Kant states that the only motive to have moral worth is acting from the motive of duty. He says there is no moral worth if one carries out a moral act just to advance ones own interests, and no moral worth if one acts out an act due to some feeling that one may have. Therefore from Kant’s theory Mary’s motive is the only one that has any moral worth, as she acts purely from a sense of duty. In John’s case it may be ‘a mere coincidence or accident’ that what his inclination and natural feelings lead him to do what was a morally right act and so he ‘can’t be morally praise worthy for an accident’1
This logically follows from these premises but there are some arguments against this view. One objection to Kant’s view is that ‘someone who acts from duty does not really care about others, but fulfils his duties towards them in order to meet a minimum requirement.’ This demonstrates that a person who acts only from the motive of duty has no love towards fellow human beings, for example a mother who cares for a child, not out of the maternal feelings she may have but from a sense of duty that she ought to look after the child to somehow meet her minimum moral requirements. The same thing can be said with respect to Mary in that she seems to have no love for fellow human beings, is just trying to carry out her minimum moral requirements. Although does this actually detract from the moral worth of her action as it could just undesirable because she seems to act in a cold way.
Another object arises from an example given by Michael Stoker of visiting a patient in hospital:
‘You are very bored and restless and at a loose ends when Smith comes in once again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend-taking so much time to cheer you, up travelling all the way across town, and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he always tries to do his duty, what he thinks will be best. You at first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, relieving moral burden. But the more you two speak, the more clear it becomes that he was telling the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you he came to see you, not because you are friends but because he thought it his duty.’
We can see that there is something wrong in Smiths actions and it can be said that has some kind of moral defect as part of our moral code is to cultivate our attitudes and feelings and feel ‘sympathy rather than repulsion’, although this does not detract from acting from the motive of duty. It may not detract from moral worth of an act of duty, as that person still had to think what was the morally right thing to do, and take that action.
A third argument against Kant’s view of duty is view of ‘Psychological Egoism. This can be considered to be a counter view to Kant as Psychological Egoism argues that ‘every human action is motivated by self interest’ people can not act other to their own interests. This is counter to the three motives Kant gives for moral actions in that Psychological Egoism gives just one reason for our actions that of self interest. If we relate Psychological Egoism to Mary’s account then Mary can not be acting out of a pure sense of duty there must be some other prudential reason for her actions. The same can also said about John reasons he is acting out of self interest as helping out at the hostel makes him feel good. And so with respect to Psychological Egoism there is no difference in the moral worth of their actions. There are problems with this theory. One such problem is that the theory is said to have a built-in irrefutability in that it can not be tested. For every counter example put to Psychological Egoism it can be reinterpreted in terms of the theory. Although the same could be said for Kant’s theory. Can we ever really ever know what a motive is for a moral act?
One way in which I can see moral worth in John’s motive and against Kant’s view moral duty is if we consider what morals actually are. Kant believes that morals are a set of universal, categorical, imperatives. His view is that morals are a set of ‘laws’ which apply to everyone. But this is not necessarily the case there are other theories as to what morality is. One of these is the ‘Natural Law Theory’ of which Aquinas is best known for. This view is that ‘moral reasoning depends on principles which do not themselves depend on reasoning but are given to us by nature.’ It states that we know the difference between right and wrong not through reason but because it has been given to you in your human nature. And so from this theory of morality we can see that morally right acts are ones that we feel in our selves to be good. And so our inclinations and feelings give rise to what is the morally right act and therefore we have moral worth in acting from them. This view point gives moral worth to John’s motive as he is acting from inclination and love for the people in the hostel. It also shows moral worth in Mary’s actions as ‘the “natural laws” that specify what we should do are laws of reason’ Mary uses reason to tell what is the morally right act and then acts on it.
In my own opinion john’s account holds more moral worth as it seems he is acting out of love for fellow human beings. Maybe it is not his intension to have these feelings. It could be chance that he is inclined to act morally but I believe that these feelings and inclinations have to be somewhat cultivated in you and so there is moral worth in acting from them. I also think Mary’s motive has moral worth as she had to think about what action to take and actively choose to do the morally right thing.
Bibliography
‘Morality self and God’ an introduction to moral philosophy, lecture notes, Paul Brownsey
‘Kantian Ethics almost without Apology’ Marcia W Baron. Cornell university press 1995
‘The elements of Moral Philosophy’ fourth edition, James Rachels, McGraw-hill 2003
‘Philosophy of Religion’ a guide to the subject. H. O. Mounce Edited by Brain Davies OP. Cassell 1998
Morality, self and God handout
Pg 118, Kantian ethics almost without apology, Marcia W. Baron.
Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’ pg 462, source Marcia W. Baron.
Marcia w. Baron ‘Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology’ pg 121/122
Rachels ‘the elements of moral philosophy’ pg 64
H. O. Mounce ‘Philosophy of Region’ Edited by Brain Davies OP
Rachels ‘the elements of moral philosophy’ pg57