Alliance system prior to World War 1

An increase in security or some other form of incentive has to be present to provide the impetus for alliance formation. Security benefits from an alliance can be generally determined from the following factors:

1. The state’s alliance needs
2. The degree to which the prospective allies fulfill the needs
3. The actual terms of the alliance treaty

The economics concept of Marginal Utility is apt to describe the situation in which ‘a state would seek allies and increase alliance commitment till the last unit of allies or alliance commitment yields a marginal value equal to the marginal cost and risk.’

The table below highlights some of the costs and benefits involved in alliances.

The distribution of benefits, or the utility derived from the alliance should be commensurate to the services formed by the parties to the alliance, and should be one of complete mutuality. This concept of relative gains vis-à-vis the individual contributions prevent intra-alliance conflict. An alliance serving common interest often results in equal distribution of burden and gains, but an alliance based on complementary interests more often than not results in one sided division of benefits and unequal burden sharing.

1.5 Alliance and Interdependence

Dependence, in its totality, is the ‘amount of harm allies can do to each other by deserting the partnership or failing to live up to the expectations of support’; thus interdependence is the ‘mutual harm each can inflict on the other by withholding the support or desertion’. The interdependence in alliances is a function of several factors such as:

1. The degree of external threat from adversary
2. The degree of contribution by the ally to the deterrence
3. Availability and the cost of alternatives means of countering the threat (such as another alliance or armaments increase, or capitulation to the terms of the adversary)
4. Interdependence might also include potential ‘political dependence’ or diplomatic support expected from allies.

Interdependence may be symmetrical (equal and balanced) or asymmetrical (compelling one ally to be more dependent) and it may be high or low, thus, the least dependent ally is able to exert more control over the others. Bismarck likened the relationship between alliance partners to the relationship between the ‘horse and the rider’ , and in most cases, the state with the less pressing need for allies becomes the rider

It should also be noted that even without an alliance, some states might have ideological, strategic, and intrinsic or other such interests in coming to the military aid of another party, as proved by Russian championing of the Slavic cause. The greater such interests, the less onerous would be the task of alliance commitment. But, even in spite of the existence of such vested interests, an alliance can greatly increase transparency, reduce uncertainty and act as deterrents. It also codifies the existing interest into an agreement which is more permanent and relatively enforceable.

1.6 Alliance Management

Alliance Management refers to the ‘joint and unilateral processes by which alliance members try to keep the alliance alive and advance their own interests within it’.  Generally, alliance management is a bargaining process: in the formative stage, the potential members bargain over the terms of the alliance contract or treaty. It reflects the scope of their commitment, the levels of force contribution, the contingencies in which the alliance operates and the mandate of the alliance as well as the organizational and hierarchical structure. Later, there is bargaining over the war plans, action plans, and amount of support and mode of crisis management.

Generally, bargaining power in alliances is a product of three factors:

2. The allies’ dependence on the alliance; which is the function of net advantage from the alliance derived from the alliance vis-à-vis the alternatives or the opportunity cost. Benefits are net due to the offsetting for the costs of one’s own commitment to the allies.
3. The allies’ commitment to the alliance: commitment is the physical act or moves that forecloses all other options save one and is often expressed in degrees. These include the verbal promise and the alliance contract as well as the interest in aiding the ally without an alliance.
4. The allies’ comparative interest in the object of bargaining.

If the alliance was created over an existing convergence of interest, the alliance management process would be less strenuous, because the partners have a vested interest in the security of their allies. Otherwise, the level of accommodation is based on the value of the alliance and the terms of the alliance contract. If the interests are divergent, and yet and alliance has been formed, there has to be constant reassurance of the fidelity of the partners, expressed in the form of meetings, joint planning and military exercise. Over time, this would compel the states to create an interest even if such an interest did not exist prior to the alliance.

The operation of an alliance can be successful only if the common interest is translated into a common policy and directive, which can be exercised. For an alliance to have operational status there must be consensual agreement on the policies as well as measures and general objectives of the alliance. 

Alliance management is also concerned with Casus Foederis or the scope of the commitment undertaken by the alliance. As discussed above, this reflects the configuration of the power within the alliance and the hierarchy within the alliance. Though an alliance might stress equality among partners, this is rarely so, especially given the alliances between weak and great powers.

