The US Government decided to address the issue of nuclear waste based on a Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and relocate all of the temporary stock into Russian facilities for reprocessing or long-term storage (Banks 2003; Stec 2010; UNEP 1992; WRP 2011). According to the US, Russia has a wonderful opportunity to benefit from the 123 Agreement since all transactions regarding nuclear waste will be paid for by the US Government. The original US plan to establish its own nuclear repository was abolished by the US President Barak Obama in 2010 since the project was not economically feasible (WRP 2011). Given the 123 Agreement, the US abides by law and prevents its future inhabitants from the potential threat of facing accidents associated with the nuclear waste disposal (WRP 2011).
However, Russian Federation seems to be less concerned about potential sustainability implications that might result from this pact. Although this country will get an enormous economic benefit from presenting «nuclear waste services» to the US, it also has to invest into further reprocessing research and development (R&D) and redo most of the environmental impact assessments in order to establish more functional repositories for the US nuclear waste. Given that most of the heavy industries used to be kept in secrecy from general knowledge during the Soviet Union, today people are aware only of a couple of functioning repositories, for example the one close to the town of Krasnoyark in Siberia. Today secrecy is still there due to the terorrism alert and local populations do not have any access to the nuclear waste information. They also cannot influence governmental decisions that are made today, which goes against the Rio Declaration principle #10 and Agenda 21 that regard nuclear waste management and consequent responsibilities towards the human population and environment affected (Banks 2003; Stec 2010; UNDESA 2009; UNEP 1992). Thus, there is an issue of public awareness, transparency and inability to express general disagreement with the governmental decision making processes. However, the international 123 Agreement between Russia and US complies with the PPP (Rio Declaration, Principle 16) and Millenium Development Goal 8, which talks about «global partnership» and development of international cooperation (Banks 2003; UN 2010; UNEP 1992). Thus, the 123 Agreement disregards the environmental sustainability issue explicitly described in the MDG 7 given the uncertainty of Russian nuclear facilities. Additionally, such Rio principles as «intergenerational impacts» (principle 3) and «precautionary principle» (principle 15) are being disregarded by this Agreement (Banks 2003; Stec 2010; WRP 2011; UNDESA 2009; UN 2010; UNEP 1992).
«Precautionary principle» is necessary to apply when one speaks about issues that are associated with the overall means of transferring the highly radioactive nuclear waste from the US to the Russian facilities. First of all, the proposed transportation is shipping, which certainly will be kept in secret from the public in order to prevent terrorist attacks (WRP 2011). One can also imply that the capsules with nuclear waste will have to be further transferred to a train and relocated to a repository. This rises the issue of protective encapsulating methods of nuclear waste and the rate of exposure of staff to potential radiation episodes. Thus, the safety problem does not only concern the society that is located close to a potential repository site, but also the staff members that will have to operate the transfer. Finally, the secrecy of the regular shipment could be unveiled and nuclear waste could be used as a potential weapon. Additionally, it is worth remembering that potential weapons can also be generated at the reprocessing facilities, the ones that Russia claims it has in operation at the moment. Globally reprocessing is looked down upon despite extensive use of this technique in France, Japan and some Russian reactors. The 123 Agreement is therefore in favor of the method that is globally feared and is willing to sponsor the growth of this type of reactor in Russia by supplying billions of dollars into the economic growth of the latter (WRP 2011).
Given such an extensive nuclear growth, the «Rosatom» Minitry that is responsible for the nuclear industry development in the Russian Federation will receive an opportunity to conduct more research in the area of nuclear waste and potentially find more efficient ways of storing the radioactive material underground for thousands of years. Yet, it is important to remember about the transparency issue that goes alond with this country and possible corruption associated with such a large international transaction. The government will also greatly benefit from receiving an opportunity to advertize its new option as a «reprosessing-nuclear waste storing land» to the world and eventually attract more «customer countries» to store their waste in growing nuclear repositories. Russia will have to look into all of the sustainability issues associated with this international deal such as public participation and associated level of transparency, storing methods and expansion of nuclear facilities, international standards and impact assessments on already existing and future repositories, as well as corruption factor that is the largest obstacle on a way to a sustainable future of the country (WRP 2011).
Finally, as for the resolution of this sustainability issue, it is relatively pointless to speak about termination of the whole Agreement. The best case scenario will involve the top-bottom regulation, where the Russian government will enforce strict measures of control on the performance of nuclear waste repositories and reprosessing reactors. Additionally, the US government could potentially invest into controlling measures by establishing its own assessment of Russian performance in accordance with the 123 Agreement conditions.
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