Legitimacy, at its most basic level, is determined by how well the state conforms to established rules and regulations. Its usage and exercise of power may be said to be legitimate if it is acquired and exercised according to established rules. These rules may be unwritten, as informal conventions, or they may be formalised in legal codes or judgements. These rules and regulations do not just cover areas of criminality but more importantly, address the processes by which decisions are arrived at and consensus formed. Argues Offe, “a bureaucratic state achieves legitimacy through following impersonal and rational procedures of decision making” (143). However (setting aside external interference), given that states do not have any higher power, the question of how a state is able to ensure that the institutions that are employed to enforce the rules actually follow the rules themselves is a fundamental problem. This may be achieved through the internal organisation of the institutions themselves, firstly through the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches of the state, so that the latter can be regarded as subject to the law. This not only requires the development of an ethos of legal impartiality, but also requires an independent media to ensure that breaches of the law are brought to attention. Also required is the effective subordination of the military to civilian control, removing the armed forces from any political role (Beetham 122-124).
Legal validity is insufficient on its own to secure legitimacy since the rules through which power is acquired and exercised themselves stand in need of justification. The rules themselves need to be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both the elites and the commoners. In order to be justified, power has to be firstly derived from a source of authority that the society at large acknowledges as authoritative, and it must serve ends that are recognised as socially necessary. The rules must provide that those who come to hold power must have the ability to exercise it properly, and the structure of power must be seen to serve a recognisably general interest, rather than simply the interests of the elite or powerful. These justifications in turn depend upon beliefs current in a given society about what is the rightful source of authority, about what qualities are appropriate to the exercise of power and how individuals come to possess them; and some conception of a common interest, reciprocal benefit, or societal need that the system of power satisfies. Furthermore, it is helpful if the legitimating rules of democratic and constitutional regimes are reinforced by the material outcomes of governmental policies (Offe 138).
Of course, it is impossible to have complete uniformity of beliefs. It is inevitable that one will find many differences in circumstance, opportunity and values between the elites and the commoners. Yet without a minimum of the appropriate beliefs defined above being shared between the elites and commoners, there can be no basis for justifications of the rules of power. The ability for all groups to express their beliefs and values equitably in a common arena is a key facet in determining the resilience of a state’s legitimacy.
The third key factor in legitimacy involves the demonstrable expression of consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved, through actions that provide evidence of consent. Actions such as concluding agreements with a superior, swearing allegiance, or taking part in an election, are important because of the contributions they make to legitimacy (Beetham 16). This occurs in two ways. The first is that they have a subjectively binding force for those who have taken part in them, regardless of the motives for which they have done so. Actions expressive of consent, even if undertaken purely out of self-interest, will introduce a moral component into a relationship, and create a normative commitment on the part of those engaging in them. Moreover, the expression of commitment creates a powerful expectation on the part of those affected by the commitment. Failure to follow-through by one who undertakes such a commitment destroys any trust that others might place in him. Secondly, such actions have a publicly symbolic or declaratory force, in that they constitute an express acknowledgement on the part of the subordinate of the position of the powerful, which the latter are able to use as confirmation of their legitimacy to third parties not involved in the relationship, or those who have not taken part in any expressions of consent. These expressions are thus often associated with ceremony.
To recapitulate, for power to be fully legitimate, three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to share belief; and the express consent of the subordinate, or the most significant of them, to the particular relations of power. All three components contribute to legitimacy, though the extent to which they are realised in a given context will be a matter of degree. In every state there will be those who do not accept the norms underpinning the rules, or some who refuse to express their consent, or who do so only under duress. What matters is how widespread these deviations are, and how substantial the deviations in relation to the underlying norms and conventions that determine the legitimacy of power in a given context. Thus, when we consider the factors above, we must remember that legitimacy is never absolute. It may be eroded, contested or incomplete, and judgements about it are usually judgements of degree. Beetham sums it up best when he says, “Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair” (19-20). The important question is usually not whether a state is legitimate, but how much.
Works Cited
Beetham, David. The Legitimation Of Power. London: Macmillan, 1991.
Connolly, William. “Legitimacy and Modernity.” Legitimacy And The State. Ed. William Connelly. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Lipset, Seymour S. “Social Conflict, Legitimacy and Democracy.” Legitimacy And The State. Ed. William Connelly. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Offe, Claus. Contradictions Of The Welfare State. London: Hutchinson, 1984.
Schaar, John H. “Legitimacy In The Modern State.” Legitimacy And The State. Ed. William Connelly. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Weber, Max. “Legitimacy, Politics and the State.” Legitimacy And The State. Ed. William Connelly. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
