Practical issues
The conflict between policy-makers, politicians and government ministers, are increasing rapidly. Both sides could solve these disagreements and understand their respective strengths and flaws if only they were able to combine occupations. It can be argued that policy makers and scientists are alike as they both have laws and regulations by which they have to abide, and can be cautious when expressing opinions without the approval of their leaders. However, there are also noticeable differences between the two groups. Rather than characterising themselves like scientists do, policy makers usually represent a government. Therefore their views are a mixture of their personal understandings as well as other, multifaceted influences.
Scientists and policy makers have dissimilar aims and objectives, attitudes toward languages, knowledge, and awareness. The way that scientists view information differs to that of policy makers. Lack of trust and admiration, different accountabilities, and whether there is or should be a connection between science and policy are some of the key issues affecting them.
Scientists consider their research to be ground breaking, expecting feedback only from their colleagues and this instructed research becomes problematic. They feel that policy makers misuse their power to control research funding as they have a political agenda.
Conversely, policy makers dislike the conceited nature of scientists, their seemingly exclusive group and their narrow-minded vision of the world. Policy makers often regard scientific data as an irrelevant, inopportune, impossible to comprehend or contextualise. The “ two-communities thesis” accurately assumes the existence of these two groups, also known as two communities that “lack the ability” to take into consideration the views or opinions of one another (Bliese 2001). Furthermore, these groups have differing views as to what establishes evidence. Scientific results are mostly quantifiable and are evaluated in a rigid way. Scientists are very particular when it comes to their research approach and their diverse study perspectives results in concentrations of evidence, such as clinical trials and observational studies. Policy makers however adopt a more informal approach in their evaluation of information, even if the results are of quantitative nature (Bosso, 1997). Thus, they are more on the lookout for significant material that could quickly be converted into facts for policy making decisions. Policy makers’ function are based on the diverse levels of evidence so that they vary from reports that can prove elements and thus presents reasons for considering a truth to believing in several elements which may indicate that the belief for the proposition is true or valid (Moss, 1995).
They regard scientists as being able to provide them with the exact data they require for their policies. Does this method demonstrate that research is becoming increasingly a retail store (Fortun, 2001)? Scientists on the other hand are frustrated as the required data may not exist, answers are unknown to them, their researching skills are flawed or just do not know how to explain their multifaceted research in layman terms. Policy makers are of the opinion that most scientists are only curious about their own research and want to publish their work rather than being motivated by the desire for accurate results from which policies can be formed. Thus, the crux of the issue is that policy makers and scientists assess evidence under different terms. Scientific evidence may clash with policy makers’ beliefs and values hence they try to look for particular evidence that supports their claims. This process makes it very difficult for policy makers look for and use data. In short, the two camps have differing views towards the use of evidence.
Scientific research is slow as it needs careful planning and preparation and is a time consuming process. Policy makers resent this because they would rather have fast data resulting in a quicker turnover of policies. Research can take years, depending on the analysis to be made, and questions to be assessed and answered. If the scientists do not have the skill sets on hand, time for training should be added.
An important factor to be considered when assessing the issues between scientists and policy makers is the weakness in logic when it comes to prioritising and results. Most policy makers regard scientific research as unhelpful. For example, countless amounts of documents on bad health can be printed, but it is not really an advancement for science unless the research produces a piece that is significantly superior than preceding research. This is known as circular epidemiology (Porta, 2008). Furthermore, policy makers are sharp enough to sift through the indifferent or junk science there is out there. Policy making founded by a history of interrelated laws can also be responsive to a number of competitive stakeholder demands. It can be determined that once made, policies are altered and compromised due to changing contexts.
Another issue is that scientists understand that their data has limitations and are increasingly trying to provide stronger evidence. However, policy makers usually only need a one-line answer. This is a hard task for scientists who tend to present their findings in such a way that at times policy makers can’t fully understand it, and hence have to resort to making decisions on the balance of probability. In addition, policy makers’ agendas are usually very busy so they are quick to jump to evidence that either they or their constituents will relate to.
It is worth mentioning the degree of accountability that revolves around scientists and policy makers. Scientists are liable to editors of scientific journals. Despite interest in policy, it still is not usually their primary concern or focus.
