It is in this sense that Cicero makes two great boasts about Rome and his mixed constitution, that it is pragmatic and thus responds to the true needs of human nature and secondly that it has evolved over time as the outcome of not one great man, but many. If as Homer remarked (Coleman 2005), ‘Captive Greece, captivated its barbarous conquerors’, teaching the Romans theory, Rome lost no time in applying what they had been taught. Cicero contests ‘virtue consists entirely in its employment, moreover, its most important employment is the governance of states and the accomplishment of deeds rather than the words of the things that philosophers talk about in corners’ (De re Publica, Book 1). This is more than an egotistical swipe at Plato’s Philosopher king, it is testament to Cicero’s belief that his constitution works because it involves participation and action in preference to theory, pragmatism over abstract concepts. Secondly, Cicero believes that pragmatism has allowed evolution to deliver Rome the best of all types of government. It is from this that he asserts that law, which we will discuss later, has evolved through tradition, and that the state benefits from the genius of many men, rather than one. After all, ‘never was a genius so great that he could never miss nothing’ (De re Publica, Book 2).
Law has therefore evolved for Cicero, established in the past through traditions and customs. It has come to be recognised as crucial to man but also as an essential contribution to the success of the state. Cicero asserts that law is not natural, but it has arisen as a result of man’s rationality. Law is therefore a response to man’s innate nature. Man has a wish to be benevolent and care for his kin, and the law responds by providing ownership, enabling him to bestow gifts and demonstrate reciprocity. For Cicero, an absence of law to define ownership would make this impossible and is therefore essential if we are to respect our innate nature. Secondly law is a convenient way of acknowledging ownership, not only to avoid civil dispute and discord, but to ensure that things are cared for. Cicero believes that despite ownership being unnatural, as only ‘God has given us a home and a country to be shared with him’ (De re Publica, Book 1), he asserts that personal ownership causes us to care for things more than if they were part of the collective. Ownership, protected by law, is therefore a convenient and pragmatic approach to dealing with society and human nature.
Law also fulfils a second purpose for Cicero, in that it is necessary and must be adhered to in order to create a harmonious and stable society. Cicero argues that ‘to promote a happy and honorable way of life, it must be established on the authority of the commonwealth in part through institutions and in part through laws’ (De re Publica, Book 4). Cicero is consistent in his conviction that the Rule of Law is paramount; within another text he asserts that laws were invented ‘for the well-being of citizens, the safety of states, and the calm and happy life of humans’ (On Laws, Book 2). But why are laws so vital for Cicero? I suggest two reasons, firstly laws create order and this is essential to the stability of any state. Cicero sees the law as a civilising force, where everyone knows their place, what belongs to them and what they may and may not take. But more than this, it provides security, as people know that their home is secure, that there is an avenue of redress if they are a victim of crime or that certain rights are inalienable. Law is therefore firstly a solution to civil volatility; it is the ultimate authority and framework for behavior and action.
The second reason is that for Cicero, law holds the answer to difficult questions arising from man’s nature, such as ‘what is justice?’ and, ‘if and how in what sense men can be equal?’ Law provides a tonic to this question because despite Cicero’s belief that men hold innate qualities in common, he does not think this causes all men to be equal. On the contrary, each man is unique, possessing different skills, aptitudes and advantages over the other. Each man may only be happy when he pursues his skill and is secure in his own order. Law has no role in seeking to equalise man’s differences, but it can provide security to each man in his rightful order. Equity is established through the law of the commonwealth, so that each is permitted in law to possess his own, despite the amount of what is one’s own differing from one person to the next. Cicero’s narrator Scipio proclaims, ‘the peculiar concern of a state and city is that every person’s custody of his own property be free and undisturbed’ (De re Publica, Book 4). Law provides the answer for Cicero to the question, ‘what is justice?’ Justice is not equality, but proportionality and equity, protected in law.
Establishing the Rule of Law and the recognition of the state as a platform for debate on issues of the common good is based on the assumption that mankind is innately virtuous, that concern spans both self-interest and collective interest. If we accept that to be true for the moment, how does Cicero explain why people should have loyalty to their state? Cicero argues ‘we have a greater obligation (to the state) than to our parents’ (De re Publica, Book 1). By Cicero’s logic, the state must be preserved to defend man’s capacity for sociability, and to protect his way of life. The institutions that protect our way of life through law must be upheld if we are to continue to utilise the characteristics that make us human and unique. Scipio argues, ‘Our country did not give us birth or rearing without expecting some return from us’ (De re Publica, Book 1). Citizenship, duty and obligation to one’s country through participation are effectively the cost of a stable, just and harmonious state. Devotion and service to the state are therefore vital to ensure that each man continues to be protected and can be maintained in the sphere that allows him the freedom to pursue his interests.
If we understand Cicero’s creation of the state and laws are based on the aforementioned precepts, then I believe Cicero’s opinion is in parts valid, but in other parts based on assumptions that can be argued to be wrong. The supremacy of Cicero’s commonwealth is based on an untested conjecture. For example I agree that man is a sociable creature, yet it is possible that man’s inclination to gather together is an outcome of necessity, that man knows instinctively he is stronger and safer within a group or a network, rather than out of any desire to help another man within a community or to contribute something beyond one’s own self interest. The creation of the state is therefore a marriage of convenience between man’s innate self-interest and a dependence on social networks to aid his survival. If this is the case, then it calls into question Cicero’s conviction that a community represented by consensus government will work towards a common good. If man is inherently self-interested, then there will be any number of desires and the group or individual with the greatest strength or authority will prevail. In order for Cicero’s mixed constitution to be a success, it must be strong enough to incorporate and bind together conflicting opinion and enforce compromise whilst avoiding power being consolidated within any one group.
