As with the British system, care is taken in appointing cabinet ministers and similar constraints exist. Pompidou had to reward a certain number of non-Gaullists who had supported him in the presidential elections of 1969. The collapse of the Gaullist majority in 1973 made Pompidou more sensitive to minority parties. On coming to power, Mitterand was careful to keep the leaders of all the Socialist party factions in Cabinet whose support would be needed in the passing of Government bills in the Assembly. Whilst the President must consider his or her support in the legislature, Safran argues that because any party can be called to provide members for the cabinet, they are unlikely to oppose the President on significant issues. Furthermore, the President holds the ultimate weapon of dissolution.
In line with the British system, the Japanese Prime Minister has the power of patronage. Article 68 of the Japanese Constitution states, "The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the National Assembly." Similar to the French system and alien to the British, Japanese Ministers may be drawn from outside the political sphere. In practice, both of the above points do not occur. Richardson points out that, "one of the 'rules of the game' in Japanese cabinet recruitment processes has been that candidates for cabinet positions must have had long service in the Diet."
In forming the cabinet, the Japanese Prime Minister does not actually make the choices; it is the faction leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and since 1993, the larger minority parties. "Since 1955, and until recently, Japans'.... cabinets have been selected solely within the parameters of the internal recruitment processes of one party - The Liberal democratic Party." Recruitment negotiations are held between the leaders of the different LDP factions, cabinet ministers are in effect, chosen according to treaties between faction leaders - one of whom becomes the Prime Minister. The factions argue for their people to become ministers on a number of assumptions, firstly that the cabinet must be capable of commanding a majority of Diet members. Secondly, they must include a number of opposing faction members as a way of giving the impression of party unity.
The heart of the process is in the balancing act between the different factions. The leaders of the factions ultimately desire the primeministership or an important cabinet post; and wish to have as many of their faction also appointed. Not all of the factions may be involved and it has been known for two or three of the five factions to form the basis of the government, giving a few positions to opposing factions to give the impression of party unity.
Overlaying the factional divisions is a process of generational close ties and previous experience. The dominance of ex-civil servants being disproportionately given cabinet positions to their numbers in the Diet is the main example of this. Richardson points out that during the 1970s, 20% of members of the lower house had civil service backgrounds, but 42% of cabinet ministers were drawn from them. "The former bureaucrats under consideration had often possessed very high ministerial positions in their former civil service careers, were very knowledgeable about national politics, had access to business funding and were credible to such potential veto groups."
Attention needs now to be turned on how a cabinet minister may lose their job. Broadly, they are all lost in the same way - defeat of the government at election time, a vote of no-confidence by the legislature, resignation or dismissal by the head of government. The length of tenure and ability of the Prime Minister to sack a minister does vary.
The use of cabinet reshuffles in the British system gives the Prime Minister considerable authority over a cabinet minister. Furthermore, the Prime Minister can create, merge or abolish a ministers' post more or less at a whim. The reshuffling of cabinets in the British system is a controversial issue, whilst the movement of ministers to new posts may prevent them going 'native' or stale, it also means that ministers are rarely in position long enough to master fully the department or allow continuity of policy at the top.
As with the British, the French cabinet minister holds his position as long as the President desires it, "All Fifth Republic presidents have had considerable discretion in regard to the selection, retention, and dismissal of cabinet members..... Whether there is any basis to the rumour that every minister deposits on the president's desk an undated letter of resignation is hard to confirm." Turnover of ministers is again quite high, between 1959 and 1989, there have been more than forty cabinet reshuffles, but not all appointed new ministers. Some posts are more stable than others, for example, Foreign affairs and Defence have each had eleven ministers; whereas education has had nineteen and justice, seventeen. Over the same period there have been four Presidents, eleven Prime Ministers and twenty-one governments.
Constitutionally, the Japanese Prime Minister has the power to dismiss a cabinet minister, in practice, this is unlikely to occur. The positions are allocated to allow government to command majority support in the Diet. Cabinet ministers are faction leaders or people of great political authority and have gained the post out of the bargaining process. To dismiss a minister would probably mean the withdrawal of support of the relevant faction or party and inability of the government to pass legislation, ultimately causing the formation of a new cabinet.
