As equity developed so too did the use of land. Land was becoming more and more a marketable commercial commodity and this began leading to the modern trust. Dissolution with the feudal system meant that people were turning to trade to not only preserve their assets, but also obtain them in the first place. This transition from land to industrial wealth led investments becoming more widely used. Bonds shares and mortgages were interchangeable, fluid means of transferring wealth, land was not. Trustees began operation at managerial level, trading against one another in their clients best interests. As such a new way of dealing with trusts had to be created by equity. Previously a trust was held by the owner of land who was also the decision maker relating to the property, trusts are now a managerial way of looking after and preserving wealth of any kind, not limited to land or property. As a result, the principles of equity have constantly developed and found new fields of application.
In equity a beneficiary may only enforce a trust if it is completely constituted. It is vital that the settlor do everything in their power to ensure the subject matter of the trust has been transferred from himself to the trustee to hold for the beneficiary. A settlor may not change their mind once a trust has been created. Only a beneficiary may end a trust by enforcing it.
A covenant is a form of promise executed under a deed and is therefore a binding contract. One vital maxim of equity is that equity will never assist a volunteer. That is, it is always necessary for beneficiaries of a trust to have given consideration or to have been made parties to the deed of covenant or to have been identified as third parties entitled to benefit under the contract. A promise made in a deed of covenant will have the full force and effect of a binding contract. In addition, marriage has been identified as ‘the most valuable consideration imaginable.’
Whilst a contract is enforceable if it is made by deed and supported by consideration, it is important to distinguish between that and a gratuitous promise that cannot be enforced. The majority of covenants to settle property are made by deed or when both parties are in consideration of the marriage in money or money’s worth. Whereas contracts by deed are recognised as valid under common law – even when there is no consideration by the promisee, they are not recognised as valid in equity. This leaves petitioners in the position that whereas the common law remedy of damages may be achieved for breach of covenants, the equitable remedy of specific performance that would require a trust to actually be constituted, is not.
Whilst common law does not recognise marriage consideration as valid, equity fills the lacuna left by the common law. As such, the husband, wife or issue of a marriage may sue in equity on a contract agreed to be made before, and in consideration of the marriage, even if they do not provide consideration in the conventional common law sense. It is important to note that marriage settlements frequently covered not only property owned by the respective parties to the marriage but also property yet to be acquired. Thus a settlement may also include after-acquired property, however, future property and expectations cannot be the subject of a trust. Therefore, such a trust cannot fail to be property constituted, as it cannot even exist. The actual practical use of marriage settlements and their covenants in modern society is questionable;
“The doctrine of marriage consideration survives as a fossil of the long era of the wife’s economic subjugation to her husband. The Married Women’s Property Act and the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act sounded the death knell of that era; and so the reasons of public policy which accounted for the court’s ambivalent attitude to the covenant to settle after-acquired property belong to a closed chapter of legal history.”
One key point is that in marriage consideration only those parties subject to the marriage – including issue of the marriage may sue on the contract. This is regarded as an atypical exception to the rule that equity will not assist a volunteer. This offered some recourse to women who, prior to the Married Women’s Property Act (1882) could not sue in their own right.
Whilst the doctrine of marriage consideration still survives it has little use in modern society and is unlike to ever expand beyond its narrow boundaries.
The exception to the maxim that equity will not assist a volunteer can be found in Strong v. Bird. When a donor has attempted to make a gift to a beneficiary but has failed to comply with all necessary legal formalities, so long as one can show that up to the moment of his death the testator has fully intended the gift to be made then Strong v. Bird will apply. However, Strong v. Bird will not apply where the donor or testator has simply made a promise to make a gift in the future or where there is intention to give, and the gift is not completed because the intending donor desires first to apply the subject matter of the contemplated gift to some other purpose.
The rule in Strong v. Bird rests primarily on two principles, that vesting the property with the personal representative at the time of the donor’s death competed the imperfect gift made in life and that the intervention of the donor to give the benefit to the donee countervails the equity of the beneficiaries under the will.
With regard to third parties The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 has defined the law relating to volunteers and beneficiaries of a trust, although never to the disadvantage of beneficiaries. The main significance of whether or not a trust was completely constituted arose in connection with the enforcement of a trust by a beneficiary who had previously been a volunteer. If a beneficiary could be found to have provided sufficient consideration then he would be able to enforce a trust even if it had not been correctly constituted. Therefore, a contract or covenant to create a trust would be enforceable if due consideration had been given. However, even if the beneficiary was the specific interest of the of the intended trust, he could still only succeed if the trust had been completely constituted – from the perspective that he was a volunteer.
This is significant in that once a settlement (or trust) has been created it cannot be undone. The exception to this rule allowing beneficiaries to ‘undo’ a trust is in accordance with the rule in Saunders v. Vautier. Remedies for beneficiaries of a trust in equity are found in specific performance as an alternative to damages. However, injunctions may also be used when appropriate.
If a trust is completely constituted the fact that a beneficiary is a volunteer is irrelevant. The beneficiary will have as much right to claim and enforce the trust as a cestui que trust that had shown consideration. However, if the trust is not correctly constituted then a volunteer beneficiary will gain no recourse in equity. Where the cestui que trust is a volunteer and the covenant is made with him there is no ‘reply’ to an action by him at common law on the covenant and substantial damages for breach may be awarded. However, due to his being a volunteer there will be no equitable remedy of specific performance available.
