Do Institutions Matter: A Case Study of Gun Control

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Abstract

The role of institutions in explaining the policy process has been a contested area amongst academics that use different institutional accounts to examine how policy change occurs and why. But the concept that individual politicians can choose to exit institutional frameworks at times of crisis has not received such attention. This dissertation analyses the role of institutions and explores the concept of the individual in the process by looking at the theories of new institutionalism and critically assessing the literature. The case study of gun control and the cross comparison between two differing institutional frameworks of presidentialism and parliamentarism identify points in the policy process where change has occurred. The problems of institutional accounts are highlighted through the use of these studies in examining the policy changes outlined and showing that they cannot be perceived to be taking place in an institutional framework. The dissertation will argue that institutions do not matter when explaining the policy process and those individual politicians can choose to exit institutional frameworks most notably around the time of crisis.

Contents

Chapter 1

Do Institutions Matter? 3

1.1 What is an Institution? 4

1.2 The Limit of Institutions 4

1.3 Conclusions 6

Chapter 2

The Problem of New Institutionalism 8

2.1 Historical Institutionalism 8

2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism 10

2.3 Normative Institutionalism 12

2.4 Conclusions 14

Chapter 3

Questions of Methodology 16

3.1 Conclusions 20

Chapter 4

Comparing Institutional Frameworks in the UK and USA 21

4.1 The Work of Government 21

4.2 Conclusions 27

Chapter 5

The Case Study of Gun Control in the UK and USA 29

5.1 Gun Control Policy in the UK 29

5.2 Gun Control Policy in the US 36

5.3 Conclusions 42

Chapter 6

The Problem of Institutional Explanations 44

6.1 Institutional Accounts and the Case Study 44

6.2 The Limits of New Institutionalism 45

6.3 Institutions Do Not Matter 47

Bibliography 48

Chapter One:

Do Institutions Matter?

Institutionalist accounts of the policy process have been widely discussed in recent years, with several variants of the theory emerging (March and Olsen, 1999, Tsebelis, 2002, Hall and Taylor 1996). This has resulted in many commentators questioning the legitimacy of the claims that institutions have provided an adequate explanation as to how the policy process works. The problem this dissertation will focus on is the limited scope by which institutionalist theories provide an explanation of the policy process and the lack of discussion surrounding the individual role of the politician.

This dissertation addresses such issues of how institutionalism can explain policy change and continuation particularly in times of crisis. There will be the argument that in terms of different theoretical perspectives rational choice institutionalism provides the most coherent account of how the policy process works, but despite this, individual politicians do not have to adhere to their institutional framework and can choose to ignore institutions in pursuit of political opportunism. Within the literature this concept has not been explored thoroughly enough. Rational choice institutionalism suggests that individuals alter and affect their institutional frameworks, but there is no suggestion that an individual can choose to ignore the rules and logics embedded in institutions in the policy process. This privileged role for politicians will be highlighted in the use of a cross comparison case study of gun control in the UK and the USA. Both countries have markedly different political systems, but the essay will argue that they provide evidence to suggest that individuals can and will, if need be, ignore any institutional framework in order to achieve their goals, particularly in times of crisis

This chapter will now introduce the idea of institutions and put forward the arguments surrounding what an institution is and different commentator’s perspectives on whether they matter. This will provide a starting point from which the essay can further expand on the theory in the following chapter.

1.1 What is an Institution?

To introduce the theory of institutions it is important that the actual meaning of the term is examined because there is much debate around what the term institution means in both the practical and theoretical perspective. Amongst theorists (March and Olsen, 1994, Peters, 1999, Hall and Taylor 1998) there is still no agreed upon definition for the term ‘institution’ within the political realm. This essentially creates part of the debate surrounding institutions because many theorists examine what they are and do in the context of their own interpretation. North suggests institutions are ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’ (cited in Besley and Case, 2003 p. 7) which is perhaps a much more broad explanation of the term in relation to Lieberman who sees institutions as ‘assumptions about actors beliefs, preferences, knowledge, understandings and explanations.’ (2002, p. 697). Both interpretations alone provide an insight into the relative complexity there can be in this field of political science. The debate about the meaning of the term provides only the beginning of how institutions can explain the policy process looking at areas such as policy change and stability which will be explored further on in the following chapter. Despite there being differences in interpretation of ‘institutions’ it will generally be understood for the purpose of this essay that institutions explain the structure or framework by which actors operate within the policy process (Peters, 1999, Hall et al 1996) and encompass how individuals may act, how their political surroundings and structures act and evolve and their apparent effects on one another.

1.2 The Limit of Institutions

As discussed the term institution is in itself a widely debated topic. This section of the introduction will move on from this and discuss the general arguments surrounding whether institutions can help explain the policy process.

To begin with there is the idea that institutions serve no purpose in explaining why policy choices are made, a case made strongly by Besley and Case;

‘the bewildering array of different policy issues needing to be solved makes the notion of specifying the optimal constitution a distant dream’ (2003, p. 9)

Besley and Case argue that the idea of institutions having a blue print toward how the policy process works in such a vast policy environment is a difficult concept (2003, p. 9) Indeed Weaver and Rockman advocate that;

‘Ascertaining which institutions matter, and when and how they affect governmental performance, is a complex matter.’ (1993, p. 445)

Although Weaver and Rockman do not dismiss the idea of institutions, they point out that like Besley and Case suggest, it is difficult to rely on the theory of institutions in practice as a complete explanation of the policy process. The authors continue with this sentiment;

‘If policies we see in the world really are responsive to the median voters preferred point in any kind of general sense, then there is no good reason to think that the institutions structure of decision making would matter much at all.’ (Besley and Case, 2003. p. 11)

Besley and Case’s rather rational statement implies that institutions should have no significance when considering the policy process. I will agree with this because as Besley and Case (2003) also imply, the institution suggests that every different policy process can be explained using the same formula, which seems to present a problem if they are to be considered as the key variable But perhaps as Tsebelis (a rational choice theorist) points out, institutions must be considered within an individual’s decision making;

‘Policy outcomes are the result of two factors, the preference of the actors involved and the prevailing institutions’ (2002, p. 17)

Tsebelis’ focus on institutions is important to his analysis of what he refers to as veto players. While Besley and Case discuss the importance of the median voter with regards to policy outcomes, Tsebelis explores different types of institutions in both the presidential and parliamentary systems suggesting that ‘a certain number of individual or collective actors’ must agree to a change, which he refers to as veto players (2002, p.2). These two contrasting views provide what is commonly seen within the literature around this topic because there is often a case that political institutions are too limited in theory to explain policy outcomes. Lieberman comments on this idea when discussing the idea of institutions;

‘They are at something of a loss to explain the appearance at any given moment of any particular menu of substantive choices’ (2002, p. 698)

Again like Weaver and Rockman (1993) Lieberman does not dismiss the idea of institutions, but questions whether they are the right theoretical tool to analyse the policy process, indeed he continues to argue that ‘institutional theories in general run into trouble in accounting for political change’ (2002, p. 698)

As suggested it seems that institutionalist explanations of the policy process are not enough, one point in particular being how they explain policy change. Weaver and Rockman (1993) and Lieberman (2002) echo this point because institutionalist explanations appear fragile in this context. This is the problem that the essay will address when considering the case study and the important role of individual politicians.

1.3 Conclusions

To conclude, the essay will focus its attention on the idea that institutions cannot account for political change because they do not consider that an individual politician may at any time ignore institutions for political gain. The general arguments presented by Besley and Case (2003) regarding median voters will enhance this debate in the following chapters. The work of Tsebelis (2002) though will provide a scope by which the essay could see institutions as a way of explaining the policy process, but will evidently suggest that this falls short in the face of criticisms of rational choice institutionalism.

The following chapter will focus on the theory surrounding new institutionalism looking at the advocates and critics of the literature as well as further enhancing the arguments presented in the introduction. Further on from this the essay will focus on the limitations discussed in this introduction, looking closely at the role of politicians using the case study of gun control to provide an analytical framework by which the theory can be addressed. The case study will utilise examples from the policy process which add weight to the argument that politicians do not have to adhere to institutional frameworks and that institutionalist explanations are often not enough to explain policy choices particularly in times of crisis.

