The first-past-the-post electoral system makes voting rather pointless in seats that are safe for one of the parties, and leads parties to focus their local campaigns on a small number of “target” seats. In 2001, only 51 percent of voters voted for the winning candidate, the votes of the remaining 49 per cent could be said to have been wasted in that they did not help to elect anybody. Increasingly campaigns are focused on target seats and the major parties almost ignore constituencies in which they have little chance of winning.9 This does not give the electorate an incentive to vote and therefore could be a reason why turnout has dropped significantly. This also links to the degree of marginality between the party elections and the number of parties in an election.
Rational choice models assume people search for parties that match their own ideological stance, if they cannot find one then they may abstain. Rational choice theorists ask why anybody ever bothers to vote at all. There are two main reasons why a rational actor would not vote. The voter will unlikely to make any gain from the process. The costs of voting such as the travelling to the polling station are simply not justifiable. Linked to this, the chances of one vote making any difference to the result are minute. This depends to an extent on the size of the electorate, but the electorate would have to be very small, in order for the citizen’s vote to be pivotal.
Whilst aggregate data can predict circumstances where aggregate turnout will be low, one needs survey data to examine why individuals do not vote. This can be problematic for two reasons as most people vote, so non-voters only constitute a small part of the surveys. Another reason why it is problematic is due to the reason of the civic duty element associated with voting, some people claim to have voted when they have not in fact done so. Nevertheless Crewe, Fox and Alt suggested a number of hypothesis about non-voting. Firstly they suggest that a significant proportion of those not voting in any election fail to do so because the cost of voting rises above the cost threshold i.e. where the cost of voting outweigh the benefits. Also since increases of voting costs are often temporary (e.g. illness, holidays, moving house) so too is non-voting. They suggest that the social differences between voters and non-voters on social background and political attitudes are negligible.10 Crewe, Alt & Fox (1992) and studies by Swaddle and Heath (1992) suggest that non-voters do not abstain persistently. Social isolation leads to less pressure to fulfil civic duty from friends or from the community. The studies also show that low levels of party identification had some effect upon turnout. In Britain, it seems non-voting at general elections is more to do with temporary, practical reasons for abstention and it is seen that persistent non-voting is a myth.
Low turnout could also indicate alienation from the political and party system. British Political Parties (Fisher 1996)11 shows that turnout appears to have declined significantly. In 1950 turnout was 84%, which was an exceptional year. This continuously declined until February 1974 where turnout was 78.1% and then declined again until 1979 where turnout was 76% and again low 1987 where it was 75.3% and in 1997 when it was 71.6%. But the lowest turnout was in 2001, when turnout was 59%. In 1970, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 years, which increased the electorate, by three million. Young people do participate in politics, but it is not till they are older and maybe wiser, that voting becomes more attractive.
While internationally it is low, electoral turnout in Britain is surprisingly quite high. The number of predictable and safe seats reflects this.
The Hansard Society argued the low turnout at the last general election in June 2001 was not due to apathy, but rather non-voters made a conscious decision to abstain because they felt ill informed regarding the current political environment and the British political system. Another reason why turnout is low is not that everyone on the register is actually able to vote. For example, dual registration, carry-over and deaths or migration reduce the official turnout rate.12
In 1992, 86% of respondents told MORI that they saw the election outcome as “very or fairly important”.13 In 1997 the figure was 79% and in 2001 it was 66%. It only takes a marginal election or a big issue to bring out the electorate. But when this is not the case, young people especially, see unconvential forms of political participation as a more effective means of being heard, as is demonstrated by student rallies and the annual May Day protests.
