In 1995 the Madrid European Council further clarified that a candidate country must also be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect. Accession also requires the candidate country to have created the conditions for its integration by adapting its administrative structures. While it is important for EU legislation to be transposed into national legislation, it is even more important for the legislation to be implemented and enforced effectively through the appropriate administrative and judicial structures. This is a prerequisite of the mutual trust needed for EU membership.
In addition, the EU must be able to integrate new members: it needs to ensure that its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable; it needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing common policies in all areas; and it needs to be in a position to continue financing its policies in a sustainable manner.
Countries wishing to join the EU can proceed from one stage of the process to the next, but only once all the conditions at each stage have been met. In this way, the prospect of accession acts as a powerful incentive to reform. The EU policy on enlargement ensures that the process is meticulously managed, so that accession brings benefits simultaneously to the EU and to the countries that join it.
- Turkey’s European Union communication strategy.
Turkey’s prospective as a possible member of the EU
Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU is politically relevant from at least two perspectives: the political discussion within the member states as well as the discussion between political actors within the EU , for example in the European Parliament.
Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership following the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Accession negotiations started in October 2005 with the analytical examination of the EU legislation (the so-called screening process). Since then the EU closed provisionally one chapter and opened negotiations on 12 chapters. On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership with Turkey.
Turkey has had a long association with the project of European integration. The European Economic Community (EEC) signed in 1963 the Ankara Association Agreement for the progressive establishment of a customs union. The Ankara Association was supplemented by an Additional Protocol signed in November 1970. Due to the Turkish failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement the Council decided in December 2006 that eight relevant chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment. The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.
The EU established a Customs Union with Turkey in 1995. The scope of the Customs Union covers trade in manufactured products between Turkey and the EU, and also entails alignment by Turkey with certain EU policies, such as technical regulation of products, competition, and Intellectual Property Law. Trade between the EU and Turkey in agriculture and steel products is regulated by separate preferential agreements. The Customs Union has significantly increased the volume of trade between Turkey and EU member states. Today, more than half of Turkey's trade is with the EU. Turkey’s main industrial imports from the EU continue to be machinery, automotive products, chemicals, iron and steel. Its main agricultural imports from the EU are cereals. Major EU imports from Turkey include textiles and cloth, machinery, and transport equipment.
Date Map
30 June 2010 - Negotiations are opened on Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy.
June 2008 - Negotiations are opened on two chapters: Intellectual property and Company law (June 2008).
February 2008 - Adoption by the Council of a revised for Turkey.
December 2007 - Negotiations are opened on two chapters: Trans-European Networks and Consumer and health protection
June 2007 - Negotiations are opened on two chapters: Financial Control and Statistics.
March 2007 - Negotiations are opened on the chapter Enterprise and Industry
December 2006 - Due to the Turkish failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the Council decides that eight relevant chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment. The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.
June 2006 - Negotiations are opened and closed on the chapter Science and Research
December 2005 - Adoption by the Council of a revised Accession Partnership for Turkey.
October 2005 - Starting of the screening process concerning the analytical examination of the acquis.
October 2005 - Adoption by the Council of a Negotiating Framework setting out the principles governing the negotiations followed by the formal opening of Accession negotiations with Turkey.
June 2005 - The Commission adopts a Communication on the civil-society dialogue between EU and Candidate countries . This communication sets out a general framework on how to create and reinforce links between civil society in the EU and candidate countries.
December 2004 - The European Council defines the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations.
October 2004 - The Commission presents its Recommendation on Turkey's Progress towards accession along with its paper Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective.
May 2003 - Adoption by the Council of a revised Accession Partnership for Turkey.
March 2001 - The Council adopts the Accession Partnership for Turkey.
December 1999 - EU Helsinki Council recognises Turkey as an EU candidate country on an equal footing with other candidate countries.
December 1997 - At the Luxembourg European Council, Turkey is declared eligible to become a member of the European Union.
1995 - Turkey-EU Association Council finalises the agreement creating a customs union between Turkey and the EU.
April 1987 - Turkey makes an application for full EEC membership.
November 1970 - The Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol are signed in Brussels, preparing the ground for the establishment of the customs union.
September 1963 - An association agreement (known as the Ankara Agreement) is signed, aiming at bringing Turkey into a Customs Union with the EEC and to eventual membership. A first financial protocol to the initial agreement is also signed.
September 1959 - Turkey applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC).
