Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan, A look back and a look forward

by maladosteo5 (student)

Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan

Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan,

A look back and a look forward.

MSG Steve Grewell, USA

Norwich University

Afghanistan is a land of rebellion. Ever since it was first settled, it has been an impossible dream to try and govern it as a whole. The terrain does not favor central control of a federal central government, since travel is so incredibly difficult. The people are fiercely independent, the direct result of the history of the region. One cannot look at current events in Afghanistan without having some idea of the great history that has crashed upon the mountains throughout the centuries. The empires that have dared tread upon Afghan soil have left their mark as well. As tribal battles have evolved into rebellions, as rebellions have evolved into insurgencies, the inspired student must look at the various tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been utilized by those very same empires. This paper will study the similarities and differences in the British, Soviet, and American interventions in Afghanistan, specifically looking at their different approaches to counter insurgency. Before one can start to define different counter insurgency strategies, a standard must be set as to the definition of an insurgency itself:

“Definition of insurgency- The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself” (JP 1-02, P. 154).

Next, logically, a standard definition of what is considered a counter insurgency:

“Definition of counter insurgency- Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” (JP 1-02, P. 73).

Now, with the standards set on the definitions, one has to take a long look back into the history of Afghanistan to understand where it is today. Along this path we look counter insurgency strategies during the First/ Second/ Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, The Soviet Invasion and occupation, and Operation Enduring Freedom/ Global War on Terrorism.

Figure 1 Relief Map of Afghanistan

It is impossible to give a quick history of Afghanistan. This ancient land has been witness to history that spans millennia. The history of Afghanistan dates back to around 500 BC when the area was under the Iranian Achaemenid Empire from the west. Although they are considered the first empire to rule over this land, evidence indicates that an “advanced degree of urbanized culture has existed in the land since between 3000 and 2000 BC “(LOC-FRD, 2008). The Persian Emperor Darius was forced to fight Alexander the Great and his Macedonian army coming from their west. The battle was lost by the Persians and Alexander arrived to what is now Afghanistan in 330 BC after conquering Persia during the Battle of Gaugamela. (LOC-FRD). The Macedonians did not simply march into Afghanistan. In fact it is noted that Alexander had to battle the local inhabitants for every bit of territory he gained control of. Afghanistan is "easy to march into, hard to march out of," he is said to have commented. (Robson, et al., 2008). Of course Alexander was not the last conqueror. Many kingdoms have established their capitals inside the modern state of Afghanistan, including the Greco-Bactrian’s, Kabul Shahi, Kushans, Mauryas, Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Timurids, Mughals, Hotakis, an the Durranis. (LOC-FRD).

The Mongol Emperor Genghis Khan marched through Afghanistan in 1220, conquering (and destroying) as he swept first through Herat in the west and then to Kabul. After his death some local Afghan chiefs established independent principalities, while others remained under Mongol rule. (Robson et al.). Tamerlane swept through the region at the end of the 14th century, when Tamerlane conquered a large part of the country and established Herat as his capital. He was intent on re-establishing the Mongol Empire. Tamerlane was also a devout Muslim and referred to himself as the “Sword of Islam” (Biran, 2002). Under Tamerlane's successors, the Timurids, the area prospered for the next century or so. Early in the 16th century, Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, made Kabul the capital of an independent principality. Babur captured Kandahar in 1522 and in 1526 established the Moghul Empire, which lasted until the middle of the 19th century and included all of eastern Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush. During the next 200 years Afghanistan was parceled between the Moghuls of India and the Safavids of Persia. The Moghuls held Kabul and the regions north, up to the southern foothills of the Hindu Kush. The Safavids controlled Herat and Farah. Kandahar was for many years in dispute. (Robson, et al.)

In 1774, native Afghan Pashtun tribes were beginning to gain power and exercise influence over increasing areas of the country. In the 18th century, one of these tribal confederations, the Durrani, was granted authority over their homelands around present-day Kandahar. Their leader, Ahmad Shah Durrani, formed a Muslim empire in the late 18th century. This was the first to encompass all of present day Afghanistan and it was second only to the Turks' Ottoman Empire.

Figure 2 Afghanistan 1772. Ahmad Shah Durrani Empire.