The length of time each minister can expect to be in power significantly alters their ability to do anything. The average British minister can expect to last approximately two years, which is considered by many as too short. The French counterpart can expect to last approximately two months longer, but as stated above, this varies according to department, education lasting on average, one year and seven months and Foreign and Defence ministers lasting two years and eight months. The Japanese minister is a butterfly compared to the French and British, lasting just under one year, most not expecting to last eleven months. Frognier argues that the more parties (or in Japans case, factions) involved, the less durable the cabinets will be. Since the British cabinet is made up of one party, the French between three and seven groups (usually three or four with one in definite majority) and the Japanese, up to five factions, Frognier seems to be broadly correct.
The roles of each minister differ in the level of autonomy the have and what they actually can do. Each system has unique positions and differing sizes of cabinet, but certain posts are common. Each system assigns ministers to a particular policy area, for example, finance, foreign affairs, defence and so on.
The United Kingdom ministers function, in theory, as the collective executive of the British system. Cabinet ministers meet in full at least once per week. Peter Hennessy in 'The Cabinet'(1986) has reprinted the "Questions on Procedures for Ministers," in it, it states,
"The business of the Cabinet consists, in the main, of the following points:
questions which engage the collective responsibility of the Government, either because they raise major issues of policy or because they are likely to occasion public comment or criticism;
questions on which there is an unresolved conflict of interest between Departments."
The Cabinet minister, at cabinet is there to make or ratify major decisions or resolve interdepartmental conflict. More specifically, "it is the arena in which most important decisions are taken...it plans the business of Parliament....arbitrates in cases of disputes between departments.... provides for oversight and co-ordination in government policies... and provides political leadership for the party." Although it does not decide many policies, it is an authoritative discussion body which is used by government to lay guidelines to be followed.
The formal role of the British Prime Minister not only includes the appointment and dismissal of ministers, but he or she also chairs cabinet meetings and important cabinet committees. The Prime Minister decides what is discussed, who discusses it and then 'sums up' the discussion. Few votes are taken at the cabinet as this is a divisive tool and goes against the doctrine collective responsibility. The summing up is usually along the lines of the discussion, but the Prime Minister has the right to sum up according to their own viewpoint despite it not being in the majority.
The British cabinet minister is in a precarious position, the Prime Minister has extensive control over the way in which policies are formulated, and a cabinet minister has a limited degree of protest; and always from the position of owing their post to the Prime Ministers patronage. The Prime Minister, being ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the government has the right to oversee, co-ordinate and intervene in each ministers affairs. Therefore, at important conferences, for example, the Maastricht negotiations or the G7 discussions, it is the Prime Minister not the foreign secretary who deals with the important discussions and formalises agreements.
Despite this characterisation, the British cabinet minister remains an important figure, heading a policy area or performing a specific role. They have the responsibility of introducing relevant legislation into Parliament and defending it on behalf of the Government. They may also use statutory instruments to carry out their duties.
The French cabinet acts, constitutionally, as the government of France. However, the assertion of power by the President has undermined this. Cabinet ministers have specific roles in supervising the civil servants in their ministries, developing policy in their area, help draft bills and have them passed in the legislature, provide expertise in the cabinet and defend government policy to the public.
In practice, the French Cabinet, "is more often than not.... a sounding board for presidential ideas." The cabinet depends upon the support of the President since it is he who ultimately appointed them. Furthermore, the President has built up a large staffing (the Presidential office - Elysée palace staff) which has forced the cabinet to compete for influence. The President has institutionalised into his staff a 'kitchen cabinet'(cabinet du président) which gives the President policy advice. The President may also consult with non-government individuals - businesses, trades unions, intellectuals, or 'the people' - as on the periodic presidential 'tours de France.'
All these sources of information for the President has diluted the voice of the cabinet in advocating policy and in some instances, allowed the President to by-pass it altogether. De Gaulles' and Pompidous' use of referenda allowed them to legitimate presidential decisions without cabinet approval. President Mitterand determined the major direction of policy and allowed the cabinet ministers discretion on specific non-controversial issues. The President led the cabinet from the front and left the details to the relevant minister. French cabinet ministers have a degree of autonomy in day-to-day running of government but have a small influence in deciding policy direction and at best can only be expected to be consulted on a major policy change.
The Japanese minister, as part of the cabinet, is probably in the strongest constitutional position of the three. The Japanese Prime Minister still holds the role of chairing cabinet meetings and setting the agenda, but he cannot determine which departments and cabinet posts exist. This requires legislation which must have the support of the cabinet and legislature.
