Argentina's Dirty War

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the armed left had originated from the Peronist movement, although there were other factions, which had a Maoist cast.  Naturally, the Che Guevara was highly regarded by them.  Although the Montoneros was the largest of the opposing organizations, the Maoist-inflected People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) and People’s Armed Force (FAP) were seriously active as well.

The United States and the National Security Doctrine

        In 1959, Fidel Castro’s rise to power was a source of much concern to Latin American conservatives and moderates alike.  A year later, Argentina implemented the Plan for Civil Insurrection Against the State (CONINTES).  This plan was not only aimed at terrorists, but also anyone who identified with or assisted in concealing them.  Therefore, lead by a senior officer, the country was split up into military zones.

        As was to be expected, Washington was not welcoming to Fidel Castro, since he was perceived as a possible weapon of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.  The United States was resolute in its objective to keep South America on its side.  In 1963, Defense Secretary Robert MacNamara, addressed the United States’ Congress by asserting that,

                “Our best return on investment in military aid probably comes from

                the training of selected Army forces and key specialists in our military academies

                and training centers in the United States and abroad.  These students are

                carefully selected by their  countries so that they, in turn, become instructors

                when they go home.  They are the leaders of the future…I don’t need to dwell

                on the value of having people in positions of power who have a first hand

                knowledge of how we think and act here in the United States.  For us having

                these people as friends is invaluable…”  

        The National Security Doctrine became the political foundation of the military juntas.  Since the rule of right-wing General Ongania, soldiers were being methodically trained regarding the threat posed by anyone who did not remain associated to  the military and Christian values  that protected the world against communism.  As many others, Ongania was considerably biased by the United States counterinsurgency courses and lectures that had promoted the doctrine all over South America.

        This National Security Doctrine was comprised of a sketchy set of concepts and its “cohesive power restive in its definition of the ‘enemy’, as communism”.  A remnant of the Cold War, it was created in order to guard the economic power of the United States in South America.  United States’ trepidation about “another Cuba drove their efforts to train Latin America against Marxism.  This dogma held that a “third world war” was in peril between the “free world” and Communism.  Commander of the Third Army Corps expanded on this further, by saying:

                “On one side were the subversives that wanted to destroy the national state

                to convert it into a Communist state, a satellite in the red orbit, and on the

                other side, us, the legal forces, which by the authority of two decrees of the

                then ‘constitutional power’, participated in that struggle.”

        The internal foe was more dangerous than those out of the country, however, because it endangered the basic Christian and Western ideals of the Argentinean society.  The role of the armed forces was to protect Argentina’s “ideological purity”.

        The government started to intercede in other nation’s internal matters and joined the Southern Cone’s military dictatorships in combating “subversion”.  Eventually, this model was “exported” to other countries—such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras—where the Argentine actively trained soldiers on repressive techniques against insurgency, as well.  In order to synchronize military activities in these nations, General Viola, proposed the doctrine of Seguridad Continental (National Security).  This created a actual secretive system for the repression.  Political refugees from Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia were warned that they would be deported, if they jeopardized, in any way, the national security of the country.  Acknowledging the hazard the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) issued a global plea to assist in relocating the refugees elsewhere.

        According to the belief of the armed forces, the worldwide tactic of Communism now required that the state responded with a wide-reaching international approach.  The predictability of a third world war systematically conditioned the minds of the officers and soldiers running the day-to-day operations.  Thus, allowing them to “justifiably” exercise the gruesome methods of repression that were being requested of them from the juntas in power.

        In his personal account on his kidnapping and subsequent detention, Timerman, editior of La Opinion, discusses what he would overhear from the officers, at he detention center where he was kept:

                “…attendance to weekly courses given by the army on such war, was

                obligatory for the entire staff of torturers, interrogators, and kidnappers.

                The massage conveyed by this academy was simple: Communism needed

                To be stopped, and Nazi tactics and methods were the only effective tools

                For fighting the subversion”

        

        Since Argentina’s labor movement was the foundation of the Peronista Party, workers from the trade union was one the main targets of this campaign.  Any demands for social or economic change coming from these groups, were interpreted as the inner workings of a communist scheme.