After Ahmad Shah's death, the empire was beset by rebellions on the part of local tribal chiefs, causing Ahmad Shah's son Timur to move the capital from Kandahar to Kabul in 1776.

“This kind of struggle for power–tribe against tribe, family against family, brother against brother–characterizes the intertribal relationships among the Afghans, and continued as their territory became crucial to the interests of greater powers, most notably the czarist Russians in the north and the British in the south”.(Robson et al).

This lent itself to the next century and a half of foreign empirical interest in Afghanistan.

The “Great Game” provides a background to the reasons why the British invaded and had interests in the region. British India at that time stretched from present day Myanmar in the east to present day Pakistan in the west.

Figure 3 British East India Company 1800’s.

“The debacle of the Afghan civil war left a vacuum in the Hindu Kush area that concerned the British, who were well aware of the many times in history it had been employed as the invasion route to India. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, it became clear to the British that the major threat to their interests in India would not come from the fragmented Afghan empire, the Iranians, or the French, but from the Russians, who had already begun a steady advance southward from the Caucasus” (Blood, 2001).

With chaos in Afghanistan, this left open the invasion routes for Czarist Imperial Russia as the Russians absorbed more and more territory on the northern boundary of Afghanistan.

“At the same time, the Russians feared permanent British occupation in Central Asia as the British encroached northward, taking the Punjab, Sindh, and Kashmir. The British viewed Russia's absorption of the Caucasus, the Kirghiz and Turkmen lands, and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara with equal suspicion as a threat to their interests in the Indian subcontinent” (Blood, 2001).

This led to what was called the “Great Game”, also called the Tournament ...

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With chaos in Afghanistan, this left open the invasion routes for Czarist Imperial Russia as the Russians absorbed more and more territory on the northern boundary of Afghanistan.

This led to what was called the “Great Game”, also called the Tournament of Shadows in Russia; was a term for the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. (Gratale, 2011).

A diplomat’s game leads to spilling of soldier’s blood, which is what happened during the First Anglo-Afghan War (Auckland’s Folly) (LOC, 1997). The timeframe was from1839-1842. The Mission was to re-install Shah Shuja, the deposed Afghan ruler, who was firmly in the British camp. The Brits also had to drive out Emir Dost Mohammad Khan in order to prevent undue Russian influence in region and protect British India. Initial movements started with 21000 troops moving from Calcutta, called the 'Army of the Indus'. Their movements into Afghanistan were under the paid protection of Ghilzai tribes. (NAM, 2012)

Figure 4 Afghanistan during the First Anglo-Afghan War.

The cities of Qalat and Ghazni fell, and Kabul was taken shortly thereafter. The initial troop strength was cut due to costs to around 8000 throughout the country. To add to this, families were allowed to join the troops in order to improve morale. The garrisons manned were too large for the number of troops that were in country. There was no counter insurgency effort. All troop strength was tied to garrison security. In November 1841, a senior British officer, Sir Alexander 'Sekundar' Burnes, and his aides were killed by a mob in Kabul. The British forces took no action in response to the incident, which encouraged further revolt. The British situation soon deteriorated when Afghans stormed the poorly defended supply fort inside Kabul on November 9th. (Blood, 2001)

“In the early months of 1841 saw growing exasperation in London at the continuing lack of progress in establishing Shah Shuja on his throne. Hobhouse sent two dispatches to Auckland in which he criticised the decision to withdraw the Bombay contingent, discounted the current policy as one of trying to maintain stability with an inadequate force, and suggested that it would be better either to withdraw from Afghanistan completely or to accept that troops would have to stay there for several years and in sufficient numbers to ensure its submission” (Ewans, 2005)

This emboldened the resistance which grew under the leadership of Dost Muhammad’s son, Akbar Khan. The Commander of the British Army of the Indus, General Elphinstone negotiated a peaceful, unmolested, and safe withdrawal from Kabul with Akbar Khan. Plan was not honored. Ghilzai tribes that were paid to help cover their movement into country, slaughtered them as they left. Only one survivor, “Dr. W. Brydon is frequently mentioned as the only

survivor of the march to Jalalabad--out of a column of more than 16,000 (consisting of about 4,500 military personnel, both British and Indian, along with as many as 12,000 camp followers) who undertook the retreat” (Blood, 2001)