Chapter 2

The Problem of New Institutionalism

This chapter focuses on the theory of New Institutionalism, analysing the different approaches and explanations of how they attempt to explain policy change and reviewing the criticisms of them. The arguments presented will focus on how existing theories do not account fully for the role of the individual within the policy process and examine why the literature does not discuss this.

Firstly the rediscovery of the debate surrounding institutions was met by the use of the term ‘New Institutionalism’ (Judge, 2005, p. 4) which in general was the rediscovery that

‘Individual preferences in isolation did not account exclusively for political outcomes, but that these preferences were rooted in…the structures and organisational biases of institutions.’ (Judge, 2005, p. 6)

This rediscovery, although not being entirely new to political science, allowed for theorists to attempt to explain in markedly different ways how the policy process works and particularly how institutions can explain policy change. There have been many different ‘forms’ of new institutionalism discussed but this section will only focus on three which are Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism and Normative Institutionalism. These three forms of New Institutionalism are perhaps the most frequently and rigorously discussed within the literature.

2.1 Historical Institutionalism

To begin with the focus shall be on Historical Institutionalism. The idea within this theory of new institutionalism is that of path dependency as Torfing comments,

‘The policy path is formed through a complex interaction between deliberate design, long lasting traditions, learning processes and chance discovery.’ (2001, p .287)

As Torfing points out institutions in a historical explanation provide a framework from the beginning of policy path which will shape future changes in the policy process. Actors are seen as ‘rule-following satisficers’ (Judge, 2005, p. 10) because rather than acting on their own interests they will abide by the traditional structures and rules, thus the institutions provide a template for current and future policy choices.

However, this reveals the first criticisms of Historical Institutionalism. The process by which policy outcomes are made in this institutional framework tend to rely on ‘persistence of patterns’ rather than ‘how those patterns might change’ (Peters, 1999, P. 68). So when it comes to explaining how the theory of institutions and its actors can explain policy change it falls short. In contrast to this argument historical institutionalists will talk of ‘critical junctures’. Hall et al thus argue that with enough strain on the prevailing institutions then a policy will take a new path (1998, p. 16). The problem here is that this perhaps suggests at a certain point institutions do not matter in explaining change, and as Peters (1999) points out there are no criteria set out for how much pressure is placed on institutions in order to justify the theory of ‘critical junctures’.

Following on from this is the second criticism that historical institutionalism’s explanation of the relationships between institutions and its actors is far too broad to examine the idea of critical junctures (Hall et al, 1996, p .939). There is no definitive criterion to explain how conflict may emerge in an institutional framework, which makes it difficult to assess their role in the policy process. Finally Lieberman contests in relation to Historical Institutionalism that the;

‘Definition is necessarily vague because analysts…define institutions in more precise ways according to their own questions and theories’ (cited in Judge, 2005, p. 12

Lieberman suggests that with so many different approaches taken by analysts there is no agreed upon theory within historical institutionalism thus it becomes difficult to identify the relationship between the institutions and actors; a point made by Hall et all (1996 p. 941) when they discuss the ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches in historical institutionalism. For example in the context of the calculus approach there is an element of strategic calculation from the actor in order to contemplate how institutions will shape future behaviour in the policy process (Hall et al, 1996, p. 9). This is in contrast to the cultural approach which sees the actor responding to their institutional surroundings based on their worldview (Hall et al, p. 8). The problems for Historical institutionalism here are that this has obvious differentiation when considering how institutions explain change because on the one hand there are elements of rationality in historical institutionalism with the calculus approach and on the other elements of socially constructed phenomena. But perhaps the most important criticism for this essay is the problem of critical junctures. There is no agreed upon explanation as to what advocates a critical juncture and most importantly when and if they do occur this surely implies institutions will not matter. There is the argument here that individuals at these points can essentially remove themselves from the institutions policy path and direct it towards their own set agenda. This is an element that historical institutionalism appears not to consider in the literature. Rational Choice Institutionalism helps resolve some of the issues presented here, but also creates new problems with the focus on the individual.

2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism

Coming directly from, but in some parts contrasting with rational choice theory, rational choice institutionalism focuses on the idea that individuals act to maximise their own benefit but do so by being ‘constrained by the rules and enhanced by the incentives provided by the ‘political space’ of institutions.’ (Judge, 2005, p. 8) Actors in this theory will attempt to shape their institutional surroundings strategically in order to gain their own outcomes (Peters, 1999). The focus is on the idea that individuals use the institutional framework to their advantage in order to achieve their goals by overcoming the collective action problem and coordination difficulties. Rational choice institutionalism has a very heavy focus on the individual, an idea that is heavily criticised by other institutionalists due to its lack of explanation of institutional constraints on the actors (Peters, 1999). Koelble comments on rational choice institutionalism;

‘Theory does not provide an adequate predictive theory of action since it cannot answer the question how preferences come about and why they vary greatly from person to person’ (1995, p. 239)

This is what many see is the one of the core problems with this explanation of the policy process and institutions. There is no real explanation of where the actor’s preferences come from and how if by any means policy change will occur under this framework (Hall et al, 1996, Peters, 1999). Judge too contests that it is difficult to see how institutions can effect individuals as ‘rational choice institutionalism is simply too narrow’ (2005, p. 7) because there is no consideration to the idea that institutions must affect the actor whether they realise it or not. For actors to essentially work as utility maximisers there is surely a conflict of interest with the idea that they are affected by institutional frameworks when pursuing their own goals. In order for rational choice institutionalism to be viable and advance institutional accounts there must be a compromise with the understanding of how institutional rules affect actor’s preferences, a position that is not explored sufficiently within the theory (Peters, 1999, Koelble, 1995).

But looking to Tsebelis theory of veto players, a variance of rational choice institutionalist theory, he attempts to provide a coherent account of institutions and how they can be useful in explaining change. Tsebelis uses practical examples to highlight his theory, particularly that of the USA’s presidential system. Tsebelis identifies the veto players as individual and collective;

‘The constitution of the United States specifies that legislation, to be enacted requires the approval of the president, House of Representatives and the senate. This means that these three actors (one individual and two collective) are the institutional veto players in ...

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Tsebelis identifies institutions in a government system, and discusses how these veto players must agree in order for a policy outcome to happen. The account focuses on ‘agenda setting’ which relates to power relations between actors and how through these relations policy outcomes can occur. Tsebelis provides a good argument as to why institutions have a large role in the policy process because he utilises the idea of how veto players react with one another to bring about change. His theory touches upon aspects seen in the analysis of rational choice institutionalism and normative institutionalism discussed by March and Olsen (1989). Tsebelis analyses individual actors within institutions regarding power relations, but also talks about how compromise must be met regarding other veto players in the policy process. This touches upon common theories like the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1999), but also that actors are rational and will make choices based on their preferences (Peters, 1999).

Tsebelis does provide some explanation of how this relationship between the rational actor and the institution can be explained. His theory of compromise through coalition is an interesting scope of how to look at the policy process. But the problem with rational choice institutionalism and Tsebelis work is that although it provides explanations of change around individual preferences, the theory assumes that the individual must in some way be connected to an institutional framework. There is no suggestion that policy outcomes are the result of individual pursuing goals without being bounded by institutional rules. This is where the apparent criticisms come from because it appears difficult to suggest that an individual can utilise their interests but also be bound by a set of rules. This is why it will be argued that individual politicians can ignore institutions and step out of any framework. Normative Institutionalism is in complete opposition to this and presents the individual as someone whose interests are created by the institution.

