Rieff, while presenting his argument, assumes that it is in the self-interest of West and the United Nations to intervene and stop the Bosnian massacre. While the members of the General Assembly of the UN might be moved by the plight of Bosnian Muslims, it would not be in the interest of some of the members of the Security Council, namely the United States and Russia, to intervene. Keep in mind that the Security Council has been empowered to take final decisions on the use of force, and yes, it is true that the rest of the UN is, as Rieff puts it, “a eunuch in an orgy.” So, what really matters, ultimately, is the opinion of the members of the Security Council.
The United States was at that time, and is, probably the sole super power in the world, and is a member of the Security Council and NATO, perhaps the strongest member of NATO. History has shown us that the United States likes to pick its battles, battles through which it has something to gain. The Balkans, unlike the Gulf, a few years earlier, had nothing to offer the US. There was no oil, no strategic gains, plus the fact that Karadzic liked to promise another Vietnam for invaders didn’t play too well with the Americans. In so many words, Rieff adds credibility to the claim that self-interest trumps moral obligation when he says that, “Hillary Rodham Clinton argued passionately against the move [of sending the Secretary of Defense to Sarajevo] on the grounds that this would take healthcare off the front page for the duration of his visit to Bosnia” (Rieff, 29). However unethical this may seem, it did serve Hilary Clinton’s purposes. And ironically, years later in 1999, when the United States, along with its NATO allies, decided to commence air strikes over Kosovo, and was hailed a hero, President Bill Clinton was facing impeachment charges related to his scandalous affair with Monica Levinsky.
Russia, on the other hand, has strong historical, cultural, and military ties with Serbia. During the course of the nineteenth century Russia had helped Serbia in military battles against the Ottoman Empire. More recently, and of greater importance, Russia had lent great support to Serbia, during World War I, and both were part of an alliance which included also Britain and France. Apart from military ties, Russia and Serbia also share cultural ties as both peoples share the same religion, Greek Orthodox, and ethnic heritage, Slavic descent. Also, what ties Russia to Serbia is the fact that Russia enjoyed control of the Balkans after they were awarded to Russia in the Nazi defeat after World War II. So, contrary to Rieff’s claims that liberating Bosnia would be in the interest of Western powers, the United States and Russia, the most important actors in the Security Council and NATO (the US), would only be acting in self interest if they decided not to intervene in Bosnia.
The UN has been in existence for over more than fifty years now, and for the best part of it, it has been able to retain order in world society, perhaps due to the fact that it is in the self-interest of states to seek order, but by no means is the United Nations a world government. Most important decisions such as the use of force are sanctioned by the five members of the Security Council, but even before we reach that point, where one has to use force, attempts at resolving a conflict peacefully have to be made. Article 33.1 of the United Nations Charter states, “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VI); war is a last resort. In the course of the context of the conflict in Bosnia, the members of the UN upheld the dignity of the UN charter whilst they attempted to resort to a peaceful means to resolve the issue through alternate dispute resolution. The Security Council issued many resolutions asking for a peaceful and politically negotiated settlement such as Security Council Resolution 764 which states, “Stressing once again the imperative need to find an urgent negotiated political solution for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Resolution 764 (1992)), and force was only used after going through the process of seeking a peaceful resolution. Efforts by the UN to mediate between the sides can be seen through the proposal of the Vance-Owen plan. These efforts of mediation eventually led to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995 which created two entities of roughly equal size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs. This arbitrary settlement was binding on its signatories and an international peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO and with a grant of authority from the UN, known as the Implementation Force, or IFOR, was dispatched to maintain further peace in the region.
Rieff, amongst a host of other things, is very critical of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was established as a peacekeeping force in Croatia, and later Bosnia. Referring to the ineffectiveness of the force, Rieff says, “As for the idea that UNPROFOR had been a success, that really was like the old vaudeville saw ‘The operation was a success. Its just that the patient died” (Rieff, 171). It might be that UNPROFOR was not able to live up to par with the standards which many had envisioned, but the truth is that UNPROFOR played a key role that led to the implementation of December 1995 peace treaty; and this too under a limited mandate offered by the members of the Security Council. Quoting Fred Cuny, a UN peacekeeper, Rieff writes:
“The UN is not the world’s government. It is an organization of the world’s governments. And peacekeeping is only an instrument that we in the UN can make available if called upon to do so by the Security Council…Were we to attempt to do so [do more for the cause of Bosnian Muslims] we would be usurping the authority of the member states, and I put it to you that they would not tolerate that for very long” (Rieff, 173);
again showing us the power of the Security Council and motivation of self-interest behind its decisions. The function of UNPROFOR is defined as “an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis” (Former Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR). Although it suffered many setbacks, it implemented ceasefires between the two warring sides which eventually led to the Dayton peace accord of 1995, signed in Paris, thus the goal of UNPROFOR, under very difficult circumstances, was achieved.
