`makers. All of these groups are important and have the capacity to
`influence or be influenced by the government and its foreign policy.
`The inattentive public, making up the vast majority of the
`electorate, exercise a poweful, yet vague, negative veto. Within
`which the government, opinion elites and pressure groups must work
`or, ultimately, seek to change. This negative veto has been
`experienced by various governments when trying to solve a foreign
`policy dilemna and has seriously limited their options. There are
`many incidents in the field of international relations were this
`point may be illustrated. After the initial surge of patriotism had
`waned during the Korean war, President Truman found that public
`opinion would not let him negotiate a peace acceptable to the
`Chinese, nor would it let him finish the war decisively. Similarly,
`it was a massive groundswell of popular opinion which effectively
`ended direct participation by America in the Vietnam war. The British
`government is also affected by a negative veto when it comes to
`consider its foreign policy options with regard to the Falkland
`Islands and Argentina. One of the most striking examples of the
`negative veto exercised by public opinion was the response of the
`Japanese public to the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty with the
`USA in 1960. Despite intense American pressure for Japan to expand
`its military capability, the ruling Liberal-Democratic party had no
`other option than to continue with its policies of pacifism. However,
`it would be misleading to attach too much importance to the role and
`power of the negative veto. The parameters within which the general
`public expects its government to stay are vague and very broad. More
`often than not public opinion plays a positive role and is
`supportive, or ambivalent, of the national government. Supporters of
`the top down process feel that the general public are ill informed,
`inconsistent and incoherent on the subject of international
`relations, and look to their leaders for guidance. Indeed Wendzel
`quotes a former British foreign minister who felt that that there had
`been no occasion on which he or his superiors had been significantly
`affected on important decisions by public opinion. (Wendzel P.230)
`Risse-Kappen, however, would take issue with these assumptions of the
`top-down process. In his study on the effects of public opinion in
`Liberal Democracies, empirical evidence from the USA found that 20-
`30% of the electorate indicated serious concern about foreign affairs,
`and that public attitudes about basic foreign policy issues were more
`stable than previously assumed. While certain segments of the
`inattentive public could be influenced by government propaganda, there
`was a lively debate between the attentive public and issue publics,
`which in turn, could influence the mood and response of the general
`public. It would seem, therefore that government policy could be
`influenced by the attentive and issue publics. How much influence and
`pressure these disparate groups could bring to bear would depend on the
`nature of the domestic political structure. 'In other words,
`similarities in public attitudes across various countries do not
`necessarily lead to similar policies' (Risse-Kappen P.483) So, in this
`respect we will now study the internal political structure of the USA,
`France and what was formerly known as the FRG.
`Risse-Kappen maintains that, if public attitudes and variations in the
`international environment cannot account for the differences in
`policies between states, then it must be the domestic structures and
`coalition building processes which are the missing link. The domestic
`structures of a state can be summarized as being the institutional and
`organizational arrangements linking state and society... and how
`responsive, or permeable, these structures are to societal demands. The
`coalition building processes will then feed into the state structures
`hoping to influence its decisions by the strength and mobilization of
`its own forces. The degree of success will be determined by the extent
`of centralization of the decision-making processes and the structure of
`the society ie whether it is split along ideological or class lines and
`how well developed are its social coalitions and organizations in
`expressing their opinions. Peter Gourevitch has developed a framework
`for coalition building processes, within specific domestic politcal
`structures, which would seem to fit our three liberal democracies
`rather well: (Risse-Kappen p.486)
`A) 'In countries with centralized political institutions but polarized
`societies and rather weak social organizations, the policy network is
`likely to be state-dominated.' As is the case with France, which has the
`aforementioned centralized political institutions and bureaucracies.
`The President is insulated from the parliament and controls the
`infighting between the bureaucracies, giving him virtual carte-blanche
`to determine France's foreign policy. To compound this French society
`is fragmented along ideological, class and religious lines, leading to
`inadequate and weak coalition building processes. As a result French
`public opinion is simply disengaged from the policy-making process.
`This was highlighted during the 1980's when Mitterand adopted a hawkish
`policy towards the USSR which reflected the attitude of the political
`and intellectual elites rather than mass public opinion. However, this
`relative freedom from public opinion and strong coalition influencing
`processes hasn't resulted in a virile and active foriegn policy, rather
`the political and intellectual elites of France seem to be a microcosm
`of the wider society, resulting in an uneasy alliance which seeks to
`maintain a vulnerable consensus.
