seven, thirteen and sixteen. Each boy was given a two hour interview
based on ten dilemmas. There was a reasonable degree of within-stage
consistency, each boy tended to display the same level of moral
reasoning for different dilemmas, with the rest being at the next
adjacent stage. The younger ones tended to perform at stages one and
two, with higher proportions of stages three and four amongst the
older boys. Some of the boys were followed up and retested at three
yearly intervals up to age thirty to thirty six (Colby et al1983,
cited by Gross); this longitudinal data largely confirmed this cross
sectional pattern.
Kohlberg acknowledged early on that there were minor contradictions in
his theory regarding the binding nature of stage six. He explains this
contradiction as evidence that people knowing what's morally right may
not have the will to act upon that knowledge if they are under great
social pressure. Kohlberg felt that this was particularly the case
when a person takes a moral stand at variance with generally held
convention. Turial and Rothman (1972), conducted an experiment
studying seventh and eighth graders. They were faced with a task
similar to Mailgram's (1974) well known procedure. Participants had
the opportunity to listen to two arguments that two adults presented
for continuing and terminating the experiment. The arguments were
directed in terms of moral criteria either one stage above, or one
stage below the children's previously measured stage. The results
indicated that for some children, those who scored at Kohlberg stage
four, responded in their actual behaviour to the reasoning one stage
above their own. This provides a convincing demonstration of the
relations that exist between the action and structure of moral
judgement. However, a portion of subjects judged to be at stage six
moral reasoners were willing to go along with social authority and
continued to shock to the point where the shocks would have caused
great pain and posed physical danger to the person supposedly
receiving the shocks. This study is often cited as evidence that moral
behaviour is associated with moral reasoning, and therefore can
predict moral behaviour because proportionately more post-conventional
reasoners resisted authority as did subjects with lower stages of
moral judgement. However, the fact that a considerable number of
people at the lowest developmental stage resisted authority suggested
that personal features rather than moral stage may have been involved
in guiding people's behaviour.
Several studies have examined the relationship between post
conventional thinking and student protest. In particular, Haan
examined the moral levels of those who participated in the Bekeley
Free Speech movement in 1964. Of those judged to be at level six, 80%
were actively involved ion protest movements. Of those at stage five,
50% were involved in protest movements and of those judged to be at
levels three and four, 10% were actively involved in the protest
movement . A substantial number of students who were assessed at
Kohlbergs levels one and two protested for their own rights. Yet, for
the majority, their thinking was more strongly post conventional than
a sample of matched non-participants. This shows that those judged as
highly moral could be predicted to act in ways which were likely to
defend their moral principles, though it is not totally clear as to
their motives. Those whose moral principles were not revoked, either
because they did not exist, or appeared at a much lower level than
those who were judged to be highly moral. This study was useful, as it
was a real-world event, yet only university students were involved ,
which perhaps weakens the extent to which the findings of this study
can be extended to the general population because of the differences
in lifestyle. The results of this experiment were not replicated for
some other protests, apparently because moral principles were not at
stake, (Keniston, 1971, cited by Crain).
Richards, (1992, cited in lectures) examined moral reasoning in a
classroom context. Following the Kohlberg system, using hypothetical
moral dilemmas to determine pupil's level of moral reasoning. The best
behaved were those at levels two and three. The behaviour of those at
stage one is motivated by external rewards , and those at stage three
are starting to conform to the norms of their own peer group. Those at
stage two were most likely to misbehave. This fits with Kohlberg's
stages of development as he claims that it is those at this stage who
are most likely to do what is right for them.
Damon gave children a real-life scenario. They spent the day in a
classroom drawing pictures. They were told that later in the week, the
pictures would be sold at the school Fayre. Some children had drawn
lots of pictures, some few, some accurate, some inaccurate, some
children concentrated and some did not. The children were asked who
should get the proceeds from the sale of the pictures. Damon found a
clear developmental progression on the basis of the children's
answers, from awarding the money to them at age four simply because
they want it, , to allocating the money at age eight onwards
considering the social goals of the group.
Damon followed up this research looking at children's actions, to see
if they would distribute the money in the way that they said they were
going to. 50% matched what they said and what they did, 40% lapsed
into a less advanced system, lower than what they said and 10% behaved
better than what they said. This finding provides conflicting evidence
as to the consistency between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. The
40% of children behaving worse than they said they would casts doubt
on the association between moral reasoning and moral behaviour debate.
Yet Kohlberg did say that children were likely to alternate between
adjacent stages, which this research demonstrates.