Ultimately, within or without the scope of the Casus Foederis, states would act according to their national interest. Thus, if the alliance has been able to create greater alliance cohesion through harmonizing the divergent interests of the various allies, external threats would create greater cohesion because each ally would want to show solidarity, thus creating a synergetic effect. But, if the process of bargaining has been lopsided, and the resultant alliance has been an exercise in appearances only, then the presence of an external threat would create cleavages within the alliance. This adage is proved by the Italian experience in the Triple Alliance; given the divergent needs of Italy and Germany and the enmity between Italy and Austria; alliance cohesion was weak. When the threat of a battle against Britain and France loomed, Italy realigned with the Triple Entente.

1.7 Ideology & Alliance Formation

Alliances based on common ideology also provide some form of interest collusion, and the Treaty of the Holy Alliance of 1815 is a good example of such an alliance, as well as the temporary alliances formed during the Crusades. Such alliances use the common ideological commitments to harness the alliance forming tendencies, but in reality, they provide less in terms of alliance cohesion, and can in retrospect, weaken the alliance by raising expectation and obscuring the extent of interest collusion and alliance cohesion.

 It is only when such ideological commitments serve as the backdrop for an alliance based on actual material needs and common interests that they act as binding glue. The greater the identical and complementary interest, the less friction it would create, and the ideological basis could act as a lubricant to move along the alliance formation process.

2. Alliances in Europe Prior to World War I

This section of the paper would address the formation and operation of alliances in Europe prior to the World War I, in light of the theoretical framework given above. Alliances were sought mainly for security reasons, and they were more often than not, the designs of Prussia, under the aegis of Bismarck.

The events in Europe were in a very tenuous situation. The Congress of Vienna, convened after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, had put a check on French aspirations for continental supremacy. The German Federation or the Diet was instituted with more than 300 separate states, and Metternich, the Austrian Prime Minister kept Prussia from usurping the position of the most powerful German state. Revolution was spreading like wildfire in all the European states, and the newer generation, free from the memories of war, was calling for greater democracy and greater liberty.

Under Bismarck, Prussia had entered into alliances with Russia and France, thus isolating Austria. Through a series of very astute political machinations and use of the advanced Prussian military, Prussia managed to oust Austria from the German Federation, and declare a unified Germany. Thus, in this moment of crowning glory, Bismarck declares Germany to be a ‘satiated state’, partly to ease the suspicion among the European rulers about the threat of increasing Pan Germanism, and partly to quell the blood lust that had gripped the German populace.

It was at this point that Germany, as an independent and sovereign state, started to pursue a coherent foreign policy which was designed to foster alliances in order to retain its hegemonic role in Europe and also to ensure its survival. The German unification had been an embarrassment to Austria, and it represented a challenge to the other continental powers of Europe, most notably France. France had had to cede the Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in the Franco Prussian War of 1870, and was resentful and suspicious of Germany, and tried to counter the growing powers of Germany.

The structural constraints on the system prevented England and Russia from forming an alliance, because they were the more powerful states in the system. In addition, they had a clash of interest over the Balkans and the Bosporus Straits. Similarly, France and Germany had such a clash over the Alsace Lorraine, but there was close ties between Austria and Germany, due to the Germanic traditions. Traditional ties and kinship bonds existed between Russia and Germany. Austria and Russia were at loggerheads over the Balkans and Russian championing of the Slavic movement, which was opposed by Austria. Colonial clashes existed between England and France over Egypt and North African regions.

3. German Alliance Formation

1. The League of the Three Emperors (Dreikaiserbund) 1872, 1881

1. First Dreikaiserbund

With the above environment as the backdrop of European politics, Germany sought to make alliances with Austria and Russia, and the Three Emperors League was formed in 1872. The parties to this league were:

1. Kaiser William I of Germany,
2. Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria and,
3. Czar Alexander II of Russia.

This League was motivated by ideological as well as material interests. European politics was undergoing a fundamental change, and there was a growing trend for more liberal forms of governance in the form of Republics. France and England were pursuing such forms of government, while the more conservative regimes in Germany, Russia and Austria resisted such changes.

The League of Three Emperors was designed to resist the spread of Republicanism and also to help the allied parties to quell the threat of revolutionary socialist movements, (the head of which was Karl Marx in London), and was a growing menace in Europe. This common ideological interest in favor of monarchical rule served to cement the relationship of the powers in the League.

Added to the above ideological interest was the material and identical interest of preserving the territorial status quo on Continental Europe. In effect, the league agreed to recognize and uphold the territorial configuration in Europe, which legitimized the claims to some disputed areas, and also negated the threat of the allied partners acting in a subversive manner to promote fissiparous tendencies in each others’ sphere of influence. The League was in effect a ‘guarantee against coalitions; and guaranteed the signatories security against an adversary coalition led by their chief opponents.

