Legal System Assignment - The case of R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303.

Legal System Assignment

The case of R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303 produces a particular aspect of legal reasoning which can often prove to be problematic. Because the English language is not necessarily suited for expressing precise and unambiguous facts, courts; judges in particular, will generally have to interpret the words of statutes with regard to the facts of each particular case. Surprisingly, there is relatively little statutory control over the interpretation of legislation; it is mostly a matter for juridicial convention and precedent.

In the case of Maginnis, a package of cannabis resin was found in the defendant’s car when he was arrested in connection with another offence (an assault). The defendant claimed that the package was not his but had been left in his possession by a friend the previous evening who he expected would collect it from him. He was charged and convicted of, inter alia, possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another, contrary to section 5 (3) of the misuse of drugs act 1971.

“(3) Subject to section 28 of this Act, it is an offence for a person to have a controlled drug in his possession, whether lawfully or not, with intent to supply it to another in contravention of section 4(1) of this Act.”

The defendant appealed, contending that his intention to return the package of Cannabis back to the owner did not constitute an intention to ‘supply’ drugs within section 5(3). The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal. Crown appealed to the House of Lords.

The particular problem in this case was with the meaning of the word ‘supply’ in section 5(3) of the misuse of drugs Act 1971. This act is a statute that is in frequent use and the preciseness of the meaning of the word ‘supply’ is important to those concerned in the administration of justice. It may seem like a trivial ambiguity, unproblematic in everyday speech, however it proves to be problematic in legal contexts.

Poorly drafted legislation causes many problems, as courts frequently have to decide whether statutes really mean what they purport to mean. Many defects are not entirely obvious. There can also be difficulties with an unknown scope of generalisation; the problem being that space precludes a complete listing of all the entities

Considering these problems mentioned in reference to the difficulties of interpreting legislation, it is fitting to consider the methods taken by judges whilst appropriating and determining specific meaning of words. There are, essentially, three approaches that judges take when they are faced with the challenge of determining the meaning of a statute. Under the literal rule, judges are required to interpret Acts purely according to their literal meaning. It is unsurprisingly the first approach that will be taken. It basically means following the literal, ordinary or natural meaning of words. Although a strict application of the literal rule is no longer in favour, it remains that in the English common Law system, interpretation is more literal in approach than most other jurisdictions. It is known as a ‘rule’ however does not bind the court and does not have to be applied.

The golden rule follows that the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further. The mischief rule represents a somewhat more purposive approach to interpretation. The rule itself is venerable; the name is taken from [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a], and in outline says that the job of the judge is to determine what defect in the common law the statute set out to remedy. A broader, and more usual, reading is that the judge should apply what ...

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In Maginnis it was held that in its ordinary, natural meaning, ‘supply’ meant providing or furnishing a person with something that they requires for their own personal use, and that while it connotes more than a physical transfer of control, it is not necessary that the provision should be made out of the supplier’s resources.

The majority of their Lordships (4:1) purported to apply the ordinary, natural meaning of the word ‘supply’ and held that a supply did indeed take place. We see how Lord Keith of Kinkel takes the literal approach;

“It follows that in so far as he was in possession of the drugs with the intention of handing them back to the friend when asked for by the latter, he was in possession with intent to supply the drugs to another in contravention of section 4(1) and was thus guilty under section 5(3).”

However, we see how the judges from first instance through the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords disagreed with each other about this interpretation and about the meaning of the common word ‘supply’. Lord Goff of Chieveley dissented on the meaning and argued that the word ‘supply’ was not fitting to describe a transaction in which A handed back to B goods which B had previously left with A. Goff was also of the opinion that the particular offence in question was aimed at drug ‘pushers’. It was argued that the defendant was not a ‘pusher’ and therefore could only be guilty of the charge of “unlawful possession”- a lesser offence. Goff argued that it was the responsibility of Parliament and not the courts to enlarge the definition of supply, if the defendant was indeed to be convicted of ‘possession with intent to supply’.

Therefore it could be argued that Goff applied the golden rule; an extension of the literal rule, but applied in circumstances where the application of the literal rule is likely to result in what appears to the court to be an obviously absurd result. I would commend Goff on this decision.

To apply the words in this statute literally is to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. One may argue that the approach taken by Lord Keith (the literal rule) is said to give certainty. However, this is disputable; there is no certainty as to literalism so therefore there is no certainty. Lord Keith can be criticised, as he is defiant that there is no ambiguity. Keith and the other judges in agreement appear to act inconsistently by fixing their judgement on a literal interpretation of the Law, however decide on a non-literal or purposive meaning of the word. This demonstrates weaknesses of the literal rule; although it sounds simple, there is not always a prescribed meaning for words- the ordinary meaning may not be so ordinary at all- problems finding the natural meaning of words frequently occur when the literal rule is applied. Slapper and Kelly illustrate this in The English Legal system;

“That fact…highlights the essential weakness of the literal rule, which is that it wrongly assumes that there is such a thing as a single, uncontentious, literal understanding of words”.