        Therefore, Finance Minister Martinez de Oz (who was also president of Acindar—one of three steel industries--subsidiary of U.S. Steel, member of ITT and Pan Am Airway board of Directors) instituted economic strategies that disenfranchised these particular employees.  Oz voided progressive labor regulation, froze salaries and increased the wages of officers of the military.  As a result, international investment sector was favored at the cost of the national industry.  In the meantime, the large credit lines extended by foreign banks and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) supported the economy.  However, this period known as plata dulce (“sweet money”) wouldn’t last for long.  As put by journalist I. Guest:

                “Down came the barriers, up went the peso and in came the loans, again”

Influences in Counterinsurgency Instruction

        In 1951, the United States Defense Department established its Military Assistance Program, in accordance to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.  The purpose of such program was to arm and coach South American armed forces.  The Inter-American Defense College in Washington was a highly regarded center, in the U.S., where the “hand-picked” candidates would be qualified in counterinsurgency techniques.  Another infamous location, where eligible soldiers were rewarded with this unique training, was the United States Army School of the Americas (SOA).

        The SOA was, initially, established in 1946 in Panama Canal Zone and later on moved to the state of Georgia, in the United States.  Here, fifty seven thousand Latin American soldiers were trained on blackmail, torture, bribery and murder.  The courses were financed by the United States taxpayer’s money.  Amongst the military men that were trained in this academy were Nicaraguan dictator Somoza, Panamanian drug trafficker Noriega   and Argentina’s General Galtieri.  The academies’ manuals that surfaced in recent years advised that  “hypnosis and truth” serum be utilized to induce interrogations.  Additionally, it was also recommended that parents of political prisoners be arrested in order to encourage talk.  The handbooks, which were translations from earlier American English versions, from the sixties, clearly violate today’s United States’ policy.  

        As far a military “instruction” is concerned, the United States was not the only resource of knowledge for the armed forces of Argentina.  The French who had combated subversion in Algeria and Indochina also influenced the Argentine military curricula, as well. The Chief of Police of Buenos Aires between 1976-79, General Camps, was an admirer of the French’s take on repression, moreso than the American way.  Camps, who believed that terror was a “rite of passage” and who proudly and openly, admitted his responsibility in over five thousand disappearances expanded on this point as follows:

                “France and the United States were the great disseminators of antisubversive

                doctrine.  They both., but particularly the United States, organized centers to

                instruct in the fight against subversion.  They sent advisors and teachers.

                They disturbed a huge amount of bibliography.  Unfortunately,. All of that

                Ended in failure, although it was possible to  analyze why they hadn’t triumphed…

                There was a basic difference: they were fighting outside their own territory,

                In countries of different race, a different language, different customs.  That

                Situation is totally distinct from the situation in our Latin American countries.

                It is important to clarify that the French optic was more correct than

                The North American; the former had a global concept; the latter were all but

                Exclusively military.  All that was fine until we ‘reached adulthood’ and

                Applied our own doctrine which enabled us to triumph against subversion.”

 In the fifties, a military operation from France arrived at the Escuela Superior de Guerra in Buenos Aires (National War College), in order to teach courses in “Revolutionary War”—also known as “Anti-Communist Warfare” and “Anti-subversive Warfare”.  During the 1950s and 1960s, articles written by French officers, were published in the school’s journals.   During the 1970s the Argentine students, published new works that built on the earlier French principles of torture. Many Argentine researchers have acknowledged the influence of this particular mission in the shaping and of Argentinean military tactics and strategy.  Clearly, the exchange of ideology at this College was of significant importance as it afforded the Argentine armed forces, yet added rationalization in their application of torture during their operations in the Dirty War.

Hitler and the Methodology of Repression

        The juntas in power put into action a new kind of repression in order to guard and enforce the Doctrine of National Security; however the Argentine Military did not, necessarily, invent this new methodology of terror.

        Hitler’s Night and Fog Decree was created in 1941 with the purpose of protecting the German security.  Since the public execution of their subversives, might create martyrs out of them, Hitler decided it would be wiser to make them “disappear” without a trace into the night and fog.  In Latin America, the “disappearance” tactic took hold initially, in 1966 in Guatemala amongst paramilitary factions that provided cover for the military.

