Advise Ahmed as to the rights he may have under the terms implied by the sale of Goods Act 1979.

        After deciding that there was in fact a contract we must look at the express and the implied terms of the contract to see what was breeched. The expressed terms were those, which were stated in the advertisement, “ 1997 Ford Fiesta for sale, only £1,500”. In fact the car was not a “1997 Ford Fiesta” but a 1993 Ford Fiesta. This therefore is a breach of the terms of the contract and possibly of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 13 (1) which states that “Where there is a description there is an implied (term) that the goods will correspond with the description”. The implied terms of the contract are not to be matters of reasonability but of necessity. This was decided in the case of Liverpool city council v Irwin (1977) AC 239 in the House of Lords. The engine working probably must surely constitute a necessity in order for the contract to work, since Ahmed would not have (had he known) bought a car with ‘serious’ engine problems. This is similar to the case of St Albans D.C v ICL (1996) 4 ALL ER 481 where the goods supplied where not fit (due to poor quality) for the intended purpose (S.7 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act), in this case the court of appeal held that if the terms protecting the promisor from forbearance were unreasonable the courts could remove that term. Soton plc have no such liability clause, making it more likely that they would be held responsible for the poor quality of the car. It would however, have to be proved that the car did have engine problems before the car was sold and also if Soton plc knew or should have known that this was the case, and in cases of implied terms the courts have recently looked to the ‘officious bystander test’ as seen in Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1939), this simply asks what a reasonable person would have said was intended. In this case they would ask whether the dealer implied, by word or actions that the car was in good condition.  

        The Sale of Goods Act 1979 contributes to the implied terms about the quality of the goods. The sections in the act that have allegedly been breached due to the “serious engine problem”, are:

Section 14 (2) which provides that the goods are of satisfactory quality,

Section 14 (2) (a) applies an objective test to this. Asking whether a reasonable person might find that the goods are of sufficient quality. Section 14 (2) (b) may also apply. This looks at whether the goods are fit for the purpose it was sold. In response to these provisions in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 we can show that it would be up to the courts to decide whether the car was of in sufficient quality, contrary to section 14 (2) and that the goods were unfit for the purpose it was sold contrary to section 14 (2) (b). The cars engine problem would have had to be in the car before or at the time of purchase in order for these sections to apply and again that would be up to the courts with the aid of evidence to decide. There may also be a case to be answered on the part of Soton plc as to a possible breach of Section 13 (1), the sale by description. This is “where there is a description, there is an implied (term) that the goods will correspond with the description”. It is arguable as to whether there was a description as to the quality of the car but the statement that the car was a 1997 registered car when in fact it was a 1993-registered car may be in breach of this section.

        Ahmed does have grounds to bring civil proceedings against Soton plc. It would be up to the courts, as to whether there are any breaches of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and whether the contract is therefore void. It is likely this would happen, although it would be required to prove that a) the car dealership was aware of the engine trouble or should have been aware, b) that the car dealership knew or should have known that the car was only re-registered in 1997 but in fact registered in 1993 first, but still continued to sell the vehicle. The civil law motto caveat emptor or “let the buyer beware” would be applicable in this case. If the courts decided that there were sufficient grounds for finding a breach of contract through the breaching of the relevant sections in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 then Ahmed could well be entitled to financial compensation for the losses incurred due the transaction, although this as with any other remedy would be up to the courts to decide. The equitable doctrine of estoppel by representation cannot apply, since this form of estoppel can only be used as a shield and not a sword.         

As an extra possibility of criminal proceedings under Section 15 of the Theft Act 1968 property by deception (the property being the money paid), or if the transaction was electronic possibly under section 15(a). If the car dealership knew the problems the car had and decided not to tell Ahmed in order to secure the sale it could be conceived that Soton plc are guilty of obtaining money by deception since they did not highlight the engine problem or the correct registration details to Ahmed before he paid for the car. The decision in R v Firth (1991) Crim. L.R 326, CA, shows that ‘deception’ is a term, which should be interpreted to include liability by omission. The courts may even look, as they did in Dick Bently v Harold Smith (1965) at whether the car dealer was in a specialist position, and therefore in a position of trust that might put him or her into a privileged position during the dealing of the car, and which would make the duty to act honourably more prevalent. More over the courts have occasionally sided against larger companies who have an extra trust due to their size. Soton plc is a public limited company that therefore might create a perception of honesty and quality since their survival as a company depends on public perception of it in order for their share price to rise, the case of Atlas Express v Cafcoe (1989) illustrates that the courts do take into account the ‘punching power’ of the companies and if they have acted slightly dishonestly or incorrectly their size will be looked at. And this may be detrimental to a company like Soton plc, since they probably are far more affluent than Ahmed.

        Ahmed would have clear grounds to bring civil proceedings against Soton plc. We have established that there was a valid contract involved through the newspaper advertisement and there may also be grounds for criminal proceedings although this would be a course of action for the Crown Prosecution Service not for Ahmed himself. It would be up to the courts to decide whether the relevant sections in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 had been breeched and it would be likely that they would.