While the Netherlands and other states focused their drug control policy on large-scale drug traffickers and so leaving small scale users and dealers relatively alone, Sweden believes that every user and dealer should be targeted in an attempt to create a drug-free society. Neither does Sweden differentiate between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ drugs. In Sweden cannabis is regarded as causing psychological damage, making people irresponsible, being addictive and is seen as a gateway leading to other more damaging and dangerous drugs. This was inspired by the “stepping stone hypothesis” and the “total consumption model” which was so influential on their alcohol policy, (Chatwin, 2003, p571 and Decorte & Korf, 2004, p142).
So the aim was for a drug free society and in order to reach this goal there were three principle lines of attack. Firstly, the supply of drugs was to be cut off, and the custom service was to play a crucial role in this regard. Secondly, demand was to be obstructed by preventing those who have not yet been affected, from coming into contact with drugs. This is where police patrols focused on street level drug dealing. Another preventative measure was in using informational and educational measures, especially school education, and influencing public opinion in order to affect people’s attitudes and behaviour so they have no desire to experiment with drugs. Thirdly, a drug care sector is required to provide treatment for drug users pushing them towards a drug free life, under compulsion if necessary, (Tham, 2003, p37).
This second section will examine the success of the Netherlands drug policy. Dutch harm reduction initiatives such as needle exchange programmes, the free testing of ecstasy pills for purity, reception rooms where users can take drugs without making a nuisance of themselves on the streets and methadone programmes in which those addicted to heroin receive free methadone in an attempt to control their addiction have been successful because they have led to a lower drug-related death rate without causing an increase in the overall number of users. Such practises have further resulted in a situation in which drug addicts are relatively visible to the authorities and far more of them come into care and treatment than in countries with more repressive policies such as Sweden, (Chatwin, 2003, p568).
Due to intravenous heroin users being able to get clean needles free, this has resulted in only 8% of the Netherlands’ AIDS victims being ‘junkies’, compared with that of 26% of those in the USA. The Dutch police estimate that they have guided about 75% of heroin addicts to undergo treatment, usually with methadone substitution, (Clutterbuck, 1995, p151).
Regarding heroin use, due to the policies the mid-late 1980s saw a decline or at least stabilisation and the 1989 figures gave an estimate of “about 7000 (opiod addicts in Amsterdam out of a population of 692,000 and reliable estimates for the whole country suggested between 15,000 and 20,000 addicts out of a total population of 14.7 million,” (Ruggerio, 1995, p30).
The methadone bus was a very successful initiative as part of the methadone maintenance program, which was distributed from a mobile bus. It was able to reach people in certain neighbourhoods who are otherwise hard to contact and it does not create any great annoyance to people in a specific area. The formation of Junkiebond was very helpful in helping drug addicts as no one knows addicts better than other drug addicts, and it was them that really pushed for increasing needle exchanges, (Macdonald & Zagaris, 1992, pp263-265).
The controversial tolerance of small-scale cannabis use and open sale in the coffee shops has proved successful. It has successfully separated the market and so preventing soft drug users to move onto hard drugs, which is shown in numerous surveys among soft drug users but also from the fact that relatively few cannabis users, some 21,000 to 23,000, are addicted to hard drugs, (Dorn, Jepsen, Savona 1996, p100). Also contrary to what many predicted it does not appear to have led to any escalation of marijuana use but stabilised it and even some reports suggest a decline, (Ruggerio, 1995, p32). Much Dutch cannabis is home grown, and this keeps the price low at about $1.50 per gm compared to that of $4-5 in the UK. Therefore at this price Dutch users very rarely need to perform acts of acquisitive crime to buy it, (Clutterbuck, 1995, p150).
There is relatively little drug-related crime in the Netherlands. There is less incentive for the dealers to bribe the police or to fight each other in ‘turf wars’ i.e. for territorial rights, especially as they know that the police could probably identify them if they did. In 1987, two years after the ‘non-enforcement’ policy was introduced, there were 18,000 deaths ascribed to tobacco, 2000 to alcohol but only 64 to heroin and virtually none to cocaine or other drugs, (Clutterbuck, 1995, p151).