        In Argentina, it was ingrained that using pervasive terror in order to protect the National Security Doctrine would prevent guerrilla groups from gaining acceptance.  

        Although there had been records of disappearances in the past, by 1976 the numbers began to swell considerably and so for every two killings, there were nine or ten vanishings without a trace.  Men and women, children, students and teachers, nuns and priests, artists and lawyers were amongst those kidnapped, tortured and killed.

        Hitler’s example was well learned amongst the military and they knew that without physical evidence it would not be easy to plan protests against the government.  Although the disappearance created panic within the society, without the bodies the regimes could not be faulted for them.  Friends and family member would not—for the most part—officially report the disappearances in fear that those responsible would retaliate in the same vein, against them, as well.  

        In order for the process to stick, however, judicial compliance was required.  With the habeas corpus unofficially suspended, it became impossible to question authorities about the missing’s whereabouts.   The newly replaced judges refused to go against the military and, therefore, rejected any writ for habeas corpus filed.  Furthermore, any attorneys representing a victim’s family in this process, could themselves become a target, by filing a request for habeas corpus also.

        The repressive system that was established was a well thought out and organized one.  It did not include random acts of terror or excesses of war, as the military would have wanted to convince the public.  A clear scheme, directed from the top down was clearly developed and carried out this methodology of terror.  The techniques and patterns of kidnappings, tortures and murders were extremely similar in far away cities from the capital, as well.  Generally, the abductions took place in the evening.  As planned in advance by the police, the area where the kidnapping would take place would be staked out and barricaded for some blocks and the electrical power interrupted.  This was known as “sealing” area.  Then, the heavily armed “task force” would move in to carry out the “secret mission”, in groups from five to fifty men.  The various branches of the military made up these task forces who were responsible for performing and alternating the tasks of kidnapping and torture.  The blindfolded and handcuffed victim/s would be thrown into the rear of an unmarked vehicle—generally Ford Falcons and military vans--and then driven to one of the three hundred and sixty clandestine detention centers that had been skillfully set up throughout the country.  According to the majority of the declarations made in the report Nunca Mas (CONADEP), the abducting brigades would ransack most of the houses of the victims in this process.

        The detention centers were set up in small isolated houses, the basement of military academies, auto repair plants, etc.  They were; generally, equipped with watchtowers, helicopter-landing pads, guard dogs and barbwire throughout their periphery.  Upon their arrival, each detainee would be registered and the responsible officers would fill out forms that were then forwarded to the Ministry of Interior and the Security Services.  For identification purposes, the officers would assign each captive a letter, followed by a number—for example: V3.  The purpose for this was two-fold: first it heightened their sense of alienation and secondly it concealed the identity of the surrounding detainees as well.  Here, men and women would be subjected to physical and mental torture in order to break down their humanity and brainwash their history, as well as their belief system.  One of the prisoners described their condition by saying:

                “The normal attitude of the torturers and guards towards us was to consider

                us less than slaves.  We were objects.  Useless, troublesome objects.  They

                would say ‘You are dirt’.  ‘Since we ‘disappeared’ you, you are nothing’. 

                ‘you don’t exist anymore’.  ‘We are everything for you…we are justice…

                …we are God’.”

        The prisoners who cooperated with the repressors during the torture sessions were rewarded with better living arrangements within the centers, or the possible reunion with a member of their family.  Much like the Nazis did, the torturers picked out those that had a certain level of responsibility within their political associations for their interrogations.  In minimum instances the captives would be permitted to leave the detention centers, temporarily, in order to visit their families.  However, during these events they would remain closely guarded and they were forewarned that they—as well as their families—would be killed if they made any efforts to escape their condition as imprisoned “subversive”.  Nevertheless, in many more instances, cooperation with the repressors did not secure their survival either.