The turnout in 1997 was low because Conservative voters were disillusioned with the government and could not bring themselves to vote for any of the Opposition Parties and therefore stayed at home. New Labour was established by Blair and moved towards the centre ground of British politics, so traditional working class supporters became disillusioned and decided not to vote rather than to support a party that no longer represented their interests and needs. However, saying that, there is no evidence to support this. In accounting for the sharp drop in 1997 one needs to remember the possible impact of the poll tax (community charge) on electoral registration in 1992. It is quite likely that some people decided not to register in 1992 in view of the risk that the registers might be used in the collection of the poll tax.14 The media plays an important role in communicating the election campaign to potential voters. In 2001 many commentators and journalists were not that excited about the campaign. Much of the media coverage of the general election campaign tended to brand it as rather boring.15 If the election was being painted as boring then that gave the signal to potential voters that it was not that important. Campaigning by the major parties often focuses on a smaller number of seats that might change hands. As a consequence the majority of voters in seats that were seen as more safe didn’t receive the level of campaign activity, in the form of canvassing and leaflets that they had previously in the past. This is likely to have contributed to the general lack of urgency about the election in 2001. Over the last ten years there has also been a slide in politicians standing for elections. Less people than in the past trust politicians to do what is right for the country and less believe that politicians will keep their promises.16
The 2001 decline was widespread in all parts of Britain. In Scotland and Wales, the decreases were large (13 percent and 12 percent), but similar to those in England, where decreases varied slightly over 10 percent in the South West to nearly 15 percent in the North West.17 Numerous commentators have said that the decline occurred in turnout in large parts because New Labour had “lost its heartlands”. This is a Downesian view and many proponents argue that, under the direction of Tony Blair, the Labour Party moved to the middle of the political spectrum, substantially narrowing the policy and ideological distance between itself and its rivals. New Labour’s policy positions and ideological stance alienated Labour’s long-established working class base.18 Another reason why turnout was so low was due to the opinions that voters had of the opposition parties in the 2001 General Election. Expanding public services was hardly a credible priority for a Conservative Party promising large tax cuts and widely seen to have run down the public sector during two decades in office. The Liberal Democrats’ credibility problem was not policy, but pragmatic – they had no chance of winning. Contemplating theses alternatives, a sizeable number of voters decided to stay at home in 2001.
One way to improve turnout could be if elections were held on Sundays, rather than Thursdays as this would reduce the costs to the elector and this links back to the rational choice theory. People vote when there are more benefits than costs to voting. In order to reduce the costs, postal voting has been made easier and there have been a variety of experiments in local elections which have involved locating polling stations in places such as supermarkets, keeping polling stations open for a few days and having all-postal ballots.19 Another way to improve turnout could be if voting was made by telephone or even by text messages. A cross-national study by Franklin (1996) has also found that certain aspects of elections lead to higher turnout such as compulsory voting and higher proportionality of the electoral system, which will increase the pivotality of the voter. Compulsory voting apparently increases turnout by about 7 percent in countries that make it obligatory and postal voting is about 4 percent.20
Declining turnout has been paralleled by a decline in the intensity of party identification and an increase in the proportions of voters who do not see great ideological differences between the main parties.21 The decline in party identification is unlikely to be reversed and this may result in future turnouts continuing to be poor as in 2001. It is also clearly in parties’ interests to try to occupy the centre ground since that is where most voters are positioned, so that distinguishing them on ideological grounds is likely to continue to be difficult.
Evidence has suggested (Heath and Taylor 1999) that turnout is higher when the election is expected to be a close one, and lower when it is expected to be an easy victory for one or other party. In 1997 the opinion polls were suggesting an easy victory for Labour whereas in 1992 they suggested a very close race. Other major landslides such as 1935 and 1983 have also seen low turnouts, while close races such as 1950 and 1951 saw very high turnouts. Another reason why turnout was low in 2001 is that many voters were disillusioned by all parties, in particular by what they perceived as cynicism and the overuse of “spin” and by politics in general. A “culture of contentment” could have grown up.22 This means that people were broadly satisfied with, if not enthusiastic about, how things were going in the country and saw no need to get excited about the election.