2.3 Normative Institutionalism

This strand of institutionalist theory generally stems from the work of March and Olsen (1989) , who define institutions as,

‘Collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs’ (1989, p. 17)

In this sense it is the institutions themselves that shape actors behaviour. Actors are perceived to make choices based on their institutional constraints or ‘logic of appropriateness’ which refers to ‘a fundamental logic of political action’ whereby the individual will shape policy using the institutions values, norms and beliefs (March and Olsen cited in Judge, 2005, p. 16). Normative institutionalism’s explanation of change is based around this assumption. Rather than being path dependant as in historical institutionalism, policy takes on a learning process which is constrained by the institutional framework (March and Olsen, 1995). If the social environment of the institution changes, then actors are said to adapt to this if there are no other alternatives (Peters, 1999) and policy change occurs. In essence actors abide by the rules, values and norms of institutions which bring criticisms of the theory forward particularly from rational choice theorists. Their argument is that of the lack of human decision making agency within the model;

‘’by placing so much emphasis on the role of institutions, and the logic of appropriateness…it remove[s] human decision making too completely from the process’ (Peters, 1999, p. 39)

Normative institutionalism tends to ignore the idea of decision making from the individual actors and places choices entirely on their institutional framework. This suggests that even amongst several ‘highly instrumental actors’ (Torfing, 1996) their choices are determined by the rules and norms of the institution. The problem here is said to be that policy change has to be difficult to achieve if the process relies solely on the institution. Removing an individual actor’s decision making entirely from the policy process leaves the theory vulnerable to criticisms, particularly from rational choice institutionalists (for example Tsebelis, 2002) that actors can only respond to change if the environment changes. The argument here is opposite to that of the rational choice institutionalist because while they contest that it is the individual that shapes institutions; normative institutionalism argues that institutions shape individual preferences.

‘Individuals find themselves embedded in cultural and organisational ‘fields’ or ‘sectors’ which determine the very concept of self interest and utility’ (Koelble, 1995, p. 22)

2.4 Conclusions

The discussion of new institutionalism when considering if institutions matter in the policy process, helps provide an understanding of how in theory institutions can explain the policy process and in particular change. But there are issues identified within this review of new institutionalism that will help shape the argument of the essay surrounding the relationship between the individual and the institution. Both Historical and Normative Institutionalism utilise the idea of the how the actor responds to their institutional framework. However, the role of the institution is itself debateable and even within the theory there is no agreed upon criteria as to how or why the actor will pursue a certain policy path. Normative Institutionalism advocates that individual’s preferences are shaped by the institutions values, norms and beliefs. But the question remains as to where and how these are shaped. With no concept of the individuals interest included it seems a difficult theory to accept. Historical Institutionalism, with it varying interpretations, does not seem to provide an adequate explanation either because even though some advocates accept individual interest, the theory of change in the use of critical junctures seems to imply that institutions suddenly react and take an alternate path. This does not give enough analysis of what situations will allow for this and what happens to the institution when and if a critical juncture occurs. Rational Choice Institutionalism does recognise the individual and can help overcome the collective action problem. The work of Tsebelis (2002) offers possibly the most viable account of institutions explanation of policy change because he utilises the theories and takes them to his own advantage when exploring the idea of veto players. Tsebelis’ practical scenarios and analysis on institutional behaviour particularly to that of the USA provide more of an understanding of how institutions can explain policy outcomes. Despite this there is still the problem of individuals being confined to a set of rules, and being able to pursue self interest. This is the main issue presented here because institutionalism assumptions regarding how individuals react to their surroundings appear fundamentally flawed as they cannot consider that individuals make decisions and policy outside of any institutional framework.

I now turn to the following chapter which will discuss the methodology of the essay and explain why the particular case study of gun control was chosen, as well as discuss why the essay has chosen to focus on a cross comparison of the UK and USA in this respect.

Chapter Three:

Questions of Methodology

To begin the process of analysing the subject of whether institutions matter, this chapter examines the reasons for choosing the approach of the case study of gun control and the methods used. To do this the methodology will examine the theoretical stance taken using ontology and epistemology and explain why certain aspects were chosen for the case study in order to analyse the problem posed.

It is important to consider the ‘world view’ that this dissertation employs in its analysis of the role of institutions in order to explain why certain conclusions will be made;

‘The different world views they reflect imply different grounds for knowledge about the social world.’ (Morgan and Smircich, p. 493, 1980)

The view therefore when considering institutions for this essay will be that of a realist position whereby;

‘There are deep structures that cannot be observed and what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/structures and their effects’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2002, p. 30)

The approach dismisses the idea of complete positivism when analysing data, but also believes that methods of quantative data can be useful in determining patterns of interaction within social phenomena. Although not completely subjective then, this view implies certain characteristics about how individuals react to social constructions in agreement with the following;

‘Humans are actors with the capacity to interpret, modify and sometimes create the scripts they play upon life’s stage.’ (Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p. 494)

The core beliefs are that there may be social constructions in place, but that human beings can interpret them in different ways and indeed choose not to acknowledge them in any given scenario (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). This identifies the essays position of institutions whereby the realist individual does not see them as playing a large role in politics (Jarvis, 1999, p. 42). Direct observation will not help define how they interpret them which are why this essay will use a longitudinal case study to help identify patterns of change and similarities through the use of secondary research analysis in a chosen time period.

The main method of constructing the case study will be through the use of qualitative secondary data derived from previous discussions relating to gun control, government published papers from the UK and the USA and the use of statistics gained from both government and other reputable sources of information. The case study itself will be a cross comparison of gun control in the USA and the UK in the time period of 1987-2007 and also a discussion of the different institutional arrangements in each country. The reason for choosing a cross comparison between the UK and the USA is because they provide two distinctly different forms of democratic government and as Handrais points out;

‘Broad patterns of difference and similarity can be established and they may be particularly helpful in the preliminary stages of a project as a basis for conceptualising a research issue.’ (1996, p. 35)

The analysis will help outline these comparisons and provide a better framework for answering the question of whether institutions matter. With the comparison between two types of democratic government and intuitional frameworks there may be clear points of argument to consider the conclusions to the essay.

The reason for choosing the subject of gun control also has similar bearing to the case for choosing the UK and the USA. Both countries have markedly different legislation on the topic and from this analysis the theory of institutions can be applied to two separate culture influences;

‘Insights into forms of life are enhanced by studying the ways in which different cultures and societies organise their social and political affairs.’ (May, 2001, p. 208)

Gun control is also a widely discussed area in both academic and public realms from which insights into how policy is made can be derived and also allows for a wealth of obtainable information through the use of the internet, libraries and particularly government published documents. The documents will provide information on the process with such areas as legislation, opposition to and documents in favour of gun control.

As discussed the case study will be longitudinal with the timescale being the years 1987-2007. The reasons behind this are that the years chosen represent important points within the policy process of gun control which as Pettigrew comments;

‘Where the change is treated as the unit of analysis, the focus is on a single event or a set of discrete episodes somehow operate…that gives these events form, meaning and substance.’ (1995, p. 94

The timescale as suggested here represents these units of analysis which will help provide discussion points as to whether institutions matter. The events that will be reviewed in this instance are that of the Hungerford Massacre, The Dunblane Massacre and the Violent Crime Reduction Bill in the UK and the Brady Law, Columbine Massacre and Virginia Tech Shootings in the USA. Both the UK and the USA provide points of analysis which help show how institutions may or may not affect the policy process using a contextual element of gun control;

‘Theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and processes of change together with their interconnections through time.’ (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 268)

The question of whether institutions matter will inevitably explore policy change and so as Pettigrew points out the longitudinal aspect of the case study can provide a good source of analysis in relation to this.

There are understandable limitations to this method of research which can be considered. Firstly there can be the issue of generalisation in comparative research;

‘One of the primary problems in comparative analysis is not only the ability of researchers to understand adequately cultures and societies different from their own, but more specifically, to generalise and explain social relations across societies and social contexts.’ (May, 2001, p. 212)

This problem is perhaps accentuated in this instance by the fact that the case study will not be using primary data but to attempt to overcome this issue, there will be extensive use of cultural publications such as newspapers in order to provide a context of the differing environments presented for the case study. These publications will help overcome statements which may be considered too general to provide any insightful conclusions. It is important to acknowledge that this case study is not interested in comparing how each country differs, but is assuming that different institutional frameworks will lead to different policy outcomes. The reason for this is that the essay focuses on institutional concerns relating to national policy. It would also become unfeasible to compare for example the UK institutional framework to both national and state arrangements in the USA because it would present a complexity making it difficult to identify any similar or dissimilar patterns in the policy process.

Relating to the limitations of comparative analysis is also the use of statistics. There may be problems when using these as May points out;

‘Of course, meanings may vary between cultures. This raises a particular problem in the use of surveys in cross national research.’ (May, 2001, p. 214)

To overcome this issue, the case study will only use those statistics which are deemed valid and compatible for comparison on the issue of gun control. This will help alleviate discrepancies in the interpretation of the data.