`B) 'By contrast, societal control of the policy network is to be expected
`in countries with comparatively homogeneous societies and a high degree
`of societal mobilization but weak state structures.' This situation is
`characterized by the political and social structure of the USA. America
`has an open and comparatively weak state and political party strucure,
`with control being divided between various competing political elites
`such as the executive, Congress and powerful state departments. Society
`is fragmented along general ideological and class divisions. However,
`the ability of the issue publics and self-interest groups to mobilize
`and organize support for their demands gives them great influence in
`the open and fluid structure of the American domestic environment.
`Examples of these powerful policy influencers are the military-
`industrial complex, the peace movement and the many ethnic lobbies.
`Each of them highly organized, vocal and with access to the decision-
`makers and political elites. The American political and societal
`structure most resembles the 'bottom up' process. Research carried out
`on public opinion and policy changes between 1935 to 1979 revealed a
`congruence between public opinion changes and policy shifts. In at
`least half the cases the policy changes followed the shifts in public
`opinion. (Risse-Kappen P.500) This is highlighted by the coalition
`building process against President Reagan's continued hardline aginst
`the USSR between 1982-84. The waning of public support for his cold war
`rhetoric allowed peace campaigners to mobilize other societal actors,
`who in turn acted on Congress and the House of Representatives followed
`by a policy shift in the Reagan administration. This is a clear example
`of issue publics using the power of public opinion to promote their
`cause, thereby influencing the coalition building process among
`political elites, which in turn influenced policy. However, this must
`not lead us to suppose that American foreign policy is solely
`determined by interest groups and issue publics. Paradoxically, the
`weakness of the party structure and the fragmentation of the elites
`means that the coalition building process is continually shifting and
`policy is never institutionalized. The administration, in many cases,
`can symbolically change its policy stance yet continue to carry on with
`a strong and stable foreign policy. Nevertheless, the USA still fits
`Gourevitch's model: the policy-relevant coalition building takes place
`among societal actors, and accordingly, public opinion plays a major
`role.
`C) 'Countries with political institutions and social organizations of
`comparable strength are likely to have a policy network characterized
`by democratic corporatism. Political and societal actors would be
`engaged in continous bargaining processes in search of policy
`compromises in an environment of give and take' This model resembles
`the domestic political and social structure of the FRG. Despite a
`comparatively weak Parliament, and fairly strong Chancellor, the
`political parties are the final arbiter between the executive and
`legislative branches. The nature of the west German coalition
`governments means that there is a continual process of consensus
`building between the various political parties. The German population
`is fairly homogeneous diplaying no great class cleavages or ideological
`divides. There are three strong social organizations: Business, Trade
`Unions and Church, which encourages a high level of participation among
`the population and ensures representation to the higher levels of
`government. The nature of the policy networks and societal
`organizations have evolved since the 1950's from a purely 'top down'
`process to one which is much more inertactive. This is illustrated by
`the peace movements of the early 1980's. As in the USA, public opinion
`began to turn against the cold war rhetoric and the introduction of a
`new generation of nuclear missiles on German soil. The issue publics
`mobilized this mass public support and influenced the coalition
`building processes among the political elites. Eventually this led to a
`significant shift of the FRG foreign policy concerning disarmanent and
`resulted in the Germans enthusiastically embracing the policies
`proposed by Gorbachev. In contrast to France the openness of the German
`structure led to a substantial configuration of foreign policy,
`reflecting the concerns of the issue public. 'And unlike the USA, the
`strength of the party system in the policy network allowed for the
`institutionalization of the societal consensus.' (Risse-kappen P.507)
`CONCLUSIONS
`In a democracy public opinion cannot be ignored, for as James Russell
`Lowell once wrote: 'All free governments, whatever their name, are in
`reality government by public opinion.' (Bloomfield P.131) Statesmen may
`try to mould or manipulate public opinion, but there remain certain
`broad, amorphous limits they can not cross. In this essay we have shown
`that there is a much more complicated and engaged dialogue, between
`governed and governing, than the simple models of 'bottom up' and 'top
`down' could incorporate. While not determining foreign policy, the issue
`publics of Germany and the USA, through favourable public opinion and
`the domestic political structures, have influenced the coalition
`buiding processes of the political elite, and with it, foreign policy
`Therefore, we conclude that statesmen, rather than ignoring public
`opinion, are sometimes implementing policy goals which have already
`been set for them by an informed and motivated public opinion.