The Role of the Catholic Church

        In Argentina, where the vast majority of the populations practice Catholicism, the influence of the Church is important.  Furthermore, since the regime portrayed itself as an advocate of “Christian values”, lack of compliance or validation from the religious groups would have posed a severe concern for the dictatorship.  The Catholic hierarchy, unfortunately became, yet another, accessory to this cruel system of repression.

        A couple of days prior to the 1976 coup d’etat  General Videla and Admiral Massera convened with ranking leaders of the CEA (Argentine Episcopal Conference).  Additionally, on March 26, when the coup took place, the junta also met with the Episcopal conference’s president Archbishop Tortolo who would, afterwards encourage the population to cooperate “positively” with the regime’s efforts.  Amongst eighty clergy men associated with this particular group, only four would, eventually, support the human rights organization.

        Some of the declarations that were made by the clergy during the years of the military description can be typified as no less than bizarre, at times. Following the initial seizure by the military regime, Bishop Bonamin said:

                “When a military man is carrying out his repressive duty, Christ has

                entered with their soul with truth and goodness”

        He further anticipated that:

                “The members of the junta will be venerated for generated to come”

        Further to this point, when the public would inquire with respect to the disappearances, Cardinal Aramburu, confirmed that the fight against the guerillas was long over.  Moreover, when human rights organizations sought out the contribution of Cardinal Pironio, with regards to this matter, he did not make himself available to any of the interviews and when Pope John Paul II arrived in Argentina in 1982, human rights organizations were unable to convene him, either.

         Within the religious community, the most powerful cohorts of the military administration were archbishop Jose Plaza and Father von Wernich.  The first one publicly sided with the regime, at any opportunity he had.  Furthermore, he was responsible for directly reporting student as “subversives” (amongst them, his own nephew), while holding the position of chief chaplain of police in Buenos Aires.  In this capacity, he regularly made his way throughout the three hundred and sixty clandestine detention centers, visiting the agonized captives.  As far as Father von Wernich is concerned, many of testimonies from kidnapped victims have linked his participation in abductions as well as torture sessions.

        Yet another controversial character within the Argentine church was Archbishop Pio Laghi. Laghi was Papal Pro-Nuncio in Buenos Aires during the dictatorship. During the administration of the regime it became know that he had accepted an invitation from the governor of Tucuman (a northern province), who was sell-know for his torturous antics.  Archbishop Laghi saw the church as part of the reorganization process and as such he would routinely visited the repression camps throughout the country providing the officers with papal blessings.  Although Laghi’s name appeared repeatedly in over 1,300 testimonies of illegally arrested victims during a 1984 investigation, the testimonies could not be “officially” corroborated and in the midst of the heated debate that followed, Alfonsin—the newly elected democratic president—jumped to his defense along with other government officials.  Upon leaving Argentina, Laghi became the Pope’s representative in Washington, D.C. until 1990.  Currently, he is a cardinal in Rome, Italy.

        Although the Argentine church took part of the repressive process and publicly defended the “reorganization” process, the junta was also responsible for persecuting those members of the church hierarchy who were assumed to identify with the progressive views of Vatican II and the 1968 conference of Medellin, since the vision of these included a community of equals.  Therefore, students of the seminary, as well as any other clergy member who worked in shantytowns, organizing peasant groups or even educating the poor were seen as “subversives” in the eyes of the regime.  While detained at one of the centers, a member of the clergy was told:

                “You aren’t a guerrilla, you are not involved in violence, but what you do

                not realized is that when you live in those shantytowns your are bringing

                people together…you are uniting the poor, and uniting the poor is subversion.”

        

        Given this, many members of the religious order also lost their lives in the hands of the repressors.  During the period of the “dirty war”, seventeen priests and two bishops were either “disappeared” or killed and over one hundred have been physically illegally arrested and tortured and then sought asylum out of the country.  Of these cases, the most notorious was that of Bishop Angelelli.  In the poor province of La Rioja, Angelelli joined himself with its subjugated indigenous inhabitants, challenging the local authorities and landowners.  In 1976 he was, supposedly, killed in a car accident.  However, during an investigation of this particular case, in 1976, the judge deemed that,

                “the bishop’s death was not due to a car accident, but rather to a coldly

                premeditated homicide, which the victim was expecting.”