Despite the mixed constitution being most suited to serving the different interests of society, Cicero has not invented a constitution immune to corruption. Again, Cicero makes an assumption, that the lower class in his society has no desire for reallocation of wealth or access to equality, but it only desires freedom from oppression. For our thinker, it is the elite who desire power and authority. In De re Publica, Scipio asserts that the Optimates, endowed with the most in society, have the most to gain from participating in politics - as only political participation can ensure their way of life. Therefore, they have the most to lose if they do not serve the collective interest. Conversely however, I argue that, the lower sections of society have nothing to gain by maintaining the status-quo - they are under-represented, have few opportunities for social mobility or to increase their prosperity - but they also have nothing to lose from civil disturbance. I fail to see how it is justifiable to argue that the lower ranks of society desire no reward, either in terms of political voice or in terms of fair distribution of income, for being the backbone of the economy, and are happy to be led by the privileged. Cicero’s inability to redistribute income or properly involve everyone in government can only lead to the sort of instability he dreads and thinks impossible of his commonwealth.
The Rule of Law ensures everyone has a kind of equality, but this is of little value if one has nothing to protect. Laws have evolved from tradition and custom according to Cicero, but does that make the law unquestionably right? If sections of a community have emerged with nothing over time, whilst others have prospered, the law only protects the status-quo; it provides no indication whether this is in fact morally right.
Where is the benevolence and social compassion that Cicero believes innate to all humans in a state that thinks it has no role in assisting or improving the conditions of the more vulnerable in society? This in itself conflicts with Cicero’s model of man: are we not meant to be gregarious and concerned enough for the plight of our fellow man to reject a constitution that favours privilege and compounds the misery of the unfortunate? I argue that Cicero’s constitution is a convenient way for the elite to disguise their dominance and the in-built advantages they have in law. Unlike Aristotle, Cicero offers no redistribution of income to assist the poor in society and to improve their circumstance, and no money to assist their participation in the political. Only the rich in Cicero’s commonwealth can afford the time to participate in politics. The role of public opinion is narrowly limited to the Plebeian tribunes, who have minimal input and no authority. Rome’s poor effectively voted in groups, rather than as individuals, and they voted last – once enough votes had been received for a majority the voting stopped. The vote of the poor in Rome was consequently worth less and more likely to go unheard. Cicero was open in his dislike for democracy, fearful of ‘the madness and license of the mob’ (De re Publica, Book 1) and warned of the requirement of statesmen to connect emotionally rather than rationally with the people he thought incapable of realising virtue through wisdom. Power within Cicero’s constitution, despite appearances, is consolidated within one main group. If this is the extent of public involvement, then consensus government is overstated and the commonwealth is limited. All of these factors contribute to political instability and a social contract that has been exhausted.
Cicero’s commonwealth is reliant on a notion of man who is not only benevolent in his nature but also happy with his position in society. If we contest this view, and suggest man is more concerned for himself than his community, we begin to encounter problems. We see that although a mixed constitution stands the best chance of accommodating each man’s desire, it is necessary that the constitution has enough strength to include all sections as representatively as possible. Cicero recognises ‘it is possible to have one senate and one people, and if we don’t we are in very deep trouble’ (De re Publica, Book 1). The strength of a mixed constitution is that it is holistic, involving everyone. A mixed constitution that pays only lip-service to some parts, whilst favouring established elites, will not function effectively or thrive in the long-term. If man is by nature not as virtuous as Cicero assumes, those who hold the greatest power can potentially exploit the constitution to their own advantage. Although Cicero argues that ‘no just ruler would implement laws he himself would not obey’, opportunities are limited for weaker sections of society to participate in politics and prevent such injustice from happening. Cicero’s constitution fails to address inequality in any sense; rather it compounds it, based on one assumption: lower classes desire freedom from oppression rather than a renegotiation of society’s structure. Cicero in affect offers the less fortunate a worthless social contract. I believe that rather than a fellowship of equals, this is an unequal society with power consolidated at the top. Cicero’s vision constitutes a weak consensus government that could certainly not exist today, as it conflicts with our more egalitarian social values and beliefs. Because the commonwealth can only function by dividing society between those who have the protection of the law and those with nothing to protect and little expectation of social mobility, there is neither hope of social cohesion nor the stability Cicero’s theory envisages.
References:
Cicero, De re Publica, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 4th Edition, published 2005
Cicero, On the Laws, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 4th Edition, published 2005
Homer, cited in Coleman, Janet, A History of Political Thought, From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity, chapter 5, published 2005
Bibliography:
Annas, J. Cicero on Stoic moral philosophy and private property in M. Griffin and J. Barnes eds., Philosophia Togata I (Oxford, 1989/97)
Shotter, David, The Fall of the Roman Republic (London, 1994).