The only historian that Friedman refers to directly is Dr. Arnold Toynbee. In two memoranda, Toynbee states that Palestine was to be included "in the boundaries of Arab independence" (Friedman, 112). Friedman finds this as a matter for surprise and finds evidence to contradict Toynbee (Friedman, 113). He argues that Toynbee would have arrived at a different conclusion if he had of consulted an October letter from McMahon that "explained why he had phrased his reservation covering the territory of Palestine as he did" (Friedman, 113). Furthermore, he accuses Professor Toynbee of using the term "vilyet" incorrectly (Friedman, 113). Friedman believes that "vilayet" was to mean "environs" because that is what it translates into from Arabic, whereas Toynbee had "used the Ottoman terminology", which covers a wider area of land (Friedman, 113). A secondary source, written by W.J. Childs, proved that Toynbee used a reference, History of the Hedjaz Rising, that "perverted McMahon's pledge" (Friedman, 114). Toynbee admitted that "he was on 'safe ground, being conclusively supported by the views of the Arab Bureau'" (Friedman, 114). Childs thinks that the safety "accounted for his failure to make a serious attempt 'to examine the pledge critically'" (Friedman, 114).
Presently, Friedman's article is clearly structured argument. He addresses the nature of British commitments to the Arabs and then shows how the obligations were or were not lived up to (Friedman, 84). Friedman's intense analysis of primary sources, focusing on a series of letters written between Hussein and McMahon, presents a convincing argument. For instance, Friedman includes a quote from an actual letter written by McMahon proving the exclusion of Palestine: "It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the northern coastal tracts of Syria" (Friedman, 108). He went beneath the surface questioning and outlines the history behind the Palestine problem. Since the British were awaiting an Arab rebellion, and that part of the bargain did not take place, Palestine was therefore out of the question. "The Arabs of Palestine did not rise against the Turks" and should not be granted their independence (Friedman, 122). Not only was the document invalid, but the argument behind the inclusion question is an invalid one as well. Even though Friedman's argument was quite convincing, Charles Smith presents a strong case for the opposing view.
There is not an ounce of doubt in Charles Smith's mind that McMahon promised Palestine to Hussein. Palestine was actually "neither specifically promised to Sheriff Hussein, nor specifically excluded by Henry McMahon" (Smith, 56). A lot of Smith's confidence in his opinion derives from the fact that Palestine was included in the boundaries proposed in Hussein's first letter (Smith, 49). With that in mind "it was only logical for [Hussein] to expect that it retained that status" and easy to say that it was meant to be included in the promise (Smith, 56). British officials, who believed that it had been [promised], if only inadvertently that is, by not only being specifically excluded (Smith, 52). The majority of Smith's essay is devoted to determining other historian's use of primary sources regarding the Arab question. There are basically two historians that Smith is responding to in his essay: Friedman and Kedourie. Smith questions the validity of their documents, especially Friedman and Kedourie. Smith questions the validity of their documents, especially Friedman's because he finds them to be "deeply flawed" (Smith, 319). According to Smith, Friedman "has manipulated sources, omitting material from some and misinterpreting others, in order to reach his conclusions" (Smith, 52). First of all, Smith feels that Friedman does not use recent sources, which weakens Friedman's argument. Then he outlines the ways that the sources are altered. For instance, when Friedman quoted from Clayton's notes, he "does not mention Palestine…although he claims, relying on the memorandum, that al-Faruqi specifically excluded it from Arab demands" (Smith, 53). Smith included an excerpt from the actual note that mentions Palestine specifically (Smith, 53). Friedman's underlying argument of the Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo being the specific territory borders for Arab independence are crushed in with this example as well; the four areas were to be the "minimum the Arabs will settle for in Syria, along with Palestine and Mesopotamia" (Smith, 53). Smith also mentions Friedman's confusion of Edward Grey's communication; it was said in1915, but Friedman uses it to be said in 1916 right before the Arab revolt (Smith, 53). Friedman's book "does not meet even the most basic professional standards expected of scholarly inquiry" (52). Smith goes as far as to say that Friedman's paper's "main contributions is to show how not to use sources and how evidence can be misused for political ends" (Smith, 321). His evidence is convincing as an outlet for describing his opinions towards certain authors debating the issue of the Palestine land claim promise. Logically, the claim that Palestine was included because it was specifically excluded is a weak one (Smith, 53).
Toynbee can sympathize with Friedman's interpretation of the Palestine promise, but he is living proof that Palestine was meant to be included. He is confident that he accurately translated McMahon's letter, focusing on the word "vilayet" to mean "environs" and cites three other authors who interpret it the same way (Toynbee, 187). Unlike the Arab Delegation to London, who uses the same interpretation of vilayet, Toynbee has no political motive to use vilayet to mean environs, which incorporates Palestine into the territory for Arab independence. While working "in temporary government service, [Toynbee] was never challenged on [his] interpretation of McMahon's word 'wilayahs'" (Toynbee, 190). Even while working with McMahon himself, who was familiar with the memoranda, his interpretations was not challenged: "If…McMahon was convinced that he had excluded Palestine from the area of Arab independence, it is incomprehensible to me that he did not take me up on this point" (Toynbee, 191). Toynbee proceeds to address the other side of the argument. Should "vilayets" be interpreted as the "Ottoman vilayet of Damascus"? McMahon's letter would then exclude Palestine (Toynbee, 191). This interpretation permits HMG to acquire "the mandate for Palestine" (Toynbee, 191).
Toynbee clearly asserts that his intentions are "not to enter into controversy with him [Friedman], but to supplement what he has written from [his] own knowledge and put some questions which arise…out of Mr. Friedman's paper, but which are not fully answered there" (Toynbee, 185). An entire section of Friedman's paper is devoted to Dr. Toynbee's lack of insight. Toynbee bases his argument on distinct questions to justify his own writing that Friedman related a part of his work to. Toynbee wrote memoranda regarding the commitment of His Majesty's Government (HMG) to the Arabs as part of his temporary position for the government. The main point that historians disagree on, in Toynbee's opinion, is the definition of "vilayet"; this word alone determines the inclusion of Palestine in McMahon's letters.
This argument is based on undocumented personal experiences as well as the primary sources that Friedman used. The focus of this paper is somewhat lost in his habit to describe unnecessary situations. In this short response to Friedman's essay, Toynbee discusses too much of his own life and does not present enough evidence to support either side of his argument. Toynbee's perspective is fairly unstable because the inclusion or exclusion of Palestine is based on the historian's interpretation of "vilayets". If Toynbee had chosen a definite side to the argument, this paper would be more credible.
Arnold Toynbee, Isaiah Friedman and Charles D. Smith have all presented valid arguments regarding the Palestine question; Smith and Toynbee believe that Palestine was intended to be included, whereas Friedman argues that it was meant to be excluded. All three historians are passionate towards their opinion, either through personal experience or the confidence of thorough research, even though the promise of Palestine was never embodied in the treaty. The entire question of the promise is based purely on speculation because concrete proof of its existence was not created. The evidence put forth in the articles indicates that certain Arab lands were promised to be independent after the war, but without solid evidence, the exact locations, including Palestine, are questionable.
