In Swot’s Defence
Automatism:
Automatism is probably Swot’s strongest defence; representing a lack of mens rea, when the performance of actions is without awareness or conscious intent. It is legally defined as acting involuntarily. There are two types of the condition: insane automatism and non-insane automatism. Insane automatism is caused by a "disease of the mind" within the M’Naghten Rules, while non-insane automatism is linked to external factors. The importance of the distinction between the two forms rests on the verdict; sane automatism operates as a straightforward denial of voluntariness and leads to an outright acquittal, whereas insane automatism is treated as a type of insanity, for which there is a special verdict and a different burden of proof upon the defendant.
Until fairly recently it was assumed that sleepwalking was the paradigm case of automatism – “Can anyone doubt that a man, who, though he may be perfectly sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in state of somnambulism, would be entitled to be acquitted.” The recent Canadian case of Parks is a classic example of sleepwalking found to be sane automatism, where the defendant was acquitted on the basis of the unanimous expert medical evidence to the effect that the his condition was not the result of mental illness but rather of a simple sleep disorder.
However in domestic law the recent case of Burgess is the precedent and here, by contrast with Parks, the expert medical opinion, following the line taken in Rabey and Hennessy, was that sleepwalking was a mental abnormality, was transmitted through heredity and hence, though there were external triggers such as drugs and stress, which can precipitate sleepwalking, the episodes were due to an internal factor, namely the inbuilt tendency of the person to sleepwalk. While there have been recent cases involving sleepwalking where the defendant has been acquitted, for example in the cases of Davies and Bilton these are anomalous with the results in both Burgess and Lowe unless it can be argued that the ‘external factor doctrine’ has outlived its usefulness, as has been found in Canada. Consequently, it is probable that Swot will succeed on a defence of insane automatism, rather than sane, provided he can prove that he was asleep when he stabbed Miles.
A predisposition to sleepwalking can be proven through medical tests. However even if Swot can prove he was asleep, the prosecution has several grounds for recourse. Firstly, Swot knows that when he overworks he is subject to attacks of somnambulism, and although there is no evidence to say that he has been overworking, his finals are imminent. Therefore one should ask if there was anything he could have done to prevent stress and thus avoid an attack of somnambulism, because ‘what is essential to the denial of responsibility for a defendant’s involuntary behaviour is that she was unable deliberatively to control that behaviour and to prevent it from occurring. The case of Bailey found however that although the episode was self-induced, he could still be acquitted if he was unaware that the consequence would likely lead to violence.
Diminished Responsibility
If Swots defence of automatism fails, then he could employ the defence of diminished responsibility. This defence does not guarantee acquittal, however it would reduce the murder charge to manslaughter. If Swot is to succeed under this defence, it needs to be shown that his somnambulism is an abnormality of the mind within the definition of the Homicide Act 1957, and that the abnormality is so great as to substantially impair his responsibility. Furthermore in Byrne it was found that to prove diminished responsibility the state of mind must be different from a normal human-being to the extent that a reasonable man would find it abnormal. Swot can use medical evidence to support his claim that somnambulism constitutes diminished responsibility however as was seen in Saunders the jury has the power to dismiss even unanimous medical opinion when considering diminished responsibility cases.
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2) Leaving Miles injured in his room
Swot’s defence of automatism may be sufficient to acquit him of the act of stabbing Miles. However when he was awoken, and therefore no longer in a state of automatism, he saw the condition that Miles was in and ran away from the scene, allowing Miles to die by his omission to help. According to Miller, there is a duty of care in a situation where one is responsible for causing the danger, thus establishing Swot’s actus reus. Furthermore, the facts of the case show that Swot was in fact aware of what had happened and so would have been capable of calling an ambulance or attempting to stem the blood loss. It would therefore be easier to prove that Swot had sufficient mens rea at the time of leaving the room.
If this is not followed by the jury the prosecution can argue that following the case of Fagan, while Swot unintentionally caused harm, and thus did not have the required mens rea, by intentionally omitting to remedy the situation he had caused this was a continuation of the original positive act, and thus Swot will be liable for the death.
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Possibility of manslaughter charge
Swot could be charged with manslaughter as he committed the act, even if it was done without the requisite mens rea. There are two forms of manslaughter, unlawful and gross negligence.
Unlawful Act Manslaughter
This is when a defendant causes another person’s death in the process of a criminal act. With regards to the first part of the night’s events, Swot stabbed Miles and thus has done an unlawful act, which resulted in death. With regards to the second part of the night swot acted criminally by omitting to help Miles, to whom he had a duty of care and thus could be liable for manslaughter.
Gross Negligence Manslaughter
The main test for gross-negligent manslaughter is considered to be a very high degree of carelessness, to a criminal degree, as decided in the case of Andrews v DPP. The jury is unlikely to find that Swot was acting recklessly when he stabbed Miles as he was asleep and thus had no awareness of what he was doing. It could however be argued that as Swot knew overwork caused him to sleepwalk he was grossly negligent in not taking any preventative measures. In the act of leaving Miles to die Swot is likely to be found to have acted carelessly and therefore could well be liable for Gross Negligence Manslaughter.
In Summary
Although the recent trend in sleepwalking cases is for the defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity, this case differs by the fact that Swot awoke at a stage when he still could have attempted to save Miles life. However Swot did not act and therefore, the prosecution would have a good case for charging Swot with murder, or at least one of the types of manslaughter.
R v White (1910) 2 KB 124, 4 Cr App Rep 257
Vickers [1957] 2 All ER 741
Fomulated in the case of: M’Naghten’s Case (1843-60) All ER 229
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1913066.stm 20/11/06- 16:59
Not guilty by reason of insanity (Trial of Lunatics Act 1983, s.2 as amended by Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s.1)
Criminal – Theory and Doctrine (2004) 2nd Ed. AP Simester, GR Sullivan p114
Stephen J in Tolson (1889) Q.B.D 168 at 187
R v Parks (1992) 75 CCC (3d) 287
Violence, Sleepwalking and the Criminal Law (2005) CLR 619
R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513
The Times, February 11, 2006 at p11
The Guardian, December 20, 2005 at p7
Sleepwalking, Automatism and Insanity – CLR 2006 901 at 903
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB
Court of Appeal in Church [1966] 1 QB 59