Finally there is the limitation of not generating primary data in the case study. There are specific reasons why this is the case. Firstly there is a large amount of published secondary data already available through government and other agencies to help with the contextual analysis of gun control. Secondly the research is concerned with whether institutions matter and the role of individual politicians The use of gun control provides a scope to help analyse the impact on the policy process of institutions and is more indicative than descriptive.

There is already a vast amount of data available both theoretical and practical and also the analysis for this essay is based on the arguments of theory through the ontological and epistemological perspectives as discussed outlining the argument that observational data will not help to enhance the argument. The empirical case study allows for enough information to be gathered and analysed providing a comprehensive concluding argument.

3.1 Conclusions

In conclusion, the methods chosen to analyse the problem of whether institutions matter will provide a theoretical and contextual framework for the argument. The use of the longitudinal case study will provide the scope for analysing the contrasting theories in the literature and help generate the concluding arguments of the dissertation. The secondary research done on the subject of gun control will enable a comprehensive analysis of the problem of institutions and allow for a practical study on the issue in relation to the theoretical assumptions made. This is because with two markedly different policy environments in the UK and USA there are certain assumptions made about policy outcomes that can be examined with the issue of gun control as it presents a different political environment in each country.

The following chapter will introduce the case study by comparing the different institutional frameworks of the UK and the USA looking at the differing types of democratic government and how they will shape the contextual case study of gun control.

Chapter Four:

Comparing Institutional Frameworks in the UK and the USA

This chapter examines the differences that can be encountered when comparing the institutional framework of the USA and that of the UK. This is an important consideration if we are to understand how institutions matter in the policy process of gun control because it recognises that political institutions in different systems have different relationships with the respective actors. The case study review of the different frameworks will focus on how each countries institutional arrangements are discussed in the literature followed by a cross comparison of the two. This analysis then informs the context for the case study of gun control policy in each country. It is important to point out that this study will not focus on the benefits and disadvantages of either model particularly with regards to the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate, but will concentrate on analysing the framework in order to allow for a better understanding of how institutions can explain or not explain the gun control policy process. The reason for not discussing the critique is because the focus of the essay is on how institutions matter and not how they may compare across different systems. The chapter will use Tsebelis (2002) theory of veto players as a scope to view the comparison between the different government branches, but will also highlight the problem of not including individual politicians within the institutional design.

The arguments presented in this chapter are that the institutional frameworks of both countries do not take into consideration the role of the individual politician and the effects that political opportunism may have on them as well as the point that the debate surrounding parliamentarism and presidentialism becomes fragile when considering this.

4.1 The work of government

To begin the discussion surrounding this issue it is important to consider how the two systems of government are perceived to work in order to create a framework for debate. The basis of UK political institutions is often centred on ‘The Westminster Model’ which is based upon the point that;

‘The most basic is that the party that after an election can command a majority in the lower House of Parliament is entitled to form the government.’ (Wilson, p.190, 2004)

This makes the House of Commons the centre for institutional arrangements (Judge, p. 25, 2005) which essentially sets the patterns for interactions and behaviour of the government. The model outlines the relationship between the legislative and executive in a representative government (Rhodes, p. 6, 1997). The model itself is not mainly used as a way of describing the British system but more a method of understanding how institutional arrangements can be explained (Birch in Judge, p. 27, 2005). Its significance when understanding the notion of UK institutions links in with the theory of parliamentary government. The relationship between the executive and legislature as mentioned above is often crucial to determining how decisions may be made under UK institutions. As Tsebelis discusses:

‘The political dependence between the legislative and executive is the defining characteristic of parliamentarism. (2002, p. 70)

It is often seen that this relationship defines institutional arrangements because if there is ever a conflict the executive has the power to dissolve the legislature and call for an election (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 70). There is therefore an accountability aspect regarding how decisions are made in UK institutions because the executive essentially has the ability to pass laws it is in favour of and reject others, unless there is a severe vote of no confidence which can ultimately end in the call for an election. The main aspect then of the UK institutional arrangements is that there is ‘no risk of divided government’ (Bonoli, 2001, p. 241) which creates the ability of passing legislation without risk of it failing in parliament. But there is also another basic defining factor of the Westminster model which most certainly contrasts the institutional framework with that of the U.S. which is;

‘One of the basic features of the British political system has been that once legislation is passed it cannot be invalidated by judges’ (Wilson, 1994, p. 194)

This is a defining characteristic because as discussed if legislation is pushed through despite opposition it cannot be overturned, something that differs markedly between the two countries. In line with the argument of the essay this aspect of UK institutions also pursues the idea of agenda setting, particularly with regards to individuals. As Wilson (1994) advocates legislation cannot be invalidated and therefore policy decisions made may not have to follow institutional constraints if they are indeed favourable to the individual and pass through the House of Commons, a point that will be utilised in the case study of gun control.

The USA in comparison to this has the element of divided government. The American system consists of the President, Congress and the House of Representatives all of which can be controlled at any one time by either the Republicans or the Democrats, but there is also the fact that;

‘In presidential systems an executive with considerable constitutional powers - generally including full control of the composition of the cabinet and administration -is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence.’ (Linz, 1990, p. 52)

Essentially, unlike the UK a president may serve their term without any change in office for the most part without fear of losing the confidence vote. This has a definitive impact on institutional frameworks within the USA and is particularly important when considering the individuals effect on the policy process. With the separation of powers policy progress can become a difficult arena particularly when different parties control government. Essentially there is equal legitimacy between legislative and executive branches of government (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 70) as Schroedel notes;

‘The American system, unlike parliamentary systems, lacks a formal hierarchical or organic link between the executive and the legislative branches of government.’ (1994, p. 3)

This can make institutional arrangements more complex as Hammond advocates;

‘It is difficult to tell from these allocations of formal authority whether the president or congress has an advantage in the struggle for control of bureaucracy. That each institution has numerous informal powers makes understanding and analysis even more difficult.’ (1996, p. 120)

The work of Foley though, advocates that Britain itself has moved toward a presidential framework which can be an important aspect to consider when thinking of the individual role of the Prime Minister and the idea of institutional frameworks;

‘The Prime Minister has pursued an uninhabited process of claiming a contractual relationship between himself and his administration on the one side and the interest of the British people on the other’ (2004, p. 293)

Foley (2004) highlights the potential informal power that may exist in the UK, and his case study of Tony Blair provides the argument that the institutional framework of the UK considered by the Westminster model does not take into consideration the factors such as the public and indeed individual leadership;

‘The Prime Ministers position no longer appears to be even nominally reducible to a construction of parliamentary accountability, nor to being a pure derivative of party democracy.’ (Foley, 2004, p. 295)

Foley’s observations of how the British political system has perhaps shifted offers and interesting position particularly in regards as to how the individual can interpret the institutional framework of a supposed parliamentary system.

The institutional framework of the U.S. though has the unique piece of legislation in the Constitution, something that the UK does not possess and can be attributed to being an important part of a presidential system. Although this is not necessarily a physical branch of government, Riggs argues for its importance;

‘Instead of looking to any living institution to serve as the basis for legitimacy and sovereignty in the United States, its citizens glamorise the constitution and the flag’ (1997, p. 272)

The Constitution’s importance in the American political arena is very much relevant as the Supreme Court can essentially overrule decisions made within the government if they are deemed unconstitutional. As previously mentioned, the UK does not have this conflictual arena within its policy process providing a different policy environment for institutions to address. This adds an extra layer to the institutional framework and links in with theories surrounding presidentialism and parliamentarism because it outlines the potential challenges surrounding the policy process.

To make a cross comparison between these the focus becomes centred on the contrasting relationships between the executive and legislative branches. Following on from previous chapters and the work of Tsebelis, Bonoli (2001) examines this aspect through the use of veto points. He suggests that in governments where there are coalitions policy can be delayed or discarded;

‘Instances in the policy making process at which a suitable coalition exists can prevent the adoption of a given piece of legislation’ (2001, p. 238)

Riggs also picks up on this notion in his analysis of presidentialism;

‘Gridlock can occur for an indefinite period of time between the executive and legislative branches’ (1997, p. 262)

This is particularly apposite in the case of the U.S. government structure when different parties are in control. If for example the House of Representatives and Congress disagreed on legislation put forward by the Presidential administration, it may never come to fruition. This is in contrast to the UK where Bonoli suggests ‘governments can control policy making and outcomes to a much larger extent.’ (2001, p. 238). Tsebelis would advocate that veto players have an important part in institutional frameworks, but suggests that in contrasts the US has more players therefore policy outcomes are more difficult to achieve.