Financial help from the EU to Turkey
Since 2007, Turkey is receiving EU financial aid under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The allocation for 2008 totals € 538.7 million.
IPA assistance is deployed in accordance with the strategy that was established in the Turkey Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for 2007-2009, which was updated in 2008 and now covers the period 2008-2010.
IPA assistance to Turkey is implemented under decentralised management according to the five IPA components available to Candidate Countries and builds on assistance provided to Turkey under the previous financial instruments, the MEDA Programme (1996-2001) and the Turkey pre-accession assistance instrument (2002-2006).
Annual or multi-annual programmes (depending on the component) are designed in accordance with the strategic MIPDs. They are adopted by the Commission following consultation with the beneficiary countries and other stakeholders. They are implemented in one of three ways: by , or management.
The core activity under IPA Component I is Institution Building, addressing priorities as fully meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, ability to assume the obligations of membership; as well as the promotion of an EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue. Institution building also includes supporting programmes aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity for the management of EU funds as well as covering Turkey's participation in Community Programmes.
The core activity under IPA component II is Cross-border Cooperation. IPA 2007 and 2008 programmes support cooperation between Turkey and Bulgaria as well as Turkey's participation in the Black Sea basin Programme under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). A key objective of the Turkey-Bulgaria Cross-Border Cooperation Programme is to tackle the lack of competitiveness in the socio-economic development in the relevant area as compared to EU development levels. Another aim is to face common challenges in the environment and nature protection, as well as in relation to cross-border emergency situations. Activities to be supported under Turkey's participation in the ENPI Black Sea basin Programme include the promotion of economic and social development in the Black Sea basin; the aim of working together to address common challenges as well as to promote local, people-to-people type actions.
Assistance under IPA Components III (Regional Development), IV (Human Resources Development) and V(Agriculture and Rural Development) aims at preparing Turkey for participation in the Community's cohesion as well as agriculture and rural development policies. The assistance is provided by an IPARD Rural Development Programme for the period 2007-2013 which has been drafted by the Turkish authorities and approved by the European Commission. The Programme will be managed by Turkey after it has set up the necessary system for managing the funds. The Programme defines several priority agricultural sectors such as dairy, meat, fruit and vegetables and fisheries, and will be implemented in 42 provinces in Turkey. Examples of actions that may be supported under the IPARD programme are given below:
- Investments in agricultural holdings to upgrade them to the Community standards (sectors supported: Meat, Milk)
- Investments in Processing and marketing (sectors: Meat, Milk, Fruit and Vegetables, Fisheries)
- Support for setting up of producer groups
- Support for preparation of local rural development strategies
- Support for measures related to the environment and the countryside
- Diversification of economic activities (actions such as: development of local products, rural tourism, etc.)
EU-TURKEY Civil Society Dialogue
EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue seeks to integrate civil society into the process of Turkey’s EU accession. It aims to generate mutual knowledge and understanding between civil societies in both Turkey and EU Member States. The dialogue creates fora where mutual concerns and topics of common interest can be discussed. Further to the EU funded activities below, projects contributing to Civil Society Dialogue are also carried out on a bilateral basis between EU Member States and Turkey.
CURRENT ACTIVITIES
-CLOSED CALLS FOR PROPOSAL
• “Small Projects Programme: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue” (€750,000) This programme supports the broad goal of deepening dialogue and enhancing mutual understanding between civil society in Turkey and the EU Member States. 17 projects are currently being carried out with partners in 13 countries. These projects cover a variety of issues, including youth, business community dialogue, minority rights, regional development and disabled persons.
-OPEN CALLS FOR PROPOSAL
• “Civil Society Dialogue: Europa-Bridges of Knowledge” (€1.4 million) Open until 10 August 2006: Projects under this programme focus on establishing networks and strengthening existing collaboration between NGOs and universities based in Turkey and the EU to enhance Turkey’s expertise on the Acquis Communautaire, ie the body of EU law.
• “Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO events in the EU” (€50,000) Open until 30 October 2006: This programme provides financial support for study visits, exchanges and NGO participation in platforms, meetings and conferences in the EU.
• “Civil Society Dialogue: Culture in Action” (€1.45 million) Open until 5 December 2006: This call for proposals provides funding for joint EU-Turkey cultural projects on the one hand and information/media activities regarding EU affairs on the other. It aims at raising public interest in Turkey in different aspects of European art and culture and increasing knowledge of the EU accession process.
