The decision to use the atomic bomb is a debate that will question and antagonize American foreign policy analysts and decision makers for as long as moral and ethical elements accompany empirical realities. However this debate was most intense and important while the shockwaves of the first use of atomic power were still encircling the world. At this time those that had to carry the responsibility of such a decision had the responsibility to defend it. This responsibility fell primarily to Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of War and main adviser to the President Harry S. Truman.

                  In 1947, two years after the first use of the atomic bomb Henry L. Stimson produced “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” outlining his reasons, and the suggestions made by the Interim Committee; the committee formulated to advise the president of his decision, headed by Henry L. Stimson. The period after the introduction to the world of atomic energy had been filled with bomb testing in February of 1946, surveys of the effects on humanity, objection to this kind of force, and a critical claim that the American government had created a ‘myth’ to justify the use of atomic warfare. Many people started to question; was the bomb really necessary during World War Two? What really motivated the decision makers in determining what plan of action to take, and what were the alternatives?

                  This new curiosity fueled an endless amount of essays, documents and protests and eventually a response from one of the key decision makers. ‘The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb’ was one of these documents, and perhaps one of the more important responses to this public outcry. This must have been what pushed Henry L. Stimson during his retirement to reinforce a decision he had made two years earlier that the Atomic bomb not only saved lives, but also ended the war.

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                  The documents most important aspects are the responses to this idea that they created a ‘myth’. This ‘myth’ was not only damaging to the American President but it was damaging to the global opinion of the American war effort, As some members of the Manhattan project called the “wave of horror and revulsion”.  Many countries were suspicious of this new weapon and the motivations behind its use. Stimson quells these fears by stating that the alternatives were “impractical”, however the document first attempts to portray the situation at hand to cement the necessity for finding such alternatives impractical.

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