In contrast, policy makers are answerable to the government and they must focus on issues in line with their political agendas. This becomes more complicated when there is mounting stress on scientists to abide by the views of a government that is becoming increasingly responsible for prioritising allocation of research funds. This undoubtedly creates a rift in the exclusive club of the scientists itself whereby the shrewd scientist will have his research proposal assessed by policy makers before his final submission.
It is however hard to determine the relationship between the quality of science and the associated policies. Responsible science does not always result in laws, and similarly non-scientific theories do not necessarily result in irrational choices. “It is true good policy does not always depend on waiting for good evidence” (Choi et al, 2005). This point can be exemplified by looking at the contraceptive pill. This treatment suppresses hormones and is used to prevent conception. However, its promotion by the government, regardless of how precariously thought out, does not guarantee success. A different example would be that promoting policies for recycling does not necessarily result in a ‘green’ environment. It should be recognised that technology and innovation is needed to develop as well as evaluate the policy. Science is the step before as well as the step after; policy is the cement that holds the scientific infrastructure together. Another issue to be considered is that of public image. While scientists are respected in society and are regarded as intelligent people who don’t have political motives, policy makers are seen to be influential people with economic and political interests.
There seems to be a number of conflicts between scientists and policy makers; it is safe to say that none of them are wrong or bad. It is just that one reacts to reasonable policies while the other to scientific rationality. It is also important to understand that society also heightens opportunities that can be identified as cultural rationality (Choi et al, 2005). If all these conflicting rationales could integrate, the apparent differences between scientists and policy makers will be resolved and informed decisions will be made on the correct evidence. The continuing debate over geo-engineering can be reconsidered in the discussion over science and policy laws. It is argued that the current trend to decrease the intake of fossil fuels could be disregarded by the introduction of geo-engineering. This is an easy to understand dispute, but the real issue lies in the fact that neither side understands the technological, multifaceted societal systems involved.
Traditionalist views of geo-engineering regard climate change as a resolvable issue due to suitable solutions such as deploying geo-engineering technologies. The remedies put forward can only work if the problem is isolated, analysed and then solved. But for this approach to work in the current situation, climate change would need to be a problem that could, a) be solved by direct legal or technological intervention and b) be isolated from everything else.
This therefore poses serious questions as climate change is not a solvable problem; it is rather a circumstance that develops from an endless network of social and built systems that reflect the aspirations of the world population to have a better way of life. Seven billion people need more food than they can afford, together with an increase of sterile water and beneficial resources for themselves and their offspring in order to conduct valuable life. Climate change is reflective of daily human activities; if the Earth is observed from space at night, the focus will be on energy and radiation but during the day, cities, transportation, and cultivation, create pollution, which further underlines the fact that human activity affects everything. The climate cannot be simply disconnected from other earthly systems such as the economy, equal and just distribution of wealth and importance of equal opportunities. These systems are so interrelated that changing global patterns have an effect on the atmosphere.
Effects are bound to ripple through overlapping domains if serious attempts at fighting global warming are made. For example, while corn ethanol failed at assisting in limiting carbon emissions, it also distorted food markets which then had a lasting effect on the starving deprived societies across the world. In order to make the key elements that cause global warming to disappear, it is important for action to take place as opposed to just knowing about the issues. ‘Geo-engineering’ deals with climate change by treating it as an independent solvable problem as opposed to other responses to climate change. It is essentially a proposal justifying using technologies that are powerful enough to have an effect on the basic climate series of the whole world, whilst assuming that the only element of significance is the average temperature.
It is important to see the linkages, for example, while stratospheric balloons could reflect sunlight back into space, they may also cause a disruption in Asian monsoons, which intern could have a devastating effect resulting in widespread famine. Alternatively, technologies could be used to produce reflective clouds by inserting sulphur particles into the atmosphere although that could cause another problem in the form of acid rain. It is not fair to say that these geo-engineering technologies are unsafe; it is just absolutely essential to see the bigger picture (Foucault, 1980). If need be one day, these technologies may be the only option and worth the risk to deploy. But what needs to be understood is that geo-engineering needs to be thought of in multidimensional levels as to how the world can be affected otherwise reality is just being ignored. Any such powerful technology is bound to have lasting and unpredictable impact across economic, cultural and political arenas- railways, cars, internet, exchange rates, lighting systems – all are linked. The issue seems to be a wilful retreat from complexity by oversimplifying the problems. But what needs to be understood is that as geo-engineering has to be thought of in multi dimensional levels in terms of how the world might be affective, another reality is just being ignored. Geo-engineering should not be dismissed but should be redefined so it can be taken more seriously.
Discussions should not be restricted to schemes or technologies that have as primary objectives the adjustment of the climate as the primary objective. More down to earth and realistic research projects and policies that could improve the consequence of global warming should also be given due credit alongside schemes such as the Pinatubo Option (Kintisc, 2010). A good example of a broader research program that could have substantial climate change benefits would be to grow beef in factories as each living cow emits around 50kg of methane yearly. Scientists claim that they could decrease the amount of greenhouse gas emissions by diverging from farming livestock. Soil erosion and nitrogen loading could be reduced as well by manufacturing meat and the land previously used for agriculture would then be free for other uses, such as growing bio-fuels. This just goes to show that there are a lot of things that could be done in line with a broader and more reasonable meaning of geo-engineering. Geo-engineering should not be assumed as a proposition suitable for a researcher but as an assortment of sustainable research programs that could potentially be seen as a guaranteed solution for the continuous problem of climate change. This planet has been made what it is by its people; it is now time to assume responsibility for our actions and develop a set of suitable approaches that can be correlated to make a difference in this unpredictable world. These approaches have individual costs as well as benefits.
Therefore, the issue of scientific evidence-based policing is not as straightforward as the layman may like to think. To answer the topic question, it is of the author’s opinion that science should not be the sole basis for policy decision, especially not at any cost. The reasons put forward throughout this essay support this argument; if the advocacy of evidenced-based policy is solely geared towards the reduction of issues into nothing more than technical calculations of cost and effectiveness of the proposed policy, then the very purpose of including scientific evidence in the discourse becomes self defeating and even pervasive. What is required is a careful and critical analysis of the assumptions that some social researchers constitute and pass off as evidence. In this essay, a more critical understanding of policy processes and consequently a more democratic definition of what amounts to evidence has been given. However, it is essential to note how challenges still remain in place when it comes to the resources and ability to realise a more ‘evidence-informed policy’ (Fritsch, 1996).
Having established that it is challenging to realise policies using an increased amount of evidence is equally important to comprehend that shifting to evidence based policies does not automatically guarantee that the policies or the research will be any good. Straightforward and simplistic models of evidence-based policy making and practice fail as they are usually regarded as accurate portrayals. Research evidence potentially can make a change when it is backed up by political will and leadership as well as an organisational culture that puts emphasis on all forms of evidence. However many policy case studies show that policy making is rarely a matter of rationally isolating the problem, analysing it and solving it by using research evidence to develop and effect a policy situation. As put forward above, it is only when an organisational culture that values all forms of research inputs exists that such a case will be made possible. The extent and degree to which this culture exists is prone to change and varies from country to country and from one policy community to another. The case of Australia’s current refugee policies demonstrates clearly how independent research is given little or no value and therefore has very limited impact. However on the other hand, Australia’s quick and well coordinated response to the HIV/AIDS crisis shows that having researchers, the right political will and leadership, social movements and service users can get things moving. But it should be mentioned that there are some facts that the same Australian government would like to forget for example the forced removal of indigenous children from their families. Within the research community as well as governments, the disregard of past research seems more and more common and fashionable.
It is not necessarily true that rational decision-making or professional policy making produces better or more efficient results than those based upon intuition and gut feeling. However, it is generally agreed that improving the use of evidence in policies will undoubtedly improve a more standardized understanding in the constituting of evidence. Additionally, it will also improve an effective dissemination of evidence to where it is most needed as well as the widespread access to knowledge. This necessitates researchers and policy makers to remain context sensitive in regards to the sorts of research methodologies and types of evidence best suited to various circumstances. Meeting these prerequisites will not mean that evidential research becomes superior to politics. Furthermore, it will not convert many ideas into policies, but the hope of an independent relationship between evidence and political decisions will be amplified.
The transfer of evidence-based principles into real life is not a straightforward task. For instance, providing social care is difficult and complex. It is possible to evaluate the effect of judgment in tackling the issue but it remains that it is a much more difficult task than testing drugs in the medical field.
It is also argued that what works and what doesn’t is not always a question of facts or evidence as of values. It has been shown that policy decision-making needs to take into account societal norms, values and collateral consequences of any proposed decision. In short, scientific evidence should not be ‘the be all and end all’ of any issue; it should be incorporated to fit in the social reality of today. Moreover, there is a real risk that real politik (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994) takes the upper hand from genuine political considerations, whereby basing policies on scientific evidence ends up as a basis for those in power to increase their control. This control establishes understanding about specific social issues in a way that lessens acquired forms of knowledge that are not scientifically measurable as well as the public interest (Sarewitz, 2004).
However, the other extreme is just as dangerous as putting science forward at the expense of everything else. Rejecting scientific evidence when it does not suit the political or ideological framework may eventually be fatal to society. The above discussion over climate change is a perfect illustration of how rejecting scientific evidence in its totality can be destructive. Despite the overwhelming consensus amongst the scientific community that climate change is man-made through its quest for industrialisation and modernization, and that consequently measures need to be taken urgently to tackle this increasingly dangerous problem, many distractions from the essential issue at stake often occur. The ‘Climategate’ scandal bears testimony to this. In November 2009, a server was hacked at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, a few weeks before the Copenhagen Summit on climate change. Climate sceptics argued that the leaked emails provided evidence that climate change is actually a conspiracy by scientists. Despite the fact that several inquiries into the matter concluded that the emails showed no evidence of fraud or scientific misconduct, the media frenzy around the anecdotal story had monopolised the stage when it came to climate change, serving as much misrepresent and misinform opinions about the real issue. This is a tactic apparently used by many Republican supporters in the United States (Rosenstock, 2002), to circumvent the real debate in order to pursue their ideological agenda. Another method of undermining science, according to Rosenstock and Lee, is to discard unfavourable scientific evidence as ‘junk science’. There are also reports of infiltration in professional organisations under the guise of academic neutrality, potentially falsifying national policies based on those evidence collected (Robinson, & Robinson, 1997).
Therefore, it is in the author’s opinion that the way forward would be to ensure the impartiality of scientific evidence gathered, that it not be gathered solely for advancing or defrauding an already pre-set policy. Professional societies such as universities and research centres should set limits on the extent and circumstances of industrial and corporate sponsorship while raising awareness of the scope and magnitude of threats to science. In an ideal world, the funding of researches should be disclosed, particularly when the funder is engaged in profit-making enterprise.
Scientific evidence should be strengthened by corresponding opinions from other logical disciplines: it is impractical to believe that it is the only object that politicians consider when conducting any decision. For example, scientific evidence can be adjusted alongside social research and economical programs. Peer review is very important within the scientific community but it should not be restricted to that as other factors such as the global economy have a part to play. A hypothetical example suggests that science can direct towards the positive areas of a specific medicinal theory, but it could be seen as non-economically profitable by political evaluations, and sociologically challenging. It is important for scientists to ensure that only the scientific research used to validate a specific statement is handled when dealing with policy-makers. Most importantly, the line of demarcation as to where science ends and where policy-making begins must be clearly highlighted by both scientists and policy-makers. Science is now very complex and no longer has the attribute of certainty that used to accompany it. As we have seen, science is closely entwined with politics, and it is difficult to differentiate accurate scientific evidence from ‘pseudoscience’, as no superior definitions exist. Additionally, science that can be assessed by others using a scientific assumption can lead to misrepresentation and inaccuracy. Despite this, scientific analysis can be used predominantly as a thorough foundation for awareness and understanding of science. This knowledge gained by the scientific investigations can also be seen as a huge importance to policy-makers. It is important to distinguish between different types of science and whether it is beneficial to society, particularly policy-makers. In this way, it can be concluded that scientific evidence can aid public policy decisions but policies cannot be dependant, as scientific theory is never considered completely accurate.
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