-COMMUNITY PROGRAMMES
• Education (Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, and Youth) and Culture 2000 Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, and Youth are Community programmes in the field of education. They help improve citizens’ skills through promotion of transnational mobility, innovation, and training. The number of Turkish beneficiaries has been growing steadily over the past years. In particular, the Erasmus programme, part of Socrates, has seen high demand in Turkey. In 2005 more than 1.300 students and 320 teachers took advantage of it to pursue academic activities abroad.
-PLANNED ACTIVITIES
• “Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue between EU and Turkey” Under 2006 pre-accession assistance the European Commission will provide a further €21.5 million to promote the Civil Society Dialogue in Turkey. Activities will focus on the following target groups: Towns and local communities, professional organisations, universities, and youth organisations. Furthermore, this programme also includes a facility to assist the dialogue by supporting interpretation and translation services needed at Civil Society Dialogue events. The Turkish government is responsible for the implementation of all projects carried out under this programme. Further information may be obtained from the Turkish Secretariat General for European Union Affairs.
- Transformation of Turkey
Turkey’s Identity and Security Culture in the Path to Europe
The Turkish Republic was founded on a zealous process of Westernization and modernization. Paradoxically, the perception of the West in the Kemalist mindset was influenced by nationalism and national security concerns influenced by historical experiences like the Sévres Treaty. The Kemalist security culture has been constantly fed by fears of national disintegration by Kurdish insurgency and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. From 1990s onwards, on the contrary, this security perception has begun to transform. The EU at its Helsinki summit of December 1999 accorded Turkey the status of official candidacy. Since August 2002, the Turkish parliament has made a number of important legal and constitutional changes to upgrade Turkish democracy in accordance with European standards. These legal and constitutional changes have played an important role in transforming Turkish political culture. These changes have been so radical and unexpected that they have shocked both the anti-EU forces in Turkey and anti-Turkey factions in Europe. Despite the false expectations of the anti-Turkey lobbies in Europe that, owing to its authoritarian, Kemalist, militaristic and state-centric identity, Turkey could not become successful in transforming its identity into a democratic “European” identity, Turkey has made a considerable amount of progress in the path to be a part of Europe. Indeed, Europe defines itself mainly as a space of economic prosperity and democracy rather than security. In parallel with this view, since the early 2000s, it can be said that, Turkey has started to abandon its strict adherence to security as an identity representation. Also, Europe is defined not as a mono-cultural identity but a collection of multi-cultural traditions and. Moreover, European identity cannot be defined by a cultural pattern that has been declared to be specifically “European”, but instead with recourse to values of European origin and which in the meantime are considered universal. It has been maintained that the cultural identity of Europe is not to be sought in diversity alone, but and above all in the confrontation of the ongoing tensions between the contrasts. Therefore no primordial conception of European identity can be reached. In terms of Turkey‟s accession to the EU, the extent to which Turkey respects the principles of European democratic culture plays an important role for Turkey in becoming harmonious with European identity.
On the other hand, after the 1980 military coup, Turkey witnessed some kind of crisis in her national identity. At the economic level, the goal of industrialization was decisively shifted from import-substitution to export-promotion and much more emphasis was placed on market forces. This shift can be regarded as an important step for Turkey towards turning her inward-oriented economic structure into an outward-oriented free market economy. This shift was an important step towards making Turkey closer to Europe.
Apart from the economic aspect of transformation, a large area of socio-political life witnessed transformation too. This further transformation of Turkish socio-political life had a number of components such as expansion of the freedom of associations and protection of minorities‟ rights. The most notable of these were the easing of restrictions on the right to broadcast in different languages namely Kurdish. The reforms related to Kurdish issue were received with considerable suspicion among anti-EU camps, namely radical Kemalists and ultra-nationalists. The main argument of that camp was that, giving further rights to Kurdish people would undermine state authority and ultimately would lead to disintegration of the state. It is evident that, the EU membership process created a strong language of rights in Turkey. The EU started to play an important role in furthering the change in state-societal relations and provided legitimacy for a vast amount of civil society organizations. This change can be seen as a shift in Turkish national identity. Because one of the most predominant features of Turkish national identity is strong state tradition. But with the EU membership process this tradition has begun to deteriorate. On the other hand, if looked at Turkish security culture, it can be seen that, Turkey has been feeding a deep-seated fear in terms of security both about external and internal “enemies”. Especially the concept of “internal enemy” caused Turkish military‟s influential role in political affairs. Despite their formal separation, a partnership based on “imperfect concordance” was formed among the military and political elites in Turkey. In short, it can be asserted that in Turkey, military elites enjoy a considerable amount of political autonomy stimulated by security culture. This political autonomy which has been exercised via National Security Council (NSC) has been inharmonious with European norms. So Turkey adopted some constitutional amendments.