        In April of 1996, Argentina’s Catholic Church publicly requested the country’s pardon for its clergy’s involvement in violence during the military dictatorships of 1976-1983.  The article released by the Argentine Episcopal Conference stated:

                “We implore pardon to God, Our Lord, for the crimes then committed,

                especially by those involving sons of the Church, whether they be enlisted

                with the revolutionary guerrillas, working for the state or members of the

                security forces.”

        Despite the sudden increase of “acts of contrition”, resentment continues to run deep amongst the Argentine, who feel that the law which forgives all but top military from prison for their “excesses” has left felons, including culpable clergy, still walking the streets.

        

Anti-Semitism and Terrorism

        Since colonial times, when the Jews and Conversos were seen as the Inquisition’s preferred objective, through the 1919 pogrom if the Tragic Week, Jews have been generally looked upon as a group of “unacculturated” foreigners, whose trustworthiness to the Argentine culture was always at issue.

        In Argentina, the infamously anti-Semitic extreme right, has often fostered the image of a “Hebraic and communistic infiltration” to the nation.  In addition, xenophobia, racism and vicious assaults from Catholic Church members have persevered in supporting this belief.

        The Argentine Nazi Party had in excess of sixty thousand members, when World War II begun.  At the last moment and unenthusiastically did Argentina declare war against Germany, in 1944.  Argentina would soon become a popular safe heaven for Nazi villains, who fit well amongst Argentina’s extensive and well-off German population. Eichmann, Mengele and many others found asylum within these communities in Argentina.

        During Ongania’s regime, the president’s brother, and chief of police Enrique Green—an infamous anti-Semite--often harassed the Jewish community.  Anti-Jewish campaigns continue to grow during the Peron’s, as well as the junta’s administrations.  Vile attacks within Jewish neighborhoods were a common occurrence.  Banks, synagogues, schools and cultural centers were routinely bombed within these areas.

        The body of doctor Ackerman was found executed in the streets of Buenos Aires in 1976, probably due to his connection in the abduction of Eichmann.  During these times, anti-Semitic books, magazines and articles circulated without restriction everywhere.  The publisher “Milicia”, openly announced that it had released a total of a half a dozen Nazi volumes, which were selling in large quantities.  Further, the following year, the American Jewish Committee was forced to close down due to the increase of intimidation tactics and terrorization against them.  The representative of the American Jewish Committee returned to the United States and declared:

                “It is apparent to us that the Argentine government has not cleansed

                itself  of subversive and anti-democratic forces within its own structure.”

        The Jewish communities’ difference in cultural and religious backgrounds, set them up as scapegoats.  The allegations against them were wide-ranging and ambiguous: they belonged to a Jewish-Bolshevik scheme, or capitalists exploiting the workers, or affiliated to a global Zionist plan.  A perception of Jews as “outsiders”, posing an economic, cultural and political threat, was the common denominator to all these assumptions.

        During the military dictatorships, anti-Semitism gained further stature amongst the torturers.  Kidnapped Jews were often interrogated about the “Andinia Plan”.  It was assumed that under such plan, the Jewish community was attempting to colonize the southern Patagonian provinces of Argentina with Jewish immigrants.  As can be expected, during the illegal imprisonments, Jews tortured were colored with additional antics.  For example, swastikas were painted on their bodies.  They were also routinely asked to raise their arm and exclaim, “I love Hitler!”  A particular type of torture aimed to Jews was the “rectoscope”.  The device was comprised of a tube containing a rat, which would be inserted in the rectum or vagina of the victims.  As the rat entered the body, it would gnaw away at the organs as it tried to find its way out.  The cruelty of the punishment was vividly conveyed in yet another guard’s testimony of a Jewish man called Chango, described in Nunca Mas:

                “He would make him wag his tail like a dog and lick his boots.  It was

                impressive how well he did it, he imitated the dog as if he really were one,

                because if he didn’t satisfy the guard, he would carry on beating him…

                Later, he would change and make him be a cat.”