‘A president may want to impose the outcome on the legislative in take it or leave it fashion, while a parliamentary government cannot do the same thing since all the veto players participate in government’ (2002, p. 74)

This idea of veto points and players advocates what potential institutional constraints there could be when making policy decisions. Although the UK government may have to reach decisions amongst its own party members such as backbenchers and indeed the EU, the U.S. may have to contend with opposition coalition within government

If both democratic systems operate in separate institutional framework such as Tsebelis’ example looks at, then policy outcomes are likely to be directly affected by this. This indeed complicates the notion of institutions as an explanatory tool for explaining the policy process, but Linz provides a less contrasting outlook;

‘Perhaps the best way to summarise the basic differences between presidential and parliamentary systems is to say that while parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political process, presidentialism makes it rather rigid’ (1996, p. 128)

Linz provides a basic understanding that can be used when considering institutions. Rather than using Tsebelis’ notion of veto players as an analytical tool it can be argued that simply comparing political systems in this way can help identify fundamental institutional differences in order to see how effective institutions are.

But Tsebelis notion of coalitions within government is an aspect which is often central when discussing presidentialism and parliamentarism;

‘(1) parliamentarism and presidentialism are different: the former is a system of ‘mutual dependence’ and the latter of ‘mutual independence’ between the executive and the legislature; (2) institutions shape incentives: presidentialism generates fewer or weaker incentives to form coalitions; (3) coalitions are difficult to form and rarely, ‘only exceptionally’, do form under presidentialism; (4) when no coalition is formed under presidentialism, a ‘long-term legislative impasse’ ensues. (Cheibub et al, 2004, p. 565)

The importance of this distinction as advocated previously is the relationship between institutional branches. The U.S. has the independence between branches within government which essentially can create conflicting outcomes in the policy process. This may help identify any institutional patterns when looking at gun control because as discussed this can lead to an obstructive policy process. In the UK there is the dependence on the relationship between the branches which requires support within the policy process. The UK can suffer opposite effects to that of the U.S. in the fact that if legislation is opposed it can subsequently be passed regardless which in effect adds argument to the idea of individuals pursuing policy agendas outside of institutional frameworks.

For the purpose of this essay the differences in institutional arrangements between the UK and USA will use this scope because of the contrasting veto players identified. . There is a clear discussion to be made from utilising the debate surrounding presidentialism and parliamentarism from this chapter which will help enhance conclusions on whether institutions matter.

4.2 Conclusions

This chapter has focused on how the institutional frameworks differ in both countries and from this there can be several concluding points to address when considering gun control in the following chapter. There is firstly the important characteristic of the relationship between different branches of government. The suggested independence of the American model of institutions may well impact on the policy process with each branch having potentially different objectives. There is also the legislation surrounding the constitution which itself can impede the process, an issue that will be picked up on when considering the second amendment and its relation to gun control. Despite the concepts involved between different branches of government, there has to be a consideration for individual politicians within this, particularly the president because institutional arrangements within the U.S, can become fragmented if an individual chooses to exit from a coalition which will be explored in the case study.

The UK model suggests institutional frameworks work differently within the policy process because of the dependence on the legislative and executive branches. Unlike the U.S. an institutional conflict may be less likely to prevent the passage of legislation. The theory suggests that institutions shape incentives which, under presidentialism, advocate that each branch of government will be affected by its party preferences in a continuing policy process under a fixed term of office regardless of opposition which the essay does not agree with. Under parliamentarism as in the UK, this may not be the case as there is no fixed term of office and prime ministers can be replaced at the next election or indeed before, but what this and indeed the theory surrounding the Westminster model does not consider is the idea of political opportunism within parties, particularly around election periods. This is why it is important to consider the idea that the British political system as Foley (2004) suggested can be representative of the presidentialism model, particularly in relation to individual politicians. Tsebelis’ (2002) idea of how veto players in each government system may respond does provide an interesting perspective, but using the case study, the ideas presented here in the presidentialism/parliamentarism debate may appear fragile.

The following chapter will provide a contextual case study of institutions based on the policy dilemma of gun control in the UK and the USA between 1987 and 2007. The conclusions drawn will focus on both this chapter and the case study in order to argue whether institutions matter in the policy process.

Chapter 5:

The Case Study of Gun control in the UK and the USA

To help further analyse the question of whether institutions matter on policy outcomes this chapter examines how the respective current policies have come about and indeed the issues surrounding them. These will take the form of defining events that have helped shape current policy or indeed had ramifications for further change in policy. The chapter begins with an analysis of the gun control policy in the UK between 1987-2007 and review critical points within the policy process which have led to policy change. Following on from this will be the case of the US in the same time period again exploring points in the policy process which have led to change. The chapter then concludes by outlining the main point’s representative of the argument. The argument that will be presented is that politicians have used the issue and political space created by crises to pursue individual goals and indeed have stepped outside of or ‘exited’ from their institutional frameworks in order to try and achieve them. The political opportunism presented by the crisis points that will be discussed have allowed for politicians in both countries to portray new policy options that seem to be irrelevant of any institutional values or beliefs.

5.1 Gun Control Policy in the UK

The prominence of gun control in the political arena within the UK has gained more and more attention in recent years, particularly with the media attention with regards to individual shootings. Recent examples include the high profile shootings of Charlene Ellis and Letisha Shakespeare in 2003 which dominated newspaper headlines when conviction was finally passed on those responsible;

‘Detectives and lawyers hailed today’s convictions as a legal watershed in the fight against gang culture and gun crime.’ (The Times, March 18, 2005)

Indeed other newspapers are similar in their attention to high profile shootings;

‘Police and community leaders expressed hope yesterday that heavy jail sentences handed down to four men who murdered two girls in a drive-by gangland shooting would deter other youngsters from joining mobs.’ (The Guardian, March 22, 2005)

The convictions were relevant to the ongoing debate surrounding guns within Britain because of laws and amendments passed which will be examined here. Within the time scale that this case study will review there are two incidents that have engaged the policy process and have relevance to what has happened in recent years since 1987, the first being what is referred to as the ‘Hungerford Massacre’ of 1987 when Michael Ryan shot dead 14 people before killing himself. The second was the ‘Dunblane Massacre’ of 1996, where Thomas Hamilton shot and killed 16 children and their teacher in a school with an assortment of weapons. These tragedies, in particular the Dunblane massacre began a sequence of events that would lead to the UK banning virtually all handguns from private ownership. These gun control measures have seen much debate surrounding their effectiveness because many saw them as desperation tactics from the then Conservative government;

‘The whole episode was not so much evidence of a consistent policy process at work as an example of ‘problem driven’ crisis management and political opportunism.’ (Squires, 2000, p. 164)

This comment from Squires begins the analysis surrounding gun control policy in the UK because as much as the laws have been tightened, there have been consistent calls for further legislation from pro gun control groups such as the Gun Control Network (www.gun-control-network.org) but also criticisms of how the laws are supposed to be effective and who is responsible for their introduction. This is the first instance whereby the argument regarding individual politicians can be seen because as Squires (2000) advocates there was no evidence of politicians adhering to an institutional framework, rather they took the oppurtunity to appeal to the pressure being mounted by the media and public.

In 1987 after the Hungerford Massacre, gun control measures were introduced to the agenda, and as Squires advocates, ‘Hungerford appeared to be an opportunity to resurrect a series of gun control proposals of over a decade earlier.’ (2000, p. 50). This can be seen as presenting political opportunism for the Conservative government by introducing favourable restrictions on firearms. These restrictions were not contested to any length, but some commentators questioned the apparent inconsistency of the amendments made to the Firearms Bill due to the fact that certain types of handgun were not included. The main concentration was on shotguns and assault weapons, but by ignoring certain handguns Yardley and Stevenson (1988) in their review of the amendments suggested it was illogical even though police chiefs at the time stated that any further restrictions on guns would be of no use (Yardley and Stevenson, 1988). The fact that police had uttered the idea that banning handguns would be unproductive meant that they were not included in the bill (Squires, 2000, p. 50). When looking to Besley and Case (2003) in the theory there appear reasons as to why this happened. As stated in previous chapters, it appears the response from politicians to appease the median voter was prevalent. The government needed a reaction to the crisis and in this instance chose to amend the Firearms Bill. The fact that Yardley and Stevenson (1988) suggested that it was illogical not to include handguns did not matter at this stage because government was adjudged to have acted on the matter.