With the 2001 constitutional amendments, the sixth and seventh harmonization packages and the May 2004 constitutional amendments, a number of fundamental changes have been made to the duties, functioning and the composition of the NSC as well as to the conditions relating to the control of military spending. The changes aimed at reducing the power of the NSC secretariat. The secretariat has been transformed into a consultative body similar to that of its counterparts in the EU members, posing a challenge to the military‟s traditional role as guardian of the Republic.
There have also been important developments towards attaining a greater transparency of military expenditures. In the past, unlike its counterparts in the EU member states, the military in Turkey enjoyed a considerable autonomy regarding defence budgeting and defence procurement. With the seventh harmonization package and May 2004 constitutional amendments, the state assets utilized by the military were brought under the inspection of the Courts of Auditors, with no reservations regarding “secrecy clauses”. With that development, state‟s attitude towards military expenditures has become similar to the European norms and practices.
Apart from that, the ideology of Turkish nationalism with its state-based definition of national sovereignty has witnessed a significant shift towards the changing notion of sovereignty in Europe. On the other hand, in terms of Turkish foreign policy, the EU membership process caused a significant change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy which can be evaluated as a significant step towards the transformation of Turkish foreign policy norms and practices. In 2003 the Justice and Development Party (JDP) took enormous domestic political risks and overturned 40 years of Turkish policy by pressing the Turkish Cypriots to accept a political compromise that would allegedly enhance Turkey’s chances of joining the EU. Also in terms of identity issues, it has been argued that, the EU, as an anchorage for Turkey, is generally anticipated to alleviate identity issues and in turn put an end to the long-standing identity politics as a source of clientelism for party politics and as an excuse for an elitist, limited democracy
Apart from that, it is asserted that debates over expansion of the EU touch on the core identity of the EU – what is Europe and what is the purpose of the EU. She suggests three possible conceptualizations or ideal types for the EU: a problem solving entity; a values-based community; and a rights-based union. By defining the EU as a problem solving entity stress is placed on “economic citizenship” and material economic interests. Arguably, this was the main basis for legitimacy in the formative years of the European Communities when Turkey concluded her association agreement. Related to this, the key questions are whether the prospective applicant adds
material resources to the EU or complements existing EU members by strengthening the EU’s capacity to perform its core (economic) tasks. Values and cultures do not figure in these calculations.
The EU would define itself in a geographically limited manner to focus on the traditions, mores, and memories of common “European” experiences and values. The last model, that of a rights-based union, would emphasize political citizenship. It is argued that the Turkish case is crucial to the EU because there is a disjunction between the values-based rationale and the rights-based rationale in a sense, Europe must choose which is more important.
As a result, it can be said that from 1999 onwards, especially during the post-2002 governments a considerable amount of change and transformation have been witnessed in Turkey’s political and security culture as well as her identity. The „strong state tradition‟ has been weakening along with the flowering of a more plural and liberal political culture. So it is not hard to see that Turkey’s identity has been transformed in line with EU values and norms as her membership to the EU serves her national interests.
The Role of the USA
During the Cold War period, Turkey was a pivotal state for the United States. It was among the select group of countries with whom special strategic relationships had to been developed in line with fundamental American economic and security interests. During the Cold War, the containment of the Soviet threat constituted the prime consideration. In the context of the late 1990s, Turkey’s claim to a pivotal state status rested on its attractiveness as an ‘emerging market’ and its willingness to counteract terrorism (particularly in the aftermath of 9/11).
Washington increasingly realized the importance of Turkey as a key ally in its quest to deal with rising trans-national crime involving drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of human beings and, most important of all, terrorism. Indeed, Washington took on a strong stance against the PKK, classifying it as a terrorist organization. The US approach in this respect deviated substantially from its European counterparts, the latter adopting a more ambiguous and qualified approach in this respect. The words of Mark Parris, the former US Ambassador to Turkey, aptly illustrate the importance of Turkey in a relationship that was fundamentally security-oriented. ‘From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship proved as important as during the Cold War. Turkish participation in peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia Kosovo and Macedonia demonstrated to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara’s capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a ‘security producing’ nation’.
