Using cases as illustration, consider the extent to which judges have been able to develop the law despite the constraints of the doctrine of precedent

Authors Avatar

“Using cases as illustration, consider the extent to which judges have been able to develop the law despite the constraints of the doctrine of precedent.”

Judicial precedent means, basically, the practice whereby judges adhere to formerly decided indictments where the particulars are similar.  The principle of judicial precedent involves an appliance of the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, id est, basically, to maintain the outcome of previous cases, without upsetting what has already been established.  When it comes down to it, the ratio decidendi part of the judgement implies that ‘inferior courts’ are bound to relate the legal doctrine set down by ‘superior courts’ in earlier cases.   This is referred to as the binding precedent.  This provides uniformity and to some extent, dependability in the law, which to up to a point means we know how we can behave within a set of rules and what the consequences could be if we infringe these rules.  

In addition it would appear also a good thing in the sense that it means individual judges cannot make decisions based on their own ideas or opinions about the case and must remain within the boundaries of the precedent.   However, the judge may talk on a tangent as he hypothesizes about what his decision could possibly have been if the particulars of the case had been of an alternative nature.  This is, what is known as, an obiter dictum.   An obiter dictum is not compulsory in later indictments because it was not exactingly applicable to the issue in question in the fundamental court case. However, an obiter dictum could be seen to be of a somewhat persuasive authority that has a possibility of being influential in later cases.

A problem that may arise is the fact that a judge could possibly make an error as, everyday, there are thousands of cases so the law is constantly changing.   Consequently, it is therefore necessary to get the ratio decidendi from cases otherwise the afore mentioned decisions could be made per incuriam.

Under the European Communities Act 1972, decisions of the ECJ are binding, in issues of Community law, on all courts up to, and including, the House of Lords, which is the highest court in the United Kingdom, unless a matter of EC law is involved.  Basically, the House of Lords was bound by its own prior conclusions until 1966 when Lord Gardiner announced a change of practice.  The Practice Statement (see appendix, which I have included for more information)  assured that although the House of Lords would regard its verdicts as normally binding this would not be so when it is perceived right to do so. Since this ruling, the right to use it has been used very seldom.   Another very important point to mention at this point of the essay is that, as the highest court of the land, a decision in the House of Lords binds all the lower courts, of which, will be mentioned later in the text.

Join now!

Principally, there is no real difference between the civil and criminal divisions of the Court of Appeal when applying stare decisis, although both divisions within the Court of Appeal are bound by the House of Lords, however, when this is put into practise, the precedent is considered not to be followed as rigidly in the criminal contingency.

Further down the hierarchy of the courts, is the High Court, which, since it is below, both the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal, is subsequently, bound by both of them.   Decisions, which are made in this court, however, are ...

This is a preview of the whole essay