Fig 1 Remnants of an Army by Elizabeth Butler, depicting Dr. William Brydon who was the sole Briton to complete the catastrophic retreat from Kabul.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War was from 1878-1880. The mission was to establish Afghanistan as a friendly buffer state between British held India and Imperial Russia. As part of the “Great Game”, this was to prevent Russians from threatening Indian border. On November 21, 1878, British forces numbering 40,000 men move in three columns into Afghanistan. They quickly occupied much of the country. During this time, the British dealt with two separate rebellions around the country. What counter insurgency efforts were employed would be best described as enemy-centric with little thought given to the safety and security of the populace. On 3 September 1879, there was an uprising in Kabul. Major General Sir Frederick Roberts led the Kabul Field Force over the Shutargardan Pass into central Afghanistan, defeated the Afghan Army at Char Asiab on 6 October 1879 British occupy Kabul. Ayub Khan, who had been serving as governor of Herat, rose in revolt, defeated a British detachment at the Battle of Maiwand in July 1880 and besieged Kandahar. Roberts then led the main British force from Kabul and decisively defeated Ayub Khan on 1 September at the Battle of Kandahar, bringing his rebellion to an end (LOC, 1997). Open insurrection was crushed. Large troop formations ensured security, preventing another massacre.

“Colonel C.E. Callwell’s treatise, Small Wars, is a classic enemy‐centric counterinsurgency manual, and is still relevant to those with preference for this school of counterinsurgency theory. While current scholars tend not to accept Callwell’s ideas wholesale, those who favor the enemy‐centric approach support many of the principles he sets forth. Callwell formulated his ideas in an era when large powers projected their power around the globe with a heavy hand. Small Wars, first published in 1896, was his most famous work, and is one of the most substantial treatises that espouse an enemy‐centric approach to counterinsurgency. An officer in the British Army with experience combating insurgents in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Callwell does not express the sensitivity for the population so carefully detailed in other manuals for counterinsurgency. Changes in press coverage and geopolitics explain some of these differences; nevertheless, many principles that he sets forth were still supported after his death in 1928 and in the current day” (Calwell, 1990).

Sher Ali's son and successor, Yaqub, signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879 (Blood, 2001)

The British Contingent leaves as a whole in 1880 after leaving Abdur Rahman Khan, "The Iron Amir" in power (LOC, 1997). He was later part of the delineation of the “Durand Line” through Pashtunistan. Spark for future conflict.

The Third Anglo-Afghan War was from May to August 19, 1919, which is seen now as Afghan Independence day. This was actually started by Afghan offensive operations into India. King Amanullah orders the Afghan Army to invade India (LOC, 1997). Pashto tribes quickly joined in the fight against the British. The combined British and Indian Army pushed back the Afghan advance and the fight ended in a draw. The punitive campaign that followed carried out by British troops was definitely enemy-centric and bordered on terrorism..

“British tactics included what was colloquially referred to as “butcher and bolt” operations, in which villages would be destroyed, their inhabitants killed, and troops would immediately return to their base, making no attempt to occupy any territory” (Proctor, 2012).

Even though Afghanistan lost the fight for territory, it did gain trued independence and its own international entity. The formalization of the “Durand Line” (current border between Afghnistan and Pakistan) permanently separates the Pashto tribes on both sides of an international border. (NAM, 2012) This splitting of the Pashto tribes is meant to weaken them, but it provides sanctuary across an international border, foreshadowing of things to come.

Historically, Russia had always been involved in Afghanistan. When it had the chance, it has taken territory over the centuries. What kept the land annexation in check was the “Reign of Kings” in Afghanistan. Under the rule of the Durrani dynasty, there was some level of stability. A bloodless coup by Mohammad Daoud, ended 231 years of rule by descendants of Ahmad Shah (Durrani) in 1973.

“The stability Zahir Shah had sought through constitutionally sanctioned limited democracy had not been achieved, and was a generally favorable response greeted Daoud's reemergence even though it meant the demise of the monarchy Ahmad Shah Durrani established in 1747” (LOC, 1997).