The German interests in forming the alliance were in preventing a conflict between Russia and Austria, and thus prevent them from turning toward France for alliance. By precluding France, Germany was also able to deter the French threat, minimize the threat of a two fronted war, and legitimize the German claim over Alsace Lorraine. By stating the ‘monarchy clause’ Germany had prevented any European monarchy forming an alliance with France, thereby preventing a consolidation of French power Austria was interested in the alliance partly due to fear of Russia, and by joining the alliance, she hoped to direct Russian antagonism away from herself. Russia joined the alliance as a means of exerting control over Germany and Austria, especially when the Three Emperors’ League was resurrected in 1881 soon after the Dual Alliance.

The League operated on a purely consultative basis, and the leader agreed to consult each other in case of a European conflict or any such international difficulties. The League was very short lived, and following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Russia grew disenchanted with Germany and with Bismarck in particular. Additionally, there was increased tension between Russia and Austria for control of the Balkans, and the league was not able to iron out the differences, and the League lapsed.

2. Second Dreikaiserbund

The league was resurrected in 1881 by Bismarck who concluded a secret pact with Russia without the knowledge of Austria. The Germany had to make a hard choice to leave out Russia and resort to an alliance with Austria, but by 1881, the situation in Russia had opened up the opportunity for Germany to pursue a revival of the lapsed Three Emperors’ League. Czar Alexander III has ascended the throne; after the assassination of his father, and he was hard pressed with revolutionary uprisings. The old ideological interests were rekindled, and a new alliance was considered to be beneficial to Russia, especially given the promise of unified action against socialist uprisings.

        There was also a feeling in Russia that they should be more Russian than Slav, and the quest for emancipation of the brethren in the Balkans were compromised for a security alliance with Austria and Germany. In addition, Russia wanted to preclude the chances of an alliance which included Austria, Germany and England, which would have significantly challenged its control in the Balkans. In addition, the presence of the Dual Alliance was also a chief motive for Russia, which highlights the anomaly that even strong states might opt to band wagon with a powerful alliance.

The Germans did not have a particular interest in the Balkans, but a reinstitution of the League allowed Germany to keep a check on the power of Austria, which she still regarded as a potential adversary, as well as Russia, which might have capitulated towards France or England. Even though the Three Emperors’ League ensured an allegiance among the most powerful continental powers in Europe, Germany still had to completely isolate France and deny her any allies.

The change in Austrian policy came after the Liberals, under Gladstone came to power in Great Britain and England and Russia had brokered a deal over the control of Turkey, and when Austria realized that she could no longer rely on English support to deter Russians in the Balkans. This greatly reduced the bargaining power of Austria within the alliance and made her more compliant with German leadership.

3. Terms of the Alliance

The more salient terms of the alliance were:

• Maintenance of benevolent neutrality and efforts to localize the conflict (by all signatories) should any one signatory be engaged in a war with a Fourth Power.
• Russia agreed to recognize and honor the potential Austrian suzerainty over parts of Balkan (Bosnia & Herzegovina) as per the Treaty of Berlin.

The Treaty was signed for a period of three years, and the specifics were to be kept secret. The outcome of this Treaty was a ‘brokered’ and uneasy peace between Austria and Russia over the fate of the Balkans.

3.2 Dual Alliance – 1879

The Dual Alliance was forged between Austria and Germany soon after the failure of the first Dreikaiserbund, and when Russia had started displaying greater bellicosity towards Germany.

1. Berlin Congress and Bismarck as a Broker of Peace

The growing power of Russia in the Balkans following the Treaty of San Stefano after the Russo-Turkish war of 1878-1879 was a matter of grave concern for the European leaders. Because all European states recognized Germany to be least interested in the Balkans, Bismarck was appointed as a broker; where upon he proceeded to remove several concessions which had been given to Russia after the Treaty of San Stefano. Bismarck maintained that he had maintained peace in Europe within the limits of what was possible, but Russia felt cheated.

Another reason for Russian disenchantment was the fact Czar Alexander II had come to aid of his uncle William I of Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War, but the assistance had not been reciprocated despite vociferous claims of support.

