Williams criminal liability for the death of Bert and Pete will be discussed under the criminal damage act 1971. A demonstration of the criminal offence committed by William manslaughter by unlawful act in terms of their definitional elements will be l

In Blue (1975) the defendant stabbed his victim piercing her lung, she refused blood transfusion on religious grounds which would have saved her life. The court held that her refusal of treatment whether reasonable, did not break the chain of causation, it was said that the accused must take his victim as he finds him.

Applying this case to William’s case it would suggest that William would be held to have caused the death of peter by tampering with the car causing the brakes to fail and the car to crash into a brick wall, William’s act made a significant contribution to the death therefore even if injury or death is not reasonably foreseeable the law still considers that the defendant is liable

Thus the test of recklessness which requires an examination of the unjustifiable risk to whether William was aware of the existence of the unreasonable risk. William’s state of mind throughout the entire period from immediately before he cut the wires and car cables the completion of the damage was relevant to the issue of liability

William may have taken a justifiable risk of causing the act and therefore he is reckless because he had the intention to cause the proscribed result or recklessness as to whether the result caused is sufficient to impose liability. It is the objective test which was used here,  William could not be culpable under the criminal law for doing something involving a risk of injury to another, damage to property if he genuinely did not perceive the risk of Bert using the mini and crashing it and leading to his death. The Caldwell test applies when a person is reckless to any property which would be destroyed or damaged if he does  an act which in fact creates obvious risk that property would be destroyed or damaged and when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk.  

Under Caldwell test it would suggest that William failed to give thought to whether there would be any risk by him cutting the cables William did not consider the risk. In W (A minor) v Dolbey (1983) D took an air riffle and not even considering the possibility that it might be loaded as was the fact aimed and friend it at V, breaking V’s spectacles and destroying his eye, under Caldwell he would be liable for causing criminal damage to the spectacles, but would not have been criminally liable at all for the destruction of the age.

Applying the Caldwell test to William case it would suggest that William would be liable for the damage of Berts car under the criminal damage act 1971 S1 a (2) but he would not be liable for the death of Bert and Peter.

William is not guilty of murder because he did not have the two elements required for it to be murder because murder is based on having the intention to kill, but manslaughter is based on the absence of having the intention to kill, which could indicate that as William did not have the intention to kill his offence would be under unlawful act manslaughter. There was no malice aforethought in the course of murder. In the homicide act 1957 S 1 (1) where a person kills in the course of furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with malice aforethought which is not the case in William’s case, he did not foresee that life could be endangered by cutting several cables and the brake cable on the mini where a person is engaged in performing an unlawful act or if at the same time it was a dangerous act which is an act that is likely to injure another person and cause death of that person by that act then he is guilty of manslaughter.

William may be guilty of an unlawful act of manslaughter; this offence makes a person criminally liable where he has set out to commit a less serious offence, but has in the process of committing that offence killed two people which sometimes are known as constructive manslaughter. The test of dangerous is an objective one because  it had to be considered that whether all sober and reasonable people recognize it to be dangerous because William did not recognize that it was dangerous William had tampered with the car he may be liable for the omitting act.

 

It would be considered whether an act which all sober and reasonable people would have realised the risk to be an unjustifiable risk of harm to others. In DPP v Newbury (1977) the two defendants pushed a paving stone over the sole of a bridge as a train approached underneath, it crashed through the window of the cab killing the guard.

 In Church (1966) where the appellant took a woman to his van for sexual purposes, she reproached him and slapped his face. The court in both of these cases held that the killing was a result of an unlawful act; the test was not one of whether the accused recognised the act to be dangerous, but whether sober and reasonable people would have recognised the risk of injury to someone.

Applying this to William’s case it would suggest that the killing was an objective act because a reasonable person would have recognised the risk of some physical harm would be done to Bert and the reasonable person must be assumed to know the facts. The reasonable person would have not known that Bert would have decided to take the mini for a drive and that the brake would fail. William did not foresee the consequence so therefore at that point the unlawful act would not become a one which a sober and reasonable person would recognise as carrying the risk of harm.  

William had committed unlawful act manslaughter, but a defence he could use would be diminished responsibility (disease of the mind)  William will be presumed to be sane until he  is proved to have a defence on the ground of insanity, at the time of committing the act,  William was in such laboring under  a defect of reason caused by the disease of the mind, he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong, he will be charged under the Homicide act 1957 s1 (2).

And finally William would be not be held responsible for Bert’s murder because he did not have the intention to cause harm to Bert, but he will be guilty of  manslaughter because he only had the intention to give Bert more work and not to cause bodily harm or endanger his life. The chain of causation was not broken, but only that William was reckless because he did not foresee that by him cutting the wires and brake cable that he could endanger life. With Peter William would be liable for death because but for his action the consequence would have not occurred. Applying the Caldwell test, it makes William liable for the damage of property, but not for the death of Bert. When William cut the wire and the brake cable he did not intend to cause grievous bodily harm to Bert , but because he was reckless to whether his life would be endangered he would not be guilty  of manslaughter under the Criminal damage act 1971 s1 (2) and for Peter he would be guilty of murder because he had an oblique intention.

                                         

                                                         REFERENCE

• Homicide act 1957 http://uk.westlaw.com
• Criminal damage act 1971
• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law chp4 p52
• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law chp 4 p53
• Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law chp 4 p66
•  Blue (1975) Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law, cases and materials, Butterworth, LexisNexis, chp2 p56
• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law chp5 p107
• W (A minor) v Dolbey (1983)Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law, cases and materials, Butterworth, LexisNexis chp4p110

 

• Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law cases and materials, chp4p108
• Criminal damage act 1971  s1 a (2) intending to destroy pr damages any property, would be destroyed or damaged, shall be guilty of an offence

• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law, chp13 p436
• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law, chp14p470
• Smith and Hogan (2005) eleventh edition, Criminal Law, chp14p479
• In DPP v Newbury (1977) Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law, cases and materials, Butterworth, LexisNexis, chp17p493
• In Church (1966) Smith and Hogan (2002) tenth edition, Criminal Law, cases and materials, Butterworth, LexisNexis, chp17p490
•  Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he is suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent cause or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being party to the killing.

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