When I take part in the voting system as a member of the multiple sovereign, I have to extinguish my private interest and let the General Will prevail over my inward feelings. Rousseau fully concedes “we always want what is good for us, but we do not always see what it is” (Rousseau, 1996: 476) but as Raphael comments, “The General Will is what we really want (Raphael, 1990: 195)”. I interpret this to mean that as the earthworks does not invade into my own personal life, and is there to benefit the general good of all the sovereignty, I am morally developed enough to accomplish and recognise my personal selfishness as inferior to the will that affects an entirety.
How does Rousseau interpret freedom?
I perceive Rousseau’s exposition of freedom in sovereignty through the following phrase “the sovereign cannot be represented by anything but itself” (Rousseau, 1996: 475). He sees representative assemblies as the antithesis of liberty, in that we can be coerced into decisions that effect us without any consultation. Representation and submitting our rights to an alternative body can be seen as a form of force. Representation makes us ignorant as we are morally undeveloped and stupid, perhaps even worse off than we would have been in the state of nature. Osborn confirms that “Rousseau rejected representative government” (Osborn, 1940: 172).
Therefore as the General Will means that we are part of the sovereignty, we take part in the legislative process. Simultaneously we are citizen and bound by legislation that we implement. We are morally developed by accepting the General Will as we consider the whole spectrum of opinion on issues that concern the sovereign entity. It can be perceived that Rousseau believes that “moral liberty is obedience to self-imposed rules” (Plamenatz, 1972: 324). I consider this to mean that as we are part of the sovereign, we are free because we manufacture the legislation we abide by. We agree to it, even if we vote against it. This makes us freer than being constrained under a representative legislature. As Plamenatz asserts, “Man is independent because he is not compelled to do what others want him to do” (Plamenatz, 1972: 325).
How does the General Will make you free?
An important statement in Rousseau’s ‘On the Social Contract” is as follows: “Whoever refuses to obey the General Will will be forced to be free” (Rousseau, 1996: 472). The assertion is paradoxical, but this does not mean that it is nonsensical. Is Rousseau contradicting himself here? After all, he is an advocate of freedom and not of coercion. Therefore, how can someone be “forced to be free?” (Rousseau, 1996: 472) Through the complexities of Rousseau’s phrase, I interpret him to mean that if someone disagrees with the General Will and refuses to act appropriately, then Rousseau thinks it will be no violation of his autonomy to require him to do so. Indeed, Rousseau seems to say that if he is coerced, then he ends up acting autonomously and be forced to obey it by the whole body politic. He then “tried to gain advantage of common good morality through reconciliation of wills and this is necessary to obligation” (Riley, 1982: 115).
I think that by adhering to the General Will and being a sovereign above our private self, we can then recognise we are never really forced to be free, as we do realise the General Will is not interfering. The General Will is just that, general, and not intrusive to our private will. Similarly, Wokler’s study on Rousseau maintains my thoughts. He wrote that “the law coerces a state’s subjects to act in accordance with their conscience and volition as citizens, and hence their own freedom” (Wokler, 1995: 66).
Critical Analysis
Rousseau’s conception of a state and how he believes it should be controlled is regrettably far too utopian. The General Will is ideal for a small society, whereby it is practicable for all citizens to vote on the issues that effect the populace. However, in contemporary states, this is not so. Voter turnout in Britain is undeniably low, and I find it hard to comprehend that all citizens in Britain would vote on the issue of the General Will when it came about. Similarly, “the larger the state - the less in fact my freedom.” (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 186). As Hampsher-Monk investigates, being a citizen in a state of 10,000 means I contribute 1/10,000 to the sovereignty. As the size of the state increases, then my sovereign power concurrently subsides (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 186). Reiterating what I said earlier, the General Will is only feasible in a micro-state.
A further criticism of Rousseau is of the idea of the tyranny of the majority. There needs to be only 51% in agreement, and therefore the other 49% see their perception of the General Will void. Similarly this can work against just one person. Rousseau can then be accused quite rightly of harbouring “totalitarian implications” (McManners, 1972: 313). It is not feasible for this to happen, and totally reject the ideas and wishes of one group. Ultimately this can lead to oppression, and this is a very dangerous situation that should be avoided. A degree of homogeneity is assumed, and people are not all the same. In principle the idea of the General Will is a good one, however it is crude. A further question is who decides what the General Will should be and why it should be enquired upon? Rousseau has emitted to answer these questions.
Conclusion
Rousseau’s concept of freedom is far removed from that of the twenty first century. Certainly, “in a perfect society, the General Will would be an infallible guide” (Osborn, 1940: 158). However, we do not live in a perfect society and the General Will, although a good idea in theory, cannot be practised in a unitary state or a federal one for that matter. Unfortunately, Rousseau’s contempt for representative government has blinded him into dismissing it. His ideas are not defunct though, and ultimately the General Will can be deemed as popular sovereignty. In contemporary Western states “Modern societies have been able to reconcile representative government with popular sovereignty” (Osborn, 1940: 183). Certainly, in large modern day states this is what operates, albeit with different voting systems. I do not conceive that freedom in the General Will is as releasing as Rousseau believes, and the paradox of forcing men to be free is not liberating, it simply implies a tyrannical rule.
Bibliography
Hampsher-Monk, I. 1992. A History of Modern Political Thought. Oxford: Blackwell
McManners, J. 1972. “The Social Contract and Rousseau’s Revolt Against Society,” in M. Cranston and R. Peters, eds., Hobbes and Rousseau. 318-332. New York: Anchor Books.
Raphael, D. 1990. Problems of Political Philosophy. London: Macmillan.
Riley, P. 1982. Will and Political Legitimacy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, J. J. 1996. “On the Social Contract,” in D. Wootton, ed., Modern Political Thought. 464-534. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Osborn, A.M. 1940. Rousseau and Burke. London: Oxford University Press.
Plamenatz, J. 1972. “Ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu’on le forcera d’etre libre,” in M. Cranston and R. Peters, eds., Hobbes and Rousseau. 318-332. New York: Anchor Books.
Wokler, R. 1995. Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