The Dutch drug policy has not been a complete success with certain negative consequences being criticised. Amsterdam attracts large numbers of ‘drug tourists’. Of Amsterdam’s drug addicts in 1990, two thousand were foreign and if they become sick or anti-social the police attempt to spot them and send them home but many come back. Others simply come to the Netherlands to purchase drugs and take them home to make a profit. Many of the Netherlands’ neighbouring states are annoyed by this and so does the fact that 80% of the EU’s amphetamines are of Dutch manufacture. However, from a realist perspective, states do what they can to protect their state and its own people and therefore the negative consequences on other states are not an issue. Nevertheless, the Netherlands have undertaken more repressive policies to discourage foreign tourism and to “ensure that any effects of the Dutch drug policy may have on other states will be anticipated and dealt with by themselves,” (Chatwin, 2003, p570). The police and customs officials of the relevant countries are now working together to control large scale drug trafficking organisations operating across the borders, (Dorn, 1999, p204 and Clutterbuck, 1995, p152).
It has been argued that the policy cannot have been that successful as there has been increasing polices of a repressive nature. For example the “frequent use of the municipal by-law by which the open use of drugs is prohibited with arrest and conviction of users,” (Dorn, 1995, p204) or the ‘streetjunkie project’, which is a package of measures designed to push and force the group of so called ‘extremely problematic drug users’ to kick the habit. Another policy is the ‘binnenstadverbad’, which is a ‘city centre banning order’, by which drug users who repeatedly cause public disturbance may be refused entry to a substantial part of the city centre for a fortnight, (Mol & Trautmann, 1995, p220). However, just because a certain policy works well at one time it does not mean it should be kept unchanged. With drugs there is a need for flexibility to deal with new problems or certain problems coming to the forefront which may arise. An increase in repressive policy for certain aspects is judged to be the best for further success and therefore should be followed but in no way has the Netherlands lost their liberal, pragmatic approach.
There is no guarantee that attempts to imitate Dutch drug policy in other countries would also be a success. Barber and Wijngaeert argue that there are crucial elements needed of the Dutch context, such as a strong belief in equal rights; beliefs in the possibility and legitimacy of social intervention; and a sound system of health care and provisions, (Macdonald & Zagaris, 1992, p267).
This third section will examine the success of Sweden’s drug policy, while also comparing it that of the Netherlands. The Swedish drug policy is generally presented as being successful. Sweden’s most successful and strongest efforts have been to educate the young; in the early 1970s, approximately 15% of 15-16 year old pupils reported having tried drugs. This declined to 7% in 1975 and to 5% in 1983 down to 3% in 1987, indicating that Sweden’s school-based drug education programs were met with some success, (Macdonald & Zagaris, pp274-277). However it is now, in 2006, at 6% but this is still significantly lower than in the early 1970s. When comparing with other European countries, Sweden seems to also fare well. Life-time prevalence and regular use of drugs is considerably lower in Sweden than in the rest of Europe. This is for the general population as well as that for young people, where average levels of life-time prevalence of drug use among 15-16 year olds in Europe averaged at 22%, the corresponding rate in Sweden was 8% in 2003 and then to 6% in 2006, (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006, p51).
Sweden is also among the European countries with low levels of injecting drug-use-related HIV/AIDS infections. On the supply side, drug prices in Sweden are among the highest in Europe and therefore, drug tourism targeting in Sweden is largely unknown, (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006, p51).
The problem in judging the success of Sweden’s drug policy is it is very rare that Sweden, officially and on its own initiative, presents comparisons of the levels of problematic drug use. Olsson argues that as long as amphetamines are included in such comparisons, Sweden looks similar to most other countries which has resulted in much dispute over success of restrictive policy models such as that of Sweden, (Decorte & Korf, 2004, p142).
According to estimates published in the annual report of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) in 2002, many of Sweden’s assumptions are false. The number of heavy drug addicts is approximately the same across the two countries, and is in fact much higher in Sweden if the figure is presented in terms of the number per 1000 of population, 4.7 compared to 2.6 of the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, 19.1% of the population have used cannabis at some point, as compared with 13% in Sweden. It can be argued that this does not show lack of success as the figure of heavy drug addicts may have still decreased if the numbers were very high in the past. However, figures show in 1979 the number of heavy drug abusers was estimated at 12,000, and in 1992 the figure rose to 17,000 and to 22,000 in 1998, whether this can be called a success is dubious however much spin Swedish policy makers may try put on it. In relation to mortality rates too, the Netherlands appears to have fewer cases of acute drug related deaths among drug addicts than Sweden, despite having a larger number of opiate abusers, (Tham, 2003, p40 and Boekhout van Solinge, 1997, p185 and Chatwin, 2003, p572).
These figures therefore question the two theoretical assumptions of Swedish drug policy: the ‘stepping stone hypothesis’ and the ‘total consumption model’ on drug use. According to the latter model we should see an immediate relation between the prevalence of drug use and the spreading of ‘heavy drug abuse’ i.e. drug addiction and drug related problems, such as drug related deaths. However, the figures show no evidence of this in Sweden or any other EU country. The very low drug use prevalence in Sweden is not reflected in particularly low rates of heavy drug abuse or drug related deaths. The ‘stepping stone hypothesis’ is questioned as there is an absence of any relationship between experimental use of cannabis and problematic use of hard drugs and therefore disproves that cannabis use results in harmful drug use, (Decorte & Korf, 2004, p143).
