In contrast, extract 2 from the attorney- general department asserts that there is an immediate need of the reform, due to everyday imminent threats with the growth of not only Australia as a country, but also of technology as a whole (Attorney generals department, 2012). In the extract, the proposed reform they introduce is as follows; four key pieces of legislation would be altered, that is the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, and the Intelligence Services Act 2001(Attorney generals department, 2012).
In addition the general attorneys department assert that terrorism, espionage and Internet crime gangs will have the upper hand in the absence of any actions (Attorney generals department, 2012). Furthermore they state that the security and resilience of such economic and social infrastructure, insists on greater security, and it can only be done by equipping our “law enforcement and “security agencies” with greater ‘capabilities and powers’ (Attorney generals department, 2012). Additional assertions are made, claiming that Australian data is in threat, and considerations should be made as to how data should be carried and stored.
Thus from a ‘utilitarian’ (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), perspective, the Australian government believe that they are justifiably acting in the interest of the people, society and the economy. They state through implementing these changes, and installing police and government agencies with more capabilities and power, and through the retention of data, and surveillance, they are protecting the liberties, security and privacy of ‘all’ Australian citizens from such things as terrorism, espionage and criminal cyber threats (), thus indicating the greatest happiness (security) is maximised, for the greater good of the Australian population as a whole.
There are fallacies that can be found within the arguments (Mike head, 2005) (extract 1) makes. (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), states that the Gillard government is aware of the destabilizing of the GFC and the potential for major struggles by workers and young people, he then continues by introducing a whole new topic, retracting attention from the first statement that had no evidential data or sources, even though it may be true. This form of fallacy is known as the red herring. Additionally the statements made in regards to the GFC still having occurring ramifications on the Australian economy, do have premise, however in accordance to the IMF (SMH, 2012), Australia’s economy is one of the strongest. Moreover the insinuation that the Gillard government is depriving Australians of work, or welfare, due to proposing an injection of cash into this reform again begs to question.
Similarly there are a number of fallacies that can be found within extract 2. The “slippery slope” fallacy is one of the most prominent throughout this extract”. This fallacy comprises when the conclusion of an argument rests upon the chain reaction, and there is not sufficient reason to think that the chain reaction will actually take place (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009). A specific statement made ‘Attorney Generals Department’, states “ the absence of action, significant intelligence and evidence collection capabilities will be lost providing criminal elements with a technological upper hand”. The assumed correlation is not ample enough to demonstrate a chain reaction, for example, if these proposed laws are not put in action, there is no irrefutable proof that insists that intelligence and evidence capabilities will be lost, which in turn will put all Australian citizens under threat. These assumptions undermine the ‘terrorism legislation’, which is already imposed to act as a security measure to all Australians.
Another outstanding fallacy presented in extract two is the ‘appeals to force fallacy’ (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009). The attorney generals department appeal to the reader by describing two exclusive options, either to face the ramifications of terrorism, threats to security and espionage, or to accept the second option, which consists of introducing laws such as telecommunication interception, which in turn not only monetarily funds, but also expands the powers the ASIO already currently hold (Head, M, 2012). This automatically implies that harm will come to the reader if s/he does not accept the conclusion. Furthermore they seek to instil fear In this case they make the implication that Australians civil liberties are at stake, however in this process there is also false declarations of “significant terror plots have been foiled on our soil”(General-Attorneys Department, 2012), when in fact there hasn’t been any substantial evidence in relation to having any imminent threat on ‘national security’ (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), e.g. (Mohammed Haneef), who was falsely accused of terror attacks and as a consequence of the “terrorism act” was stripped of his visa (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009). Thus not only conveying the amount of power police have due to the “terrorism act” but also conveying that there are already substantial laws in tact, which adequately respond to such situations. Nor is there indication that the proposed reform is the only or best way to help prevent future attacks/plots.
An assertion is made in extract 2 has been made which carries red herring and inconsistencies (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), “While advances in technology and communications have resulted unquestionable benefits...they have also introduced significant vulnerabilities, including the ability to disrupt, destroy or alter critical infrastructure and the Information held on it”(Attorney General’s department, 2012), indicating that there is imperative to implement a retention plan storing our “telecommunication infrastructure to secure its availability and integrity” (Attorney General’s department, 2012). This calls for the attention of begging the question (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), as in accordance to the EFT(Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2012) that a centralized database will be inefficient, as opposed to multiple sources that can be accessed as efficiently, or (or even more easily) than once central, which evidently contradicts the essence of the proposal reform.
Additionally (Head, M,2012) states that Australian residents are already subjected to intensive monitoring of their telecommunications. In 2010-11, according to official data, the intelligence and law enforcement agencies were granted nearly a quarter of a million dollars to intercept requests under the existing legislation (Head, M,2012). Moreover looking specifically at communications data, section 313 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) imposes obligations on all carriers and carriage service providers ‘to provide all assistance to Commonwealth, State and Territory Government agencies that is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law or a law imposing a monetary penalty, the protection of the public revenue or the safeguarding of national security’ (Interception and Access) Act 1979). Significantly, this involves, amongst other obligations, providing assistance to agencies in relation to the interception of communications and access to stored communications (Lyon, D, 2012).
Similarly there is no ‘hard evidence’ to support the statement that changes in technology and the practices of are causing serious problems for law enforcement agencies (EFT, 2012), Additionally no statistics have been provided on the number of attempts made by law enforcement agencies to obtain data from companies that were unsuccessful due to the company not being able to retrieve or collecting the data.
Through the thorough analysis of both perspectives, on the issue Australian Surveillance, specifically the telecommunication interception reform, telecommunication sector security reform, and Australian intelligence community reform. Has led me to believe Australia should reject mandatory data retention. The government wants communication sectors including mobile telephone and Internet service providers to retain traffic and location data of all users for two years (Head, M, 2012). This would create massive collections of data that will be at threat of automatic disclosure, misuse, or breach (EFT, 2012).
Additionally the actual reality of formal inquiry as to your identity rather than the relevant characteristic (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), implies that we are not equal before the law and places you in the position of being not a customer or equal citizen, which steams from the fundamental principle of a free society under the rule of law (Head, M & Mann, S, 2009), because we have to be treated equally in equal circumstances. Moreover because the capacity to speak freely about any kinds of matters – personal, religious, political, will be spied upon, it will create a constrained society, which in turn will be controlled by different sects of the government, which means fundamental human rights will be constrained or diminished, which essentially is indicative of democracy being threatened.
Conclusively without sound justification as to why the laws that already exist need expansion, validation of the proposed implementation cannot be warranted to protect Australians, but instead it exploits the natural right to privacy and in some cases work/ freedom of speech of Australians. Socialists such as Mike Head believe that these propositions are disguised in allowing unprecedented powers. However General Attorney’s department through taking a utilitarian standpoint, insist that achieving the greatest good for the greatest happiness (which in this case is security). Nonetheless these proposals not only act as a threat to freedom of privacy under the human Rights declaration, but also allowing unprecedented powers and economic resources, in what seems to gain excessive control.
References:
Attorney-General’s Department (2012) EQUIPPING AUSTRALIA AGAINST EMERGING AND EVOLVING THREATS
Australian economy leads the world. 2012. Australian economy leads the world. [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 9 October 2012].
Electronic Frontiers Australia | Your voice for digital freedom, access and privacy.. 2012. Electronic Frontiers Australia | Your voice for digital freedom, access and privacy.. [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 8 October 2012].
Freedom Not Fear: David Lyon on Contemporary Surveillance | Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2012. Freedom Not Fear: David Lyon on Contemporary Surveillance | Electronic Frontier Foundation. [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 7 October 2012].
Head, M and Mann, S (2009), Law in perspective, 2nd Edition, UNSW Press. With particular reference to chapter 1-4 and 9-12 for topic (A), chapter 18
Head, M (2012)Australian government proposes sweeping Internet surveillance, World Socialist WebSite, Published :14July2012
Overview of legislation: The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, available at: <> accessed 4 October 2012
Surveillance technologies | ALRC. 2012. Surveillance technologies | ALRC. [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 5 October 2012].
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 2012. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 8 October 2012].
What is privacy?. 2012. What is privacy?. [ONLINE] Available at: . [Accessed 9 October 2012].
by
billzarama (student)