Miriam Lewin de Garcia, recalls here experience while testifying before the CONADEP:

                “The general attitude was a deep rooted anti-Semitism.  On one occasion

                they asked me if I understood Yiddish.  I replied that I did not, that I only

                knew a few words.  They, nevertheless, made me listen to a cassette they

                had obtained by tapping telephones.  The speaker were, apparently, Argentine

                businessmen of Jewish origin, talking in Yiddish.  My captors were most

                interested in finding out what the conversation was about…the only good

                Jew is a dead Jew, the guards would say,”

        Marcos Aguinis, an Argentine philosopher and writer explained,

                “When the security  forces arrest a Jew, be he innocent of guilty,

                they make him suffer more insult and torture not only because

                anti-Semitism excites them, but because this anti-Semitism has

                the ‘noble’ justification to be at the service of the Western and

                Christian victory.”

        The Committee of Relatives of the Victims of Repression based in Israel estimates that the five to ten percent of Jews that disappeared during this period, certainly exceed by far, their representation within Argentina’s general population.

The Collapse of the Regime

        Towards the end of the seventies, it was becoming considerably difficult for the juntas to placate the demands of the demands of human rights organizations, as well as international inquiries on the disappearances.

        In 1979, the regime passed Law number 22, 068 with the function of wipe away the results of its operations.  The purpose of the so-called law of “presumption of death” was to declare all disappearances as death in order to mitigate any explanation requests regarding the missing’ whereabouts.  Additionally a law providing financial reparations for the families of the dead was also instituted.  This, they hoped, would conclude any debate concerning the disappearances; however the relatives as well as the human rights organizations rejected them.

        Nevertheless, it would be the defeat of the Falkland Islands and the critical financial situation that would exacerbate the crumbling of the regime.  Military spending swelled the foreign debt threefold, between 1980 and 1982.  Unemployment skyrocketed and salaries plummeted.  Through Fabricaciones Militares, the armed forces were the leading employer, responsible for producing close to three percent of the country’s GNP.  They directly took part in the antics and manipulations that were burying the country in debt.

        

        Internal rivalry amongst the various branches of the military also became intensified.  In 1981, the next regime that came to power only lasted a few months because of the friction between General Viola and General Galtieri, who would become the next official of the military in charge.  The same year, the Multipartidiaria was created.  The Peronists, Intransigents, Christian Democrats and Radicals joined forces in a movement for integration and development that would together push the negotiations for the return of a civilian power.

        The major hindrance to the junta’s administration was the war of the British Falkland Islands—know to Argentines as the Malvinas.  In an attempt to distract the public from the financial crisis and banking on the U.S. support, through the relationship with Reagan’s administration, the junta launched an attack on the southern isles.  Despite the fact that Galtieri had been key in organizing and carrying out military Nicaraguan trainings, Reagan stood by Margaret Thatcher’s side, imposing economic sanctions and assisting in providing the Great Britain with the best technology in order to win the war.  Two months after the invasion, Argentina admitted defeat in the war for the islands.

        In view that the end was near, in April of 1983 the military released the “Final document of the Military Junta on the War against Subversion and Terrorism”.  The article that grossly distorted the events of the past seven years caused outrage worldwide.  The president of Italy sent a telegram to the government declaring that such reports were “beyond human civility”.   The Pope, John Paul II also criticized the document.  Following this event, the human rights organizations called for the public protest that drew over fifty thousand demonstrators.  And months later, junta passed a law that granted amnesty for the crimes committed by the military in the past.

        As a prelude to the eminent political elections, each of the parties included in their platforms an explicit rejection of the National Security Doctrine.  Future president Alfonsin, had then vowed that, if elected, he would not compromise on human rights issues and that he would annul the law that granted such amnesty.

        In December of 1983, Alfonsin was elected president. Nevertheless, because his concern about a military backlash, he decided that only those “most responsible” for the repressive acts of the juntas would be brought to the courts for justice.  A few years later, the ex-commanders of the military regimes were publicly tried and convicted not only for the tortures, murders and robberies, but also for their crimes against humanity.  However, they kept their jobs in the police military and civilian institutions, while lower ranked officials were never even charged.

        Carlos Menem, Alfonsin’s Peronist successor, in a blatantly unconstitutional move, acquit almost every military official still facing trial for felonies perpetrated during the “dirty war” years.  Moreover, he would also pardon the ex-commanders already facing sentences and released them “in time for Christmas”.

Conclusion

        The military regimes that seized control of Argentina, in 1976, were not an exception from the usual path in the history of this country.  Although the campaigns of state sponsored terror took on unprecedented heights here, in comparison to other nations in the Southern Cone, the basis for such repression was founded in the deep social and political issues that had been bringing down the country since the third decade of the twentieth century.  Although General Videla and his cohorts, succeeded more than any other regime in institutionalizing repression, they were not responsible for initiating its practice into politics.

        The Nationalist movement, motivated by European fascism and Nazism seems to have played an important part in justifying the pervasiveness of the terrorism imposed by the juntas.  Similarly, the Doctrine of National Security, which the United States underscored through its counterinsurgency education programs, instructed that the military armed forces were responsible for securing the social order against communistic subversion.  Although General Peron gained control in a Nationalist administration and was against Communism, his plan was extremely aggressive to deep-rooted interests and had, therefore, a progressive connotation.  

Backed by the “ruling elites”, the armed forces derived from nationalism as well as the doctrine of National Security in order to restrain Peronism and ideologies from the left.  In order to cease these allegiances, the juntas did not curb its implementation of torture against the civilian populace, in the process.

The Nationalists presumed that liberalists and leftists (and also Arabs, Asians and Jews) were strangers to the “national culture”; particularly to the Argentine’s Catholic Church.  Inspired by European fights against Communism, this administration supported right wing paramilitary factions that committed torturous acts against progressive individuals and organizations.

As a recurring cycle in the history of Argentina, these old patterns emerged again under this last military regime, which described the outside demands of human rights as an anti-Argentine movement, victimized the Jewish community and unconventional groups and also initiated an exaggerated preoccupation with Marxism and Soviet insurgency.  Much like the earlier conservatives, the armed forces proclaimed it their obligation to thwart mass politics from tearing down Argentina.

        The last century has seen Argentina oscillate between civilian and military rule, but not yet really progress into a successful “age” of democratic government.  Even though the odds of achieving this seem vague in light of the recent socio-political situation of this country, the potential of putting together a rational “road map” to that future seldom have been better, given what we have unearthed in the past few years…

♦

Selected Bibliography

Bagengast, C.  (1994).  Violence, Terror and the Crisis of the State.  Annual Review of Anthropology 23: 109-136.

Bateson, G.  (1997).  Game Without End.  Oklahoma City, OK: Norman

Buchanan, P.  (1989).  State Terror as a Complement of  Economic Policy, 1976-1981.

Deutsch, S.  (1993).  The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to Present

Feitlowitz, M.  (1998).  A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Huser, H.C.  (2002).  Argentine Civil-Military Relations: From Alfonsin to Menem

Loveman, B.  (1993).  The Constitution of Tyranny:  Regimes of Exception in Spanish America.  Pittsburgh, PA:  University of Pittsburgh Press.

Osiel, M.J.  (2001)  Representations of subversion in Argentina’s Dirty War.  CA:  University of California Press

Smith, W.  (1989).  Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy

Timerman, J.  (1981).  Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number.  New York, NY: Randome House. 

Articles

200 Military officers are pardoned in Argenitna.  The New York Times, Oct. 8, 1989 v139 p12 col. 1

An Argentine court upholds convictions of five ex-leaders. The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1986 v136 p5(N) pA6(L) col. 6 

Argentina: ex dictator facing trial.  The New York Times, Sept. 28, 2001 pA10(N) pA12(L) col.5

Argentine justice trampled underfoot, again.  National Catholic Reporter, Jan. 11, 1991 v27 n11 p28.

The Influence of French “Revolutionary War” Ideology in the Use of Torture in Argentina’s Dirty War.  By Eric Stener.  Human Rights Review, April-June 2000 v1 i4 p71.

Memories of the Dirty War.  U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 14, 1991 v110 n1 p9

No Peace in the Dirty War.  Time, Jan 14, 1991 v137 n2 p32

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