The United States, right from its early stages, sought to link Turkey explicitly to the European integration process. The key objective here was to anchor Turkey firmly to the West by integrating it into its institutional settings. NATO was one of the key institutions; the EC/EU was another. The active promotion of Turkey’s integration into Europe also reflected a desire on the part of the US to share the burden of responsibility in creating a strong and stable ally in a critical region of the world. Indeed, the US’s attitude and commitment to Turkey’s integration process with the EC/EU contrasted sharply with the far more ambiguous and lukewarm approach of the principal European states. One of the key reasons for this underlying difference is that Turkey’s membership of the EU did not involve any explicit costs for the US.
The Europeans, on the other hand, had to take into account the potential costs of Turkish accessions in terms of its impact on employment prospects, community-wide budgetary transfers, Common Agricultural Policy, the decision-making process and so on. Furthermore, the EU is a much more inward–oriented and much less security-oriented entity than the US. Consequently, it tends to view Turkey more as a security liability rather than as a security asset. This perception was based on the fear that the incorporation of Turkey would link the EU explicitly to a highly unstable part of the world and would import instability into the EU.
Clearly, a major difference could be detected in the transatlantic alliance well before the Iraqi War with the US, as a global power, putting much more emphasis on security and much less emphasis on the nature and quality of democracy than the EU. Hence, from an American perspective the security producing credentials of Turkey were of greater importance than its immediate democratic deficits, constituting a strong basis for rapid progress towards EU accession.
In any case, it is fair to say that the American administrations, right up to the Iraqi War, have tended to view differences with Europe as being of marginal rather than of fundamental significance. Notably, from an American standpoint, differences pertaining to the nature of market economy and democracy were matters of detail, not constituting in any way issues of substantive divergence. The US became increasingly active in promoting Turkey’s membership aspirations for the EU from the late 1990s onwards. A number of concrete steps could be identified in this respect. Following the disappointments of the Luxembourg Summit, the Clinton administration provided active diplomatic support for Turkish initiatives. This support was, in part, instrumental in securing a favorable outcome for Turkey at the subsequent Helsinki Summit.
In the aftermath of Helsinki, American support was also critical in terms of seeking a durable and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus dispute. Furthermore American support, through the IMF, was also important in Turkey’s ability to come through the deepest economic crisis of the post-War era. The Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, however, clearly displayed the limits of American power in so far as decision-making regarding EU membership was concerned. With the impending War on Iraq, the Bush administration placed considerable diplomatic pressure in European capitals to generate an early accession date for Turkey. The fact that this backfired indicates that although American support is important, what ultimately matters is the ability of Turkey to undertake domestic economic and political reforms and to implement the Copenhagen criteria fully. In retrospect, one should also recognize that persistent American pressure for Turkey’s EU membership had one important negative side effect. For a long time, it led significant elements of the state establishment in Turkey, notably the security and foreign policy making elites, to assume that they could avoid implementing certain key components of Copenhagen criteria. Given Turkey’s security importance and American support, they hoped to evade some elements of the Copenhagen criteria, such as the provision of cultural rights for the minorities (meaning the Kurds in the Turkish context), which they considered to constitute a threat to the unity of the nation state.
Rather paradoxically, therefore, strong American support for Turkey’s EU membership tended to strengthen the ‘anti-EU coalition’ in Turkey, meaning those who did not oppose EU membership per se but rather the political and economic conditions attached to EU membership. Indeed, such groups tended to view the US-Israel-Turkey axis as a natural basis for Turkish foreign policy and security interests and as a natural alternative to EU membership, which according to them was unlikely to be realized in any case given the conditions attached to such membership.
Clearly, the position of these groups in Turkish politics was fundamentally shaken by the US-led war on Iraq and the strains in Turkish-American relations experienced in this context.
- Conclusions
The Turkish leaders have been walking on a diplomatic tight-rope and it is essential that they strike a delicate balance between Turkey’s own security interests, the necessities of its close alliance with the US, its European orientation and the public demands. along with the extension of social interactions between the EU and Turkey, Turkey has reproduced her interests in parallel with her transforming identity. As known, in the constructivist approach, as a result of social interactions, actors in the international system are prone to change or redefine their interests in accordance with their identities. So, it can be asserted that in the relations between the EU and Turkey a change in Turkey’s interests is obvious.
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