In order to succeed, ANFJC/AAHFS must make out at least one ground of review.
Ultra Vires
Simple ultra vires may be argued under s5(1)(c) of the ADJR Act, as the Minister must have jurisdiction to refuse entry. Section 16 of the IFC Act confers power upon the Minister, limited to referring foods for inspection. It may be disputed that the Minister was unauthorised to demand that all noni-juice be refused entry prior to inspection.
Breach of Procedural Fairness
The Hearing Rule
As there was a breach of the hearing rule under s5(1)(a), the rules of natural justice were consequently infringed. In accordance with Mason CJ’s reasoning in Kioa, procedural fairness should have been accorded as ANFJC’s individual right to import noni-juice was affected, not the general public. Furthermore, it is evident that procedural fairness has not been excluded by any clear expression of statutory intent.
ANFJC were not advised on the Minister’s orders as they were first informed that a decision had been made once the juice arrived in Australia, denying ANFJC the opportunity to present their case. Based on the facts, it is unlikely that the Minister acted in accordance with procedural fairness. Substantial debate arises as the hearing rule is not applicable to policy decisions of general application. As ANFJC are the sole importer of noni-juice, the decision is sufficiently direct and individualised.
The Bias Rule
It would be difficult to establish actual bias, therefore apprehended bias may be easier to pursue. A fair minded observor might reasonably apprehend that the decision maker did not bring an impartial mind to this matter. Procedural bias may arise from strong expressions of opinion articulated by external sources, such as the Minister’s sister who was a doctor and a member of the AMA.
The Minister formed a pre-judgement, as he had already articulated personal views, and had issued government papers regarding alternative medicines. Although distinguishable, Livesey affirmed that a situation of apprehended bias will arise where a Minister has already expressed personal views. A higher standard will be applicable when dealing with Ministers due to the nature of their role, although bias cannot be automatically assumed based on the Minister being amongst public debate.
Relevant/Irrelevant Matters
The Minister must take into account all relevant matters for the decision to be valid. However, he did not consider that noni-juice was marketed by Australian shops as a fruit juice consisting of antioxidants, nor does any evidence suggest that it contains any unhealthy ingredients. Instead, irrelevant evidence collected in a company in the US was given strict attention to.
ANFJC/AAHFS may argue improper purpose under s5(2)(c), which can be inferred from the Minister’s words. However, there will be no discussion on the matter as the above grounds of review present stronger arguments.
If ANFJC/AAHFS were to be successful on one of these grounds of review, an order may be sought requiring further consideration, or to quash the Minister’s decision.
Decision 2:
Food Control Certificate is issued requiring that the juice be destroyed or re-exported from
Australia.
A food control certificate must be issued by an ‘authorised officer’ under s12 of the IFC Act. Furthermore, under section 14(2)(b), an officer is authorised to destroy or re-export failing food.
ANFJC/AAHFS may seek judicial review of Peter’s decision. Peter’s decision regarding noni-juice as a failing food, needing to be exported or destroyed, was then affirmed and internally reviewed by the secretary of DAFF, from the power given by s42(4) of a ‘reviewable decision’. Under s42(5)(a), the secretary held the power to confirm Peter’s initial decision.
Merits Review
Section 42(4) of the IFC Act provides an inbuilt review for the secretary to reconsider Peter’s initial decision. This has already been exhausted by the secretary. Section 42(11) gives the AAT jurisdiction to review the ‘reviewable’ decision made by the secretary.
The AAT provides full merits review in order to give a correct and preferable decision, as it ‘reviews decision made in the exercise of powers conferred by an enactment’. The secretary satisfies this requirement as she was allegedly acting within her power conferred from the IFC Act.
Under Commonwealth jurisdiction, s27(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (1975) (AAT Act) allows anyone to bring an action to the tribunal who's interests are affected. As stated earlier, it is clear that ANFJC/AAHFS have standing.
The AAT holds the power of an original decision maker to constitute a fresh decision. If ANFJC were to be successful, they could argue that the secretary’s decision be substituted under s43(1)(c)(i). This would be in the parties best interests, as noni-juice would no longer be destroyed/re-exported.
Judicial Review
In regards to the secretary's decision, if the expected outcome was not acquired under merits review, judicial review may be sought. Peter also has the right to seek judicial review under the ADJR Act. As previously discussed, ANFJC/AAHFS have standing to seek judicial review and the following grounds may be argued.
Unauthorised Delegation
In accordance with s5(1)(c) of the ADJR Act, a decision will be invalidated where a person did not have the jurisdiction to make a decision. Sections 40(1) and 41 provide an express statutory power, where the secretary may delegate an officer of AQIS her powers, through a signed instrument. No facts suggest that this instrument has been accorded. Furthermore, it is questionable as to whether Peter is an ‘officer’ of AQIS, due to his early arrival and lack of compliance with procedural formalities. Although there is inadequate evidence to determine this conclusively, if Peter did not have jurisdiction to make the decision, it will be deemed invalid.
Procedural Ultra Vires
ANFJC may argue that procedural ultra vires has arisen under s4(1)(b). There appears to be an abuse of discretion due to an improper purpose under s5(1)(e). Inflexible policy fetters the decision maker’s discretion. As the policy here displays that noni-juice poses a high risk to public health, this will significantly influence the decision maker. Counter arguments could be made for ‘multiple purposes’, suggesting that the policy is directed towards public health. Claims made for complementary medicines constitute an unauthorised purpose, therefore it must be substantial that but-for the existence of this purpose, it is likely that a different decision would have been made.
Inflexible Policy
Inflexible application of policy should also be examined, however more information would be necessary to provide any conclusive statements. Section 5(2)(f) of the ADJR Act communicates that an exercise of discretionary power in accordance with policy without regard to the merits of the case, will form an improper exercise of power. Although policy may aid consistency, it cannot be justified to be ultra vires the statute or where it is inflexibly applied. Due to the exceptionally harsh government policies in place, it is fettering both Peter and the secretary’s discretion to make an impartial decision. This is evident when we apply the ‘but for’ test. A decision will be invalid if Peter/the secretary's reasons for making their decision were purely policy related.
As stated above, if ANFJC/AAHFS were to succeed on any of these grounds of review, an order can be sought for further consideration or to quash the decisions made by Peter/Secretary.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s5.
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990), 170 CLR 321.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, Sheppard J at 28.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s3(4).
Imported Food Control Regulations 1993, s18.
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, see Mason J.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57.
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng 2001205 CLR 507.
Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288.
Hot Holdings v Creasy (2002) HCA 51.
Webb & Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41, Deane J at 74.
Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288.
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, See Gleeson CJ and Gummow J.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s5(2)(b).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Imported Food Control Act 1992, s42(5).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s25(1)(a).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Imported Food Control Act 1992.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), see also; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
R v Toohey (1981)151 CLR 170.
Green v Daniels (1977) HCA 18.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s16(1)(b).