Neustadt argued that an individual cannot rely on another to carry out their wishes unless their job relied on it, "When one man shares authority with another, but does not gain or lose his job upon the other's whim, his willingness to act upon the urging of the other turns on whether he conceives the action right for him." That is, the Prime Minister can only expect ministers to be loyal to him or her if they hold the power of patronage. In the Japanese system, as already discussed, the Prime Minister does not hold this power and so is severely weakened. In the other two systems, the head can be seen to hold this power of patronage and can assert their authority over cabinet more than the Japanese model. This lack of patronage makes a significant difference to the role of the cabinet minister in the Japanese system.
The cabinet is the highest executive authority, it has the authority, "to exercise control and supervise the administrative branches of the government, prepare the budget, conduct the affairs of state, manage foreign affairs, administer the civil service.... and conclude treaties." It is also a cabinet decision when to dissolve the House of Representatives and call an election, the only cabinet in the three discussed here to actually be able to do this. The Prime Minister is seen as the representative of the cabinet, not the leader. He is the co-ordinator of the ministers autonomous actions.
As outlined above, the Japanese cabinet minister is in the strongest position of the three, he does not owe his position to the patronage of another but to discussion and compromise: he is also largely autonomous of the Prime Minister who has little power in directing the general policy of government. However, this power is severely curtailed by the rapid movement of ministers who are in position for approximately one year. It therefore makes it difficult to have significant policy impact or guide a policy to completion. The continuity is given by the civil service. The second in command in each ministry, the Vice-Minister is a career civil servant who has worked his way through the hierarchy of a particular ministry. They function as a 'subcabinet' and meet regularly to provide, "continuity, co-ordination and direction in the shaping of government policies." With the exception of controversial issues, most policy is decided by the subcabinet and is routinely ratified by the full cabinet. This exemplifies the 'bottom-up' notion which prevails in Japanese government and business - the idea that the best decisions start their way from the lowest ranked worker and 'float' upwards through the hierarchy until ratified by the highest rank.
As with the other systems, each minister is relatively autonomous from the interference of other ministers, but more in the Japanese system. Japanese ministers also safeguard their autonomy from the Prime Minister and do not see him as having any right to oversee them. For them, the Prime Minister is there to co-ordinate the general direction of the cabinet. A Cabinet minister is however less free to make decisions from his civil servants, due to his short length of tenure and lack of recent experience in a policy area. As discussed earlier, a high proportion of ministers have previously been senior civil servants before going into politics. They may have spent their previous career in the ministry that they now head which would give them considerable knowledge in the workings of policy, but it appears, it does not give them any more ability to make a difference in the ministry or last any longer in office.
The three cabinet ministers of Japan, France and Britain all have varying roles. This is best shown in how the job is gained, lost and what the job entails. It is incorrect to see the jobs power as zero sum vis-à-vis the Prime Minister or President, but each has a differing degree of autonomy from their head. It does appear that a large characterisation can be made of each of the roles by examining the relationship between a minister and the head. The French President uses the cabinet as a consultative body but can go 'over their heads' if necessary. The British Prime Minister leads the cabinet but cannot afford to completely exclude them from the policy process. The Japanese Prime Minister is a co-ordinator and ineffective as a leader or policy initiator; each minister is relatively autonomous but are themselves constrained by the civil service inherent with the ministry and very short life span of office.
The Japanese minister has the most autonomy but the least amount of time to do anything. The regular reshuffling of cabinet, as the result of Diet election, election of LDP leader (effectively the Prime Minister), and internal rivalry leading to the collapse of government, means that the Japanese cabinet has little time to learn the role and make a difference to policy. The French minister, bring little more than a consultative figure, may influence policy via the President but has to compete with the Presidents' office. The British Minister appears to be in the strongest position of the three, whilst he or she is in power for a relatively longer time than the Japanese, they also have more power than the French and greater ability to enact change in their system. In terms of actually being able to do something, the British Minister has the most opportunity. The Japanese minister, if given enough time, may be able to have the most effect in comparison to the Prime Minister but this really is a case of having the cake (power) and not being able to eat (use) it. The French, on the other hand does not get any cake, whereas the British gets a little bit and some time to eat it.
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