Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).

As already identified, section 1 states that “No person (shall) interfere with or impede a (member of Her Majesty’s armed forces) engaged on guard, sentry, patrol, or other duty in relation to a prohibited place”. Although the categories of duty, which include “guard, sentry and patrol”, suggest duties occupied with security and observation, the addition of the phrase “or other duty in relation to” shows a wider scope than roles that are solely concerned with protection and surveillance. It is logical therefore that an engineer working in the engine room of one of Her Majesty’s battleships is performing a duty which is clearly in relation to the prohibited place.

The third point of law is whether the terms defined in section 2 of the Act, “includes any army, naval or air force establishment or station, factory, camp, belonging to or occupied by, or on behalf of, Her Majesty” can include one of Her Majesty’s battleships. In R v Keegan [2001] 2 All ER 359 it was successfully appealed that an army patrol vehicle, staffed by two soldiers, on duty in Leicester Square was not a prohibited place under section 2 of the Act. When taken in context with the other definitions of station, factory, camp etcetera, the patrol car did not have the same permanence of position or occupation. In R v Keegan The Lord Chief Justice held that “It is not to suggest, however, that a mode of transport could never be a prohibited place within the meaning of Act (for example one of Her Majesty’s ships occupied constantly by service personnel)”. Further proof of the permanence of occupation of one of Her Majesty’s battleships is the all-encompassing nature of the facilities and functions of these vessels. They are regarded by The Royal Navy as floating garrisons, which house troops and support staff. Although, by their nature they are mobile, they are classified as constantly being a Naval establishment occupied on behalf of Her Majesty. I conclude, therefore, that one of Her Majesty’s battleships is indeed a prohibited place as stated in section 2 of the Act.

In R v Keegan The Lord Chief Justice remarked that were it the case (that one of Her Majesty’s ships) were to be considered as a prohibited place, careful consideration of the meaning of the word “includes”, as at section 2 of the 2001 Act, would be required. The House of Lords in Coltman v Bibby Tankers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 1068 clarified the meaning of the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 section 1(3) which defined “equipment” as including “any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing”. The appellants argued that the ship was not “equipment” under section 1(3). In his judgement Lord Oliver of Aylmerton stated that “The key word in the definition is the word “any” and it underlines, in my judgement, what I would in any event have supposed to be the case, having regard to the purpose of the Act, that is to say that it should be widely construed so as to embrace every article of whatever kind furnished for the purposes of his business.”  In the judgement of Lord Goff of Chievely he confirms “that the definition of equipment in section 1(3) of the 1969 Act must have been included in the Act for the purpose of clarification only, and that the mere fact that ships and vessels were not expressly included in the definition cannot have been intended to have the effect of cutting down the ordinary meaning of the word “equipment” by excluding ships or vessels from that word.” I have found the reasoning in the judgements of Lord Oliver and Lord Goff to be compelling. Section 2 of the 2001 Act clearly states a “prohibited place” includes “any army, naval or air force establishment or station, factory, camp belong to or occupied by, or on behalf of Her Majesty”. For the purpose of this Act, it should be widely construed to embrace every establishment or station that has some permanence of position or occupation. Her Majesty’s battleships, as reasoned by the Lord Chief Justice and the reasons mentioned previously, are quite clearly included in this definition and therefore are covered by section 2 of the Act.

The final point of law that I shall address is the meaning of the phrase in section 1 “in the vicinity of” and whether the Act is meant to include offences committed whilst in a prohibited place.  Lord Justice Green gave careful consideration to the natural meaning of the word “vicinity”, defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “surrounding district, or nearness in place”. In R v Jackson [2001] 3 All ER 1003 he said that although “ably argued by the appellant’s counsel that if the appellant was on the station he could not be in the vicinity of the station. The appellant has referred to the natural meaning of “vicinity” which, he argues, means the state of being near in space. This, he contends, is inapt to cover the facts of this case, namely being on the station. I am quite satisfied that no violence is done to the language by reading the words “in the vicinity of” as meaning “in or in the vicinity of”.”  Although I note The Home Secretary’s remarks during the passage of the Bill (and mentioned in the judgement of The Lord Chief Justice R v Keegan) that “section 1 is only intended to deal with obstruction of the police and the armed forces in their duties of preventing unauthorised access to prohibited places. It is not intended to extend to activities committed whilst on such property” I am obliged to agree with Lord Justice Green in R v Jackson. He states, “Here is an Act of Parliament designed to prevent interference with Her Majesty’s forces who are on guard, sentry, patrol or other duty in relation to a prohibited place. It would be absurd if an offence were created when the obstruction took place outside the precincts of the station, albeit in the vicinity, and no offence at all was created if the obstruction occurred on the station itself.”  I therefore reason that the appellant in the case before me was in or in the vicinity of a prohibited place and that the Act applies when the offence takes place within the precincts of the prohibited place.

My conclusion is this; the appellant was (as stated above) in or in the vicinity of a prohibited place, namely one of Her Majesty’s battleships, he interfered and impeded with a member of Her Majesty’s armed forces, the engineer, who was engaged in a duty in relation to the prohibited place, and has therefore committed an offence within section 1 of the Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 2001. For the reasons I have given, I would dismiss the appeal.

Short-Course LJ