Returning to Williams however there is one potentially fatal weakness to this arguably entirely plausible argument and it offers some explanation as to why moral relativism should be held in such particular distain by so many. Could the argument not equally be made to say that the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was acceptable as part of the wider moral and social climate of the time, and therefore it was no business of the world community to pass judgment on the German nation? This question of fundamental human rights, a relatively modern concept in itself, seems to be a considerable stumbling block for moral relativism. Williams chooses to use another famous example to illustrate his point, the Spanish “conquistador” exploration of Aztec Mexico. In Mexico the Spaniards encountered wholesale slaughter of human beings to appease the Aztec gods. This kind of inhuman behaviour, violation of human rights, indeed of the right to life itself, more fundamental than any right one could imagine, is the point at which relativism, for many, become a dangerous philosophy. Or in Williams words (and on the potential consequences of applying a relativist view wholesale);
“But it would be a particular moral view, and one both psychologically and morally implausible, to insist that these adaptive reactions were the only correct ones, that confronted with practices which are found and felt as inhuman, for instance, there is an a priori demand of acceptance.” (William, 1972, p 38)
Williams goes on to make the argument for an overriding moral code. To say that something is right simply because it is culturally accepted would be to say that state discrimination in Nazi Germany was right, or that human sacrifice is “right”.
How though could one determine what is right and what is wrong? If enough people believe an action is right it is deemed to be so, and if enough believe it wrong, it is equally deemed wrong. An excellent example is the differing public response to the recent invasion of Iraq, in The United States the war was broadly accepted as “right” whilst many in Britain, and certainly in Europe, felt it to be “wrong”. This is the key point of moral relativism; the determination of right and wrong is “relative” to the circumstance and surroundings of the person making the determination. Therefore whilst many may believe that there exists a set of fundamental moral “rights” and “wrongs”, or moral truths, how can these be applied? For my moral truths may differ to yours and yours to mine, and how would either of us justifiably determine which is superior? And even then if we were able to determine a set of undeniable moral truths, how could we put these into practice? This is a point raised by Billington (1988);
“The weakness of absolutism, and the strength of relativism, is that this affirmation is often made in circumstances where the ideal option is not on offer. In these circumstances the affirmation of an ideal rule appears as no more than a theoretical but impracticable exercise.” (Billington 1988 p37)
Another argument, based more on objectivity but also comprising a conception of underlying moral imperatives, is to say that at the basic level there are certain characteristics such as generosity or courage and conversely barbarity or inhumanity, which are universally understood. Therefore you could perhaps not say that there could exist a society which saw generosity as making one self rich, or caring for an infant as inhumane. Therefore although significant disagreements may exist between societies as to what is regarded as courageous, or inhumane, there would be some agreements as to the general principle itself. This argument was made by Foot (1978), and seems to offer an attractive alternative to the more a priori Kantian style arguments for moral truth and overriding moral codes, whilst still asserting some universality the theory allows some variation of conception on morality between social groups.
However if one considers this interpretation in a practical situation perhaps its effectiveness as an alternative to relativism is somewhat diminished. For example a Palestinian suicide bomber and an Israeli army recruit may well agree that courage is the placing of oneself in danger for the good of others, but the means by which this is enacted would be so contrasting as to leave little or no room for agreement. For the Israeli is unlikely to accept the murder of civilians as an act of courage and neither is the Palestinian likely to accept the shooting of stone throwing teenagers as such either.
The consistency of an argument is obviously an overriding factor in its practical application and in this case whether in opposition to or support of relativism a consistent rationale perhaps must therefore be apparent. Williams (1972) bases his criticism of relativism on a perceived inconsistency in its fundamental assertions. As discussed he takes this further to question the practicality of the theory in circumstances where moral conflict raises situations in which tolerance seems illogical, it is however worth considering his objection to the consistency of relativisms central argument.
“[Moral relativism] consists of three propositions: that ‘right’ means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) ‘right for a given society’; that ‘right for a given society’ is to be understood in a functionalist sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society.
Whatever its results, the view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third proposition, about what is right and wrong in one’s dealing with other societies, which uses a non-relative sense of ‘right’ not allowed for in the first proposition.”
