Critical Review of Van Evera's Article 'Offense, Defense and the Causes of War'

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A Critical Review of Van Evera, S. (1998) 'Offense, Defense and the Causes of War' [Electronic version]. International Security, 22(4), 5-43.

    This essay will provide a critical evaluation of Stephen Van Evera’s article ‘Offense, Defense and the Causes of War’. This will be done by beginning with a brief overview of the article and the key points the author makes which lead him to reach his eventual conclusions. The main arguments put forward by the author will then be placed within the wider context of the literature on the offense-defense argument and causes of war, studying the strengths of this article and then moving on to the weaknesses, continuously comparing Van Evera’s thesis to other academia. The critical evaluation will then conclude with the validity of the author’s argument in regards to the issues discussed.

    Van Evera is a defensive realist and in this article he constructs his arguments around the offense-defense theory, and states that the probability of war is increased dramatically when “conquest is easy”. However, changes in the offense-defense balance can greatly increase or decrease the chances of war (Van Evera 1998 p5). He goes on to argue that even if these ‘changes’ in balance are merely perceptions they still greatly affect the likelihood of war (Van Evera 1998 p41). Van Evera begins with an outline of the ‘effects’ of offense dominance and lists ten ‘war-causing effects’ that occur during offensive dominance. This is summarised later in the article in the form of a table which displays how all explanations conclude in war. These are ‘opportunistic expansion’, ‘defensive expansion’, ‘fierce resistance to expansion by other states’, ‘moving first is more rewarding’, ‘windows are larger, and more dangerous’, ‘faits accomplis are more common and more dangerous’, ‘states negotiate less and reach fewer agreements’, ‘secrecy is more common and more dangerous’, ‘more intense arms racing’, and ‘offense grows even stronger’ (Van Evera 1998 p12). Furthermore, he gives examples of failed offensive countries, such as Germany (Van Evera 1998 p42), to display the flaws in being offensive and validate his own viewpoint. To test his hypothesis he uses three case studies, Europe since 1789, ancient-China, and the United States (US) since 1789, and concludes that the offense-defense theory “has the attributes of a good theory” and a “wide explanatory range,” and it also has “wide real-world applicability” (Van Evera 1998 p41).

    The solution to this problem of offensive realism, according to the author, is for states to adhere to the defensive branch of realism, as this reduces the risk of war dramatically and makes issues such as pre-emptive war very undesirable (Van Evera 1998 p9). He also implies that during any given period that defensive realism dominates, states are more cooperative with one another, and this thus creates stability in the international realm (Van Evera 1998 p10-11). Van Evera’s main argument is that war is more likely to occur when a state believes that conquest is easy (Van Evera 1998 p5). This argument is prominent amongst offensive realists and there is much academia to support this, such as Morgenthau, who claims that states continuously attempt “to accumulate power internationally” (1955 p26). In addition, other offensive realists works support another of Van Evera’s main theories, that the offense-defense balance consistently changes, as each state ‘races’ to surpass the other technologically (Van Evera 1998 p14). This is supported by Mearsheimer, who states that offensive weapons have been developed in response to defensive weapons, such as the tank (Mearsheimer 1983 p25). As aforementioned, Van Evera is a defensive realist, and thus the aim of the article is to state the various disadvantages of offensive realism. As Van Evera’s arguments are still widely accepted it is evident that the article has many strengths, with academics, such as Paul, strongly agreeing with Van Evera that when a state can easily impose its will upon another it will engage in offensive policies (Paul 2004 p5). Additionally, the 1998 Spring edition of ‘International Security’ was headlined by two articles on the offensive-defensive theory, the first of which being the article under evaluation, the other being by Glaser and Kaufmann. This article concurs with Van Evera’s main argument that having an “Offense advantage makes war more likely” (Glaser & Kaufmann 1998 p48). Furthermore, the theory of defensive realism that is favoured by Van Evera is also supported by various other political scientists, with much academia on the topic that predates the article by a number of years, such as Mastanduno, who argued that “states are not ‘gap   maximisers’ ” (Mastanduno 1991 p79). Furthermore, this is also heavily supported by the “balance of threat” theory put forward by defensive realist Stephen Walt. His thesis claims that if an imbalance of threat occurs then “states will form alliances or increase their internal efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability” (Walt 1987 p263). Walt, as well as Joesph Grieco, also argue that security is the principle goal of the state and as such “only seek the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival” (Dunne & Schmidt 2001 p152). This branch of realism is the one adhered to by Van Evera, and according to this view, states are defensive actors and thus do not seek to gain further power if it comes at the cost of its own security. Thus when conquest is difficult, the prominence of powerful states is accepted by smaller states, as “they adopt sensible and effective balancing strategies” (Hopf 1991 p488), and then become “less aggressive and more willing to accept the status quo” (Van Evera 1998 p7). This can be seen as a strength of the article, as this statement is supported by various academics, such as Dunne and Schmidt, who also argue that this is the case (2001 p152). Van Evera also enjoys much consensus on one of his concluding statements, that the offense-defense theory “has the attributes of a good theory” and a “wide explanatory range,” and it also has “wide real-world applicability” (Van Evera 1998 p41). Political theorists, such as Labs, also argue that offensive realism provides the best theory of international relations (Labs 1998 cited by Donnelly 2000 p76).

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    Since the publication of Van Evera’s article there has been much debate on the issue, with the article coming under heavy criticism. Almost immediately after the publication, Van Evera was subject to much scrutiny in an editorial from the journal ‘International Security’. In this critique Davis reveals a strength of Van Evera’s work, but presents it as a weakness, in that he claims that Van Evera overstates the extent to which his theory stands up to empirical tests (Davis et al 1998/1999 p181). He also states that Van Evera presents an argument in which every outcome is in ...

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