Is Dworkin a natural lawyer? Before examining the Dworkinian perspective, it is important to define the melange and conflict that the two opposing leading theories of jurisprudence, natural law and positivism reflect.

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Ronald Dworkin's name resounds eponymously with the realms of legal theory having been recognised universally for his pioneering scholarly work of worldwide impact1 consequently becoming one of the most cited legal scholars of the twentieth century.2 As an influential contributor to the jurisprudential movement, he has become known for advancing two main theses, "law as integrity" which advocates that the judiciary should read law with shared moral community principles. His second theory, possibly the most relative to the natural positivist debate is that of legal interpretivism. Legal interpretivism denies that law and morality are wholly independent systems3, yet due to the lack of morality, it would be misleading to flatly states that examples such as Lemuel Shaw, a staunch supporter for the abolition of slavery, and his compliance with the Fugitive Slave Act was not valid law, or similarly that the Nazi edicts were not valid law4. However is this theory merely a neologism of the original stance resting on the laurels of natural law, with Dworkin as a sheep in wolves clothing, acting as a parochial natural lawyer? Further within his newest text, Justice for Hedgehogs, what does his 'revolutionary' one system of jurisprudence indicate?

Before examining the