Later in the development of common law these principles came to be applied also to the decisions of administrative bodies acting judicially whereby the royal courts exercised a supervisory jurisdiction over them, primarily by means of the former prerogative writs. The importance of the application of the principles of natural justice rests not merely on insistence on due compliance with simple or elementary procedural rules, but also on the fact that a decision which has been arrived at in circumstance where the principles of natural justice have not been observed, will be void. As Lord Wright said in General Medical Council v. Spackman,
“If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is, indeed immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision.”
Such a decision must be declared void; until it has been scrutinized by a court it is voidable only and is not a nullity ab iniitio, as is an order of a court made without jurisdiction. Professor de Smith suggests that there may be a difference in effect between the case where both sides have not been properly heard and one where there is shown to be bias, but if there is such a difference this would seem to be illogical and it is not clearly sustained by the authorities. The justification for the application of the natural law principles to administrative bodies is based on the ultra vires doctrine; the court will not readily believe that parliament intends an administrative agency to come to a decision in such a manner as would flout natural justice; therefore if a particular body does not so act, it must be exceeding the powers conferred on it by parliament. The only circumstances submitted, in which the courts have recognized that the rules of natural justice need not be observed, are themselves situations where there can be no question of any excess of statutory powers. It has been suggested, that the idea of natural justice, as understood in this sense, “contains the very kernel of the problem of administrative justice” ; it is this practice of insisting on observance of the principles of natural justice that has been used by the courts to exercise such inherent control as there may be over administrative agencies. We shall now consider the meaning of each of these two principles, as understood and applied by the common law, and discuss the kind of administrative agencies that must apply the principles, the circumstances in which they must be observed, and the situations to which they do not apply.
After the Second World War natural justice suffered a setback, and the whole subject threatened to become unsettled, in a manner which is all too characteristic of case-law. This was closely connected with a parallel confusion over the remedy of certiorari. A turning point came in 1963 with the decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin. The facts in that case are that the plaintiff, a former Chief Constable of Brighton, had been prosecuted but acquitted on certain charges of conspiracy. In the course of that trial the presiding judge had made certain observations animadverting against the plaintiff’s character as a senior police officer, and a number of damaging facts had been admitted by him in the course of the trial, all of which had been fully reported in the national newspapers. Immediately after the trial, the local watch committee summarily dismissed the plaintiff from the post as Chief Constable. He appealed to the Home Secretary under the Police Regulations, and his appeal was dismissed. In the present proceedings for a declaration he claimed that his dismissal was wrongful, in that the watch committee
In Joseph Baguma v. Uganda national examinations board Uganda v Elsam Rumundo & Others (HCT-05-CR-AA-0184 OF 2002) [2004] UGHC 31 (11 April 2004)
The plaintiff Joseph Baguma, a former employee of the defendant brought this suit against the defendant seeking to recover special damages by way of the balance of unpaid terminal benefits in the tune of shs.5,260,250/=; general damages and interest at 20% on the above.
The facts giving rise to the cause of action were that in January 1988 the defendant employed the plaintiff as a Higher Clerical Officer. The plaintiff worked diligently for the defendant and rose to the rank of Higher Executive officer, until suddenly and without any warning he was unlawfully terminated on the false allegations of involvement in gross misconduct concerning the leaking of examinations. Hence this suit.
The defendant denied the plaintiff’s claim and contended inter alia that the plaintiff was lawfully summarily dismissed for gross misconduct in relation to the leaking of examinations and that all payments which were made to the plaintiff were made ex-gratia on humanitarian grounds.
During scheduling conference the fact that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and was in service of the defendant until he was terminated on 6th October 1999 was not contested. It was also agreed that the plaintiff received some amount of money from the defendant as terminal benefits.
One of the issues was whether the plaintiff was unlawfully terminated or unlawfully dismissed
Dowrick, Justice according to the English Common Lawyer (1961), chapter 4.
Per Maugham, J., in MacLean V. The Workers’ Union (1929) 1 Ch. 602, at p. 624
Natural Justice, by H. H. Marshall (1959)
(1915) A.C. 120, at p.132
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, at p. 99
Prof. H.W.R.Wade, Administrative Law, at p.127