The Labour Government could not have been entirely happy with the outcome of the 2001 general election. It was re-elected with a large majority in the House of Commons but it had presided over a decline in turnout, especially in Labour’s strongest areas, which suggested that the electorate was less than happy about how the government had performed in its first term. For this generation every general election in living memory, with the exception of 1992, was arguably a foregone conclusion. In 1997, and most notably in 2001, the media told us that Labour was going to win by a landslide and there was no reason to doubt them and that could be a reason why turnout was so low. For many people elections do not matter at all. Another reason why young people tend to vote less is that politicians try to woe “Middle England” so young people may feel alienated or disillusioned to vote.23 But having said this, young people have always abstained and grow interested in Politics when they get older.
To conclude it is important to note that one should not just look at one specific theory. In order to look at why there has been a decline in turnout over the last few decades it is necessary to combine different theories from Crewe, Alt and Fox and Franklin. I agree to an extent with Franklin on how people sometimes do not vote because costs are greater than the benefits and people need incentives to vote such as Sunday voting and postal voting. Turnout was higher at elections which the voters thought would produce a close outcome between the two main parties, hence the lowest turnout in 1997 and 2001 when the electorate expected a substantial victory for Labour. The state of the national contest is important with high turnout found in close races and low turnout characteristic of landslide elections. As such, the fall in turnout in the 1997 general election can most be attributed to the ways that the opinion polls, mid term elections and political commentators all predicted a safe Labour victory so that very few could doubt the outcome of the election. The particular circumstances therefore encourages Labour voters to stay at home, especially in safe Labour seats, confident that one vote or less would not affect the outcome. If New Labour remains close to the centre of the political spectrum and if the Conservatives move back towards the centre-ground, which may seem possible, a new political phase may develop where there would be little difference between the parties and continuing low turnout.
Bibliography
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- Clarke et al (2002) “Downs, Stokes & Modified Rational Choice: Modelling Turnout in 2001” in Bennie et al, British Elections & Parties Review Vol. 12: The 2001 General Election
- Crewe, Fox and Alt – “Non Voting in British General Elections 1988 – October 1974” in Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992)
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Park. A – “Young People and Political Apathy” in Jowell et al (eds.) British Social Attitudes, The 16th Report, who shares New Labour’s Values? NCSE, Sage (2000)
1 Denver. D – Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.28
2 Lawrence et al – Comparing Democracies (SAGE publications 1996) pp.218
3 Lawrence et al – Comparing Democracies (SAGE publications 1996) pp.220
4 Denver. D – Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.29
5 Fisher. J – British Political Parties (MacMillan 1996) pp.30
6 Denver. D - Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.31
7 Park. A – “Young People and Political Apathy” in Jowell et al (eds.) British Social Attitudes, The 16th Report, who shares New Labour’s Values? NCSE, Sage (2000)
8 Denver. D - Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.31
9 Denver D – Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.28
10 Crewe, Fox and Alt – “Non Voting in British General Elections 1988 – October 1974” in Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992)
11 Fisher. J – British Political Parties (MacMillan 1996) pp.30
12 Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris - Critical Elections pp.167
13 Butler. D and Kavanagh. D – The British General Election of 2001 (Palgrave 2002) pp.258
14 Geoffrey Evans & Pippa Norris – Critical Elections pp.168
15 http://www.imprint-ps.com
16 http://www.imprint-ps.com
17 Clarke et al (2002) “Downs, Stokes & Modified Rational Choice: Modelling Turnout in 2001” in Bennie et al, British Elections & Parties Review Vol. 12: The 2001 General Election
18 Clarke et al (2002) “Downs, Stokes & Modified Rational Choice: Modelling Turnout in 2001” in Bennie et al, British Elections & Parties Review Vol. 12: The 2001 General Election
19 Denver D – Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.28
20 Lawrence et al – Comparing Democracies (SAGE publications 1996) pp.226
21 Denver. D - Elections & Voters in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.46
22 Geddes. A and Tonge. J – Labour’s Second Landslide: The British General Election 2001 (Manchester University Press 2002)
23 Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris - Critical Elections pp.169