2. Interests and Rationale

Given a choice between an alliance and with Russia and Austria, Germany allied herself with Austria. Germany, despite being powerful, might not have been able to withstand the might of the Russian empire, and by allying with Austria, she was assured that she had a strong enough ally to balance out Russian power, but not be subsumed by Austria. Russia did not need an alliance with either Germany or France, but Austria was militarily weaker, and hence more dependable on the Germans.

In addition, Germany had a strategic interest in maintaining the security of Austria, with or without an alliance, thus, the cost of the alliance did not appear to be too great for Germany. On the other hand, it would have been catastrophic if Austria had succumbed to Russia and band- wagoned or turned towards France. Because the first Three Emperors’ League had been already lapsed when this alliance was negotiated, Germany also hoped to draw Russia towards the German camp, thereby maintaining peace between Austria and Russia.

There were other complementary interests to Germany, including the opening up of the Danube River Valley for German trade. There were the ‘organic’ racial ties which existed between the two Germanic states, and this also helped the alliance formation. It was also hoped that England would tacitly side with Germany, given the convergence of interest England had with Austria over the Russian containment in the Balkans.

Austrian interest lay in precluding Russian alliance formation, having some control over the German use of power, ‘extended deterrence’ or precluding Russia from allying with France. The biggest drawback of the alliance was that, whereas Austria did not have a strategic interest in the security of Germany, she was forced to accommodate such an interest. But, it was reasoned out that Germany was unlikely to become more bellicose and reckless just because its power had been slightly augmented by an Austro-German alliance.

3. Alliance Formation

Germany wanted to create a general defensive alliance, but Austria was opposed to it because if she was forced to side with Germany against France, it might weaken Austrian ties with England. Austria suggested, instead, a defensive alliance against Russia only. Austria had more to gain in such a situation, because she had an interest in deterring Russia with or without an alliance. An alliance against Russia was not welcome by the Kaiser, given the kinship ties. The final compromise was that:

• Each contracting party would support the each other militarily till the end of the war if either party was attacked by Russia (and by Russia and a third power) (Article I)
• Each agreed to remain neutral of the other was attacked by another power other than Russia

The Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria was signed on the 7th of October 1879, for a period of five years, and this alliance remained in effect until it was defeated in World War I.

4. Dependence

Initially, Austria had been the more dependant partner, due to its conflict with the Russians over the Balkans. But, the balance began to shift slowly, and by 1900, Germany virtually had no alliance partners. Because Germany had a strategic interest in the defense of Austria, Austrian commitment to the alliance was weak, and there was fear of defection. The period of Russian Austrian entente in 1897, as well as the Mediterranean Agreement with Italy and England heightened the fear of political alienation of Germany, thus Germany began to be more committed to the Austrian campaign in the Balkans. The ‘blank check’ issued by Kaiser Wilhelm II sanctioning full mobilization in support of Austrian invasion of Serbia after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand showed the way the balance had tilted.

3.3 Triple Alliance

        Even though Germany had been on hostile terms with France since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and the invasion of Alsace Lorraine, the royalty and diplomats of continental Europe were too enmeshed into one integral block that they did not remain free from each others’ pressures. Using delicate political maneuvering, Bismarck had encouraged France to seek continents in the nether regions of the world, and to expand their empire outwards like the English and the Spanish.

        The French desire for colonial expansion put them on a collision course with Italy because the French invasion of Tunis in 1881 put a damper on the Italian designs to build a colonial empire in Africa. The ensuing animosity between France and Italy was exploited by Germany to further isolate France by making Italy part of the German alliance structure.

1. Terms of the Alliance        

The Triple Alliance was signed on the 20th of May 1882, with Italy, Germany and Austria as partners. The security implications of this alliance were:

• No signatory could enter into an alliance which was hostile to the existing Triple Alliance and the signatory states (Article I)
• If Italy was to be attacked by France, the other parties would come to the aid of Italy (Article II), and Italy should come to the aid of Germany should she be attacked by France
• If Germany or Italy was to attack France, each would aid the other, with full force.
• If Austria was attacked by Russia, Italy would remain neutral, but if Italy was attacked by France, Austria would aid Italy with full force
• If any signatory was attacked by a combination of two or more powers, the other signatories would come to the aid with full force. Casus Foederis (Article III)
• Any sort of peace agreement, armistice or treaty resulting from war should be consulted among the signatories before the members commit themselves.
• The present Treaty would not, under any circumstances, operate against the British Empire

The Treaty was signed for a period of five years, and the signatories were instructed to keep secret about the specific contents of the Treaty. The direct implication of this Treaty was that it created further division between the powers of Europe, and created more suspicion. The Treaty was one way Austria ensured security against a possible war with Russia on the Balkans issue, and Germany cleared one more hurdle in the political alienation of France.

