On the Necessity of Justice: An Analysis of Plato's Republic.

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On the Necessity of Justice:

An Analysis of Plato’s Republic

Devin Pratt

#0131759

January 28, 2003

PHIL 210

Prepared for: David Morris

On the Necessity of Justice – an Analysis of Plato’s Republic

        The central theme of Plato’s Republic is the question of whether it is better to govern oneself justly, or to behave unjustly.  The argument, however, is not proposed to determine whether it is “better” to be just on some abstract moral scale, but rather to determine whether it is truly advantageous in life for a human to love justice and be just.  In addition to using examples about justice that explain its advantage, Plato attempts to define justice on its own in order to fully and appropriately deal with the issue at hand.  This is not surprising when you take into consideration Plato’s belief in the forms.  

        Plato has Socrates trying to prove to his fellow Athenians that the just is truly more advantageous for many reasons.  Socrates uses arguments that attempt to show how justice is more advantageous to people while they are on earth, to their soul once they leave earth, and to their subsequent lives that follow.  He also attempts to show us how justice is better for a city in order to convince us that justice is a virtue.  Although he makes fairly good arguments all around, I am not interested in anything regarding justice as involved in a larger group or the justice of a city, nor am I interested in anything that has to do with the life of a soul beyond life as we know it here on earth.  I go in this direction because I am in the pursuit of truth, or as close to it as I can get while in this life which is the only life I know.  This means that I will disregard anything that is not relevant to my argument.

In book two, Glaucon argues that people are only considering consequences when they act justly or unjustly, and that if any man, just or unjust, had Gyges’ ring and could become invisible, he would behave unjustly since it is advantageous to get the best of others when there are no consequences.  Socrates disagrees and by book ten he thinks he has shown that justice is required for people to gain the greatest benefits.  I believe that Socrates is correct and Glaucon is wrong and I will prove this through my own points and by using Socrates’ proof.  I will argue that all of humanity (even if they do not know it) has the same goal in life, and that goal is truth.  I will argue that the long and difficult path to truth requires justice or is justice itself.  As part of this I will argue that philosophy is needed for someone to recognize the advantage of justice and also to act in accordance with it.  This will require showing how Glaucon’s definition of justice is not correct.  It will also require an explanation of why the goal of all people is truth, why justice is part of this, and what it has to do with philosophizing.  In addition I will give various moral, knowledge based, and advantage based arguments.

  I will start by refuting Glaucon, since that is what Socrates set out to do.  By doing this, I will not be in any way proving Socrates right, but it is a step in that direction none the less.  There are several reasons why Glaucon’s account of justice is unsatisfactory.  First, all Glaucon proved was that those who seem to be just will benefit, and those who seem to be unjust will not benefit.  Glaucon never actually says that being just is not beneficial; he only says that one can gain more by not restricting oneself to justice.  On top of this, it is not made clear what kind of benefit one will gain by seeming just or by playing both sides; in fact I will argue later that the benefits of behaving unjustly are not true benefits at all.  This also does not make being unjust beneficial at all, because a person cannot know for certain whether they will appear to be just or unjust.  By this I mean that we make decisions based on predictions, and so we are unable to know for certain what consequences will result from our actions, and things become even more difficult when we are attempting to predict the behaviour of others in response to our own behaviour.  In this way, being unjust never leads to an automatic benefit, and in fact, if a person was to be certain of their benefits they would need to seem as just as possible to the point where they will have an easier time simply being just.  In addition, it is evident that Glaucon is under the impression that true benefits come from other people, or outside of ourselves, and there is no logical grounding for these assumptions about the good life.        

If Glaucon were to rank people according to who would be closest to the good life and who would be farthest he would rank them as such:  The closest would be the man who is unjust but seems just, second closest would be the man who is just and seems that way, third closest would be the man who is unjust and seems that way, and the farthest would be the man who is just but seems to be unjust.  The two middle ranks are in the order they are because it is clear even by Glaucon’s standards that the benefits of seeming just outweigh the benefits gained from unjust actions, and in addition we know that actually being just is certainly not detrimental, while seeming unjust is definitely detrimental.  Glaucon only speaks about the top position and bottom position because they best exemplify the perfectly unjust and perfectly just, however this is a mistake of his argument.  

No single man can embody justice in its perfection, nor can he embody injustice in its perfection.  Justice is a much more complicated concept, and the discussion in the entirety of the Republic surely makes that quite obvious.  Whether justice is a virtue of man, or a form (as in the theory of the forms), or just a rational connection a person makes in their observations of reality, it is most clear to all that justice is not something that can be understood in all its perfection through a single example, such as a perfectly just man.  Regardless of what justice is, there can be no perfectly just or unjust man, and so Glaucon’s use of these men in his argument is not legitimate.  I understand that examples are often useful and needed in arguments, but using extremes like this is not useful here because it is not a possible situation, even in principle.  What is important is not that a man cannot be perfectly just, but that we cannot understand or learn about justice through the example of a single man.  This makes the only reasonable examples of man the second and third, making the second best position the best, which means that it is best for man to be just and also seem that way.  This is supported by Socrates in book five when he discusses how, in real life, nothing can fully embody those fundamental ideas that it represents, like justice. (Plato, p. 152-3)  

Another problem with Glaucon’s argument is that its own assumptions make it irrelevant.  The argument that Glaucon presents assumes that all men truly do not care for justice and only practice it out of fear of the consequences of not doing so.  If this were so, then people would not be afraid of acting unjustly at all, because all the other people would expect nothing other than unjust actions, knowing that injustice was more advantageous.  I cannot condemn a person for acting unjustly when I would do the same because I am like everyone else, and we all know that we will do what is advantageous.  To be stated more clearly, if none of us care for justice then we will not carry out some silly charade of trying not to look unjust, we will just do what we have to do for advantage, and we will fully expect the same from others.  Since this is not how things are in reality, and we do fear the consequences of behaving unjustly because we know that everyone is not the same as us, it must be true that there are relatively just people and relatively unjust people.  The argument could be posed that we are all hypocrites and so we still need to put on a façade.  This is not true however, because looks would be meaningless if we all were hypocrites and all knew that when a person seems just, it is just a façade, and so any benefits one might receive for looking just would not come.    

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This does not tell us which is most advantageous, but it tells us that it is not so inherent in us to do the unjust or not care for the just.  If anything, it tells us what is being exemplified in the discussion of justice in the text itself, that some think it is more advantageous to be just and some think it is more advantageous to be unjust.  This tells us one of two things: Either some people are correct and the others confused, or neither is correct, and acting justly or unjustly has nothing to do with human ...

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