Two hundred and thirty-one years of royal rule by Ahmad Shah and his descendants had ended, but it was less clear what kind of regime had succeeded them. (LOC, 1997) Daoud had sought to distance the country from the Soviets. He also purged leftist supporters from power, which included Mir Akbar Khyber an Afghan intellectual and a leader of the Parcham faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Khyber’s assassination led to the overthrow of Mohammed Daoud Khan, and to the advent of a communist regime in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. (Cordovez, 1995). This bloody coup was known as the April (Saur) 1978 Revolution. (Rubin, 2002).

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was a Soviet backed Communist party. It was very factional between various parts of the PDPA that would take on violent overtones in the future. In March 1979, Hafizullah Amin took over as prime minister retained the position of field marshal and becoming vice-president of the Supreme Defence Council. Taraki remained President and in control of the Army. On 14 September, Amin overthrew Taraki, who was killed. Amin stated that "the Afghans recognize only crude force." (Saikal, 2006). The PDPA immediately implemented a liberal and Marxist-Leninist agenda. It moved to replace religious and traditional laws with secular and Marxist-Leninist ones. Men were obliged to cut their beards, women could not wear a chador, and mosques were placed off limits. There were attempted reforms on women's rights, banning forced marriages, state recognition of women's right to vote, and the introduction of women into political life (Saikal, 2006). The PDPA imprisoned, murdered, and tortured thousands of members of the intelligentsia traditional elite, and the religious establishment. While these reforms were received well in the cities and larger population centers, they were wildly unpopular in the rural areas and the Pashto tribal areas in particular. By spring 1979, unrests had reached 24 out of 28 Afghan provinces including major urban areas. Over half of the Afghan army would either desert or join the insurrection.

“Most of the government's new policies clashed directly with the traditional Afghan understanding of Islam; making religion one of the only forces capable of unifying the tribally and ethnically divided population against the unpopular new government, and ushering in the advent of Islamist participation in Afghan politics ” (Berkely Center, 2012).

Fig 1 The Soviet Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979

On December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces, joining thousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul under the pretext of a field exercise. On December 26, Soviet “Alpha Group”, their national level commando force of 65 operators, stormed the palace killing 400 guards and assassinated Hafizullah Amin. The operation was fully complete by the morning of December 28, 1979. Babrak Karmal, the exiled leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, was brought back from his posting as the Afghan Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and made him Prime Minister. Soviet Premier Leonid Breshnev ordered massive Soviet ground forces (40th Army) to invade from the north and they quickly over ran the country. (BBC, 2009)

As the Soviet Occupation began, so did the opposition against liberalization of Afghanistan and the movement away from Islamic law.

“Soviet counterinsurgency – as a reaction to the insurgency that contested the government supported by the Kremlin – was also a synthesis of varying approaches. On the one hand, Soviet forces adopted many enemy‐centric principles into their strategy: they sought to engage and kill as many insurgents as possible and went to great lengths to bring the fight to their enemies. Often unable to apprehend elusive insurgent forces, Soviet forces routinely decimated crops, livestock, and villages in an effort to weaken insurgent supply sources and sanctuaries.48 On the other hand, Soviet strategy did include non‐coercive principles aimed at persuading the population to support their cause. Significant funds were invested in Afghan infrastructure and education in an effort to build institutions and human capital. Soviet politicians worked to influence the Kabul government to support reforms aimed at improving conditions in Afghan society. Soviet leaders supported substantial propaganda initiatives for promoting and publicizing the message and interests of the Kabul government. (Doohovsky, 2009).