2. Alliance Management

The Italian commitment to a Treaty with Austria was dubious given the disruptive role Austria had played to prevent Italian unification, and the fact that there was a general feeling of Italian irredentism about the population living in the Austrian regions of Trentino and Istria. When Italy approached Germany with a desire for an alliance, the Italians were made to realize that the door to any alliance with Germany lay in Vienna. Thus, Italy was forced to reconcile with Austria, but old animosity proved to be greater than fleeting and temporary allegiances. Austria, likewise, were wary of Italian commitment, and refused to grant them concessions and increase alliance commitment than what had been agreed on.

Additionally, the Italian rationale centered on the threat of a war with France, while Russia was the main focus of Austria. If Austria was to declare war on France, to come to the aid of Italy, it might pave the way for a Franco-Russian alliance to open up an additional theater in the Balkans. Italy had desired the Alliance to be a defensive one, but Germany and Austria were already on war footings.

Furthermore, Italy did not want the treaty to work against Britain, because there was a tacit understanding between Italy and the British Empire regarding passage across the Mediterranean. British wanted to have a short and easy passage to her colonies in Africa and Asia, and Italy was surrounded by the Mediterranean, thus, Italy could not afford to have strained relations with Britain.

For such reasons, Italian commitment to the Triple Alliance was quite low, and she had forged a secret agreement between her and France. This was also one of the reasons why Italy defected from the Triple Alliance camp. The alliance was extended to include Rumania in 1893.

The Triple Alliance was renewed in 1912, and the nature of the alliance was offensive. Germany, no longer the preponderant power by then, was being dragged into the Balkans crisis by Austria, and Italy was hard pressed for a choice between loyalty to the Triple Alliance and its own security in the Mediterranean. To maintain the façade of solidarity, Germany granted several concessions to Italy in the periodic renewals, and increased alliance commitment by supporting Italy in the North African campaign against France.

The hollowness of the Italian commitment to the alliance was displayed when Italy announced a foreign policy that was ‘loyal to the heart of the Triple Alliance, we [Italy] shall maintain the traditions of intimacy with England and our [Italy’s] honest friendship with France’. The German Kaiser remarked that ‘one cannot serve two masters at once’, but this was what Italy intended to do for some time, as she forged alliances with both England and Russia, which were contrary to the interest of the Triple Alliance.

When alliance cohesion was weak, and loyalty was dubious, the threat of a war with England and France, and the threat to the peace of the Mediterranean was enough to make Italy forsake the alliance and choose national security, which again harks back to Realist notion of national interest.

3.4 Re Insurance Treaty 1887

        The rivalry over the fate and control of the Balkans turned out to be the albatross around the neck of the Three Emperors’ League, and the Germany recognized that it could not maintain the league indefinitely. After the Berlin Congress and the Dual Alliance in 1879, Russian gravitations towards France had been ferreted out by the political feelers of Germany, thus, in order to preclude an alliance between France and Russia, Germany allied with Russia.

        The Re Insurance Treaty was concluded between Germany and Russia with the intention of creating a security arrangement outside the lapsed Three Emperors’ League, which also give evidence of the mistrust existing between the members.

        For the Germans, this Treaty served as a means of keeping the Russians under check and away from France, while for the Russians, this Treaty served as a means of undermining the security of the Austrians in the Balkans.

The central issue to the Russo-Austrian clash was over the Balkans, and Russia wanted the assurance of Germany that it would not act in cohorts with Austria to undermine the Russian might. Though this treaty was contrary to the Dual Alliance, Germany placed much value in an alliance with Russia.        

1. Alliance Formation

The terms of this treaty were:

• Both contracting parties had to observe ‘benevolent neutrality’ if the other was attacked by a third party: except if Germany was attacked by France and Russia by Austria.

The Treaty, like all the other pacts that were enacted during the time of Bismarck, had his personal guarantee and assurance. After the Treaty had lapsed in 1890, the Russian were interested in renewing the treaty, but Kaiser William II, who had succeeded his father Kaiser William I, felt that his personal relationship with the Czar of Russia was enough to ensure Russian loyalty to the Germans and would also prevent Russia from allying with France.

The specifics of this treaty had been kept a secret, and they were leaked by Bismarck, who by then had been forced to resign. The successors of Bismarck did not have the political dexterity to juggle the contradictory Austrian and Russian interests and still maintain alliance cohesion. The announcement of the contents of the Treaty, after it has appeared in the German paper Hamburger Nachrichten, caused such a furor in the German.