What is questionable is the classification and identification of necessary intention. It can be assumed that the intention in question is that of the covenantor and not the covenantee. However, it is questionable as to whether or not the same decision would be reached today as Fletcher v. Fletcher was decided at a time when then the privity of contract doctrine was in its developmental stage. As a result the law was much more guarded in its approach to privity and attempts to thwart it by invoking a ‘trust of promise.’ In addition to this later cases have shown that intention will not be found as effortlessly and must be affirmatively proved.
The difficulties that trustees, as parties to a covenant face is whether or not they can sue to recover damages with a view to holding monies received on trust for the (volunteer) beneficiaries. Where a beneficiary may only recover nominal damages an action in law on the covenant will be of no use to him.
Generally, a claimant may recover damages in an action for breach of contract sufficient to compensate him for his loss. However, what does common law recognise as a claimant’s loss? With regard to a breach of a voluntary covenant to settle, a loss will be construed as the failure to pay a certain sum or transfer a certain property to a certain individual. As such the damages will be directly related to the original sums involved.
In the case of a voluntary covenant it is important to look at the intention of the settlor who, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, should be presumed to intend a trust for the volunteer beneficiary. Whilst this seems directly at odds with the provision that equity will never assist a volunteer, the real difficulty lies in establishing that the trust has been completely constituted by the vesting of the trust property in the trustee, and of what the trust property consists of.
In conclusion, the concept of the covenant in equity is perhaps as outdated now as it was in the 1800’s. The various doctrines have received substantial academic criticism in the past and the judiciary have been interpreted to be somewhat contradictory in their approach to the law of modern equity. As equity was developing, it had no fixed standards and each Chancellor was free to judge as he saw fit. As a result there was no real uniformity or consistency to equity. While the Judicature Acts 1873-75 gave rationale to equity’s position, any court which applied the rules of both equity and the common law would face divergence as common law would produce one result, equity another. As a result Section 28 of the Supreme Court Judicature Act 1877 provided that where conflict arose, equity would prevail. Obviously, this did not serve to unite the two areas of law. Whilst equity remains a useful tool and it is difficult to imagine a legal system that does not incorporate it the concept of equity is perhaps best described as outdated and archaic, especially with regard to covenants in equity. Thus whilst equity will always prevail the development of the covenant is neither relevant nor useful in modern law or society.
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Time immemorial was fixed by the Statute of Westminster 1 of 1275 as 3 September 1189, the date of Richard I’s accession to the throne.
Sir George Jessels MR, re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696 at 710
W.J. Stewart & Robert Burgess, Collins Dictionary of Law, HarperCollins 1996
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity: Doctrines & Remedies, 3rd Ed, Butterworths 1992
Under feudal custom the husband of a woman would become the owner of his wife’s land during his lifetime by a right known as curtesy.
Jill E. Martin, Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity, 16th Ed 2001, Sweet & Maxwell pp44
Alastair Hudson, Equity & Trusts, 2nd Ed Cavendish Publishing 2001 pp 161
Ibid. See Milroy v. Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264
Ibid. See Pullman v. Koe [1913] 1 Ch 9
Ibid. See Cannon v. Hartley [1949] Ch 213
Ibid. See Contact (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 & Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844)
Alastair Hudson, Equity & Trusts, 2nd Ed Cavendish Publishing 2001 pp 161
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 101- See A-G v. Jacobs-Smith [1895] 2 QB 341 at 354 CA
Paul Todd, Textbook on Law & Trusts 4th Ed, Blackstone Ltd 1991 pp 83
Paul Todd, Textbook on Law & Trusts 4th Ed, Blackstone Ltd 1991 pp 84
W. A. Lee, The Public Policy of Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts (1969) 85 LQR p227
Paul Todd, Textbook on Law & Trusts 4th Ed, Blackstone Ltd 1991 pp 85
Strong v. Bird (1874) LR 18 Eq 315
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 115 – See Re Innes [1910] 1 Ch 188
Ibid – See Re Freeland, Supra, CA
Ibid pp 115 – See Re Stewart [1908] 2 Ch 251 at 254-255, per Neville J.
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp105
Ibid – See Davenport v. Bishopp (1843) 2 Y C Ch Cas 451
Ibid pp162 See Paul v. Paul (1882) 20 Ch D 742
Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 107 – See Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58, [1967] 2 All ER 1197, HL.
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 107
Ibid – See Re Plumptre’s Marriage Settlement [1910] 1 Ch 609
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 105
Graham Moffat, Trusts Law Text & Materials, Butterworths 3rd Ed 1999 pp 143
Ibid – See Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67
Graham Moffat, Trusts Law Text & Materials, Butterworths 3rd Ed 1999 pp 143
Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York [1933] AC 70
Graham Moffat, Trusts Law Text & Materials, Butterworths 3rd Ed 1999 pp 133
Ibid – see [1982] Conv. 280 at 281 (M. Friend) agreed that substantial damages are available on the basis of debt in the case of a voluntary covenant to pay money, but suggesting that this is less clear in the case of specific property other that money.
Philip H. Pettit, Equity & the Law of Trusts, Butterworths, 2001 pp 110 - J D Feltham (1982) 98 LQR 17
‘The two streams have met & still run in the same channel, but their waters do not mix’ Jessel MR Walsh v. Lonsdale (1882) CA