The available prevalence figures’ data has many limitations as it only refers to 15-16 year old school students and 18 year old military conscripts. The data of only of these young age categories is inadequate to comment on the development on the prevalence of drug use in general. Moreover, the major decrease in experimental drug use as shown by the Swedish data, did not take place during the 1980s when the concept of a drug free society was introduced, but in the decade before, when the policy was less restrictive, (Boekhout van Solinge, 1997, p184).
Even though heroin use is not very substantive due to amphetamines being the drug of choice in Sweden, increasing numbers of young people are smoking heroin, especially in deprived neighbourhoods, which are characterised by a very high unemployment rate and a very large percentage of immigrants. It is this relationship between young people growing up in problematic social circumstances and their vulnerability to abuse drugs, seems to be very much underestimated. The activities of the police having any success are also very questionable. Their focus on visible drug scenes on the street or raves etc. is confusing as the problematic drug users do not seem to be found here, but among the drug using population in the deprived suburban areas and at those drug scenes they are present the drug users have just ‘spread out’ to other areas. Moreover, the urine tests that were originally meant as a way to find previously unknown drug users only had the desired effect in the introductory period. Most of those undergoing the test were drug users already known to the authorities. The treatment programmes implemented seem also seem to be not very effective, at least to a lesser extent than is generally presented. However, the evaluations of compulsory treatment programmes do not give a positive picture. As a matter of fact, there are no indications that they have a life-saving effect. This is demonstrated in the mortality rates, where the mortality rates amongst drug addicts in Sweden are high but this is particularly high among those drug users who have undergone compulsory treatment, (Boekhout van Solinge, 1997, pp184-187).
Even though the policies may have not been successful, the implementation was very successful with numbers of police officers working with drug crime increased continuously as did numbers of persons sentenced to prison for drug offences and the proportion of drug users among those admitted to prisons has also increased, (Tham, 2003, p7-10).
You cannot argue against Sweden’s relatively low level of drug problems. However this is not solely due to the repressive drug policy or even a major factor of it. The three main factors that are important are: the unemployment rate, the geographical location of the country and the culture and history of Sweden.
In terms of unemployment, a high level of which can be expected to constitute fertile soil for the growth of demand for drugs. Youth unemployment in Sweden never exceeded 5% throughput the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore it is understandable that unemployment has only attributed to a minor importance in explaining the drug misuse which existed. However, the highest levels of drug use occurred in the early 1970, when youth unemployment was allowed to rise for the first time since the Second World War, and that drug use was highest in the region which had the greatest in youth unemployment, (Dorn, Jepsen and Savona, 1996, pp106-107).
The geographical location of Sweden in relation to the major drug routes in Europe means there is little exposure to the drug market, unlike countries like the Netherlands. This may partially account for much of the variation in heroin addiction between the Netherlands and Sweden. Ollson and Lenke argue that the statistical explanatory power of repressive policies if one excludes the peripheral position and low unemployment of Sweden during the 1980s results in it being ‘not statistically significant’, meaning repressive policies are not significant for explaining the low drug use and problems in Sweden (Dorn, Jepsen and Savona, 1996, pp109-110).
One has to look at the drug use and problems in the context of the country, and its culture and history. Historically, Sweden has not had a problem with illegal drug use and their culture has been that of conformity. The Swedish population in general has a negative view of drug use and is convinced that drugs pose a major threat to society.
In conclusion, the problems of drugs in our society is so complex, no nation’s drug policy will work completely. The Netherlands have a liberal drug policy and it seems to have worked well. On the other hand the Swedish have a repressive policy and it seems to have worked on the surface but in reality is has not at all very well. The success gained by Sweden can be more explained by their previous more liberal policy in the 1960s and 1970s and also the lack of exposure to the drugs market and low unemployment as well as their inherent culture.
The implications of this is that for other countries aiming to formulate an effective drug policy may observe the Netherlands greater success and move towards a liberal drugs policy. Moreover, it is impossible to reach a common drug policy for the whole EU with such contrasting approaches and therefore in the future if the EU was ever to push for a unified drug policy, it may also move more towards a liberal approach. I acknowledge the ambiguity of the effects of such a liberal or repressive drug policy may have on other countries but this is unavoidable.
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date accessed: 22/11/2006