This set of preferences changed in the aftermath of the Dunblane massacre and put in motion the 1997 Firearm Amendments Act, which effectively made the UK’s gun control laws some of the tightest in the world;

‘To anyone in the United States it was nothing short of amazing when Britain’s House of Commons voted on June 11th…to end virtually all public ownerships of handguns’. (Karp, 2003, p. 193)

Karp’s comment signifies the extent to which the UK had radically attempted to essentially outlaw all types of guns, but originally government parties in the UK were not so keen to bring emphasis on the issue;

‘Despite the enormity of the incident, an initial reaction in official circles was to see Dunblane within an essentially continuing pattern of policy development’. (Squires, 2000, p. 164)

The mass media reaction along with large public support in particular the Snowdrop Campaign provided the catalyst for policy change;

‘The Snowdrop Campaign set up by victims' families after Dunblane, wants to see a total ban on handguns’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/16/newsid_3110000/3110949.stm)

This was alongside media pressure

‘There were immediate calls for greater security in schools and tightening of the laws on gun ownership, last addressed after the Hungerford massacre in August 1987. ‘(Guardian, March 14, 1996)

The interesting issue politically at this point was the upcoming election of 1997. There was immense pressure on politicians to appease supporters and despite most parties’ initial reaction Karp comments that this pressure was significant;

‘While the debate over the decline of civility is not something restricted to the United Kingdom, it was there that the pressure had been strongest to translate vague social anxiety in tangible public policy.’ (2003, p. 196)

Along with both media pressure and public pressure, politicians also had the issue that as with the Hungerford, Thomas Hamilton held legally licensed guns which made demands for policy change even more desired (Waldman, p. 18, 2003). This pressure inevitably led to the Lord Cullen enquiry in 1996, who in agreement with government consensus did not advocate a total ban on guns (Karp, 2003), which did nothing to hinder the efforts of those strongly in favour of the idea. Those who were not in favour of a ban on all handguns as Squires comments quickly shifted;

‘If not exactly unthinkable, the idea of a complete ban on all handguns was not thought feasible or practical by many key commentators. Later, however, a number were to shift their ground as the public and media pressure mounted.’ (2000, p. 164)

When the Firearms Amendment Bill was finally passed in 1997 much to the appeasement of the media and the public, there were still many questions raised about the bills effectiveness. Squires in his review of the post Dunblane gun policy process questioned the use of such legislation;

‘It is widely recognised that the overwhelming majority, usually around 90 percent of fire-arm related offending is committed with illegal or stolen firearms’ (1997, p. 681)

With the policy process surrounding the Dunblane Massacre there was initially no intention from government to change the legislation. The evidence here suggests that again like Hungerford, politicians seized the crisis as an opportunity to appease public and media scrutiny. This defies the idea of institutions because they appear not to be reacting to particular values or beliefs (March and Olsen, 1989) neither are they attempting to shape their institutional framework or form coalitions as Tsebelis (2002) may suggest. The upcoming election signifies the idea that Prime Ministers from both sides were looking for an opportunity to gain public support.

Squires (2000) along with many other commentators commented on the underlying potential problems of the proposed legislation. Indeed these sentiments were echoed within the House of Commons before the initial passing of the act;

‘We have been told that great urgency is required to pass this legislation. Apparently such great urgency is required that there has been more than a moderate degree of co-operation between Government and Opposition Front Benchers…when the Government and the Opposition get together as of one mind, they usually make a mess of it, and they are doing so again on this occasion.’ (Hansard, 750, 1997)

The criticisms circled around how the legislation was rushed through the Commons supposedly based on public pressure. In both the commons debates and comments from authors such as Squires (1997, 2000) and Karp (2003), the legislation was the result of politics rather than adequately addressing the issue something not lost on pro gun lobbyists;

‘The 1997 Firearms (Amendment) Act was a bad law, making no contribution to public safety or crime prevention, rushed through by a weak government desperate for re-election. (Harriman in Squires, p. 164, 2000)

With gun policy in Britain now at its most restrictive there was wide expectation publicly that gun crime would reduce. The problem facing the newly elected Labour government in the preceding years was the fact that despite new legislation gun crime was still seen as a problem;

‘When the Labour Party took power…Despite this high success rate, the number of illicit firearms is still believed to be high’ (Cukier and Sidel, p. 189, 2006)

There has also been many statistics produced which often show that the new legislation, despite its initial goals may well have been proven to be an act of political opportunism because there is seems no indication of a clear reduction since 2007.

Shown below is one example of Homicide rates since 1989;

Source:

The graph highlights the fact that homicide overall has not reduced once since the new legislation in 1997. It echoes the sentiments of commentators who argued that illegal guns are potentially mostly responsible or that indeed simply banning handguns was not the answer.

‘Since it is so much easier to buy a firearm in the USA than it currently is in the UK, the conclusion might seem obvious. It is not that simple. There has been an increase in gun crime in Britain. (Sharp, 2006, p. 773)

The reaction to statistics produced by the Home Office such as looking at Homicide and indeed the number of firearms offences created more media attention specifically from the report ‘Violent Crime Overview, Homicide and Gun Crime 2004/2005’

‘Firearms (including air weapons) were reported to have been used in 22,769 recorded crimes in 2005. This is 5% down on the previous year, and the first fall since 2007’

The problem for the government was that gun crime was still a large issue particularly since 2000, and this led to more media and public calls for new restrictions on firearms. It was not the case that there was an instance like Dunblane or Hungerford, but there was more attention placed on individual instances such as the shootings of Charlene Ellis and Letisha Shakespeare in 2003. New Labour’s response in early 2005 was to propose the Violent Crime Reduction Bill which was partly focused on more limitations to firearms particularly focusing on air guns and imitation guns. There was also a large emphasis on giving the police more powers over people carrying imitation firearms including longer prison sentences (news.bbc.co.uk). This new piece of legislation, much like the 1997 Firearms Act came into the political arena toward the time of a general election;

‘Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, promised new legislation to tackle the use of imitation firearms and knives on the streets if Labour is re-elected.’ (The Times, April 22, 2005)

Criticisms of the proposed Bill were voiced as in 1997 by those who felt that simply making further restrictions was not the problem;

‘Measures in the Bill, however, will not wipe out the menace of gun crime in the inner city. We need to look at a number of underlying issues, including education.’ (Hansard, 598, 2005)

The argument that there were other issues which have led to a British Gun Culture hinders the government’s mentality including both New Labour and the previous Conservative Government that tighter legislation means a reduction of gun crime. Again politicians focused on the issue around the time of an election. The policy process does not represent a continuing consistent pattern or highlight institutional concerns, but seems to highlight the fact that at points in the process which are significant such as this, Dunblane or Hungerford, politicians react to appease the median voter and indeed act outside of their institutions.

The case study of UK gun control from 1987-2007 has produced two key points in the government’s response to problems that arise in the policy process. Firstly in the aftermath of Hungerford, Dunblane and the lack of a significant reduction in gun crime preceding this have all been responded to by introducing tighter legislation. The effectiveness of new laws introduced has been questionable in each circumstance which poses the question of why the government continues to follow a continuation of policy pattern if they can see it is not having a desired effect. The argument here will opt for political opportunism rather than the effects of institutional frameworks. This relates in particular to Dunblane and New Labours attempts to reduce crime, because both were proposed around the time of upcoming elections and this debate will be further advanced upon in the concluding chapter. The second interesting aspect of this study is that the media and indeed public have called for these tighter legislations. This is an interesting aspect when considering the UK’s views on firearms. It seems generally clear that the majority of the UK likes the idea of a ban on firearms even if its effectiveness is debatable. Smith makes this point;

‘Insofar as a ‘pro-gun’ lobby exists in Britain it is really a lobby seeking the preservation of shooting sports, rather than a general ‘right’ to gun ownership’ (2006, p. 718)

Smith’s comment outlines the fact that even though pro gun groups do exist in Britain they are a small minority in comparison to those against and this concluding point leads on to the case study of the USA which has a very different take on gun control within the political realm.

