According to determinism everything happens necessarily. If X happens than Y comes as a result. Here Y necessarily has to happen because X (cause) had already happened. This means that in determinism there is nothing like chance. Can there happen something in nature by chance is the question. According to Chaos Theory, when fluctuations in a system started to evolve, it threatens the structure of the system by forcing it in to far-equilibrium condition. At that point of bifurication, the system has to choose a path whether it will lead to chaos or high order. It is impossible to determine which path will the system choose. This path is chosen by chance. Therefore, there is something like chance and thing could happen by chance in nature.
Determinism describes a system where order, equilbrium, reversibility of time takes place, there is no room for disorder or non-equilibrium. This equilibrial and ordered system only works for closed systems which are independent from external forces. On the otherhand as Chaos Theory explains most of the parts of universe and nature work in open systems where disorder and non-equilibrium takes place with order and equilibrium. So, there are open systems in nature and the attempt to understand open systems by determinism is impossible. If one believes in the assumption of a preconceived scheme of nature, than one’s point will be deterministic, which does not actually work for open systems. Thus, the acceptance of a preconceived scheme of nature would be nothing but limiting science examining nature.
Determinism tries to describe all systems by the same universal laws. However those so called universal laws are not universal at all and only apply to some parts of the reality. One can not use those laws in social-cultural sciences or administrative sciences. Trying to find a simple unified explanation for everything is impossible. However determinism is trying to reduce the world’s complexity to simplicity. Determinism creates a cultural mechanical world based on Newtonian mechanics, trying to explain systems by universal laws. On the otherhand it did not work. As mentioned above determinists believe that if the cause is known than, the result could be determined. But in socio-cultural sciences or in administrative sciences it was not always case.
For example in international relations voting behaviour changes according to the ethnicity and religion of the voter. A voter is expected to vote according to his/her religion and ethnicity. In Israel Arabs were expected to vote for parties which are formed by Arabs and not to vote for radical-Jewic parties. However in 1992 Knesset elections in Israel may of the Arabs did not care about religion or ethnicity and voted for Shas (a radical-Jewic party) and National Religious Party.1
What about human nature? Does universal laws of determinism can be applied to human nature? The answer is obvious, it can not. Human action is not recieved by cause and effect. One have intensions which take he/she to the action. Human action aims something which leads that person to the result. Thus, explanation of human action by cause and effect is impossible.
The assumption of a preconceived scheme of nature limits science to describe nature. This scheme could only be applied in open systems which are a small part of the universe. So science was made to study only in closed systems and ignore the rest. Another important point is that this scheme rejects that things could happen by chance. But Chaos theory explained that at some point chance is involved in nature. Thus this assumption again limits science in a way that science had to ignore things happened by chance. Also the universal laws of determinism can not be applied in all fields of science. Therefore administrative and socio-cultural sciences can not be exemined by universallaws of determinism. As a result, if the nature fallows the scheme preconceived by science, it would do nothing but limiting science.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frisch, H. ‘The Arab vote in the 1992 elections: The triviality of normality; the significance of electoral power.’ Israel at the polls 1992. Ed. Daniel J. Elazar, and Shmuel Sandler, 103-125. London: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher Inc., 1995.
H Frisch, ‘The Arab Vote in the 1992 Elections: The Triviality of Normality; the Significance of Electoral Power,’ in Israel at the Polls 1992, ed. Daniel J. Elazar, and Shmuel Sandler (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher Inc., 1995), 103.