2. Failure of the Re Insurance Treaty

Another reason for the collapse of this alliance was the increasing expansion of the Germans under Kaiser William II. He did not believe that Germany was a satiated state, and wanted to acquire more land and colonies, thus he initiated his policy of Drang Nach Osten (Drive to the East).

Germany was driving in to the Balkans and the Middle East with a resolute single-mindedness that it caused a shock to the other European powers. She had also supported the Austrian expansion in the Balkans, contrary to the interests of the Russians, and through these rash and ill advised policies, managed to create a rift between Russia and drive Russia towards France and Britain.

Another reason for the failure of the Russo-German alliance was the refusal of the German financers to honor Russian Imperial Bonds. Russia had been borrowing from the Berlin Stock Exchange to finance several industrial projects, and after some time, the consortium refused to lend additional money to Russia, and also refused to float the Imperial bonds. Without the finance needed, a lot of industrial and economic activities in Russia came to a standstill. This may have been one of the gravest mistakes committed by Bismarck, under the influences of the Coalition of the Iron and Rye in Germany.

The only other financial center on continental Europe which could raise the required amounts was in Paris. The French investors were keen on investing in Russia, and this rapidly improved the Russo-French relations.

4. End of French Isolation

The German alliances, when presented in a chronological order would be as follows:

• The Three Emperors’ League 1871
• The Dual Alliance (Austro-Germany)        1879
• 2nd Three Emperors’ League – 1881
• Triple Alliance 1882
• Re Insurance Treaty - 1887

German alliance formation had been done with the intent of isolating France, thus, by maintaining relative peace between Austria and Russia over the Balkans through the Three Emperors’ League, Germany had managed to preclude the possibility of an alliance with France. Logic supports the notion that a hostile Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany should have resulted in a Franco-Prussian alliance soon after, but the political mastery of Bismarck prevented such an occurrence.

In addition, the ideological differences between France and Russia, as well as the kinship between Kaiser William II and Czar Nicholas prevented Russia from allying with France. Added to that was the fact that France did not want to antagonize England by allying with its adversary in the Balkans: Russia; and neither did Russia have any interest in Alsace Lorraine.

Following the death of Kaiser William, and after the signing of the Mediterranean Treaty between Austria, England and Italy, the conditions were right for a Franco Russian alliance. Kaiser Wilhelm failed to refuse the Re Insurance Treaty, and the British began to hard-line the French in Egypt, thus both Russia and France needed allies.

4.1 Franco-Russian Alliance

        The Russians now turned their interest towards the French, thus it ended the diplomatic isolation of France, for which Bismarck had worked so hard. By all means, it was a belated response to the Dual Alliance. There was also the fear that England was moving closer to the Triple Alliance, which would result in an agglomeration of power, which would threaten peace on the continent. Thus, preclusion was also a motive.

Despite the differences of ideology which existed between France and Russia (Russia was an absolute monarchy while France was a republic); a treaty was enacted in 1892. This goes to prove that ideological differences can be overlooked and ignored so long as there is identical interest and identical concerns which promote interest collusion and alliance cohesion. Both countries had a strategic interest in balancing the power of German led coalition, and both had particular interests that were not contradictory, but which could be favorably affected by an alliance.

1. Alliance Formation

Ties were first forged by the military leaders like General Mouton de Boisedeffre and General Obruchev, and after several rounds of alliance bargaining, the terms of the alliance were agreed upon.  The terms of this alliance were:

• If France should be attacked by Germany, or Italy aided by Germany, Russia should use all available military means to attack Germany. The same held if Russia was attacked by Austria or an Austro-German combination (Article I)
• If there was any mobilization on the part of the Triple Alliance, Russia and France shall immediately mobilize their troops, and take positions close to the borders (Article II)
• The alliance would be in operation as long as the Triple Alliance.

Additionally, the treaty also implied that France and Russia would not broker a peace settlement outside of the Treaty, and there would be cooperation between the military general staff of both countries.

This alliance serves as a perfect example of an alliance created to deter a specific threat, of a possible German attack on France, or a combination of Triple Alliance attacking Russia and France. The ultimate aim of this treaty was to commit more than 1,000,000 French troops and 700,000 – 800,000 Russian troops with speed so as to engage Germany in a two fronted war.

