B (a minor) v DPP (2000) a 15 year old boy was charged

for asking a girl under the age of 14 to have oral sex

with him. He argued on his defence that he believed her to be over the

age of 14. He was not guilty and it was held that ‘’

the law will never require that the mistake have been reasonable,

provided it was honestly held’’. In contrast to this Mr

Blake accepted that he knew of what he was doing before hand and he

knew of the consequences but did not desire it.

It can be argued that the use of the defence of lawful excuse varies

from one case to another. In the case of R v Kelleher

(2003) the defendant was convicted as he did not have the defence of

lawful excuse as it was held that through his actions

even if he genuinely believed that he was helping to protect the

interest of others, this was not acceptable as lawful excuse

is ‘’only available where, whatever the defendant’s state of mind, the

defendant’s act had been in order to protect his own

property or right or interest, or that of anyone else.’’ So therefore

it can be argued that however genuine Mr. Blake beliefs

were this did not amount to a defence as Parliament was not his

property.

Both the case of Morrow Geach and Thomas (1994) and Blake portray that

‘’sincerely held beliefs do not make an act lawful’’.

In Morrow there was an anti-abortion demonstration carried out, they

were found guilty under Public Order Act 1986; there

actions may have been the result of there sincere and deeply held

religious beliefs but this could not be used as a defence

in English law.

In the case of Johnson v D.P.P. (1994) the defendant changed the locks

of the house he was occupying , when charged he argued

that he had believed that there was an immediate need of protection for

the property. ‘’Held, dismissing the appeal, the damage

to the door was not done to protect property and the appellant had no

belief that his property was in immediate need of protection.’’

 There are cases that demonstrate where the courts have allowed the

defence of lawful excuse and cases were the defence was

not accepted. In conclusion, if in a case such as Blake v DPP sincere

held beliefs made the act committed lawful then this

would open a floodgate as anyone can commit a crime and say God told me

to do it. The case of Kelleher shows us that however

genuine Mr. Blake’s beliefs were this did not amount to a defence as

Parliament was not his property.

However it can be seen in the case of Johnson that even in situations

where there is a genuine belief that property is in

need of immediate protection and that property is of the person,

sincere held beliefs do not make the act lawful.

Bibliography

Journal Articles

Miscellaneous Provisions: 23-46 to 23-55: This article was found on

WestLaw UK. The Publishers are Archbold from sweet and

Maxwell

Reed. A, ‘Court of Appeal – Criminal Damage: Defenses’ (2004)  Vol 68

JoCL p.2

Crim. L.R. 1993, Aug, 586-588

Crim. L.R. 1994, Sep, 673-674

           

           Cases

                 

B (a Minor) v DPP (2000) 1 ALL ER 833

Blake v DPP (1993) Crim LR 587

Chamberlain V Lindon  (1998) 1 W.L.R. 1252, DC

 Johnson v D.P.P. (1994) ALL ER 201

Morrow, Geach and Thomas v DPP; Secretary of State for health and

social security; British pregnancy advisory service (1994)

Crim LR 58

R V. Kelleher (2003) All ER (D) 296

           Statutes

           

Criminal Damage Act 1971   s 5(2)(b)

           Websites

Looked at the case of B (a Minor) v DPP (2000) and Morrow, Geach and

Thomas v DPP (1994) on the website

http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod3a/3_40_gen_defences/04_mistake.

htm

Looked at case of Rv Kelleher (2003) on the website:

http://sixthformlaw.info/02_cases/mod3a/cases_75_property_criminal_dam.

htm#Kelleher,%20R%20v%20[2003]%20CA

 Criminal Damage Act 1971 as cited in

 Blake V. DPP (1993) Crim LR 587 as cited in Reed. A, ‘Court of Appeal

– Criminal Damage: Defenses’ (2004)  Vol 68 JoCL p.2

 Crim. L.R. 1993, Aug, 586-588

 Chamberlain V Lindon  (1998) 1 W.L.R. 1252, DC

 Miscellaneous Provisions: 23-46 to 23-55

 Ibid

http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod3a/3_40_gen_defences/04_mistake.

htm

http://sixthformlaw.info/02_cases/mod3a/cases_75_property_criminal_dam.

htm#Kelleher,%20R%20v%20[2003]%20CA

http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod3a/3_40_gen_defences/04_mistake.

htm

http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod3a/3_40_gen_defences/04_mistake.

htm

 Crim. L.R. 1994, Sep, 673-674