To what extent can it be argued that 'youth crime' is a social construction?

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Youth, crime and society IQ202                Zoe Emma Liddiard

To what extent can it be argued that ‘youth crime’ is a social construction?

‘There cannot be ‘social problems’ that are not the product of social construction – naming, labelling, defining and mapping them into place – through which we can ‘make sense’ of them’ (Clarke, 2001).

It will be argued that to understand ‘crime’, it must first be understood that it is a historical and social construction. This is equally true when looking at ‘youth’. The concepts of ‘crime’ and ‘youth’ are neither fixed in time or place and therefore definitions of either are as such are both contested and contestable. It will be argued that due to the problematic nature of these individual definitions, that ‘youth crime’ is also social construct, and as such problematic. The criminalisation of youth, by imposition of age restrictions and responsibilities, will be specifically focused on. This essay does not intend to comment on the rights or wrongs of the resulting constructions neither does it intend to comment on youth crime causation.

Crime is not a unitary concept (Henry, 2001), and as such it cannot be seen outside its broader, demographic, economic, religious or political contexts, (Briggs, Harrision, McInnes & Vincent, 1996:18) as it is constructed from within these contexts. That is to say that as a social construction what is or is not ‘criminal’ changes over time and across societies (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball, 2002).The Oxford English Dictionary states that crime is ‘an act or omission constituting an offence (usu. a grave one) against an individual or the State and punishable by law’(Simpson and Weiner, 1993). However the law is socially constructed, it changes across time and place. For example in 2003 it is illegal to buy alcohol at 15 in France; 17 in the UK and 20 in the USA (1). Also in the USA the drink purchase age, of 21, was only made a national law in 1984, prior to this it varied from state to state and from 18 to 21(2).

Hester and Eglin (1992) argue that the law is constructed within society, and as such crime is a social construction. Becker (1963) furthers this point from an interactionist stance and as such argues that deviance, crime is created by social groups making rules, infraction of which is labelled a crime or criminal. As such it is not the quality of an act but what is conferred on the act by society that is at issue for Erikson (1962), Becker (1963) and Kituse (1962).

This interactionist stance has subsequently been reinterpreted with a Marxist slant. It has been argued for example that when we examine the social construction of categories of criminal law it becomes clear why certain social groups, such as youths, are over-represented in criminal statistics (Box, 1983; Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). The argument is that the law rather than being a fair reflection of behaviours that cause us collectively the most suffering, is in fact an ideological construct (Box 1983). As such the criminal law is an artfully, created construct designed to criminalize only some behaviours, usually those more commonly committed by the powerless, and to exclude other behaviors, that are more usually committed by the powerful against others. (Box 1983, 7) In other words no matter how immoral or harmful, to the individual or society as a whole, the behaviour may appear to be it cannot be regarded as crime unless it comes under current legislation. As such, those in power criminalize the ‘other’, a prime example of which is the criminalization and problematising of youth (4). This Marxist stance has been argued by revisionist historians as consistent through out history, both modern and pre modern (Muncie, 1999).  

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Muncie (1999) argues that ‘the notion of childhood and youth are not universal biological states, but social constructions in particular historical contexts’. These ideas of social construction can be applied to the concept of ‘youth’. Like crime, youth is not a unitary category (Cohen, 1986 cited in Muncie, 1999). Newburn (2002) states that ‘‘youth’ is an elastic concept. It means different things, at different times, and in different places.’ The concept of childhood, as we understand it today did not emerge until the late nineteenth century (Valentine, Skelton and Chambers, 1999); similarly ‘adolescence’ is a historically invented category (3). ...

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