(Williams 1972 p34)
Therefore to make the judgment that passing judgment on another societies morality is wrong is in itself a moral judgment which in not relative but objective. This is perhaps the strongest argument that relativism needs to overcome for it to prove its practicality, and moreover its validity. For how can people overcome the conflict of interpretation foreseeable on the rightness or wrongness of interfering, what could be considered as the “right” time to intervene? However what is more, even if the relativist is to concede that at certain times intervention in foreign cultures seems starkly necessary (Darfur, Zimbabwe, Burma, etc.) to prevent the suffering of a minority or persecuted group, and/or to preserves the rule of international law, how and on what basis could the determination be made as to when it is “wrong” to interfere and when it is “right”, without some form of objective judgment. As Williams states the only answer is to either never interfere no matter what the circumstances or accept the relativist concept as an ideal, but be faced with no basis upon which to determine any objective moral imperative of any kind (despite the fact that the whole theory relies upon one itself, that interference in unjustified, or “wrong”).
So which ever way the argument is taken it seems that situations can be envisaged in which, on grounds of both practicality and rational consistency, neither an entirely relativist nor entirely objectivist approach is plausible. The absolutist may assert the existence of moral absolutes, or moral truths, but in reality these may not be practical due to disagreement on their nature (Billington 1988). The objectivist may state that there are grounds for agreement in any situation, such as on the nature of moral virtues (Foot 1978), but find conflicts in which they offer no resolution (Israel-Palestine conflict). And finally the relativist may state that tolerance and acceptance of the conflict must be applied, but be confronted by a situation in which not to act would be impossible (the holocaust, slavery).
So what then can be said of the validity of relativism? Should validity be based upon practical applicability, if so the determination would perhaps be a mixed one.
In some situations (polygamy, female circumcision etc) tolerance may be desirable, and as discussed many others where it may equally may be misplaced. Again on grounds of rational or empirical consistency, as discussed, validity would also seem to be uncertain. So essentially relativism is sometimes true, and sometimes not, sometimes rational, and sometimes not, sometimes practical and sometimes not. Equally you could argue the same point for almost any of the opposing theories.
Perhaps then the clamorous opposition to moral relativism is entirely understandable, and its truth irreconcilably placed into question. However it is hard to escape the problem which began the whole debate in the first place. What right have we as advanced societies to impose our moral judgments on others across the world, as in the case of linking aid to abstinence in Africa, or of imposing democracy in Iraq, or free market economics in Latin America?
Perhaps then only a compromise on the issue is logical, and several attempts have been made to achieve this. It is perhaps not necessary to outline the varying structures of these mixed arguments, coming as they do from various absolutist, relativist, sceptical and objectivist perspectives. What is key is that many who have participated in this debate over the years have reached, from their different starting points, the conclusion of a mixed position, comprising elements of relativism in absolutism, or in objectivism, etc.
It is worth noting however that even Bernard Williams (1981) came to formulate a theory which included this “vulgar” and “unregenerate” argument in a form of compromised mixed position. His “relativism of distance” basically states that relative judgments can be made to notional or non immediate moral determinations, mostly in the historical or theoretical setting, but immediate moral judgments should not be thought impossible and that determinations can be made should the need be great enough. How much of a compromise this actually is is perhaps debatable, but it is at least a compromise of a kind.
Therefore it seems that moral relativism is unlikely to be a valid argument if taken wholesale and without compromise, as it seems unworkable on a range of practical and semantic grounds. However the conception of relativism in morality is perhaps not in and of itself untrue, rather its application, just as the application of moral absolutes and objective determinations, should perhaps, somewhat ironically, be relative to the situation.
Or to close the argument perhaps a little more concisely;
“Maybe in the end we are relative absolutists some of the time and absolute relativists for the rest.” (Billington 1988 p39)
Bibliography
Billington, Ray “Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought”, 1988 Routledge, London
.
Foot, Philippa ,”Virtues and vices, and other essays in moral philosophy”, 1978,
Blackwell, Oxford
Williams, Bernard “Morality: An Introduction to Ethics” 1972, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Williams, Bernard. “Moral luck : philosophical papers, 1973-1980” ,1981,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge