Thirdly, the Lords can provide a much more in-depth and vigorous role in scrutinising legislation than the Commons. This is because the Lords have more time to debate issues in detail and a higher level of meaningful debate takes place. The time constraints and work burden placed on ministers in the Commons often leads to uninformed and less substantive debate. As well as this, the composition of the Lords is more independent and less party influenced which again allows for a higher level of debate than the adversarial brand of political point scoring often witnessed in the Commons. Therefore, again through its debating function the House of Lords can scrutinise the actions of government.
Fourthly, the Lords have their own committees, which can scrutinise government legislation and consider bills in detail. Select committees in the Lords have the power to investigate government activities and to hold hearings and collect evidence. In this way the Lords continues to act as a powerful check on the executive.
Finally, the bicameral system – with the House of Lords as the Upper Chamber and the House of Commons with its scrutinising powers through questions, committees, debates and the role of the opposition party - works together to provide a power check on the executive, which is an important safeguard on democracy in an era where primeministerial power has increased.
However, despite these arguments there is also evidence to suggest that the House of Lords no longer acts as a power check on the executive due to its limited powers and composition.
Firstly, the legislative powers of the Lords have been reduced significantly since 1911. Reforms have all but reduced the legislative function of the Lords to a delayer rather than an initiator. The Lords now only possess the power to delay the passage of legislation for a year. The Lords have no effective power to stop legislation permanently or to introduce their own bills. In this way, the House of Lords could be criticised for merely rubber stamping the legislative decisions made by the executive. Therefore, the Lords is no longer a powerful check on the executive as its power base has been severely diminished.
Secondly, the social composition of the House of Lords tends to be white, upper-class males, largely Oxbridge educated. Their views tend to reflect that of the establishment and are essentially conservative and traditionalist. Their role therefore in acting as a checking mechanism on the government depends on the government in power and whether they are in agreement with their ideas and policies. In other words, the Lords are unlikely to check or delay legislation they agree with, only matters that they do not. An example would be government legislation on fox hunting. This goes to show the Lords power in upholding democracy and providing checks and balances on the power of the executive power is somewhat limited by their personal beliefs and policy positions.
Thirdly, the Salisbury doctrine states that the House of Lords should not defeat a government bill at second reading if the bill was meeting a manifesto commitment of government. In other words, as the government have an electoral mandate the Lords should not stand in the way of giving the people what they want. This doctrine whilst ensuring the Lords inferior position to the elected House of Commons also demonstrates their weakened powers vis a vis the Executive.
Finally, Labour’s staged reform of the House of Lords, although supposedly leading to a fairer, more elected second chamber, have reduced hereditary peers and led to a situation where the Lords is composed of many appointed peers. This is problematic in regards to the checking function that the Lords might have on the executive, as many of these peers have been appointed by no other than the PM. In this case, it might be argued that an upper chamber made up of ‘Tony’s Cronies’ is unlikely to operate effectively as a tool of scrutiny and more likely to push government bills through. In such case the Lords ability to check the power of the executive is compromised.
To conclude it seems that whilst in theory the House of Lords has an important role to play in checking the power of the executive, particularly in an era of growing party discipline and large government majorities, their powers are limited to delaying legislation, and their composition makes them unlikely to challenge many government decisions on behalf of democracy and the people. Let us hope that an elected upper chamber as promised by government reform will be more effective in this role.