5.2 Gun Control Policy in the US

The prevailing argument of gun control in the USA is a contrasting one to that of the UK notably because of the divide within government and society on the rights to own a gun which all stem from the interpretation of the second amendment. It appears not the case that certain events within the time scale of 1987-2007 have affected gun control, though they do have a bearing as will be discussed, but more to do with the ideologies of the controlling government party and indeed the potential financial clout they have behind them (McKay et al, 2002, p. 96) including such organisations as the NRA. The focus of the USA gun control debate within this time period will be on the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and the Columbine High School Massacre of 1999 with a brief discussion of the Virginia Tech Shootings in 2007. It is important to point out that this case study will focus on Federal gun control laws and not State laws. The reason for this is that all the states of the USA have different laws in force which have changed throughout the time scale. The differing laws would make a comparison with the UK unfeasible because of the complications it would present, for example some states have a right to carry a concealed weapon law where as others do not, therefore a focus on the main laws and issues at federal level will allow for a clearer comparison of institutions in preceding discussions. The focus on institutional frameworks is that of national concern between parliamentarism and presidentialism and a stated state laws would be difficult to cross examine.

It is firstly important to discuss briefly the ambiguity of the second amendment in order to comprehend how the gun control debate became such a large issue. It states;

‘A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of people to bear arms, shall not be infringed’ (U.S. Constitution ,amendment II)

The debate surrounding its meaning is not important for this study but the contrasting views have created a template by which political parties have defined their beliefs and policy goals. There are two general conceptions of what the amendment states, one being that it gives Americans the right to own a gun as part of their freedom and alternatively that it gives Americans the right to own a gun as part of a ‘militia’ against an oppressive federal government (Kates, p. 143, 1986).

These two contrasting opinions have throughout America’s history caused debate between opposition parties. It is often acknowledged within American politics that the Republican Party is in opposition to gun control and the Democrats in favour, which essentially take the line of the two contrasting views represented in the meaning of the second amendment (McKay, p. 104, 2002). This assumption can be used to study the policy progress since 1987 and indeed provide analysis surrounding the debate of institutions.

To begin the debate the issue of the introduction of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 will be discussed. The arguments for and against this legislation began four years after the attempt on President Reagan’s life in 1981, when James Brady was shot. Sarah Brady, his wife in 1985 joined the pro-gun control group Handgun Control Inc, and began in 1989 lobbying for the introduction of the above act. The significance in the political realm was well documented as in the race for the 1992 Presidential elections; the Democrats famously supported the campaign;

‘When presidential candidate Bill Clinton (but not President George Bush endorsed the Brady Bill in the run up to the 1992 election, Sarah Brady endorsed him. In 1996, she addressed the Democratic National Convention.’ (Jacobs, p. 66, 2002)

This point in the election signified the contrasting ideologies of each party. It is no secret that the National Rifle Association has been avid supporters of Republican candidates which may suggest why George Bush Senior had no interest in backing the campaign. Clinton’s support of the Brady Bill may well though have been more of a political incentive at that point. As in the UK, popular public and media opinion seem to dominate policy options more so than actual political party goals;

‘While a majority are against taking away the right to own a gun altogether, substantial majorities favour the Brady Bill, the registration of all handguns and limits on the sale and manufacture of semi-automatic weapons.’ (McKay, p. 96, 2002)

Clinton’s endorsement of the bill perhaps allowed him the advantage of gaining votes from those in favour with the Republicans looking for a way to endorse it also;

‘With public opinion polls showing growing support for the Brady bill, White House aides say President Bush has been looking for a way to back the waiting period without being criticized for flip-flopping’. (New York Times, March 31, 1991)

When the issue was up for debate during the presidential election, with the Clintons full endorsement, the Republicans response was unlike their supposed institutional values and beliefs by trying to show they would consider it.

The passing of the bill in 1993 after being rejected by the Senate twice was seen as being due to the ‘political climate’ reducing the chance of a Republican backlash (New York Times, November 14, 1993).

The eventual passing of the bill in 1993 had significance when studying gun control in the USA in that;

‘The Brady Law was enacted when the democrats controlled both Houses of Congress and the White House’ (Jacobs, p. 38, 2002)

This fact emphasises the importance within the US political system about who is in control. It could be argued that if it were the case that the Republicans were in control of the Houses of Congress the Brady Act may never have passed. Indeed the fact that in 1998 the Brady Bill was strongly amended in the Republicans favour insists that the policy environment can be quickly changed with a change of party leadership. The question of whether this is institutional beliefs or a political activity though requires discussion. The Columbine School Massacre provides a framework to analyse this aspect of American Politics.

Although it is important to point out that since 1987 there have been 35 school shootings in America (National Centre for Educational Statistics’ Violence and Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools) Columbine in 1999 sparked the debate surrounding gun laws in the USA similar to the Dunblane tragedy in the UK. Two students killed 12 other students and a teacher, as well as wounding 23 others. It was the deadliest shooting in the US since 1966. The tragedy created a similar debate between the Democrats and the Republicans on the issue of gun control;

‘Congressional Democrats insisted that weak gun control policies were responsible, while republicans attributed responsibility to violent images in the entertainment media’ (Haider-Markel and Joslyn, p. 531, 2001)

In comparison to the UK where the public and media called for an outright ban, the political response in the USA reflects the two different party ideologies. But commentators suggest that the response from both is perhaps not attributed to an institutional framework;

‘Because the policy processes seldom or never address gun control as a systemic issue, legislators view it is an arena for political, rather than subject expertise.’ (Vizzard, p. 175, 2000)

This argument outlines the idea that gun control in America is less of a progressive policy process and rather more an area which politicians can use to utilise public support. The use of Lobbyists in this respect can help emphasise this idea. The NRA is known to support Republican Candidates, who in turn do not see weak gun control as the issue;

‘As George Bush emphasised during the 2000 presidential campaign, school shootings would not happen if were not for parental neglect and the culture of violence popularized by Hollywood.’ (McKay, p. 97, 2002)

Bush as Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) commented on defended the current legislation and in return the Democrats would take their campaign focusing on weak regulation. Gun control in this respect may have therefore been fought on a political ground, something Vizzard further comments on in the aftermath of the Columbine massacre;

‘In such an environment, policy advocates have strong incentives for crafting policy initiatives to capture fleeting public attention and capitalise on current symbolic concerns, but have few incentives for devoting resources to building expertise in policy implementation or outcomes.’ (2000, p. 174)

The Columbine massacre provided a basis for both parties to project an argument, and with the Republican candidate getting financial backing from the NRA, George Bush was inclined to be against tightening gun control laws.

This debate is again relevant in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech School shootings of 2007. The issue of gun policy provided something for opposition parties to take opposing views on as was the case in after Columbine which commentators in the media realm suggested;

‘after the 2000 election, in which Vice President Al Gore’s support for new gun regulations was widely thought to have hurt his candidacy, many Democrats showed little appetite for challenging the gun lobby.’ (New York Times, April 16, 2007)

It seems that both tragedies provided a catalyst for party leaders to present policy objectives, but as Vizzard (2000) advocated, the American stance seems focused on short term objectives. This appears to have been the case as with the Brady Law and the Columbine shootings. Politicians readily take a stance on the issue, but long term effects of what they achieve is generally less viable. The legislation presented after the Virginia Tech shootings presents an example of this as the problem of gun shows in America was not addressed meaning the killers could still have gotten hold of the weapons regardless of whether they could not obtain them due to a criminal record;

‘The Virginia Legislature’s failure mocks all of the high-minded promises of closure uttered in the blood and grief after the tragedy. It again underlines the need for federal legislation to close gun-show loopholes’ (New York Times, February 11, 2008)

This issue surrounding gun control portrays a consistency within the time period of the case study much like that of the UK. The response of each point within the UK was to introduce tighter gun legislation, whereas the U.S. politicians often respond by arguing for and against gun control on either side. This political element can be attributed to the design of the institutional arrangements and who has power along with the ambiguity of the second amendment, but as Lott points out, America’s culture as a whole can be said to create this political sphere surrounding the issue;

‘American culture is a gun culture – not merely in the sense that 75 to 86 million people own a total of about 200 to 240 million guns, but in the broader sense that guns pervade our debates on crime and are constantly present in movies and the news’ (2000, p. 1)

Lott’s point illustrates how U.S. gun control has such a political aspect to it. Even the use of statistics is prevalent in the debate, but these too portray differing views on how effective gun control has been. Here are some examples;

Source: (UCR)

This graph represents national statistics but their interpretation from lobbyist groups is where differing political stances from groups like the NRA and Handgun Control Inc differ. The NRA point out;

‘The FBI reports that the nation’s total violent crime rate declined every year between 1991-2004. In 2004, the violent crime rate fell to a 30-year low, lower than any time since 1974. The murder rate fell to a 39-year low, lower than any time since 1965. (www.nra-ila.org)

This differs from the Handgun Control Inc who argues for specific statistics that stand out;

‘In 2004, 1,804 children and teenagers were murdered with guns, 846 committed suicide with guns, and 143 died in unintentional shootings. A total of 2,852 young people were killed by firearms in the U.S., one every three hours.’ (www.bradycampaign.org)

The relevance of these in the U.S. gun control debate is that from the same statistics opposition lobbyists can help fuel the gun control debate and indeed financially back political candidates.