Why the COIN strategy the Soviets used failed in Afghanistan: There are a lot of reasons why the Soviets had so many difficulties in Afghanistan, but one certainly is that their military was built for fighting a big war in Europe: maneuver, firepower, artillery, lots of tanks and mechanized vehicles. In fact, most of their crew served weapons systems mounted on their vehicles could not depress low enough to engage targets on the high ground I the mountain passes. They were not inclined to deploy too many forces, so they actually put too few of the wrong kind of forces into Afghanistan and they were prosecuting the wrong kind of operations, those suited for a large conventional war that involved a lot of lethal action, a lot of heavy bombing, targeting villages, and employing airpower excessively and indiscriminately. Another reason was that they basically misunderstood the nature of Afghanistan and tried to impose a communist social design without asking the Afghan people if they wanted or not.(Manea, Cassidy, 2012)

The United States in entered Afghanistan following attacks on September 11, 2001. The official reason is due to the Taliban government of Afghanistan refused to surrender Osama Bin Laden to the United States. The first forces on the ground were elements of 5th SFG(A), working in concert with Other Government Agencies. They effected link up with United Front also known as the Northern Alliance who had been under the artful leadership of the “Lion of the Panshir”, Ahmed Shah Masood. Masood was assassinated by Al Qaeda on 9 September 2001. Their mission was to topple the Taliban ruled government in Afghanistan. With the backing of its allies and a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution, the United States took decisive action. With Special Operations Forces (SOF), CIA operatives, and U.S. airpower in support, the Northern Alliance and friendly Pashtun tribes in the south were able to vanquish the Taliban forces and chase them and their al Qaeda allies into Iran and Pakistan

The Coalition forces build strength as the mission changes from regime change to nation building. The NATO sponsored International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) grew to @130,000. The top five contributors were the US, UK, Germany, France, and Italy. (ISAF, 2011) The stated ISAF Mission is

“In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.” (ISAF, 2011).

This counterinsurgency campaign being waged by ISAF and the United States is more population centric than the Soviet campaign or the British campaign during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. If one were to try and scale the three differing strategies on a single line, on the far left would be the British strategy of counter insurgency during the Second Anglo-Afghan war. The British were very enemy centric, taking the fight to the insurgents. While this is a very easy approach for the military mind because the units conducting such missions for the most part are manned, trained, and equipped for such offensive operations, it does ignore the population and its security.

The Soviet strategy would be to the right on this scale. The Soviets blended both enemy centric operations conducted mostly by their airborne and special operations forces and some limited population centric operations. These were limited in nature and tended to be overwhelmed by the Soviet use of immense firepower. This was demonstrated by the use of large maneuver formations that were better suited for the rolling plains of Europe than the mountainous regions of Afghanistan.

“The May operation, rather typical of the larger Soviet offensives in Afghanistan, employed about 15,000 Soviet and DRA Army troops equipped with armored personnel carriers and tanks and supported by artillery and Mi-24 helicopter gunships” (Baumann, 2001).

Even though they brought an enormous advantage of firepower to the fight, they still lost 3000 soldiers during that operation (Baumann, 2001). The problems get deeper when one looks at the second and third order effects of such firepower on an insurgent battlefield. When civilians are caught in the crossfire, it is not the insurgents who are blamed, it is the government(s) in power who are held responsible by the people.

This brings us to current counter insurgency strategies being employed by ISAF and American forces in Afghanistan currently. If one was to peruse the book “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” by David Galula, you would be looking deep into the core of the type of operations being waged today. He proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency:

“The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

-Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

-Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

-Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.” (Galula, 1964).

Galula’s laws are reflected in the US Army’s latest manual Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This is hardly surprising when one looks at some of the architects of that manual David Killcullen and John Nagl, both proponents of Galula’s population centric focus of counter insurgency. It encapsulates current strategy of American forces in Afghanistan to Clear, Hold, and Build. The idea is that COIN forces should move into an area and “Clear” it of insurgent forces. Those same forces should “Hold” the same area as local forces can be manned, trained and equipped to secure the area. Then the next step is to “Build” local infrastructure and governance in order to successfully severe the ties between the insurgent and the population. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan are doing this at the village level in what is known as Village Stability Operations. In these operations, villages are selected for their strategic or operational value and their willingness to work alongside coalition forces. (Connett, 2011).

Over the centuries, the truth has been told of how great forces break upon the mountains of Afghanistan like waves upon the rocks. It is known as “the graveyard of empires” (Mahmud Tarzi, 1919). The Achaemenid Empire, Alexander the Great, the Timiruds, Ghengis Kahn, the Durannis, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union all met with defeat and disaster in the mountains of Afghanistan. Maybe this time will be different.

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Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan, A look back and a look forward

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