Delinquency offers a natural ground for testing the relationship
between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. Schmidlin (1977, cited by
Blasi) reported the average score of a delinquent group to be between
stage three and four. Kantner (1976, cited by Blasi) reported that
only 10% of his adult delinquent sample was pre conventional. Of
twelve studies of delinquents, six indicated that at least 80% of the
delinquent group was at stages one and two. Other studies reported
substantial numbers of delinquents who scored at Kohlbergs
conventional level. The varieties of scoring criteria used by
different studies make it impossible to arrive at a precise
conclusion. With two exceptions, all of the researchers resorted to
Kohlbergs interview as a measure of moral reasoning. This can be seen
as a good method of comparing data, if it were not for the well-known
lack of standardisation of Kohlbergs instrument. Six of the studies
reported overall significant relations between moral reasoning and
behaviours. Three yielded negative data and the remaining three had
mixed results. It is clear that a range of moral reasoning can be
present among delinquents. Moral reasoning is an important aspect of
delinquency but does not offer alone an explanation of this behaviour.
Children's moral development can be dependant on parental guidance.
Mothers who explained the consequences of behaviours tended to have
infants who were more likely to be helpful. This was especially likely
if the parents pointed out an emotional tactic. Physical punishment
was not helpful. According to Smetana, in prohibiting actions, giving
instructions, and responding to transgressions, parents are an
important, and because of their emotional bonds to their children,
valued source of children's social experiences that lead to the
construction of moral concepts throughout childhood and adolescence.
These findings are consistent with previous research by Grusec and
Goodnow (1994, as cited by Smetana).
Possible reasons for the discrepancy between moral reasoning and moral
actions include: although you may think it is morally right to take
some action in a given situation, you may not see the action as
morally necessary, or obligatory. Also, if the cost to the person
behaving morally, (or refraining from doing something morally 'wrong')
has little cost in time, money or effort, then most children and
adults will help, regardless of their overall level of moral
reasoning. When there is a cost associated with a more 'moral' choice,
then the level of moral reasoning becomes more significant. This
perhaps suggests that moral reasoning only becomes a factor in moral
behaviour when something about the situation heightens the sense of
moral conflict, such as when costs are involved, or if the person
feels personally responsible.
Blasi (1983), provided the first comprehensive review of the
relationship between moral stage and behaviour. He concluded that
there was a general trend for moral behaviour to be associated with
developmental stage and that people at higher stages of development
were less likely to engage in various forms of misconduct than people
at lower stages. However, he suggested that the association between
the two was far less than perfect and suggested that we may need to
introduce other variables to clarify this relationship. One variable
may be the extent to which individuals feel the need to maintain
consistency between their moral thoughts and actions (Blasi, 1980,
Kohlberg and Candee, 1981, as cited by Crain). He began to look at the
possibility that the link between moral judgement and action lay in
the degree in which morality and moral concerns were integrated into
the person's sense of self. From moral identity there is a
psychological need to make actions consistent with ideals. In 1993,
Blasi declared: 'Self consistency is the spring of moral action' (as
cited by Nucci). Similarly, Power states that the motive for moral
action is not simply the direct result of knowing the 'good,' but from
the desire to act in ways that are consistent with ones own sense of
self as a moral being. Power states: 'Individuals may undertake a
particular course of action, even at some cost, because they want to
become, or remain a certain kind of person' (Power and Khmelkov, 1998,
as cited by Nucci).
The approach taken by Blasi, now joined by Colby and Damon, Hart,
Keller and Edelstein, Noam and Power: 'does not attempt to replace
moral ideals with a set of non-cognitive personality characteristics:
it sees personal identity as operating jointly with reason and truth
in providing motives for action (Blasi, 1993, pg99, as cited by
Nucci). The assumption of interpersonal variation in moral identity
has not been extensively researched. However, recent work by Blasis
and colleagues has provided evidence that some individuals allow moral
notions to penetrate their core, of what and who they are, while
others construct their central defining features in different ways.
This work still has a long way to go, it is reductionistic and
mechanistic by reducing all complex contextualised moral judgements to
a simple evaluation of whether or not the action is consistent with
one's sense of self, yet provides an exciting and realistic
alternative to the stage theory offered by Kohlberg. Much research has
been conducted on white, middle class children and more research on
children from different cultures is needed, which could perhaps widen
the theories of current researchers to encompass those from other
cultures.
References
Bee, H. (1998). Lifespan Development. (2nd Ed), United States of
America: Longman.
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging Moral Cognition and Action. Psychological
Bulletin. 88, 1-35.
Crain, W. C. (1985). Theories of Development. (pp 118-136). Prentice
Hall. Retrieved November 30, 2002, from
http://faculty.plts.edu/html/kohlberg.htm.
Nucci, L. (n.d.). The Promise and Limitations of the Self. Retrieved
November 30, 2002 from
http://tigger.uie.edu/nucci/moraled/articles/nuccipromise.html
Smetana, J. G. (n.d.). A role of Parents in Moral Development, A
Social Domain Analysis. Journal of Moral Education