Another assumption made by David Rieff is that if the UN arms embargo was lifted, the Bosnian Muslims would use this only as a defensive weapon. War is not an idealist situation; pessimism is part of human nature and the worst in individuals tends to come out in war. How can one assume that the Muslims or Croats, or for that matter, any other suppressed ethnic group or regime, not resort to even greater harm if given the chance when history has shown us otherwise. During World War II, the Croats “led by Ante Pavelic and his fascist Ustasha party… had collaborated with the Nazis and had been responsible for the murders of hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Jews” (Rieff, 38), and the ragtag Muslim force compromising of gangsters and members of the Sarajevo underworld, people condemned for spreading the ills of society, ambushed a column of JNA troops who were withdrawing from Sarajevo, and that too under a UN brokered ceasefire; again showing the anarchic and pessimistic nature of society. The number of fatalities would have greatly increased if the United Nations did not enforce the arms embargo, leading to an even greater humanitarian disaster. Some people would invoke Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter- national peace and security” (Article 51of the Charter of the United Nations), to justify the lifting of the arms embargo. What has to be taken into account is the second part of the clause which states that “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter- national peace and security” and as we know, the Security Council had already implemented certain resolutions towards the cause of resolving the Bosnian conflict. One more thing to keep in mind is that the overseas “freedom fighters” who fought alongside their Muslim brethren in Bosnia are the same people whom the West has labeled as terrorists today, either in Chechnya, Palestine, or Kashmir. Would the West want weapons in the hands of such terrorists?
In August of 1995, perhaps soon after David Rieff’s book, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West was published, NATO commenced air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets forcing Slobodan Milosovic on to the negotiating table. The result of the peace negotiations labeled the Dayton Peace Accords, was the General Framework Agreement which was initialed by Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slobodan Milosovic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Franjo Tudgman of The Republic of Croatia in Paris in December of 1995. The agreement established the sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina which would be divided into two entities of almost equal size known as the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic; citizens of the state would have freedom to move about in the whole state without fear of persecution. To Rieff, and like-minded thinkers, this would be a great step forward from the Vance-Owen peace plan, which advocated carving Bosnia along ethnic boundaries, thus, in a way, rewarding Serbia for its aggression. The new agreement would preserve the ethnicity of Bosnia, part of the basis of Rieff’s argument for intervention. Rieff mentions in the book that he has no hopes of peace, or even a war crimes trial; he writes, “… that after peace returned, he [Haris Pasovic] hoped there could be a war crimes trial… I told him that he should not imagine the UN was really serious about this, that the people negotiating with Karadzic and General Mladic were not going to lock them up later…” (Rieff, 130); yet, the UN has returned peace to Bosnia and has indicted these same men for crimes against humanity. In 1999, again, NATO led air strikes against Slobodan Milosovic, this time for liberating Kosovo. Since then Milosovic has been kept captive in the Hague, and is currently on trial facing indictments regarding crimes against humanity committed in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo; Kradzic has also been indicted, but has not been apprehended by authorities. The advent of the International Crimimal Court (ICC) earlier this year, for swifter issuance of justice for crimes against humanity, is a great leap forward for international law enforcers, and would satisfy Rieff, as he had pleaded for the Western powers for taking swifter action. Apart from the fact that many people had to lose their life in Bosnia, Rieff should be relatively pleased with the developments that have taken place after the publishing of his book.
The world has taken giant strides in bringing human rights law into the mainstream of international law, but the fact remains that even though countries like to put up a good face, there is not a universal consensus on human rights law. It has been rooted in human nature that states act rationally in self-interest to protect their sovereignty. Self-interest is the motivational force that leads states to make certain decisions. If the West chose not to intervene immediately, using force, in Bosnia, it was in their own self-interest; and when they eventually did, that too was in their own self-interest. It is in the nature of states to seek order. The UN was trying to bring order to the situation in a very systematic way that upheld the essence and traditions of the United Nations by first seeking a diplomatic resolution, and reserving the right to use force only as a last alternative. Many times in the past the West has been criticized and accused of imposing imperialism when it has used force to resolve conflicts, what would make the cause in Bosnia any different? It is true that self-interest trumps moral obligation, and till states are willing to cede their sovereignty to a unified world government which represents all states equally, this will remain the case.