However, the literal rule may also benefit the system. As seen in Maginnis, wording is applied to each case in its own context; thus allowing judges to expand a definition.

In his dissenting judgment, Goff cited a dictionary definition to support his interpretation of the word- evidently looking beyond the statute and emphasizing the intention of the legislature. However, Keith as well as Goff argued that his meaning of supply was the ‘ordinary’ one even though both definitions came from a dictionary.

The dictionary definitions mean that extrinsic aids have been used. Extrinsic aids to interpretation consist of everything not found within the statute, whereas intrinsic aids are those found within the statute being interpreted. The use of extrinsic aids thus implies a literalist construction of statutes, since a purposive approach would seek to enforce what parliament intended, rather than enforce the meaning of what is said. It is evident that the legislation has been looked beyond. Lord Keith refers to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary;

“The word ‘supply’ is defined…as follows: ‘…To fulfill, satisfy (a need or want) by furnishing what is wanted. To furnish, provide, afford something needed, desired or used…’ Those are the two definitions which seem to be relevant to the particular circumstances.”

Aids to interpretation are used by parliament and courts to avoid obscurity; however, we still see in this case that different interpretations of the word ‘supply’ are given by the dictionaries. Goff selects a meaning from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary that he believes is consistent with his approach. His approach applies the use of context upon the idea of depositing an item.

It is not all that unusual for a `battle of dictionaries' to arise, with both sides finding dictionary definitions that support their own cases. This gives the possibility of many potential meanings, but enlarges the likelihood that there may be a miscarriage of justice.

Goff also uses analogies, which some may argue is an extrinsic aid in itself;

“In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant, the left luggage officer, the warehouseman and the shoe mender do not ‘supply’ to their customers the articles which customers have left with them”.

There is also a passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, 12th ed. (1969) that is referred to by Lord Keith in reference to ambiguity.

“But as I say, if there is, the principle set out in Maxwell applies, namely that the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the defendant.”

Some may argue that the doctrine of precedent is also an extrinsic aid. Precedent is a judgment or decision of a court, used as an authority for reaching the same decision in subsequent cases. It is the legal reasoning or ratio decedendi of a case that is binding, but only if the legal reasoning is from a superior court and, in general, from the same court in an earlier case. Accordingly, ratio decedendis of the House of Lords are binding upon the Court of Appeal and all lower courts are normally followed by the House of Lords itself. In Maginnis there are various cases cited, and in particular, two important cases cited as precedent; Rv Delgado[1984] 1 W.L.R and R v Dempsey [1985] 82 Cr.App.R.291

In these cases, the meaning of the word ‘supply’ was also deliberated. In R v Dempsey, the question was whether the handing over of an ampoule to somebody to hold temporarily amounted to a supply. The court ruled that it would not amount to a supply and quashed the defendant’s conviction. In R v Delgado, the appeal judges ruled that the defendant who returning cannabis to those who had given it to him would be an act of supplying. Their interpretation of the word ‘supply’ was again supported by a dictionary definition. They interpreted a supply as a mere physical transfer of control, as opposed to the interpretation in Dempsey, where context was also taken into consideration. R v Delgado was distinguished by the House of Lords because there was no ‘duty’ to return the substance. Therefore, putting the substance back into circulation amounted to a supply.

It is evident that the interpretation of statute remains open. The use of precedent is effective for their Lordships when giving reasoning for their decisions. Lord Goff agrees with the ruling in R v Dempsey and concludes that the Act is directed at those who are ‘pushing’ controlled drugs. Use of precedent can however lead to later cases being misguided. This `declaratory theory' of judicial decision-making has a main principle which states that when judges are required to make decisions, they do not create or change the law, they merely `declare' it.

In conclusion, although I would hold some of Lord Keith’s arguments and reasoning with acclaim, I would have to surmise that overall I agree with the judgment and reasoning of Lord Goff. I would commend Kinkel’s argument that it is not a necessary element in the conception of supply that the provision should be made out of the personal resources of the person who does the supplying; however, I disagree with his judgment. Kinkel makes many valid points about how the word ‘supply’ connotes more than a mere physical transfer of control from one person to another, yet concludes that someone is guilty of a ‘supply’ whether

“…a person in unlawful possession of a controlled drug which has been deposited with him for safe keeping has the intent to supply that drug to another if his intention is to return the drug to the person who deposited it with him”.

This literal approach appears to me to give little certainty, and in this case the term ‘supply’ is too broad to be defined without reference to context. Goff takes into account the point that section 5(3) of the Act creates an offence which is ‘evidently directed at those who are “pushing” controlled drugs’. In my opinion this is a more valid argument and, as Goff argues, appears to accord with the purpose of the subsection. I do assent to the principles of the literal rule, however, there is not always a prescribed meaning for certain words, therefore to apply a given definition may result in an absurdity. Thus, I would argue that where the words are insufficient of a construction that will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the enactment must prevail- unless context of the case can clear up any ambiguity.

Word count: 2090

Slapper and Kelly, The English Legal system, page 176, published 2003, 6th edition.