2. Alliance Cohesion and Dependence

Alliance cohesion proved to be difficult at first. France wanted the Russian support for their colonial projects in Africa, while Russia wanted to interest France in the Balkans issue. This divergence of interest was further widened by statesmen on both sides who were slow to realize the importance of the alliance.

France was the more dependent partner, and thus, was more concerned about Russian abandonment. As a result, France increased the alliance casus foederis in 1899, 1901, 1902 and 1912, the latest being right after the Russo German talks at Postdam in 1910. France was worried about the effects of her lack of support for the Russians in the Bosnian crisis, and this was proved right when Russia repaid in kind during the Fashoda Crisis, in which the Russians withheld their support and forced France to make more concessions to Germany.

By 1911, there was more talk of alliance cohesion. There had been a change of guard, and the policies became more offensive in nature. The growing might of the Triple Alliance and the seething tension in the Balkans made war inevitable, and the alliance was preparing for a war. The leaders had been tried and tested, and they knew the extent of the allies’ capabilities.

5. Entente’ Cordial and Anglo-Russian Entente’

Balance of Power or the reconfiguration of the European power system was the ultimate and unconscious aim of the Triple Entente bloc. The Balance of Power of the Central powers in Europe had been eroded after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, and the unification of Germany put her in a preponderant position. The alliances she forged with Italy, Austria and Russia allowed her to become more despotic and more adventurous.

The British and the French had been left out of the alliances being formed on the continental Europe. France was excluded due to the political machinations of Bismarck, but England chose to stay out and focus on her growing colonial empire. She did not want to get involved in the continental European matters, and did not want any of her colonial interests to suffer due to a clash of interest over alliance formation in Europe.

The colonial clashes in places like China and Turkey were the triggers that prompted the British to end their delusional splendid isolation and get immersed in the peace of continental Europe. The Boer was another wake up call for the British, who had been lulled into a sense of complacency about their control over the colonies. The war proved that British military presence was over leveraged, and she needed allies to keep control and prevent depredation on her empire.

1. End of British Isolation

England was no longer the preponderant empire it had been. Growing power of the Triple Alliance and the Franco Russian alliance stalemated politics on Europe, and challenged the power of Britain. These alliances also turned into expansionist empires, putting them on a collision course with Britain. France and Russia had had open hostilities with Britain over control of the Balkans and colonies respectively, and she had more enemies than she could contend with.

Thus, both the Anglo-Russian Entente and the Anglo-French Entente served as a means for England to negotiate pacific means of conflict resolution over the particular interest France and Russia had in common in the Balkans and in the colonial empires. The strategic motive for all three states in the Entente bloc was that they could balance the power of Germany led Triple Alliance.

The other reason why Britain chose to end her splendid isolation was that there was a growing preponderance of German and allied powers of the Triple Alliance and it threatened the sovereignty of the other Free states. Security on the continental Europe, according to the British beliefs, lay in the independence and vitality of the several powerful states, and when this multitude came under threat from the hegemonic designs of Germany, she had to intervene.

2. Anglo-German Alliance Attempts

Under Bismarck, Germany had been cautious to keep Britain under check, and regarded her as ‘the most traditional and closest ally’. This was one way of pacifying the British sentiments without them being rebuffed about diminished influence in Europe. England and Germany had tried at alliance brokering, but the absence of strategic interest as well as particular interests and conflicts prevented them from being fruitful.

Under Kaiser William II, Germany had embarked on an ambitious maritime venture, and Germany started to amass a huge navy to rival the British supremacy of the waves. The naval arms race between Germany and Britain was also compounded by the colonial desires and expansionist policies adopted by the Kaiser, and the British felt that her supreme position would be challenged by German increase in naval power.

3. English Alliances

Prior to forging alliances on continental Europe, Britain had signed an alliance with Japan in 1902, designed to keep the Soviet expansion in the East under check. The signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was momentous in the sense that it signaled the end of English isolation and marked the beginning of the English effort to forge alliances.

After the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was forged, Britain still wanted to form an alliance with a powerful European state. France seemed the most likely candidate. They both wanted to balance out the power of Germany and Austria, and also had a common threat perception about Germany; France feared German invasion and Britain wanted to prevent colonial clash and the naval arms race and retain the greater peace in continental Europe. There was the convergence of interest about colonial matters like the Moroccan crisis, and also the fear that if Germany was to invade France, the English Channel might be too narrow to stop Germany from invading England.

