Land Registration Act 2002

Many issues have been highlighted by the introduction of e-conveyancing (separate from the substantive changes) for example problems with security particularly with regards to ‘Phishing’; as seen the Halifax Internet banking in 2004. Areas concerning computer literacy and training have also been highlighted, specifically with the financial struggle that could be faced by smaller solicitor firms when training and securing their networks. However with careful planning and management of the transition the effect can be minimised. The introduction of e-conveyancing can also benefit smaller firms; as ‘everyone receives the same benefit from e-mail’ it allows smaller firms to benefit in the same way as larger firms.  In order to ensure the success of electronic conveyancing ‘the law was dramatically changed.’ There was major changes to all areas involving registered land, this included; the law of adverse possession, voluntary registration, protection of third party interest and estoppel.

The change involving adverse possession was one area that received the most media and academic attention. Previously after twelve years adverse possession, the paper owner of the land holds it on trust for the squatter who may apply to be registered as proprietor of a new estate. The new system introduced by the LRA 2002 has meant that it is much harder for a squatter to succeed in their claim for adverse possession. Under section 96 adverse possession of itself, for however long, will not bar the owner's title to a registered estate in land. Squatters can apply for adverse possession after 10 years however all those who hold interest in the land will be notified, they can then object to the application. If the notification is objected then the registered owners have 18 months to remove the squatters, after the 18 months the squatters can then reapply where they will then become the registered proprietors.

Although on first appearances it seems that the LRA 2002 has decreased the requirements for adverse possession, it has successfully reduced the number of claims for adverse possession of registered land. According to Mr Sahib Sehrawat ‘gone are the days when you can just go into occupation of a house and sit there and say ‘it’s mine.’ That’s not going to work anymore under the 2002 Act.’ However the Act only covers land which is registered and therefore it has to be questioned if the Act goes far enough. The Law Commission had attempted to close off any prospect of further debate on the subject, they set out arguments for the near abolition of adverse possession, despite this they also stated that ‘…any substantive reform of [adverse possession] should be undertaken separately and ought not to be conditioned purely by registered conveyancing considerations.’ Nevertheless the 2002 Act has signalled a step towards the end of adverse possession; in the light of Human Rights legislation the courts may restrict it further.

As mentioned earlier the LRA 2002 also made changes to voluntary and compulsory registration.

A further change is that of third party interest and estoppel, since 1925 there has been much change even to the law of land, one of the most prominent is the development of proprietary estoppel. This development has been a source of new opportunities for litigants and a source of problems for both academics and judges. As seen in section 116 of the LRA 2002 the Law Commission has tried to resolve these problems, though it is limited to registered land. The section is exactly the same as the one contained in the draft bill in the Law Commissions Report, its aim ‘is to settle a debate concerning the nature of rights arising as a result of proprietary estoppel.’The section itself reflects the decision made by the House of Lords in NPB v. Hastings Car Mart.

The academic and judicial views of the changes appear inconclusive. Previous case law clearly shows a division between judges; with His Honour Judge Boggis in the High Court and Morritt L.J taking a clear stance towards the idea of estoppel and judges such as Peter Gibson L.J. and Robert Walker L.J showing evidence of being against. It is possible that, with the justification of different interpretive techniques and the discretion they have in estoppel cases, judges could continue to rule in a similar manner as before.

To conclude

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