5.3 Conclusions

From this case study of the USA it seems that the ideology surrounding gun control has consistently shaped policy. In the aftermath of Columbine, Democrats and Republicans argued for different reasons as to why the shootings occurred, but more importantly how to combat the issue. This is the first real comparison point between the UK and the USA in terms of how institutions affect the policy process. It appears that in both countries there may be an argument for political rather than institutional reasons as to how policy change and political parties make decisions. The policy choices appeared more to do with appeasing a political climate created by factors outside institutional frameworks such as public demand The contrasting institutional framework of both countries adds to this argument, because the cultures differ significantly. It is clear that in the UK there was a majority call for a tightening of gun control as the answer to tragedies to Dunblane. This is different to that of America where political ideology as well as lobbyist organisations, which do not have the effect in the UK than they do in the U.S splits the opinions on gun control amongst the public which has in the years reviewed in the case study, had a dramatic impact on political outcomes such as elections. Ideology in the U.S. is not seen as part of the differing political institutions because as the case study has outlined there appear political motives whereby gun control has been contested. On the subject of the Brady Law the Republicans were not quick to dismiss the law because of the political environment and this does not account for their institutional values. This seems to be the difference when considering if the ideology is part of a US political institution because as Vizzard (2000) rightly advocated, gun control is part of a political battle ground which will be further emphasised in the conclusions. Indeed in the context of gun control it is political processes rather than institutional frameworks that matter. The passing of legislation was provoked by individuals seeking to gain ground particularly around elections and not an example of institutions explaining policy change.

Chapter Six:

The Problem of Institutional Explanations

The concluding chapter will summarise the issues raised throughout the essay and demonstrate the points made about the role of individuals exiting institutionsl frameworks. Firstly the conclusion will address the arguments made involving the case study and emphasise the problems of institutional accounts when explaining the policy process. The next section will focus on the limits of new institutionalism in this aspect and how they cannot collectively explain the policy process or indeed fully comprehend the role of individuals. Finally the concluding paragraph will identify the main arguments presented throughout and reaffirm the position that institutions do matter because they do not fully explain the role of politicians in the policy process and are at a loss when explaining policy choices during times of crisis.

6.1 The Problem of Institutionalist Accounts and the Case Study

This study asks fundamental questions of institutional accounts of the policy process. When studying the events in both the USA and the UK gun control debate, changes in policy revolve around political actors not conforming to a supposed institutional framework. This is significant when considering the differences in presidential and parliamentary systems. Tsebelis advocates that veto players combine to conform change, but he himself acknowledges that this is only relevant in a situation he describes as ‘status quo’ (2002, p. 285). Although his rational explanations of policy change using institutions provide some reasoning in the context of individuals reacting to their institutional environments, there appears no evidence for this in the case study. In the UK gun control legislation was reformed around the time of an election, suggesting that politicians were appealing to the median voter rather than their institutional framework around the time of crisis. Indeed, after Dunblane, politicians on both sides were initially not in favour of new legislation, but political opportunism encouraged the change. This is the case in the USA too where there is a different political sphere by which institutions can be analysed, but it still appears that individual politicians act outside an institutional framework. Although it can be suggested that this loosely connects with rational choice institutionalism, this is not the case. The essay does not suggest that the individual is seeking to maximise interest and shape the institutional framework from this, but that they are reacting to political consequences outside of this in times of crisis where they can gain political ground. This is evident in the U.S. because an individual politician on either party will conform to any policy change; including gun control which they feel can help them win an election. This is a point made by Weaver and Rockman;

‘The problem of the U.S. system is not so much that accountability is lacking, but rather that it is divided and targeted at individual politicians, who have little institutional insulation.’ (1993, p. 460)

The individual politician is not necessarily connected with any institutional framework and will shape policy preferences away from it because they can appeal to the voter, particularly in election debates on policy issues, without ramifications from their institution.

6.2 The Limits of New Institutionalism

The second issue to identify is that of how new institutionalism helps explain policy progress and change. The gun control scenario, in particular the UK showed a pattern in the policy process in that new legislation would be proposed at a time of heightened public and media pressure. The problem with using institutionalism to explain this is the fact that each strand of institutionalism cannot fully provide a coherent account of why this happens; in crisis normal politics does not work.

‘Each theoretical lens has its advantages and disadvantages, each may be criticised as faulty from the perspective of the other approaches, but each also has a set of features superior to its competitors.’ (Koelble, 1995, p. 243)

When providing an explanation in the gun control policy process, new institutionalism may help explain one aspect, for example historical institutionalists could argue that the UK’s consistent policy process is due to the executive and legislative branches reacting to policy continuation by employing new legislation on what has been done before. This though ignores the individuals within the political realm which in the case of the U.S. would be a large hindrance in explaining the policy process.

The rational institutionalist would ignore social impacts and focus solely on the individual’s impact on the institution, whereas the normative would look at the logic of appropriateness. Where these aspects fit into the case study example is debatable though and none consider the individual political actor being a separate entity from any kind of institutional framework. The case of gun control seems to highlight the idea of political reasons for policy decisions. There appears no consistent example of either theoretical perspective in the case study, but several for the reasoning behind political actors being able to step outside any institutional framework. Tony Blair called for new legislation on the back of the Dunblane massacre in order to instil the idea that under Conservative government legislation had not worked. Indeed, in the U.S., both major political parties have a stance on the gun control issue, but the reasoning behind this appears not of institutional beliefs but of a political battle ground for each side to argue for and against to win votes as Vizzard (2000. p.175) advocated. The argument can be further extended in this aspect because of the idea that in some states when Republican support is high even Democratic candidates are coarse when it comes to being against gun control to and therefore durinf times of crisis institutional patterns no longer work Finally there is the question of where these institutions form, and from what as Peters suggested;

‘Few if any of the approaches are explicit about the internal dynamics of an institution, and the underlying behavioural mechanisms that make them work.’ (1995, p. 164)

This is important because when considering the case study, the institutional arrangements discussed appeared to have no consideration as to why an institution will take a particular pattern of behaviour. Presidential systems, with a separation of powers framework have no consistent dynamics to explain their behaviour much like that of a parliamentary framework. Despite the supposed differences in institutional arrangements, their reactions to crises points in the policy process of gun control were remarkably political considering the explanations of how they may react according to theorists such as Tsebelis (2002) and March and Olsen (1984). Individual actors again seemed to step out of the institutional framework which cannot be explained using the theory, and indeed questions where these behaviour patterns are formed if this is the case.

6.3 Institutions Do Not Matter

From studying gun control and different institutional arrangements of the UK and the USA this essay argues that institutions do not matter and that the policy process is a political one. It seems the case that because there can be no clearly agreed definition of the term to begin with, there is already an issue as to how institutions can be applied practically. The idea of a set constitution by which institutions work in agreement with Besley and Case (2003, p. 9) is a difficult concept to agree with. Each policy process has a markedly different problem that will be faced that can only be answered by politically appealing to the median voter, not institutionally. The political actor essentially wants to remain in power or gain power and to do this they will to exit any institutional framework. There is no optimal explanation as to where institutional behaviour arises and with such an array of different explanations it appears to provide only a limited scope by which theorists can attempt to explain the policy process rather than apply it in any practical measures.

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Do Institutions Matter: A Case Study of Gun Control

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