By definition, an Entente is ‘an explicit pledge of mutual assistance and agreement that tacitly raise expectations of mutual support by reducing the amount of conflict between the parties’. An entente involves conflict reduction, and given the presence of such conflicts between the England and France as well as England and Russia, Entente seemed to be the most obvious choice.

As regards Russia, the new Entente Cordial between France and Britain and the old Franco Russian Treaty allowed for a more ready convergence of interest, and France acted as the go between in forming the Anglo Russian entente. The Franco-Russian dual alliance, and Anglo Russian entente and the Anglo-French Entente enabled the powers concerned to create a war camp of the Entente powers.

The Entente Cordial and the Anglo-Russian Entente were not security alliances, but the nature of this arrangement were defensive and designed to prevent the expansion of German influence and militarism. But, even though they were not security alliances, the nations concerned were engaged in preparing for a war which they believed was inevitable. Mass conscription, mass production of armaments and nationwide mobilization was going on, and a continent which had been largely demilitarized after the Napoleonic trysts was armed to the teeth.

2. Analysis of Alliances on Europe prior to World War I

The state of affairs on continental Europe at the time was a microcosm of the greater international insecurity and thus, alliances were forged with greater alacrity. But, one of the most obvious contradictions of these alliances was that the states were very often on the wrong side of the alliance blocs. States paired into alliances without any apparent conflict, as the British and Russian pairing against Germany, and the Austrian and German pairing against England proves. This might be an aberration due to the use of alliances as ‘extended deterrence’.

The alliances also prove the Realist adage of Balance of Power to be true. The systemic anarchy created the insecurity that galvanized alliances initially. When threat of preponderance grew, the states allied to restore the balance. Another characteristic of the European system showed that it is possible for a single state, albeit, a man (Bismarck) to effectively ‘beat the system’ as he did by preventing Russia from forming an alliance with France. One reason was his astute political mastery; the other was the lack of information because the alliance terms were kept secret. Thus, alliances reduced systematic uncertainty between allies, and increased it among adversaries who did not know whether the alliance was aimed at them or not.

The alliances also prove that alliance maintenance is as important as the initial formation. No state wanted to be on a minority side, and thus, the less dependable partner(s) were able to extricate greater concessions from the needy allies. It also showed the transition of the international system, from a loose multipolar one to a rigid bi polar system. By 1910, the alliance blocs were rigidly demarcated into the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

Were the alliances the cause of World War I? Some might be inclined to think so, especially given the evidence of inertia and the pull of alliance politics. Could war have been averted if Bismarck remained? Nationalism was on the rise in Europe, and the old monarchies such as Austria Hungary were on a collision course with the states in the Balkan regions. The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand was a pretext. The ‘sick old man’ of Europe has been too sick; for too long, and the fringes of the empire were open for depredation. Russia was interested in the Slavic brethrens’ desire for freedom, as well as the strategic access to the Straits.

Alliance politics might have been the reason why peace was maintained in Europe till it broke down in 1914. But, it was definitely the reason why the whole of Europe went to war when Austria attacked Serbia. Thus, in attempting to prevent a war, it paved the way for a war of colossal proportions.

Conclusion

Lord Castlereagh defined Balance of Power as ‘the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any one of them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest’, and the various theories of alliance politics highlight the need for the states to balance out against a preponderance of power, an ominous threat or the need to augment one’s insufficient power. The politics of pre world war I Europe highlight these several dimensions of alliance politics.

The alliance politics and diplomacy of Pre World War I, to a very large extent, was shaped by Bismarck and the conservative old guard. The diplomacy of Bismarck might have prevented the outbreak of World War I, but it was bound to erupt sooner or later. Bismarck gave a very apt example of the European state of affairs when he likened it to a chess board with only five pieces. Within such a system, a tri-power agglomeration was the most favorable position any state wanted to be, thus, there had to be a scramble for alliances.

Did the alliances lead to war? No. But it was symptomatic of the greater insecurity in Europe. Bismarck predicted war to come from Eastern Europe, and rightly so, for there was too much friction that any lasting solution was impossible without a war. The fact that the Central Powers got mired into the Balkans issue only served to escalate the situation and make possible a greater war.

Lastly, from 1871 till 1914, international relations on Europe were in a protracted state, with a vertiginous inertia and break neck speed. Alliances were coming up overnight, and old enemies at day break returned as new friends at dusk. Such a heady state of affairs could not have lasted for long without a serious backlash. The backlash needed only a trigger to erupt into a wildfire, and when Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated, the fire grew to consume the whole of Europe.

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